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JAMES MARTINEAU






JAMES MARTINEAU

A BIOGRAPHY AND STUDY

BY

A. W. JACKSON, A.M.

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BOSTON
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1901

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TO HORATIO STEBBINS.

*Dear Friend, whose noble presence fails to show
The regal grandeur of thy inner plan,—
Patrician mien, but an IMPERIAL MAN,—
I link thy name with that of Martineau.
He sage; thou prophet. His the orient glow
Of one who stands on peak of Darien;
Thine, to call back dead souls to life again,
Isaiah's flame, the tones of Cicero.
He is the Phosphor of the coming day;
Awakener thou of those who dwell in night.
Through him men see the heights, through thee adore;
And they who write your epitaphs should say
Of him, "He touched the mountain crests with light;"
Of thee, "He thrilling witness to its glory bore."*

P R E F A C E

THOUGH the plan of this volume may be manifest in its pages, it may yet be not amiss to state it. Of course I could have prepared the narrative of Dr. Martineau's life and followed it with an analysis of his teaching, intent upon nothing more than a just account of his labors; and this is what I contemplated when I set about the task. As I meditated, however, the thought occurred to me that I might make the volume not only an account of Dr. Martineau, but also an utterance of my own mind; and these two aims have ruled my labor. In saying this, I hope I do not need to say that, save in love and reverence, the disciple does not place himself beside his master. I only imply that the disciple is other than his master, and interprets him from his own mind and heart.

This twofold aim may explain to some a frequent feature of the page, a mingling with exposition of much that is extra-expository. There is another feature, too, of which it is the explanation. In dealing with the problems of thought, it made necessary the treatment of them at first hand. This necessity brought me to the study of Dr. Martineau in his teachers,—the masters of Tübingen, the great moralists, the great philosophers, who appear somewhat conspicuously in the perspective of these pages.

Conceiving my task thus, I was happily, in the general bias of my mind, fairly well prepared to execute it without controversy with my master. Indeed I am not sure that my thought has not been too accordant with his for the best result of a critical study of him. His admonition to me, "Be sure that you do not spare me," has sometimes come back to me almost as a reproof for not finding more in him to dissent from. However, the Empirical type of philosophy, never more than a tentative in my mind, long ago ceased to be even that; and Utilitarian ethics had always seemed to me at best to provide only rules of conduct, never standards of character. Thus on the one hand. On the other, the latter-day Idealism, though taught me by a teacher whom I must always revere, and met in books altogether admirable, had never laid a spell upon me. Accordingly, I was prepared to receive as they came the *Types of Ethical Theory* and the *Study of Religion*; and, coming at length to the discussion of their problems, I found their cardinal teachings my own working convictions. In the domain of Christian Theology, too, Dr. Martineau had long been a leader whom I was well content to follow, while his peculiar ecclesiasticism was an ideal of my mind before I met it in his pages. When I came to the *Seat of Authority in Religion*, the cardinal features of his New Testament criticism were too familiar to be disturbing; and, though I had long wished for ample assurance that John wrote the Fourth Gospel, my studies had made me more and more doubtful if he could have done so. On the Messianic question, however, I was thrown for a time into an attitude of dissent: Dr. Martineau's contention that Jesus did not claim to be the Messiah

for a time seemed incredible, and I girded myself for something like a debate with him. Collating, however, the Synoptic texts which bear upon this problem, I soon found that my own affirmative position was not without difficulties; and at length, meditating the great declaration at Cæsarea Philippi, the general truthfulness of Dr. Martineau's theory was irresistibly borne in upon me. Thus I have toiled on, as serenely satisfied with Dr. Martineau as was John Fiske with Herbert Spencer when he wrote the eloquent volumes of his *Cosmic Philosophy*.

A work like this, dealing with a teacher of so vast a range, must necessarily be selective in its character: it can deal with but few of the themes that invite consideration. In the present volume even of the themes selected and studiously treated, by no means all are offered. Among other discarded manuscripts my mind turns regretfully to a lengthy and toilsome discussion of the *Types of Ethical Theory*. My publishers, undoubtedly wiser than I, conceived that it were better to compress the two volumes I had prepared into one, and so this was left out because it *could* be spared.

My thanks are due to Longmans, Green & Co., of London, for their kind permission to quote according to my need from the *Seat of Authority* and the *Essays, Reviews, and Addresses*, of which they are the publishers. The like grateful acknowledgment is also due the Clarendon Press of Oxford for their permission to use in like manner the *Study of Religion* and the *Types of Ethical Theory*. I gratefully remember, too, a group of ministers in Boston in the smile of whose sympathy and most cordial helpfulness my task has been performed;

also the children of Dr. Martineau for the valuable assistance they have given me. There are others who have variously aided me; they will doubt not that I remember their kindness, though I do not name them.

The labor that here closes has been the happiness of many hours and the comfort of some pain; and I send it forth in the hope that it may draw some to the further contemplation of the great intellect and soul to which it is devoted.

A. W. JACKSON.

CONCORD, MASS., Feb. 20, 1900.

CONTENTS

Book I

THE MAN

CHAPTER	PAGE
I. ANCESTRY, FAMILY, EARLY HOME	1
II. EDUCATION	12
III. MINISTRY IN DUBLIN	35
IV. MINISTRY IN LIVERPOOL	50
V. MINISTRY IN LIVERPOOL (<i>continued</i>)	72
VI. LONDON	88
VII. LATER PUBLICATIONS; A REMARKABLE TESTIMONIAL	107
VIII. HIS INTELLECT	123
IX. PERSONAL FEATURES	135

Book II

THE RELIGIOUS TEACHER

I. THE PREACHER	142
II. THE CHRISTIAN THEOLOGIAN	162
III. THE NEW TESTAMENT CRITIC	221

Book III

THE PHILOSOPHER OF RELIGION


I. KNOWLEDGE	279
II. GOD AND COSMOS	299
III. GOD AND CONSCIENCE	358
IV. HIS CRITICISM OF PANTHEISM	401
V. FREEDOM AND IMMORTALITY	423

INDEX	449
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JAMES MARTINEAU

BOOK I

THE MAN



CHAPTER I

ANCESTRY, FAMILY, EARLY HOME

LOUIS XIV. conferred incalculable benefit upon other nations by acting the tyrant within his own. The Edict of Nantes, their Magna Charta of religious privilege, had given the Protestants within his realm a legal if precarious exercise of their worship. The Revocation of this Edict in 1685 made Protestantism an outlaw. The horrible detail of persecution that followed, the demolition of churches, the separation of children from their parents, the galleys, the Dragonade, need not be recounted here. The inevitable result was a flow of emigration which the severest penalties and a ubiquitous police could not check. The refugees went, availing themselves of every favorable circumstance, in every manner of disguise, the arrest of some only leading others to plot more skilfully; and with them went the bravest manhood, the sturdiest intelligence, the most profitable industry. They recruited the armies with which France was soon to be struggling, and carried French manufactures into countries wherewith France was competing. More than this, they carried the latent intelligence that was destined to unfold in children and

in children's children, that should have added to the triumphs of French art and letters and statesmanship and philosophy.

Among these refugees was one in whom we have a special interest, a certain Gaston Martineau, son of Elie Martineau of Bergerac. There is also a tradition that makes him a surgeon of Dieppe. Bergerac, as we know from general history, was one of the places visited by the Dragonade, and the Martineaus may therefore have witnessed, perhaps experienced, its atrocities. After the Revocation of the Edict, this Gaston, a young man and a surgeon, came into England. On the ship that bore him across the Channel was a family of Pierres, also refugees; and one of these, Marie Pierre, became afterwards his wife. They settled first in London, afterwards in Norwich, where were already a considerable number of Huguenot exiles, and here he practised his skill and reared his family. Eight children were born to him. What was his age when he came into England, or the date of his coming, it is impossible to say; but the records of the Walloon Church in Norwich, in which he and his immediate descendants worshipped, show him to have been the father of two children in 1695. This is all that can now be told of one the full record of whose life we should be so glad to know.¹

Of the children of Gaston Martineau, the third was named David. He adopted the medical profession, and blessed Norwich by walking in his father's footsteps. To him was born a son, also named David, who became a surgeon likewise. Though he died at the early age of thirty-seven, he left seven children. The oldest of these, Philip Meadows Martineau, fulfilled the family expectation of a surgeon, and in the practice of that noble science

¹ Since writing the above I have learned that he was married at Spital-fields in 1693, and that his first child was baptized there in 1694.

advanced the family fame. The youngest of the seven, Thomas, born after his father's death, became the father of him whose life and work now engage our studious interest. Of Thomas Martineau little need be said. He settled in his ancestral Norwich, and engaged in the manufacture of bombazine, a species of cloth much in use in those days, of which Norwich was the chief source of supply. From a notice of him published several years ago, the impression has gone widely abroad that he was also a wine-merchant. This is an error. His customers in other countries would sometimes send him wine in recognition of some business favor or from friendly regard. His wine was consequently often of choicer flavor than that of his neighbors and friends, who would therefore sometimes ask him to secure a pipe for them. This he would do, though not as business, but as accommodation.

Thomas Martineau married Elizabeth Rankin, of Newcastle-upon-Tyne, a woman of hardy Northumbrian stock, vigorous, affectionate, and capable. She bore him eight children. Of these the sixth was Harriet, born in 1802, with whom the world has become well acquainted through her large intelligence, broad sympathies, and heroic work; the seventh was James, born April 21, 1805, the lion of this tribe of Judah. The other six sustained, perhaps not less worthily, their less conspicuous part. Of these Elizabeth, the first born, and Ellen, the last, married each a surgeon, and so imported into the fifth generation a native product of the preceding four. Rachel never married, and for many years conducted a boarding-school in Liverpool. There were three brothers, Thomas, Henry, Robert. The latter was a prominent manufacturer in Birmingham, and at one time mayor of the city. His eldest son afterwards twice held the same office, and in 1887 was knighted by the queen. Ellen left also a son, who is now a nonconformist minister.

Of this large group James was for many years the sole survivor. It was his fortune to enjoy far more than the customary period of earthly life, and to be vigorously employed at an age when most must rest. It was not till January 11, 1900, then a little less than ninety-five, that he put off mortality.

Of the early home life details are scanty, though such as we have afford a tolerable picture. The father was a man of fine taste and kindly spirit, and, as we shall see further on, of unbending integrity. He was, however, immersed in business, and his part in the home could be hardly more than a wholesome and cheerful influence. The management of the family, therefore, fell mainly on the mother. A mother with eight children may be as a sun in the domestic firmament, that shines on all alike; but though they may severally have all her love, they must of necessity divide her care, and so early learn the useful lessons of self-dependence and mutual helpfulness. It was thus in this household. A portrait of her, taken in old age, shows a strong and self-reliant character; and her gifted son speaks of her sympathies as "open and flexible to new admirations, to new thoughts, to new virtues." He also tells us that "Burns was the poet of her heart," and that "she would repeat his lines with a mellow and racy simplicity, whose tones ring in my memory to this hour."¹ She was, too, a woman of large executive ability, also of unbending conscientiousness, braced and softened by religious sensibility.

As respects the general flow of family intimacy and affection, it is fair to remember that this family were of the early part of the present century, when ideas and standards were very different from now. Dr. Martineau himself says: "In old nonconformist families especially, the Puritan tradition and the reticence of a persecuted race had left their austere impress on speech and demeanour unused to be

¹ 1884.

free; so that in domestic and social life there was enforced, as a condition of decorum, a retinue of language and deportment strongly contrasting with our modern effusiveness." He adds: "In the process of change to more genial ways, that Norwich home was in advance of the average movement rather than behind; and in few others have I found the medium better observed between . . . bidding high for profession of enthusiasm and quenching its reality by coldness and derision." From this we get a clear impression of a gentle hand that guided firmly, a love less marked by profuseness of endearment than by constancy of parental service.¹

The religious discipline of the home was probably graver than is the wont in like households now. The traditions of Puritan ancestry had not then had time to relax their hold, as they since have done, and we can imagine the compulsory Bible-readings, the severely decorous Sabbaths. Yet, that the severity of that home was less than might be looked for at that date, the following anecdote may show. The mother, going to church one evening, left the children at home alone with direction to read the Bible in her absence. On her return she asked James what he had read. His answer was "Isaiah." "Why, no, you cannot have read the whole of Isaiah." "Yes, mother, I have, skipping the nonsense." Many of us whose birth was of later date took our Bible as it came, not daring to skip the nonsense or even find it. Further, in the bias of religious opinion, the family had departed widely from the Calvinistic standard of their Huguenot ancestry; indeed, they represented the liberalism of the day. Their church stood

¹ See two very interesting letters by Dr. Martineau in the London *Daily News*, December 30, 1884, and January 8, 1885. These letters were drawn out by some reflections on his mother by Mrs. Fenwick Miller in her biography of Harriet Martineau. These reflections, as well as certain intimations in Miss Martineau's *Autobiography*, should for all time be discredited by his most finely tempered word.

for English Presbyterianism, the root whence English Unitarianism sprang. A cardinal principle with English Presbyterians was the requirement of no creed, adopting for their rule the maxim of Chillingworth, "To the Bible and the Bible only the Christian shall subscribe."

In the earlier years the father prospered in business; and though the family maintained no extravagant standard, their circumstances were very comfortable. There came, however, an evil day of which, for the sturdy honor and self-sacrifice it called forth, it is pleasant to tell. In 1823 France threw her armies upon Spain, which received them almost without resistance. New commercial arrangements were dictated to the advantage of France, but to the grievous loss of England. Thomas Martineau's bombazines had long gone to Spain in exchange for Spanish silks. This trade was now cut off, and, despite his bravest efforts, his business rapidly declined. At length his affairs reached such a degree of embarrassment that he could honorably keep silence no longer, and he laid them before his creditors. They found his liabilities in the neighborhood of £100,000, his assets not far from £75,000. Fifteen shillings to the pound could have been paid, and thus release secured. Fifteen shillings, however, could not pay a pound, according to Martineau standards; nor could war or any other disaster release from an obligation that any toil or sacrifice could cancel. Confident of his ability in time to pay all, his creditors suffered him to undertake the struggle. It was a long struggle, lasting beyond his life, and carried on by his family. At length the goal was won; the debt, a maelstrom that had sucked in all their family fortune, was discharged, and the family could face the world with poverty and honor. Rachel and Ellen must needs take service as governesses, and Harriet incur the hardships of her brave early career, but no indulgence was purchased with an unpaid debt.

That this achievement left a legacy of pleasant memory we may well believe; and testimony is not wanting. In the memoirs of Lord Brougham is a note which he once addressed to Lord Grey, soliciting a pension for Harriet Martineau, whom he felt to be overworked and much deserving. In it he referred, innocently enough, to her father's *failure*, meaning, of course, the catastrophe that swept away his fortune. On the appearance of the book Harriet wrote to the London *Daily News* with the intensity with which she might have repelled an insult: "*My father did not fail.*" Dr. Martineau also, in a later writing, speaks of the "imputation" (of having failed in business) erroneously cast upon his father "in Lord Brougham's autobiography." Some years later still, speaking of this event with the present writer, he said with a satisfaction his modesty could not conceal: "There was no failure; twenty shillings to the pound were paid." If there had been failure, surely, according to the judgment of men, there had been no dishonor. The war was none of Thomas Martineau's, and he was powerless to avert its consequences; and not a few may find at the root of his conduct an exaggerated sense of honor. Here, however, is the austere ethics of such emergencies, as his son in later years proclaimed them: "Whatever be the practice of society with respect to the insolvent, surely it is a mean perversion of the natural moral sense to imagine that his temporary inability, or length of delay, can cancel one iota of his obligation: these things only serve to increase its stringency; tardy reparation being a poor substitute for punctual fidelity. I am far from denying that circumstances of special and blameless misfortune may justify him in accepting the voluntary mercy of friends willing to 'forgive him all that debt.' But whoever avails himself of mere legal release as a moral exemption, is a candidate for infamy in the eyes of all uncorrupted men. The law

necessarily interposes to put a period to the controversy between debtor and creditor, and prohibit the further struggle between the arts of the one and the cruelty of the other: but it cannot annul their moral relation. Obligation cannot, any more than God, grow old and die: till it is obeyed, it stops in the present tense, and represents the eternal now. Time can wear no duty out. Neglect may smother it out of sight: opportunity may pass and turn it from our guardian angel into our haunting fiend: but while it yet remains possible, it clings to our identity, and refuses to let us go."¹

Beyond the home, the surroundings, if not the best conceivable, were by no means unfavorable. Norwich was, indeed, no Athens of poets and philosophers; and neither was she a Nazareth from which no good thing was to be expected. Though a manufacturing city, it had in the early part of the century an intellectual life which was considerable, and with it the Martineaus were in touch. William Taylor lived there, and was then doing his work, which, if not great, as viewed in relation with the ages, was yet not without value to his time. To the periodicals of the day, he was a toilsome contributor on subjects of foreign literature. He was among the first to introduce German poetry to English readers. He translated the *Nathan der Weise*, and gave a rendering of the ballad of *Ellenore* which found favor in the eyes of Longfellow, and from which Sir Walter Scott derived some inspiration.² He also wrote an *Historic Survey of German Poetry*, and a work on English synonyms. His style was quaint, involved, harsh,—no mortal could read him now; but the fact stands that he was read, and not without profit, then. There was also a Dr. Frank Sayers who abandoned medi-

¹ Sermon: *Christian Doctrine of Merit, Endeavors after the Christian Life.*

² Mrs. Barbauld wrote him: "Do you know that you made Walter Scott a poet? He told me the other day. It was, he says, your ballad of Lenore that inspired him." *Three Generations of English Women*, Janet Ross.

cine for literature. He wrote *Dramatic Sketches of Ancient Northern Mythology*; he brought out a volume of poems; he was the author of a volume of *Disquisitions, Metaphysical and Literary*. None of these works reached the standard that insures fame, yet they served their day. There was likewise a Dr. Rigby who wrote very elaborately on subjects of medicine and agriculture; also a Dr. Alderson, who wrote on agriculture and geology; and several others whose names are recorded, and whose works the curious may still find,—not stars, yet very serviceable candles. There were two others who stood in a somewhat different category: Amelia Opie, whose novels, though not great, were yet wholesome, and gained a popularity that lasted beyond her day; and Anna Lætitia Barbauld, intelligent, gentle, pure, who fell a little short of popularity and just missed of fame. The latter did not live in Norwich, but was a frequenter there, and an occasional visitor in the Martineau household. Indeed, the Norwich of Mr. Martineau's boyhood might have filled an alcove of a public library with the works of her contemporary authors.

Besides, the city was not without a record of strong men in whose paths the growing boy must tread. There was John Taylor,¹ teacher, author, and Presbyterian divine, who wrote many works of a theological character,—*A Hebrew Concordance*, *A Scheme of Scripture Divinity*, *The Scripture Doctrine of the Atonement*, *A Paraphrase and Notes on the Epistle to the Romans*, *A Free and Candid Examination of the Scripture Doctrine of Original Sin*. The latter was honored with a polemic cannonade both from Edwards and John Wesley. Reaching somewhat farther back, there were Archbishop Parker, Thomas Legge,

¹ Born at Lancaster, 1694. Ordained by "dissenting ministers" at Derbyshire in 1716. He moved to Norwich to become the colleague of another minister in 1733. In 1754 he laid the first stone of the famous Octagon Chapel, described by John Wesley as "perhaps the most elegant one in all Europe," and too fine for the "old coarse gospel."

Bishop Cosin, Bishop Pearson,—all Norwich born; also Erpingham, Bishop Hall, and, best known of all, Sir Thomas Browne, had found here their home. It was surely no empty panegyric on the part of Lord Houghton, when he said in an address at Norwich, not many years ago: “I know no provincial city adorned with so many illustrious names in literature, the professions, and public life; those of Taylor, Martineau, Austin, Alderson, Opie, come first to my recollection, and there are many more behind; and there is this additional peculiarity of distinction, that these are for the most part not the designation of individuals, but of families numbering each men and women conspicuous in various walks of life.”¹


In this period, too, flourished a somewhat famous school of landscape painting, distinguished by the works of Crome and Cotman and Vincent,—far enough from Gainsborough and Turner, yet awaking some admiration and enkindling some incentives in their day.

Norwich is a venerable town, with its heirlooms of tradition and its historic monuments,—a more marked feature in the first quarter of our century, perhaps, than now. In the first quarter of the eleventh century it was the home of Canute; in the first quarter of the twelfth century Henry I. gave it a charter. Here are traces of the ancient wall, which in the first half of the fourteenth century surrounded whatever of city there then was, a circuit of four miles. Here is a Cathedral, a Norman structure, somewhat more than four hundred feet in length, with a spire of three hundred and fifteen feet. Here, too, is a Benedictine monastery, completed before the middle of the twelfth century. Here are numerous churches said to antedate the discoveries of Columbus; and here is the Walloon Church in which Mr. Martineau’s ancestors worshipped.

Mrs. Chapman, in her *Memorials of Harriet Marti-*

¹ *Three Generations of English Women*, Janet Ross.

ANCESTRY, FAMILY, EARLY HOME



neau, writing of Norwich, speaks of its "uninteresting antiquity." The antiquity may have been uninteresting to Harriet, very likely to Mrs. Chapman. To James, however, who was of another order of mind, it may have been not only interesting but profitable. Now it were pleasant to tell how as a youth he explored crypt or churchyard, or was lost in reverie as he gazed on some venerable pile; of his thus doing, however, there has come to us no tale. But from our knowledge of the man we may come at least to some divination of the boy; and from this we may be sure of a sensibility to which these traditions and these associations had meaning. Silently, and perhaps unconsciously, he must have received their influence.

James and Harriet were children of the same mother; yet the contrasts of their ruling characteristics were very marked, and here we meet one of them. Harriet was a child of to-day, who bravely looked to the future for whose weal she toiled. She had, however, little reverence for the past; she was wanting in the sensibility by which she should have seen that through the toils and struggles of other generations had been handed to her the very torch she bore. The institutions, the ideas, the faiths of other times she was apt to treat as the dry stalks and decayed herbage of her spring-time garden, which she cleared away to give space for the fresh summer blossoms. James, too, is a child of to-day, yet a Janus that looks before him and behind,—to the future with prophetic hope, to the past with eye clear to the deep meaning of its endeavors. His is the historic sense that finds in to-day the unfolding of yesterday, and in yesterday the interpretation of to-day. In his garden he is not so much mindful of the dry stalks and decaying herbage as of the hardy root from which they sprang, and from which each season comes another and, by some miracle, a different flower.

CHAPTER II

EDUCATION

AMONG the useful institutions of Norwich is a grammar school, a foundation of the fourteenth century. To this school James Martineau was sent from eight to fourteen years of age as a day-scholar. The school was not without reputation. It had had among its pupils not a few who had won distinction; Dr. Samuel Parr was at one time at its head. When James was in attendance, Edward Valpy was head-master. As a classical scholar Valpy had reputation, nor is he yet forgotten. Before James entered the school, he had published *Elegantiæ Latinae*, a text-book for such as would teach an elegant Latinity, which he used. Somewhat later he brought out editions of the Greek Testament, the Septuagint, and the Iliad. Under a teacher of such marked classical accomplishment, the emphasis of the school was naturally upon classical studies, and in these James made rapid progress. He also learned the French language. Mathematics, however, then as ever after a favorite study, he was not permitted to pursue to an extent commensurate with his abilities and his desires.

In a public school of two hundred and thirty pupils rude elements are to be looked for; and the sensitive boy who has endured well, should have a tolerable martyrdom put down to his credit. James was this kind of boy. He had also a moral sensibility to which the hazing and hectoring were moral affronts of serious proportion. Of course, therefore, he was not entirely happy there.

The way opened for his transfer to another school. His sister Harriet, who had been visiting in Bristol, brought home glowing accounts of Lant Carpenter, who was both minister and teacher there. She does not speak of him reverently in her *Autobiography*; but her representation of him then led her parents to place James under his care. His school was a boarding-school; therefore it was not large. It was intended to be, and doubtless was, select.

No proper account can be given of Dr. Martineau that does not embrace an account of Lant Carpenter. Dr. Martineau has never been stingy in his recognitions of the friends of his intellect or spirit; but to no other of his helpers has he confessed a debt so large as to him. Harriet Martineau speaks of him as "superficial in his knowledge, scanty in ability, narrow in his conceptions." His influence upon her brother, of which, after seventy years, he kindled into eloquence when telling, makes her judgment incredible. Writing of him in 1841 he said, and never after saw reason to unsay: "So forcibly, indeed, did that period act upon me,—so visibly did it determine the subsequent direction of my mind and lot, that it always stands before me as the commencement of my present life, making me feel like a man without a childhood; and though a multitude of earlier scenes are still in view, they seem to be spread around a different being, and to belong, like the incidents of a dream, to some foreign self that became extinct when the morning light of reality broke upon the sight." If further testimony be needed, it may be drawn from the action of the University at Glasgow in which he studied. When yet but twenty-six years of age, forecasting authorship, he conceived that the degree of Master of Arts might be helpful to him; and wrote to his Alma Mater respecting it. The Faculty without dissenting voice sent him, not an M.A., but an LL. D. instead. Was it thus that the Glasgow University treated

young men of "superficial knowledge and scanty ability and narrow conceptions"? Again, the class of minds on which he acted, together with his ever-extending and lasting influence, makes the acceptance of this estimate impossible. There are those, indeed, who mistake twinkle for star; but the wise navigators of life's ocean speedily detect the difference. Yet again, here are his writings, not wise with the wisdom the last fifty years have gathered, but surely reflecting the scholar's mind, the thinker's insight, and, before all else, the Christian heart. Grant that he had less than the large and solid erudition of Arnold, less ability, also, to mould the opinions of his pupils after the fashion of his own,—a thing he would have religiously shrunk from doing,—we yet feel that we are here dealing with one of those instances in which Miss Martineau's early impressions were truer than her later retrospects.¹ Finally,

¹ There is a view of Harriet Martineau, entertained in very high quarters, which, in consideration of some of the judgments contained in her *Autobiography*, seems in its nature charitable. She was an invalid a large portion of her life; she suffered from extreme deafness, which is almost sure at last to leave its trace upon mind or spirit. Besides, she experienced a spiritual transition from a faith the most confiding, to a scepticism the most ultra. The view is that she threw back, as it were, her later and poorer moods, and so saw her past in the discoloring light of her present.

An illustrative instance is told at Oxford by a gentleman in very high standing. In earlier life, as is well known, Miss Martineau wrote a book of a devotional character. In later life, after she had become, as she supposed, an atheist, she was visited one morning by a lady whom she took into her garden, then profusely in blossom. Waving her hand over her flowers, she said, "Who would n't be grateful for blessings such as these?" "Grateful to whom, Miss Martineau, on your theory?" "Ah," said she, with a smile, "you have me there." "Do you know," said the friend, "it has always been a matter of great surprise to me that one who wrote those beautiful prayers should have become an atheist?" "What prayers?" "Why, those you wrote." "I never wrote any prayers." "Why, certainly you did, Miss Martineau, and I have the book and prize it very highly." Miss Martineau still persisted that there must be some mistake about it; so the friend called again the next morning and placed the volume in her hands. "Well," said Miss Martineau, "I suppose I must have written it, but I had forgotten all about it; and I do not see how I could have done it."

Forgetting the authorship of a book seems an extraordinary lapse of

while it is true that a Marcus may be the father of a Commodus, and that to a John Shakespeare a William Shakespeare may be born, still in these days a permanence of high characteristics in a family is a suggestive circumstance. It seems in point to remember that Lant Carpenter was the father of Mary Carpenter, also of William B. Carpenter, whose fame two continents have proved not large enough to hold; that the latter became the father of Prof. J. Estlin Carpenter, who promises to add to the lustre of his line.

In his mental outfit he was not a specialist, nor yet a congeries of specialisms, as that of the modern scholar is apt to be. He knew the classics well, mathematics well, the sciences well, mental and moral philosophy well. He was also, by education and training, a theologian. His knowledge, however, was an organism in which all parts had vital relation. He had therefore the primary qualification for imparting knowledge,—a balanced appreciation not likely to depreciate in one direction or exaggerate in another. Indeed, so far as he went, he answered to Dr. Martineau's own idea of an educator, as given in his address on retiring from Manchester New College. Gently criticising the tendency to specialisms by which the student is handed along from master to master, he likens a mind so formed to a ship put together in "water-tight compartments" which is "not really at home in the element it traverses, but treats it as an enemy against whose surprises it must guard." On the other hand, he maintains that a "learner of many subjects from one mind sees them in their analogies and unity; for they cannot well lie apart from one another, unaided by agreement, unconscious of memory; and it is difficult to help feeling that the inability to see how she, the atheist, *could have done it*, in part explains the phenomenon. The incident compels us to feel that, however zealously she may have been pressing on to the things that were before, it is necessary to receive with caution her testimony as to the things that were behind.

contradiction, but must necessarily share the unity of the personality they occupy." Of course this presupposes the one mind, not large necessarily with the largeness of Bacon's, but possessed of a certain assimilating and organizing power, Baconian in character. Such a mind was Lant Carpenter's.

He was, however, something more than a well-rounded scholar; he was a well-rounded man. He was deficient, his pupil tells us, in aesthetic sensibility; of art he had no due appreciation. His moral sense, however, was of the noblest order: if he could not adequately appreciate Phidias' statues, he could enter into Aristides' justice; and if clouds and sunsets did not appeal to him, he knew the look of Duty, and was responsive to her frown or smile. Not that he was an austere man; on the contrary, he was a very gentle one. For religion too dwelt within him, and softened into a Christian the stoic he might otherwise have been. His one conspicuous departure from moral fairness was probably in dealing with himself; he wore himself out in the pursuit of an exaggerated duty. Then, the smile he could so freely give he could not appropriate. He would turn from his toils, when perforce he must, not with self-approval for the much he had done, but depressed by a torturing consciousness of what he had failed to do. Such a toiler we would have seen in the skies he looks into a considerateness equal at least to his own, and in his nightly musing take account of the diligence with which he has climbed as well as of the height he has not gained.

There was, too, a largeness in his view the want of which has brought disaster to many a man of like austere conscientiousness. Detail and minutiae he required; but he saw through them, and made others see, the principle that ennobled them. The order of his school-room was heaven's order brought down to earthly relations; and the trivialities of behavior, or what we call such, were as snow-flakes

or grains of dust in which the whole law of gravitation is manifest.

As a theologian he was involved in much controversy; yet his zeal for the faith never supplanted his religious tolerance; a Protestant of Protestants, he could yet toil for Catholic emancipation; a nonconformist of the Unitarian type, he lifted religion out of all relation with sectarianism. His convictions were reasonably intense; yet so far did he put by religious partisanship that parents of the severer schools of religious opinion would place their children under his tuition, that they might receive the benefit of his religious instruction.

He was greatly helped in his work by a charm that young people found in him. He could enter into their sympathies and take hold of their affections. No mere charmer, however, will leave the enduring impression that he left; his work was guided by an aim which only a great teacher and a holy man could realize. All are familiar with the criticism of Montaigne upon the education prevalent in his day,—that it made men learned, not good and wise, taught how to decline *virtus*, not to love *virtue*; and the criticism would most likely apply to education in its general scope in any time. With Mr. Carpenter the aim was the reverse of this: his pupils should meet the communication of truth with answering reverence; he grasped the idea of a symmetry of culture in which intellect, the conscience, and the heart should be nurtured together. To this end he brought to bear upon them his stern and lofty ideals, his intense and burning enthusiasm. The economies of time, the punctilioes of behavior, were taken out of drudgery by being lifted into moral relations. As for religion, it was as the sunshine and atmosphere, an element in which they lived,—a stimulus, a consecration, and a joy. "There was something in his voice," writes his pupil, "mellowed by the spirit within, that made the

reality of God felt; something that broke through the boundary between the seen and the unseen, and opened the secret place of the Almighty, whence sanctity descends on all human obligations."

Such was the teacher to whom young James was committed. That the progress in his studies was rapid hardly need be told. The value of tuition from such a teacher, however, must be estimated, not in terms of measurable attainment, but of immeasurable impulse. If in Dr. Carpenter was the genius to give, in his pupil was the genius to receive; and under that stimulus his whole nature was aroused. It was as dew and sunshine upon rich and fallow soil in which are germs of multifarious use and beauty. In his long life of toil there was probably no period in which he would not have confessed the still-abiding influence of his Bristol school-master.

Two years only of this high privilege were allowed him, and with their termination he supposed his school-days to be ended.

His father had decided on his career; another was to be added to the many attempts, some of them mournfully successful, to make Apollo a farm-hand for Admetos. He was to be an engineer, and was sent to Derby to learn his profession. He was employed there in the works of Mr. Fox, and for a year was kept at the lathe or the bench of the model-room. He had a positive liking for the work, and ever after preserved a taste for mechanical construction.

Several circumstances were soon conspiring against this mistaken enterprise. First, his master, in many ways a capable man, was yet not able to give him that instruction in mechanics which an accomplished engineer should have; and he found himself an apprentice learning a trade rather than a pupil being taught a science; and he was dissatisfied. Further, the spell of Lant Carpenter was upon him, and powerfully influenced him. Again, the death of a

distant kinsman, Henry Turner, a not highly gifted but saintly young minister, deeply moved him.¹ Yet again, and more significant than all other circumstances, the vocation whereto he was called, while Henry Turner yet lived, and before he knew Lant Carpenter, was declaring itself within him. At length the conviction took form that iron and steel were not the materials in which he was to work, but thought tempered in the fire of spirit.

The announcement of his desire to become a minister brought disappointment to his father, who saw an exchange of a profession that promised a comfortable livelihood for one which, outside the Establishment, meant the crust of well-nigh irremediable poverty. Too wise, however, to attempt to thwart the wishes of his son in such a matter, he offered to incur the expense of his needful education.

The year at Derby we may well believe not without value to his future work; the Pontifex Maximus who will throw his arch from this world over to the other may be helped by experience of terrestrial bridge-building. It was, too, of great significance to him personally. He boarded in the family of a dissenting minister, Rev. Edward Higginson, who had a daughter of about James' age. The rest is the old story that is always new. They took the situation somewhat too reasonably for ideal lovers. Too young, as was thought, for engagement, they agreed to leave the matter as it was, not seeing each other, or corresponding save at distant intervals, until the years of study were completed. Then, if their present mind continued, all should be according to their hearts' desire. The years of waiting only proved their constancy, and their hope for each other was fulfilled in marriage.

At the time when James Martineau decided on college training preparatory to the ministry, the great historic uni-

¹ In his address on the occasion of his leaving Manchester New College he speaks of "Henry Turner, whose death was my conversion."

versities of England were closed to such as would not sign the articles of the Church of England. The expense, too, of attending one of them might have been too severe a tax upon the family exchequer. The college chosen was the Manchester College, then at York. Historically this college succeeds the famous Warrington Academy, that Priestley served, but which expired after a brief and brilliant career of twenty-nine years. These were the days of heroic and disheartening struggle for "free learning" in England.¹ Six institutions, succeeding one another, had in less than a century borne aloft the torch ere Warrington took it;² and now Warrington had let it fall. With a faith in the principle which defeat could not vanquish, the friends of "free learning" founded at once the Manchester College, or Manchester Academy, as it was at first called; which for more than a century has borne the torch successfully. This College, however, has been remarkable for its peripatetic tendency. It received its first class at Manchester in 1786. In 1803 it was moved to York. Thence it was returned to Manchester in 1840. In 1853 it was moved to London; and in 1889 to Oxford. Here we will hope that its peregrinations are over, and that it may long diffuse its light.³

¹ The phrase "free learning" occurs very frequently in occasional addresses at this College, and it has a meaning to our English brethren which we in America can scarce appreciate. It has tacit reference to the persistent opposition of the State Church to whatever "university learning" she did not foster and direct. And, as the enjoyment of this implied subscription to her creed, her attitude meant the ban of ignorance upon such as could not gather within her fold. The struggles for "university learning" in England in the face of this opposition constitute one of the heroic chapters of English history.

² See a very interesting and instructive speech by Rev. Alexander Gordon on the occasion of the one hundredth anniversary of the founding of the College; also an address by Dr. Martineau on the same occasion. Both may be found in the volume entitled *Theology and Piety Alike Free*.

³ In its various changes the College has undergone corresponding changes in its official designation. In its first Manchester period it was

In all these various stages it has been true to one cardinal principle, that of absolute religious freedom. Of creed subscription as a condition of university learning it has left to the State institutions an ungrudged monopoly.¹

The purpose of the College, as quoted in an address of its first Principal, was "to establish a plan affording a full and systematic course of education for divines — and preparatory instructions for the other learned professions — as well as for civil and commercial life." It was thus a college of divinity and of general culture in one. The number the College has educated has never been large; in its earlier years the number that took courses in Theology was very small. Yet not only has it filled a most important place as an institution of learning in which the higher problems of thought could be traversed without predetermined conclusion, but its record is a proud one. In a roll-call of its students not a few of honored name and laurelled brow should answer. In its professors it has had some of the fairest ornaments of England's learning.

In its theology the freedom of its spirit has forbidden it to be stationary. In its first Manchester period, under Thomas Barnes, it represented the later development of English Presbyterianism, mildly looking towards Arianism. In the York period, under Charles Wellbeloved, we perhaps may say that it accomplished the transition to the older type of Unitarianism. In the second Manchester period it represented that type of thought in its completer unfolding. When the College reached London, it came under the principalship of John James Tayler, and, follow-

simply Manchester Academy. At York it was Manchester College, York. On its return to Manchester it became Manchester New College, Manchester. At London it became Manchester, New College, London, and at Oxford, Manchester New College, Oxford. Later its official designation was changed to Manchester College.

¹ Oxford and Cambridge have abandoned creed subscription save for the theological professor.

ing the lead of his large thought and learning, it took on Unitarianism of the more modern type, which anon under Martineau it further unfolded, and now under Drummond reflects in its fullest development. In its lecture-rooms for many years Unitarianism as such has had but an inconspicuous place in truth's large inclusiveness. It is a school of Divinity, not the arsenal of a sect.

It was in the York period that young Martineau, in the year 1822, sought admission. The course was five years; the first three devoted to studies of a general character, the last two to Theology. Hebrew was taken through the entire course.

The college work was pressed with great earnestness; John Kenrick twice mentions his pupil's "intemperate study;" also he speaks of his "care of research" and of his "minute accuracy." He worked by a theory, oftener commended than adopted, of which he spoke in later years. "I remember," said he, "thinking that the use of education was to correct the weakness of nature, rather than to develop its strength, which would take care of itself; and so I gave double time to whatever I disliked, and reserved my favorite studies for spare moments of comparatively tired will."

The College did not have the facilities deemed indispensable in such institutions now. He found in it, however, two essentials to rapid progress,—to such a pupil the only two,—studies equal to his powers, and guidance equal to his need. He was taught the Calculus by the fluxional rather than the differential method, which he afterwards had reason to regret; and Hebrew without the vowel pointings, which must have added to the toil of learning.¹ However,

¹ A note from John Kenrick begets the suspicion that tracts of learning were sometimes traversed rather than explored. He thought a year at Göttingen, where they went through only one evangelist, one prophet, three or four epistles, or three centuries of ecclesiastical history, not equal to a year at York, where Wellbeloved was in the habit of going through the Old or

at the end of five years he stepped forth into life with thoroughly disciplined faculties, together with a store of mathematical and physical science, of classical languages and literatures, of history, logic, philosophy, theology, that gave him firm footing as an educated man, and ample equipment for entering on his chosen career.

This summary, however, hardly conveys the full significance of his college years. Like all deep natures, his was, then and ever after, extremely susceptible to personal influence; and in college, as in the school at Bristol, he was most fortunate in this. The number of students was small,—there were ten only in his class, and he had but three comrades in Divinity; so that the pupil enjoyed a closeness of contact with his teachers which a thronged lecture-room makes impossible. The closeness of this relation was further provided for by the smallness of the number of teachers. Many years later, contrasting the Manchester New College from which he retired as Principal with the Manchester College in which he studied, he mentioned the fact that the subjects taught at the later date by fourteen teachers were taught by three at the earlier; and he was clearly of opinion that the advantage is not wholly with the more extended division of labor which is now prevailing. Then was the “pluralist” teacher, now the “specialist;” and, for purely educational advantage, he found much to urge in favor of the pluralist. Another advantage, however, which he did not mention, but which he surely would have recognized, is this: Where now the student receives his instruction from many teachers, and so meets them at but a single point, and feels their influence but slightly, he then, in receiving his instruction in many subjects from few teachers, met them at many points, and so experienced from them the full weight of their intellect

the New Testament. On this basis of comparison modern views of learning would certainly give to Göttingen the preference.

and character. Where the intellect was great and the character was high, this was a circumstance not to be regarded lightly. Such were the intellect and character of two of Dr. Martineau's teachers, John Kenrick and Charles Wellbeloved.

John Kenrick, in the largeness of his attainments, must have stood high among the first scholars of his day. Certainly in his line there was no institution in England whose fame he would not have advanced, and any congress of scholars would have applauded his erudition. His studious and uneventful life has not called forth a biography, and the encyclopædias have for most part passed him by; so that his record, save in the affectionate memories of those who were near him, is somewhat dim. Nor had he the genius for prolific book-making, such as characterizes, for instance, Max Müller; and so he failed of that *éclat*, sometimes rather cheap, which a voluminous authorship may win. Yet his volumes, though few, entitled him to the student's gratitude and the scholar's admiration. He was the translator of Zumpt's Latin Grammar; he was one of the earliest to undertake the preparation of popular manuals for Greek and Latin study, which have made the approaches to those languages in these modern days so much more easy and delightful. He published two volumes on Egypt,—*Egypt of Herodotus* and *Ancient Egypt under the Pharaohs*, of which the worst that can be said is, that they are not enriched with the results of investigations that have followed them. He published a volume on Persia, which for forty years has held its place without serious challenge. His more important books were the outcome of his college work; and it was the cause of learning they were designed to serve, not popular favor they were put forth to win. So, while written in a style singularly clear and forcible, his matter is offered without dilution or condiment,—the solid meat of learning in

which healthy appetite may rejoice, not the beef-tea which feeble stomachs can receive.

He studied theology with thought of the ministry, but from this the needs of Manchester College drew him aside. From such religious writings as he left, it seems clear that in him a great theologian was sacrificed to a great professor in another field. As already indicated, his special lines of study were classical and historical. His ability to enter into a language, to grasp its details and absorb its spirit, was of the first order. When a young man he had the privilege of a year in Germany, and availed himself of an opportunity to practise Latin conversation with Zumpt. Zumpt afterwards remarked of his German that it differed from a native's only in its extreme purity,—“correct literary speech without a trace of local colouring.”¹ A student of language must deal much in the minutiae of learning; and for this reason the classic tongues have been a field in which pedantry has prospered. Professor Kenrick, however, brought to them the patient research of the investigator, together with the broad view and deep insight of the philosopher. His was the order of mind to which Comparative Philology owes its being; and, had not his work led him in a somewhat different direction, it is hardly to be doubted that he might have stood with the Schlegels and Wilhelm von Humboldt among the leaders of that noble science.

The same order of ability he brought to the study of history. With untiring patience in the scrutiny of details he combined the clearest perception of the forces by which history is ruled. For this reason his books, even when they need the correction of more recent knowledge, are yet profitable: they are the kind of books from which we gather wisdom as well as learning; they are unambitious in aim, modest in pretension, but wearing on every page the impress of a master mind.

¹ Martineau's *Essays, Reviews, and Addresses*, vol. i. p. 404.

He was a sun that did not need a solar system in which to shine; for thirty-five years the little class-room at Manchester College was his field of toil, and there is no evidence that he was ever haunted by the consideration whether his influence reached beyond or no. Mr. Martineau thinks that of his title to be heard in the high debates of European scholarship, he could not have been unconscious. He was, however, one of those rare souls whose satisfaction in simple duty makes a small place large; and the "last infirmity of noble mind" was ever far away from him. His great pupil bears witness to him as "above ambition, incapable of pretence, eager to see things as they are, and assured that, through the darkness that sometimes enfolds them, the only guide is the unswerving love of truth; and, accepting life for service, not for sway, he never measured his sphere to see whether it was small or great, but deemed it enough to bear his witness where he stood, and help, as he might, the companions of his way." This will do for him; but there is another aspect of the matter respecting which satisfaction is not so easy. How came it that he was so little known? That his name is not written beside the names of Boeckh and Lachmann is easily explained: he did not measure himself against their problems; at any rate, did not participate in their discussions. That his reputation, however, was hardly insular suggests some fault in his environment. To be sure, he had no Eiffel Tower from which to shine; but neither was his candle hidden under a bushel; and its pure white beam shone clear. The explanation at once suggested, it is to be feared, is too obvious: he represented that nonconformity which to English churchdom is a Nazareth out of which no good thing is expected, yet out of which how frequently have the best things come. When Matthiae's Greek Grammar, very celebrated in its day, after a considerable growth through several

editions in Germany, needed a revised and complete English translation, the Bishop of London, who had the task in hand, settled upon Professor Kenrick as one to be intrusted with the labor. Accordingly the work was published under his editorial care. The printer sent proof not only to Professor Kenrick, but to the Bishop as well; and in it the editor's name appeared, "Rev. John Kenrick." The Bishop erased the "Rev.," and at the same time wrote to the printer explaining that it was impossible to concede that title to one not in Holy Orders.¹ The Rt. Rev. could see the scholar, but a nonconformist Rev. was impossible. It is to be feared that the spirit that cannot see the nonconformist Rev. will, save in rare exceptions, fail also to see the nonconformist scholar; at least, will but dimly discern his merit and stingily measure off his fame.

As to the order of his mind, he was little speculative, perhaps too little. The classic poets and orators and historians stirred his enthusiasm, but not the classic philosophers in like degree. A page of Demosthenes was more congenial to him than a page of Aristotle, and the Histories of Tacitus than the Disputations at Tusculum. In all his investigations in whatever field it was objective evidence he sought, and with which alone he was satisfied. On one side this may imply limitation; it was limitation, however, that afforded the negative value of protection. It saved him from illusions to which the theorizer is ever liable, and spared his pupils the brilliant vagary. Whether in the realm of myth, or legend, or ancient inscriptions, or laws, or institutions, it was with feet he walked, never with wings he flew. He was one, therefore, from whom to derive solid erudition. Likewise he was one to set the example and instil the spirit of patient, slow-footed, and toilsome investigation.

¹ Martineau's *Essays, Reviews, and Addresses*, vol. i. p. 410.

As to his conduct in the class-room, we have hints here and there, and Dr. Martineau has borne suggestive testimony. There must have been something of severity in his general tone; possibly too little tenderness for struggling stupidity; for shiftlessness and laziness the manifest impatience or the biting sarcasm that was their due. His professor's chair was doubtless something of a judgment seat to the student who had been undutiful. Yet one of his pupils tells of a "courtesy that bent to every intellectual need, a sympathy that went half-way to meet every genuine intellectual aspiration."¹

He was a man of the severest literary taste, and the bubbles the ambitious student might bring him were sure to be delivered of the wind that had blown them. To indelicacy of language he was sensitive, and a strained and foolish pedantry was certain to meet a summary judgment. Mr. Martineau tells of a student who, in reading from Tacitus an account of some German tribes who wore *braccas*, stopped at the word. "Well, what does *braccas* mean?" The student blushingly replied, "A species of habiliment for covering the lower part of the body." "Humph, Mr. B., commonly called *breeches*." Thus under his criticism was language ever brought down to the dimensions of things and made correctly to name them.

With respect to his instruction Mr. Martineau's own testimony had best be quoted. Speaking especially of his classical instruction, he says: "In Mr. Kenrick's treatment of every subject, there seemed to be one constant characteristic,—a comprehensive grasp of its whole outline, with accurate scrutiny of its separate contents. Nothing fragmentary, nothing discursive, nothing speculative, broke the proportions or disturbed the steady march of his prearranged advance. His prolegomena to every classical text furnished a compendium of its literary his-

¹ Rev. Charles Beard.

tory, and reproduced the conditions of ancient life, civic, legal, domestic, personal, under which it arose. The reading of it in class was marked by a similar completeness: nothing was allowed to slip by without coming into the full focus of elucidation: grammatical construction, textual criticism, archæology, dialect, geography, dates, graces or defects of style, all were brought into distinct view; yet without inducing any tedious slowness in the progress, or killing out the spirit of the piece." His testimony to his instruction in ancient and modern history is not less emphatic. It seems not strange, therefore, that fifty years after he left the class-room he should be able to testify that he brought thence a "standard of philological accuracy, of historic justice, of literary taste," that had directed his "aspirations ever since."

The features of Charles Wellbeloved are less easy to outline, though the materials at hand are sufficient to show what manner of man he was. During the York period of the College, a period of thirty-seven years, he was its Principal. All this time he was pastor of a church to which he gave the long ministry of fifty-four years.¹ Perhaps he was not a man of Olympian mould, yet from the magnitude of his work and the quality of his influence one not to be passed indifferently.

Mrs. Catharine Cappe in her *Memoirs* speaks of his "humility, his disinterestedness, his varied talents, his desire for knowledge, especially religious knowledge, his freedom from prejudice, and his manifold piety." Thus he impressed her when, a young man of twenty-three, he came to York to assist her husband in his pastoral office.

¹ The ministry of his predecessor, Mr. Cappe, was forty-six years. John Kenrick very well remarks: "It is not common to find a pastoral connection lasting even the shorter of these terms; that two in succession should fill up a century must be a very rare occurrence." *Memoir of the Late Charles Wellbeloved*, p. 228.

She also quotes her husband, himself a saint and scholar, as saying: "This, my dear, is the very young man I wanted; he will be eminent in his day." John Kenrick, also, writing of him after his death and from many years of intimate acquaintance, says: "The characteristic feature of Mr. Wellbeloved's mind was benevolence. It beamed in his eye; it spoke in his voice; it diffused itself over his manner, which was kind and courteous to every one, of whatever rank or condition, with whom he had intercourse. It might truly be said of him that he was a 'man made to be loved.'"¹ We learn from the same writer of an official relation which he held with the York Lunatic Asylum. He says of him that "his benevolence led him to feel a lively interest in those who were suffering from this grievous affliction; he was convinced of the power of gentleness and kindness to remove what severity only tended to aggravate. He felt none of that undefinable terror of the insane which affects many persons of stronger nerves and greater physical courage, but mixed freely and fearlessly among them. His voice and manner were peculiarly suited to soothe a troubled mind and win confidence, and his sagacity pointed out to him how their delusions were most effectually to be dealt with."² These touches bring before us a man of peculiarly gentle mould, of sympathetic nature, of winning grace. So constantly were these features manifest, that those near him did not know until his lips confessed, that he was naturally of a choleric temper of which only through long and patient watchfulness had he gained the mastery.

Such, however, was only one aspect of the man. Under his soft glove was a hand that was capable of a grasp that was strong; he was ruled by the finest and most exacting moral sense, to which no services were to be declined

¹ *Memoir of the Late Charles Wellbeloved*, pp. 244-245.

² *Ibid.* pp. 139-140.

because onerous, and trifling duties were sacred. They were taken, too, without apparent consciousness of aught deserving in them, and with a modesty that looked upon his best and utmost as the least that fidelity could render.

It may be doubted if students ever had before them a more marked example of methodical and tireless and consecrated industry. In the earlier years of the College it was not the teacher's privilege to have a single province of learning over which he presided; and we find Mr. Wellbeloved with one assistant, who rendered some service in the classical and mathematical departments, doing the entire work alone. That work embraced the work of an ordinary college together with the courses in Theology. Applying for an extra tutor, he writes: "I have, therefore, seldom delivered less than four, generally five lectures a day, each lecture occupying an hour. It is to be recollect ed that the preparation for most of the lectures cannot be made in so short a time as is occupied in their delivery. The labour, therefore, which I have undergone, since the Academy was removed to York, has been greater than is consistent with other duties incumbent upon me as a minister and as the father of a numerous family, and also with a regard for my health."¹ With this labor he must conjoin the multifarious cares which the office of Principal devolved upon him, and answer the calls of his church, reserving only Saturdays for the preparation of his sermons. Yet with this vast amount of routine work, he managed to devote to tranquil study a daily period of time which many a modern minister, with only his pastoral office, finds impracticable. This may be taken as a sample of his devoted and strenuous life.

Probably he was not a scholar in the august sense in which John Kenrick was; yet his ready mind, through its unrelenting application, gathered a stock of erudition that

¹ *Memoir, etc.*, p. 91.

was large. He read with ease the Greek and Latin classics; he had a thorough acquaintance with Hebrew, Chaldee, and Syriac; he had a considerable acquaintance with Arabic; knew French and Italian well; and "understood German," his biographer tells us, "so far as to be able to avail himself of translations and commentaries in that language." Of course he was widely read in theology; he was an accomplished botanist and an archæologist of fame. Notwithstanding his life was so crowded, he found time to enrich his mind with more genial letters.

His work done mainly in the first half of our century, it goes without saying that he represented a type of theology not now widely prevailing, and a certain vigor of theological interest not common in his theological descendants. Yet under his guidance the school was for nothing more remarkable than for the breadth of its instruction. He made it an institution of theological learning, not an arsenal from which to draw the weapons of sectarian warfare. John Kenrick speaks of his theological lectures as critical and philological, not dogmatic. In his curriculum, indeed, one finds no dogmatic theology. The various subjects of theology were laid upon, difficulties shown, differing attitudes stated, copious references given, and then the student was left to shape a conclusion for himself. So he went forth from the school with conclusions he had formed, not opinions he had learned. He was taught to investigate; and, to the end that he might more surely do so, his teacher laid upon his mind no fashioning influence. From this reserve on the part of the teacher there is reason to suspect that there was sometimes discontent on the part of those who wanted a judgment rather than data from which to form one. It is easy enough to imagine the complainings of the student whose indolent mind asked a dogmatism rather than that supreme respect for his intellect that made dogmatism impossible. Which, how-

ever, on the whole must be productive of the nobler results, and which was practically wiser for a mind like Mr. Martineau's, we need not pause to consider.

Many are the notices scattered here and there of this modest scholar and devoted instructor, whom the world so little knows, and whom no university ever honored itself by honoring; and their testimony is unanimous to the richness of his intellect, the candor of his judgment, the saintliness of his character, the nobleness of his aim, and the success of his endeavors. One of these notices, that of Dr. Martineau himself, there can be no error in quoting. In an address at Manchester New College, soon after Mr. Wellbeloved's death, he said: "Well do I remember the respectful wonder with which we saw, as our course advanced, vein after vein of various learning modestly opened out; the pride with which we felt that we had a Lightfoot, a Jeremiah Jones, and an Eichhorn all in one, yet no mere theologian after all, but scarcely less a naturalist and an archaeologist as well; the impatience with which, out of very homage to his wisdom, we almost resented his impartial love of truth in giving us the most careful epitome of other opinions with scarce the suggestion of his own. Many of us have found the notes taken in his lecture-room our best Cyclopædia of divinity during the first years of our active ministry, when books were forced aside by other claims; and when at last some leisure for independent study has been won, and the entrance of the theological sciences upon new phases has taken us into untried fields, then most of all, if I may generalize from my own experience, have we been thankful for our training under a master of the true Lardner type, candid and catholic, simple and thorough, humanly fond indeed of the counsels of peace, but piously serving every bidding of sacred truth. Whatever might become of the particular conclusions which he favoured, he never justi-

fied a prejudice; he never misdirected our admiration; he never hurt an innocent feeling or overbore a serious judgment; and he set up within us a standard of Christian scholarship to which it must ever exalt us to aspire.”¹

Such was Dr. Martineau’s education; in intimate relation with such minds did he receive it. From the contact, too, came by far the most important part of it,—the incentives, not the lessons. The dryest pedantry that ever criticised a text, and the dullest mechanism ever misnamed a school would not have been able permanently to repress an intellect so earnest; but through this contact a quickening had been given him, a standard had been shown him, his possibilities had been revealed to him. The opportunities he enjoyed have a meagre look when compared with those of England’s older universities, and for his deprivation of these we may detect in him now and then a quiet sigh,—the utterance, we may believe, of his casual, not his habitual mood. To President Garfield, to sit on a log with Mark Hopkins was to attend a university; Mr. Martineau had had intimate relation with three Mark Hopkinsses. He had received guidance equal to his need, and inspirations such as only great and consecrated minds can give; and we see not how he could have been better trained for the career that now opens before him.

¹ *Essays, Reviews, and Addresses*, vol. iv. p. 54

CHAPTER III

MINISTRY IN DUBLIN

IN 1827 Mr. Martineau, aged twenty-two, completed his college studies. He was "admitted to preach," but did not at once enter upon the clerical office. His friend and former teacher, Lant Carpenter, in consequence of over-work, was obliged for a time to suspend his labors, and for a year Mr. Martineau took his place in the Bristol school. It was a year of excessive toil for one so inexperienced. Not only must he conduct the school, but he must assist in the church in which Dr. Carpenter was wont to minister. The pulpit was nominally supplied by a venerable clergyman; but by reason of infirmities he was unequal to the task of regular pulpit ministration, and Mr. Martineau was called upon frequently, often at short notice, to take his place.

At the close of the year, Dr. Carpenter's health not being equal to the two offices of preacher and teacher, Mr. Martineau was asked to take the school. He had admirable qualifications for a teacher, the relation would have been pleasant and fairly remunerative, and the offer was in a measure tempting. His mind, however, had been fixed upon the ministry, and happily this had the stronger drawing. Erelong the Eustace Street Presbyterian Church in Dublin invited him to the co-pastoral office. The pastor, Philip Taylor, grandson of the Dr. Taylor of Norwich fame, after fifty years of service, while enjoying the ameni-

ties of his office, was to devolve its burdens upon younger shoulders.

On going to Dublin he was attended by his sister Rachel, who superintended the establishment of his home. He planned to take pupils, and a house equal to his needs could not be rented; so, with the aid of a friend, he purchased one at an expense of seven hundred pounds. A few months later, at Christmas time, he crossed over to England, and Helen Higginson returned with him his wife. Anon another came to bless them, a baby Helen, an angel visitant that stayed not long. Ere long a son, Russel, was born to them, destined to the scholar's quiet toils and honorable success.¹ In due time there was another daughter, Isabella, now Mrs. Leyson Lewis,² of East Farleigh in Kent County. Such, in brief, is the domestic story of those Dublin years.

It was on Sunday, October 26, 1828, that he received ordination. The service was according to Presbyterian usage; it was as a Presbyterian that he began his work. His Presbyterianism, however, was English, not Scotch, a distinction which, however apparent in England, needs to be pointed out in America. In America the name Presbyterian suggests John Knox and the Assembly's Catechism; while in England for the last three hundred years there has been a Presbyterianism that writes its history from the days of Baxter, whose broad and tolerant spirit it has reflected. A ruling principle with it has been, that there shall be no binding dogma. With respect to creed subscription its sentiment was voiced by Chillingworth, "To the Bible only should a Protestant subscribe." It has

¹ He was for several years professor of Hebrew in Manchester New College, and for many years Assistant Keeper in the British Museum. He was an Orientalist of fame and a user of twenty languages. He was also, as is testified by those who knew him, and was apparent to those who met him, one of the most modest, the most conscientious, and most lovable of men. He died December 14, 1898.

² Died January 5, 1900, after the above had been put in type.

sought, that is, to build on the religious sentiment while leaving opinion free.

Dating from the times of Baxter, it hardly needs to be said that it has reflected the sterner types of doctrine; but by virtue of its ruling principle it has been ever reaching forward to more liberal views; until Unitarianism came there was to be found within its rank the best advance upon the standards of orthodox opinion in England. Indeed it is the antecedent of English Unitarianism; and a large number of the Unitarian churches in England to-day, and nearly all those of Ireland, are Presbyterian in their history. In the pamphlet in which are preserved the services of Mr. Martineau's ordination, printed in 1829, is a note which tells of the "same spirit of religious freedom" among the Unitarians of Boston and the Unitarians [Presbyterians] of Dublin. One year later suit was brought against certain of the Unitarianized Presbyterians, indirectly implicating all of them, to recover from them the chapels and trust funds their expansive views were believed to have forfeited.

The church, then, that ordained Mr. Martineau, although Presbyterian, stood for the heresy of the day. It interests us to come into the atmosphere of that ordination to learn something of the spirit of that heresy. The sermon was preached by Rev. Joseph Hutton; and, aside from a slight Presbyterian coloring, there was nothing in its prevailing tone to distinguish it from the ordinary type of orthodox discourse. His subject was "The Character, Duties, and Privileges of Christians," which he illustrated not with far-reaching thought, but in a spirit of most fervid loyalty to his Master. "To be Christ's, implies that we have enlisted under the banners of the cross — that we are soldiers and servants of the Lord Jesus — that we have taken the oath to be faithful to our Great Leader, the Captain of our Salvation — that we will perish rather than desert his standard,

or betray his cause—that we have renounced the world, and willingly forego its pomps and vanities, and pride and pleasures, to be with Christ.” “To be Christ’s, is to call no man *master*, spiritually speaking—to acknowledge no authority in religion, but the Bible; no master but Christ.” “To be Christ’s, we must adhere to him *alone*;—*alone*, I say, for he admits no copartnership, nor hath substituted any authority in his place.” “And further, we must take the holy Gospel, and search for ourselves, to find its hidden treasures; which we shall doubtless find, if we search with humility, and sincerity, and faith.” What *must* have been the orthodoxy to which this was heresy?

But further, “I beseech you, brethren, examine for yourselves often and closely, whether ye be *in Christ*. Is your piety that of him, who passed whole nights in communion with his God in prayer? . . . Consider, again and again, the illustrious example of every virtue, which he hath set before us; and let it be our daily prayer to God, that he would assist us by his divine grace to imbibe more and more freely of this heavenly temper, . . . that so we may be Christ’s here, and his for ever.” These passages fairly illustrate. The sermon sounds no depths and soars to no heights; but it is charged with a sentiment in the exuberance of which the most stalwart orthodoxy of to-day would find superabundant proof of Christian discipleship.

Following the sermon, a long discourse was delivered by Rev. James Armstrong on Presbyterian Ordination. This was natural and appropriate in a Presbyterian church, flanked on the one side by Episcopacy and on the other by Congregationalism. It was but slightly shown, as would be shown to-day, that Presbyterianism is useful, justified by experience, a fair and practicable means to an end that is most desirable; it was mainly shown to be of divine appointment, which makes consideration of expediency a superfluity and an impertinence. He who said,

"Let there be Light," also decreed, Let there be Presbyters. "We maintain," said he, "not only that the Bible is an unerring rule of faith and conduct, but, also, that it contains such regulations for order, and directions for worship as are adapted to every state of the church. Therefore, whatever is not either positively directed by the word of God, or clearly warranted by the practice of our Blessed Lord and his Apostles, we feel ourselves compelled to reject as the invention of fallible uninspired men." He then goes over the familiar ground of debate as to the meaning of *πρεσβύτερος* and *ἐπίσκοπος*, buttressing his arguments with Scripture texts, and explaining the usage of the Apostolic Age. He brings his discussion to the climax with the surely evangelical asseveration that "we aim at nothing but the primitive purity of the apostolical constitutions, the naked simplicity of evangelical truth, and that liberty of conscience wherewith the Son of God hath made us free. . . . We preach the Lord Jesus, and Him crucified — we believe that He alone is the way, the truth, and the life; and that there is none other name under heaven whereby we may be saved — we place our confidence in him as our Saviour and Redeemer; and we receive, without question, whatever he has communicated with respect to the nature of the Deity, and the purposes of the Divine will."

And now Mr. Martineau; — and here we read not only the word spoken as he was crossing the threshold of the ministry, but, so far as we know, his earliest printed word:

"Every Minister of the Gospel I conceive to be the servant of Revelation. . . . By the authority of this Revelation I believe myself supported, when I assume, as primary principles in the conduct of my ministry, that the first and simplest religious truths are incomparably the most momentous — that there is no being with whom we have so much to do as God; and that as all religion begins, so also does it end, with exhibiting the relation which man

bears to his Creator. To this infinite Being, and to Him alone, do I ascribe every conceivable perfection. He is the source of power, to whom all things are possible — he is boundless in wisdom, from whom no secrets can be hidden — He is love; the origin of all good, himself the greatest; and the dispenser of suffering only that we may be partakers of his holiness — He is spotless in holiness; his will the only source of morality, and the eternal enemy of sin — He is self-existent and immutable, for ever pervading and directing all things, and searching all hearts; the Being from whom we came, and with whom, in happiness or woe, all men must spend eternity.

"From these views I infer that it is my first office, as a Minister of Christ, to awaken the attention of my people to the claims of this one infinite Jehovah upon their adoration, obedience and love. As I believe him to be the only scriptural object of worship, so do I conceive the affections implied in that worship to be the greatest glory of the human soul, and to be absolutely essential to the acceptable discharge of duty here, and to participation in the felicities of heaven hereafter. I am conscious of nothing but sincerity in saying, that to inspire in others and in myself a devotion ever fervent and humble, which shall have a bearing on every duty, purify every thought, and tranquillize every grief, I desire to make the main object not only of my ministry, but of my life.

"At the same time I believe, that of the will, the purposes, perhaps even the existence of Jehovah, we should have remained in ignorance, had he not revealed himself, partially by patriarchs and prophets of old, and more gloriously by Jesus Christ, his well-beloved Son. Him I acknowledge as the Mediator between God and man, who was appointed to produce by his life, and yet more peculiarly by his death, an unprecedented change in the spiritual condition of mankind, and to open a new and

living way of salvation. No pledge of Divine love to the human race impresses me so deeply, as the voluntary death of Jesus Christ, and his exaltation to that position which he now holds above all other created beings, where he lives for evermore, and from which he shall hereafter judge the world in righteousness. I receive and reverence him, not merely for that sinless excellence, which renders him a perfect pattern to our race; but as the commissioned delegate of Heaven, on whom the Spirit was poured without measure — as the chosen representative of the Most High, in whom dwelt all the fulness of the Godhead bodily. As authorities for our duties, as fountains of consoling and elevating truth, Jesus and the Father are one: and, in all subjects of religious faith and obedience, not to honour him as we honour the Father, is to violate our allegiance to him as the great Captain of our salvation. When Jesus commands, I would listen as to a voice from heaven: when he instructs, I would treasure up his teachings as the words of everlasting truth: when he forewarns of evil, I would take heed and fly as from impending ruin: when he comforts, I would lay my heart to rest as on the proffered mercy of God: when he promises, I would trust to his assurances as to an oracle of destiny."

Then follows a statement of his duties, as he conceives them, growing out of these convictions, and a confession of the Jewish and the Christian Scriptures as successive revelations of God, together with the obligations they devolve upon him. He closes thus: "Full well do I know that I must review hereafter, in the unveiled presence of God, the ministry on which I have now entered; and that I must then meet those who surround me now, and whose spiritual interests I bind myself to serve. That no one may then appear to reproach me with unfaithfulness — that there may be no wanderer from the fold of Christ, whom my neglect may have caused to stray, is the earnest and

solemn desire which I now profess before God and my brethren."

Brave words which the life shall qualify as to the letter, but intensify as to the spirit.

Such was Mr. Martineau's theological temper at the time of ordination, and such that of the ministry that ordained him. The prayer, the charge, are in like tone. Under these so orthodox conceptions were, indeed, departures from the standards of orthodox opinion of which only the coming years should reveal the significance. Yet here and there in the service we meet a word, a phrase, which betrays dissatisfaction with the relative position, which shows that these almost orthodox, to whom the Bible was an inspired volume, and Christ the Lord and Master, chafed at orthodox objection to them. Yet in the light of ultimate issues the objection was, as it ever has been, rightly taken; and the chafe, then as ever since, as unphilosophical as unmanly. "If you go thus far," said John Henry Newman to his brother, "you will go farther." It may be at a trifling angle that one railway branches from another. Passengers wave salute as they glide on side by side; through many miles they have experience of the same climate and look out upon the like sceneries; they disembark after the day's journeying and find the like life around them and the same constellations above them; but conceive the lines extended far enough and it is plain that, in due time, they must look out upon most widely contrasted conditions,—the haze of tropic sunsets, the blaze of auroral skies.

The settlement of Mr. Martineau was in its outward aspects a happy one. His church, born of the Act of Uniformity, had behind it more than a hundred and fifty years of honorable and inspiring history. It had been ministered to by a long succession of able and devoted pastors, and so had gained in strength, rather than contracted infirmity,

from age. It had local standing and its influence was wide. The congregation was a superior one, both in numbers and intelligence. It had wealth, of which it was not illiberal in the use; it supported an almshouse for twelve widows; it had a school for boys, another for girls. It was organized, earnest, appreciative, harmonious. Mr. Martineau was emphatically the minister of their choice, and admiration deepened into affection as they knew him better. We may doubt not there were troublesome spirits enough to keep a minister in discipline, but on the whole he seems to have entered into a pastoral felicity of which most ministers dream, but which very few attain.

His income was equal to his needs; his clerical labors not excessive. Work, however, to the utmost of his strength he must have, and for this he had provided. His purpose to take pupils had been met by a desire on the part of pupils to be taken; the school at Bristol had broken up on his leaving it, and half its inmates had followed him. He took into his family some students of the Dublin University whom he tutored. He taught Hebrew, also the higher mathematics. In the Calculus, as we have seen, he had been taught the fluxional notation; to meet the needs of his pupils he now taught himself the differential.

The hymn-book of his church was old and poor; so he compiled a new one, which was published in 1831, under the title of *Hymns for Christian Worship*. It was a small collection, numbering only two hundred and seventy-three hymns, and was prepared from very scanty material. In 1830 he delivered a sermon on *Peace in Division*,¹ which is the earliest of his published works. We read it now not only for the interest it awakens, but more than this, for the view it gives us of the Martineau of twenty-five. Certainly it does not seem a great effort, when set beside some of the mighty productions of his riper years; yet the author

¹ See *Studies of Christianity*.

of the *Endeavors* and the *Hours of Thought* is here. The elaborate and rhythmic style, the profuse yet careful metaphor, the gleaming insights, show the more youthful photograph of our maturer friend.

Those Dublin years, in a word, were pleasant and prosperous. In the pulpit, indeed, he had no Whitefield popularity; his quiet delivery, together with the severity of his intellectual demands, were likely to incline the crowd to follow after other attractions. For the serious, earnest, thoughtful, however, he had the magnetizing word. Socially, though the least obtrusive of men, for his breadth, purity, earnestness, he could but command a large respect. Personally he had his attractions: his manners were ruled by an interior courtesy, his temper was serene, his conversation agreeable. The freshness of youth was upon his features; the maturity of wisdom was on his lips; the light of genius was in his eye.

A long and prosperous ministry here we should naturally forecast for him. A difficulty, however, was in his path which, alas! to most had been quite the opposite of a difficulty. The venerable pastor died, and Mr. Martineau came by natural succession to his place. To his surprise he found that the change brought an addition of £100 to his salary. To this of itself we may presume he would not have objected; but the source whence it came raised scruples which tore him from his charge, and gave a new direction to his career.

The £100 he thus succeeded to was his share of the *Regium Donum*. Of this he had not heard before.

The *Regium Donum*, though at this time a parliamentary grant, was originally, as the name implies, a royal bounty. It was first bestowed by Charles II. upon the Presbyterians of Ireland, a sum of £600 annually in order to secure their loyalty. Discontinued for a time, it was renewed and increased by William III., and yet again by George I. And

not to Presbyterians of Ireland alone was it given; the Presbyterians of England and some other nonconformist bodies were smiled upon in like manner, though less bountifully.

In its intent this Bounty was at first of the nature of a bribe, and in this aspect there is evidence of some wincing at receiving it. Baxter would have nothing to do with it, and returned it when sent to him. It was given, however, ostensibly for the support of poor ministers¹ or their widows, though in Ireland it seems to have been used in a more general way for the support of the ministry. It had gone on with brief interruptions for more than a hundred years;²—custom had established it; it was taken as the rain and the sunshine,—the more approved as it did not imitate the bounty of heaven, which sends rain and sunshine on all alike. It supported a needy ministry,—why should it not? It did not support the Quaker or the Catholic,—why should it? That it was a good thing for the government to support Presbyterians, Presbyterians were not unnaturally agreed.

Mr. Martineau, however, took a different view of it. It was customary,—yes, but custom can consecrate no wrong. It has been long continued;—many an error we are fighting is hoarier still. The best and worthiest have received it and thought no wrong, among them your venerated predecessor. Alas! the holiest are not infallible; and even plodding virtue cannot be helped by saintly blindness. But it is the State that gives it; let the State take care of its own affairs. It is indeed the State that gives it, but it is I that am supposed to receive it; and to my own master must I be true or false in the matter. In recounting his emotions at this exigency when fourscore and five, the

¹ See Skeats' *Free Churches in England*, pp. 319–321, 671.

² The English *Regium Donum* was discontinued in 1850; the Irish in 1870.

event sixty years behind him, there was more than the usual kindling in those mild blue eyes.

He quickly decided on his course. He might indeed refuse to receive the money; but that might ultimately mean refusing it for his church, which his fine ethical sense forbade. One of two things must be: the church must itself surrender the Bounty or he and they must part company.

He made known his scruple to his friends. He was well satisfied to go on with his present income, but even were it otherwise this fund he could not receive, and he must make his most emphatic protest against it. At length he addressed a letter to the church in which the grounds of his objection were fully and earnestly stated.

Receiving the Royal Bounty he conceived to be placing him in a relation with the State to which the objections were insurmountable. First, the Bounty was of the nature of a "religious monopoly." It was a fund belonging to the whole people diverted to the benefit of a few. For what all the people contribute to the benefit of the State, all the people, he argued, should receive an equivalent in the blessings of good government. The governors, he declared, are simply trustees of the governed, and when they divert from the common fund for the benefit of a few, they violate their trust. The Royal Bounty he showed to be an instance of such misappropriation. The people gave; only Presbyterians received. Quakers, Free Thinkers, Catholics, were taxed with the rest, and for the support of a worship in which they did not participate and with which they had no sympathy. Were the question brought to those who pay this fund whether they would subscribe for the maintenance of Presbyterian worship, there could be no doubt of their refusal. It was not, therefore, a "free-will offering," but an "exaction upon reluctant consciences." Any of us, he pleads, would con-

sider it a hardship to be compelled to aid in the support of the Catholic church; surely, then, we depart from the Golden Rule when we inflict upon the Catholic a hardship not less grievous. The system was inherently unjust; and though the government might be the author, yet by receiving the Bounty he should feel himself an abetter, of the injustice.

Such was his first objection; his second was not less weighty. The Bounty made a sinecure of his office. The clergyman labors, but the labor is for one party, the congregation; the remuneration is from another, the State. He thus is made to sustain a twofold relation,—to the people for whom he works, to the government for which he does not. Relatively to his people indeed the office is no sinecure; but relatively to the State it is. To entitle one to receive this fund it is not enough that he be a good citizen; in some specific way he must be in the employ of the government. In short, he is in the employ of the State or not. If he is, then his office is that of a State priesthood, and his religion is thereby made a matter of State selection, a secularization to which he, Mr. Martineau, could not be a party. If he is not, then he has remuneration without duty, and so far his office is a sinecure.

Thirdly, State remuneration seemed to him to hinder the circulation and impede the progress of religious thought. That religion may bring forth its fairer fruits, it must be unfettered in its thought and utterly free in its utterance. To these ends, anything that tends to call forth profession where belief is wanting, makes it for one's interest to believe this rather than that, or to smother the utterance of the latest and fullest conviction, is to be deprecated and resisted. To just this is there a natural and inevitable temptation where State emolument is given in consequence of some particular connection and forfeited by departure from it. There is a constant and persuasive appeal to self-

interest, to which — he does not say it, but it is plain that he thinks it — even clerical virtue is not safe in exposure. The free utterance and natural circulation and change of religious opinion, there is a constant bribe to stay.

Fourthly, alliance with the State he holds to be inimical to the "credit and influence of Christianity." He gives it as his firm conviction that more unbelievers have been made by "establishments than by all the speculations which friends of establishments deem so dangerous." Wherever it is known that there is personal interest in religious profession there is sure to be widespread distrust of religious sincerity. It will be suspected that you "hold for pay the faith you are paid merely for holding."

These were the reasons that convinced him that in principle the Royal Bounty was wrong. "And if the principle is wrong," he asks, "how can I believe the practice right?" "I am not blind," says he, "to the inconveniences of any general plan for relinquishing it; but if in its abandonment I see difficulty, in keeping it I see wrong."

Thus was the issue defined. What should have been the decision seems clear enough. The Bounty, however, was of long standing; this view of it was novel; interest was persuasive, very likely blinding. Abstract right must usually fare hard in its first encounter with a wrong that is defended by custom and advantage; and the measure of Mr. Martineau's success is eloquent testimony to his hold upon his people. The younger members rallied to his side, and the contest was earnest. In the final decision Mr. Martineau's party were defeated by one vote. The letter was sent to the congregation the last of October, and he resigned on the thirteenth of November.

As a matter of fact, it was the thought of the Catholics about him that most deeply moved him; they practically, with respect to Ireland, the national church, owing indeed with all others a loyalty to the common nation, but entitled

with all to a common benefit; yet taxed to support a worship in which they could not participate and which their consciences abhorred! Our minds wander back to Mr. Martineau's ancestors, driven from France by the terrors of a Catholic persecution. We remember that this persecution was consecrated by the Pope and applauded by Bossuet; and here was Mr. Martineau throwing himself into the breach in defence of the rights of Catholics!

It was a moral contest into which he entered — to his cost in either issue. If he won, it would be at the forfeiture of £100 annually; if he lost, it would be at the sacrifice of his church to which he was strongly attached. This was not all the cost. He had purchased a house, as we have seen, by the aid of a friend. Valuations for some reason had seriously declined, and he must part with it at a great sacrifice. The consequence was that he had now to face the future with a young family and a heavy debt. Young life is brave, but it seems reasonable to suspect that for a time the sun did not rise as cheerily as usual, and that the evening damps were peculiarly depressing.

CHAPTER IV

MINISTRY IN LIVERPOOL

By his attitude towards the *Regium Donum*, Mr. Martineau had practically disqualified himself for further ministry among the Presbyterians of Ireland, and, as a minister, he was little known in England. Or rather, we perhaps should say, he was better known than he supposed. Some one once said of Gladstone that he could not whisper so low in London as not to be overheard in Edinburgh; Mr. Martineau's voice even then had something of the like reaching power. Visitors in Dublin had listened to his preaching; visitors from Dublin had told of the new man that had come. Very soon after his resignation in Dublin he was invited to become the colleague of Rev. John Grundy, who was settled over the Paradise Street Chapel in Liverpool. Charles Wicksteed, writing in 1877, remembered how "the circular staircase of the somewhat conspicuous pulpit was quietly ascended by a tall young man, thin, but of muscular frame, with dark hair, pale but not delicate complexion, a countenance full in the repose of thought, and in animation of intelligence and enthusiasm, features belonging to no regular type or order of beauty, yet leaving the impression of a very high kind of beauty, and a voice so sweet and clear and strong without being in the least loud, that it conveyed all the inspiration of music without any of its art or intention." He also tells us that "when this young man with the background of his honour and his courage rose to speak of the

inspiration that was not of the letter but of the soul, and [for that time of day] boldly distinguished between the inspiration of the Old Testament books and the Old Testament heroes, he completed the conquest of his hearers."

He had exchanged the generous income of Dublin for a salary scarce equal to his needs, and he took pupils to eke out a maintenance. About this time he began to exercise his hand as a reviewer. In 1833 he contributed to the *Monthly Repository* an article on *Joseph Priestley*, which very properly leads in the first volume of *Essays, Reviews, and Addresses*. In 1835 he appeared in *The Christian Reformer* with an essay on Bentham's *Deontology*, to which in his collected works it is to be regretted that he gave no place. Not only is it a very able paper, but it has a biographical interest. In those days he followed with Mill and Bentham, and so championed the doctrines of Necessity and Utility. This article was a proclamation of Utilitarianism. We read it now with vivid memory of his later teaching, and see how completely were the ethical doctrines of his school lived through and abandoned in the mumps-and-measles period of his intellectual manhood.

In 1835 Mr. Grundy died, and Mr. Martineau became sole pastor. It can hardly be said that the change added to his labors, which were always to the utmost. He continued to take pupils; teaching was not only a source of income but a congenial occupation. He took great interest in the religious education of the young, and conducted them through long courses of Biblical instruction. At one time he gave a nine months' course of weekly lectures on the *Eucharist*, its history, its doctrines, its forms. This was very appropriately followed by a "self-dedication service" preparatory to the next communion. He bore an active part in more general outside work, especially that of an educational character. In 1833 he delivered a course of ten lectures on *Chemistry* before the

Mechanics' Institution in Liverpool, of which the *syllabus* is still to be seen. A few years later his sister Rachel came to Liverpool and opened a girls' boarding-school; and for ten years Mr. Martineau aided her by giving instruction in some of her classes. He was much in demand on public occasions,—a speech here, an address there, and all those multifarious services which are likely to be asked of an intelligent, an interesting, and a willing man.

New domestic experiences were before him. In 1833 a daughter, Mary Ellen, was born to him. Two years later another son, Herbert,¹—“born for the future, to the future lost,”—came to gladden him. Three other children were yet to enrich him: Gertrude, now an artist, Basil, a London solicitor, and Edith, his latest born, also an artist. Upon Mary Ellen, with Gertrude and Edith, devolved in his later years the care of his home,—in his old age, of himself.

In 1836 appeared his first original book, *The Rationale of Religious Inquiry*, a thin volume, a little larger than Emerson's *Nature*, and, like that, a proclamation of original power. It had done service as a course of six lectures, discussing various aspects of Christian thought, and cogently pleading for Rationalism against Orthodoxy. It was written in a style possibly less winning than that of later years, but concise, strong, earnest, elevated. It was characterized by great polemical dexterity, but also by a fearless and invincible candor. What could be fairer or nobler than this testimonial to the Roman Catholic church, at whose

¹ He died at ten years of age. On his headstone is this touching epitaph:

“O Life too fair! Upon thy brow
We see the light where thou art now.
O Death too sad! In thy deep shade
All but our sorrow seemed to fade.
O Heaven too rich! not long detain
Thine exiles from the sight again.”

dogma of Infallibility he is about to deal a trenchant blow? "Long and far was this Church the sole vehicle of Christianity, that bare it on over the storms of ages, and sheltered it amid the clash of nations. It evangelized the philosophy of the East, and gave some sobriety to its wild and voluptuous dreams. It received into its bosom the savage conquerors of the North, and nursed them successively out of utter barbarism. It stood by the desert fountain, from which all modern history flows, and dropped into it the sweetening branch of Christian truth and peace. It presided at the birth of art, and liberally gave its traditions into the young hands of Colour and Design. Traces of its labours, and of its versatile power over the human mind, are scattered throughout the globe. It has consecrated the memory of the lost cities of Africa, and given to Carthage a Christian, as well as a classic, renown. If in Italy and Spain, it has dictated the decrees of tyranny, the mountains of Switzerland have heard its vespers mingling with the cry of liberty, and its requiem sung over patriot graves. The convulsions of Asiatic history have failed to overthrow it; on the heights of Lebanon, on the plains of Armenia, in the provinces of China, either in the seclusion of the convent, or the stir of population, the names of Jesus and of Mary still ascend. It is not difficult to understand the enthusiasm which this ancient and picturesque religion kindles in its disciples. To the poor peasant who knows no other dignity it must be a proud thing to feel himself a member of a vast community, that spreads from Andes to the Indus; that has bid defiance to the vicissitudes of fifteen centuries, and adorned itself with the genius and virtues of them all; that beheld the transition from ancient to modern civilization, and itself forms the connecting link between the old world in Europe and the new; the missionary of the nations, the associate of history, the patron of art, the

vanquisher of the sword.”¹ What should we say, were we to meet the like testimonial to Protestantism from a Wise-man or Capel?

The book won immediate recognition, and in sixteen years it reached a fourth edition. Among our older liberal divines there is vivid recollection of the bright day when it first shone upon them. It treated familiar themes, yet with the freshness of original thought, and with something of prophetic boldness. It, indeed, was quite in advance of the time; and there are perhaps to-day few books that should do better service in guiding the groping intellect from the old faith to the new.

The purpose of the book is to exhibit the rational method by which he would deal with the problems of religion. Imagination has its place and value; but “however much imagination there may be in our belief, there must at least be *some* logic.”² Say what we will of Authority, on the throne of final judgment we meet Reason. We plead the probability of an inspired Authority; he answers: “It cannot lead me to renounce a tenet which is equally probable; and if the evidence against any doctrine appears greater than that for the Authority which recommends it, it has no conceivable claim to my belief. A divine right, therefore, to dictate a perfectly unreasonable faith cannot exist.”³ We are told that belief should submit; he answers: “Belief cannot submit; belief is an act of the understanding, submission an act of the will; belief is perfectly involuntary, and is determined by *evidence*; submission perfectly voluntary, and determined by *motives*.⁴ There is but one way in which a renunciation of belief can be won from me, and that is by showing me its falsity. If you “wish me to relinquish a credible doctrine, the nature which God has given me leaves you but one method: you

¹ pp. 19-20.

² pp. 26-27.

³ p. 21, 3d edition.

⁴ p. 25.

must present me something contradictory to it which is more credible.”¹ He furthers his argument by exposing in the ordinary Christian apologist a prevalent and palpable inconsistency: “When a Christian advocate wishes to prove the divinity of his religion, he does not content himself with the external proofs, but proceeds to make reference to the doctrine so worthy of God, the morality so pure and sanctifying, the views of human nature so just and elevated, the hopes of futurity so rational and fitted to our nature, the demeanour of Christ so majestic and yet so tender. In this he does perfectly right; and the argument is to my mind decisive. But surely he here assumes that human understanding is capable of perceiving the worth and tendency of Christian doctrine, the adaptation to our wants of Christian hopes, the dignity and excellence of Christian virtue. And when an opponent, following the same course, says, here is a notion absurd and unreasonable,—here a sentiment that tends to evil,—here a representation of God which violates the analogies of nature, with what justice can the Christian turn round and declaim against the weakness and presumption of human reason and the depraved judgments of the human heart?”²

The denial of this principle leads to manifold confusion and absurdity. The free and natural impression of the Gospels cannot be indulged; for the faculty by which alone it can be realized is superseded and discredited. You could turn to them as the works of men, earnest, truthful, making the best report possible of things they saw, of events in which they participated, yet ignorant from the prevailing ignorance of their day,—in their ethics, in their philosophy, erring as other mortals err; but you are told that these men did not write as other men, that they were the passive agents of a higher Reason.

¹ p. 25.

² p. 67.

To test their work by human reason, therefore, is impertinent and profane. These writings are to be "approached with divine awe," not "embraced with human sympathy." Understand and believe,—these are the only functions allowed us; and whatsoever is more than this cometh of presumption in dealing with writings from a source so high. "Interpret a portion of history, and you have a narrative perfect from the memory of God," respecting which it, of course, were blasphemy to raise question;—"a piece of argument, and you have the reasoning of the Infinite intellect;—an expression of expectation, and you have a prediction from the prescience of the Most High."¹ In consistency with such view reason can but dumbly disown its function, and any natural relation of mind and Gospels is impossible. "To praise their simplicity, to admire their beauty, to judge of their moral excellence, to point out the ingenuity and adroitness of their arguments, is as presumptuous and absurd as to question their accuracy, and discover in them traces of erroneous thought. What kind of critics are we of the ability of the Holy Spirit for narration, for precept, or for the exercise of logical art?"²

These passages show the trend and temper of a volume that stimulated much thought and awoke some raptures sixty years ago, and which still has magnetism in its pages.

In the preface to the third edition is a passage over which the reader should be indulged a smile: "Soon after the publication of the first edition of this book, the Author was asked by a friend, whether he thought that the opinions which characterized the volume could be regarded as '*ultimate*.' As no one can foresee the changes of his own mind, he answered with an affirmative." He had found a bivouac for the night, and thought to build his

¹ p. II.

² p. II.

home and his temple there. Ultimate opinions are for stationary intellects. The Martineau of this volume and the Martineau we know seem in comparison like the little lake in the mountain and the lower Mississippi flooded with a thousand streams and rolling ever and ever gulfward.

In 1839 an event took place which brought Mr. Martineau into a good deal of prominence. It was the Liverpool Controversy, whereof the echoes have not wholly died away. He had then two comrades in Liverpool,—John Hamilton Thom, a hoary octogenarian recently gathered to his fathers, then thirty-three years of age, winning in spirit and in manner, with mind well stored and disciplined, no Titan of unruly might, and likewise no Adonis of effeminate grace; and Henry Giles, long since gone over to the silent majority, then in the vigor of his manhood, an intense believer, and, though by temperament literary rather than polemical, a champion not lightly to be encountered. All were then engaged in pulpit and pastoral work; Mr. Thom was likewise editor of the *Christian Teacher*; and Mr. Martineau was not only heavily burdened with outside teaching, but in the quiet of his library was engaged in work whereof anon we shall see the fruits.

In the midst of such cares they threw themselves into a contest which alone should have taxed the strength of men who are accounted strong. On the twenty-first of January there appeared in print a circular invitation "To all who call themselves Unitarians in the town and neighbourhood of Liverpool" to attend a course of lectures in which the errors of Unitarianism were to be exposed. The tone of the missive was popish; and it abounded in phrases in which Orthodox dislike of Unitarianism was plainly rather than delicately shown. The motive of the enterprise was set forth as "our solemn impression of the value of souls, and of the peril to which the false philosophy of Unitarianism exposes them." They were told that Unitarians were

sunk in the most blasphemous and deadly error, and wholly unworthy of being considered Christians in any proper sense of the word. The spirit of the invitation, they were assured, was that of "the tenderest charity, of the purest love, of the most affectionate sympathy with those in the extreme of peril, and that an *eternal peril*." "Shall he who, unwittingly, totters blindfold on the edge of a precipice, deem it a rude or an uncharitable violence which would snatch him with a strong and a venturous hand, or even it may be with a painful grasp, from the fearful ruin over which he impends ?" The missive closed with the announcement of the intention of the reverend gentlemen undertaking this work, to come together, on the day preceding its commencement, "for the purpose of solemn humiliation before God, and earnest prayer for the blessing of our Heavenly Father." It was signed by Fielding Ould, minister of Christ Church. At the same time there was published a *syllabus* of a course of lectures, thirteen in number, to be given by thirteen clergymen of the Church of England. The subjects were to traverse the entire line of difference between Unitarian and Orthodox faith.

Whether or not these worthy gentlemen expected to carry on this enterprise and receive no challenge, we do not know. That they were hardly looking for the challenge they received seems probable; that they did not duly estimate the antagonists they were to encounter seems certain. With good courage one may poach his neighbor's preserves when they are guarded by a docile mastiff that will only bark, or at worst snarl at the intruder; but if there be an armed and watchful guard there, it is another matter. The above missive was promptly answered in polished but sometimes pungent phrases, and the correspondence that followed should beguile the dullest hour.

The answerers expressed great interest in the enterprise; and, while doubting whether a public audience was the

best tribunal before which to try questions so grave, yet felt it their duty to co-operate, that from a comparison of views no merely one-sided impression might be imparted. "Deeply aware," said they, "of our human liability to form and to convey false impressions of views and systems from which we dissent, we shall be anxious to pay a calm and respectful attention to your defence of the doctrines of your church. We will give notice of your lectures, as they succeed each other, to our congregations, and exhort them to hear you in the spirit of Christian justice and affection; presuming that, in a like spirit, you will recommend your hearers to listen to such reply as we may think it right to offer. We are not conscious of any fear, any interest, any attachment to system, which should interfere with the sincere fulfilment of *our* part in such an understanding; and, for the performance of *yours*, we rely on your avowed zeal for that Protestantism which boldly confides the interpretation of Scripture to individual judgment, and to that sense of justice which, in Christian minds, is the fruit of cultivation and sound knowledge." Then followed the announcement, that to the lectures given on the Orthodox side there would each week be given a lecture in reply. That the lectures might meet the larger audience, they proposed that abstracts of them be printed side by side in some paper. Or, if this arrangement did not please, they would undertake a newspaper discussion of the points at issue.

Reviewing other parts of the missive, they use language which, though most polite in itself, we fear must have been the opposite of soothing to Orthodox sensibilities: "You ask us, reverend sir, whether it is not a 'sweet and pleasant thing,' to 'tell and hear together of the great things which God has done for our souls.' Doubtless, there are conditions under which such communion may be most 'sweet and pleasant;' . . . but such conference is not 'sweet and pleasant' where, fallibility being confessed on

one side, infallibility is assumed on the other; where one has nothing to learn and everything to teach; where the arguments of an equal are propounded as a message of inspiration; where presumed error is treated as unpardonable guilt, and on the fruits of laborious and truth-loving inquiry, terms of reprobation and menaces of everlasting perdition are unscrupulously poured."

Referring to the announced meeting for humiliation and prayer, the letter reads: "Permit us to say, that we could join you in that day's prayer, if, instead of assuming before God what doctrines his Spirit should enforce, you would, with us, implore him to have pity on the ignorance of us all: to take us all by the hand and lead us into the truth and love, though it should be by ways most heretical and strange; to wrest us from the dearest reliances and most assured convictions of our hearts, if they hinder our approach to his great realities. A blessed day would that be for the peace, brotherhood, and piety of this Christian community, if the 'humiliation' would lead to a recognition of Christian equality, and the 'prayer' to the recognition of that spiritual God whose love is moral in its character, spiritual, not doctrinal in its conditions, and who accepts from all his children the spirit and the truth of worship."

Thus in most polished phrases was the issue accepted, but in a temper which showed a more than willingness to wield the sword of the spirit,—in an emergency, to exchange it for a more carnal weapon.

The hope of fair and candid comparison of opinion, if such was entertained, Mr. Ould's reply did not encourage. The plan of publishing together abstracts of lectures he would not agree to; a newspaper discussion he did not approve. To the question whether he would recommend his congregation to hear the Unitarian lectures, he replied unequivocally that he would not. "Were I to consent to

this proposal," said he, "I should thereby admit that we stood on terms of a *religious equality*, which is, *in limine*, denied. As men, citizens, and subjects, we are doubtless equal, and will also stand on a footing of equality before the bar of final judgment. I therefore use the term '*religious equality*,' in order to convey to you the distinction between our relative position as members of the community and as religionists. Being unable . . . to recognize you as *Christians*, I cannot consent to meet you in a way which would imply that we occupy the same *religious level*." "To *you*," he adds, "there will be no sacrifice of principle or compromise of feeling, in entering our churches; to *us* there would be such surrender of *both*, in entering yours, as would peremptorily prohibit any such engagement." He closed his letter by congratulating his correspondents on their expressed purpose to attend the lectures with their congregations, to hear what was fatally false in their system, and with a prayer that the Great Head of the Church would prosper the effort about to be made for the promotion of his glory, through the instruction of those who were "*ignorant and out of the way*." In applying this italicized phrase to Mr. Martineau and Mr. Thom, Mr. Ould certainly betrayed a want of the sense of humor, the best office of which is often to save us from being ridiculous.

Whether in thrust or parry, Mr. Ould was a bungling fencer in comparison with his lithe and dexterous antagonists; and the reply he drew from them was his humiliating discomfiture: "You deny our *religious equality* with *you*. Is it as a matter of *opinion*, or as a matter of *certainty*, that such equality is denied? If it is only as an opinion, then this will not absolve you from fair and equal discussion on the grounds of such opinion. If it is with you not an *opinion*, but a *certainty*, then, Sir, this is Popery. Popery we can understand,— we know, at least, what it is,— but

Protestantism erecting itself into Romish infallibility, yet still claiming to be Protestantism, is to us a sad and humiliating spectacle, showing what deep roots Roman Catholicism has in the weaker parts of our common nature."

In his first missive Mr. Ould had imputed to Unitarians, if sound theologians, the belief that their Trinitarian neighbors were guilty of the "most heinous of all sins — idolatry," — a belief which, of course, he knew they did not entertain, but which it served the purposes of his argument to charge. The imputation was now turned upon him with a significance he could not have anticipated. "In reference to your repugnance to enter our chapels we say no more, reserving our right of future appeal in this matter to those members of your church who may be unable to see the force of your distinction between religious and social equality. But we are surprised that you should conceive it so easy a thing for us to enter your churches: and should suppose it 'no sacrifice of principle and compromise of feeling' in us to unite in a worship which you assure us must constitute in our eyes 'the most heinous of all sins — Idolatry.' *Either* you must have known that we did *not* consider your worship an idolatry, *or* have regarded our resort to it a most guilty 'compromise of feeling; ' to which, nevertheless, you give us a solemn invitation; adding now, on our compliance, a congratulation no less singular." That there was no wincing at this most palpable thrust, they may believe who can.

Two days after the above letter, there appeared an invitation "To the Trinitarians of this Town and Neighbourhood who may feel interested in the approaching Unitarian Controversy," and they were addressed as "Christian Brethren." It recapitulated the correspondence, and appealed to them to give that "equal audience" which their clergymen had refused. Three days later,

there appeared another address "To the [so-called] Unitarians of Liverpool;" in which Mr. Ould made a lame attempt to justify his attitude.

The next move was from Mr. Ould, in the offer of a platform discussion, which was promptly declined, extempore debate before a miscellaneous assembly not being considered the proper mode of treating themes that need the most critical and careful statement. To this Mr. Ould made hasty reply that he could but "hope a secret consciousness of the weakness" of their cause "prompted their determination;" — a most unfortunate remark, which his keen adversary turned upon him: "Sir, it is not a little mournful to find a Christian Minister expressing the hope that other men are hypocrites, that they are secretly conscious of the weakness of the cause which they habitually defend. To *hope* that we secretly know our errors, whilst publicly preaching them as truth, is indeed strange preference of faith before works."

Meanwhile, on second thought, the offer of a newspaper discussion was accepted in a letter signed by Mr. Ould and two of his brother clergymen. The consideration of the preliminaries to this led to some statements of theological attitude which revealed the fact that on the Unitarian side there was dissent from the doctrine of plenary inspiration, and a denial that even miracles were a guaranty of infallibility. At the revelation of these heresies the Orthodox party withdrew from the controversy. "While, therefore," said they, "we shall continue to use all lawful methods of argument and persuasion, in the hope of being useful to those who, though called Unitarians, are not so entirely separated from the common humanity as you seem to be, we have no hesitation in saying that, with regard to *yourselves* as individuals, there appears to be a more insurmountable obstacle in the way of discussion than would be offered by ignorance of one another's language; because

the want of a common medium of language could be supplied by an interpreter, but the want of a common medium of reason cannot be supplied at all." To this came the sharp rejoinder, that "Theology appears in this instance to have borrowed a hint from the 'laws of honour;' and as in the world a 'passage at arms' is sometimes evaded, under the pretence that the antagonist is too little of a *gentleman*, so in the church a polemical collision may be declined, because the opponent is *too little of a believer.*"

The last letter was written March 25, but some seven weeks earlier than this the pulpit contest had to be girded for. As their adversaries had done, the Unitarians published a *syllabus* of their lectures, thirteen against their thirteen. Of the thirteen subjects Mr. Martineau took five; Mr. Thom and Mr. Giles each four. When we bear in mind that the thirteen chose their subjects, each according to his special interest or strength, and that the three had thus their subjects practically appointed to them, the odds seem fairly Thermopylæan. Theological sympathies will incline the reader to one side or the other independently of any consideration of weight of learning or cogency of argument. But the readers are surely few who will not say that if the odds were Thermopylæan the polemic victory was Spartan.

On Wednesday evening of February 6, Mr. Ould gave the opening lecture, in which he stormed the Unitarian line with plagiarized thunder.¹ The crowd that gathered was immense; the three Unitarian clergymen found it difficult to gain admission to the church. A pew was afterwards assigned them, from their occupancy popularly known as the "condemned pew;" and here, under the fulminations of the pulpit and amid the responsive amens of the faithful

¹ As was afterwards conclusively shown, he took a large part of his lecture from Andrew Fuller's *Calvinistic and Socinian Systems Examined and Compared.*

about them, they sat out every lecture. Mr. Thom replied in the Paradise Street Church on the evening of the following Tuesday, and the crowd was not less great. The Trinitarian clergymen, however, true to their word, stayed away, and used their best endeavors to keep their flocks away also. Through thirteen weeks the strife continued. Liverpool was stirred as communities rarely are by conflicts of religious opinion, and the noise of the fray travelled far.

If there was hope, however, of making proselytes, the result was disappointing. Two families brought over to the Unitarian rank were the sum total of conversions.

The lectures on either side were promptly printed in pamphlets with appropriate prefaces and appendices, and thus sent forth to enlighten as they might. At the close of the discussion they were gathered into two volumes, respectively entitled *Unitarianism Confuted* and *Unitarianism Defended*; and from their pages he who cares to read them now can judge the controversy.

Unitarianism Confuted expresses a desire, possibly a belief, but hardly a fact. It may confute Unitarianism with those to whom it is already confuted; but from its temper, method, and low range of ability, it is poorly calculated to confute Unitarians.

With respect to temper, the plea may be made that the standard should not be too exacting; in the heat of controversy, as in the grip of battle, phraseology will not be always nice. But we open to the general preface, and there read that Unitarians are "men wise in their own conceits and fervent idolaters of their own unhallowed reason;" that "this glorious transcript of the Divine Mind — originated in the counsels of Triune Deity from all eternity — promulgated to fallen man in the shades of Paradise," they "have endeavored and are daily endeavoring to pull down and destroy;" that "the existence and agency of the

Tempter, as Satan is emphatically styled by way of bad eminence, is regarded as allegorical and visionary by men, unthinking that it is one of the depths of Satan, one of his most subtle devices, to make them deny and ridicule the idea of his existence, that he may thus throw a dreaming and deluded world off its guard and lead it captive to his will." The belief of Unitarians is described in Milton's picture of Death,— "If form it may be called that form hath none,"— quoting, or rather misquoting, from memory most likely. Unitarian polemic is alleged to be characterized by "hardy misquotations," "inconsequential reasonings," "the perversion of obvious meanings." "Unitarians," we are told, "have borne some such proportion to the Christian church, as monsters bear to the species of which they are the unhappy distortions." It informs us that "unworn hostility is waged by Unitarians against the mind of God." In closing it quotes from the Collect for Good Friday, "Have mercy upon all Jews, Turks, Infidels and Heretics." All this within the scope of a brief preface. In the pages that follow, the like expressions are scattered with less plentiful profusion, but they are there; and they give the volume a tone of which the nobler passages do not neutralize the impression; they are of the bitterness that alienates, not the charity that wins.

The method of argumentation, too, considered with reference to Unitarians, is singularly mistaken. It is a continuous appeal to authority,— the decretals of church, texts of Scripture,— precisely what Unitarians had lived through, wearied of, and cast aside. Unitarians were then somewhat nearer to Orthodox standards than now; but then, as now, it was needful to show them, not what Moses and Athanasius said, but what Reason and Conscience say. The Unitarian may not be wiser than other men, he may be less wise; but in general he has a characteristic way of

seeing things, and by this way you must approach him if you will win him. Here these advocates made a capital mistake; original Greek they flung at him; proof texts they showered upon him; creeds were quoted and explained to him; but the presentation of the Orthodox view in such manner as to show that it answered to the deepest and truest within him was not offered him; and so failure was decreed from the beginning.

Judged by the common, intellectual standard, too, the book, as a whole, seems hardly worthy the occasion that called it forth. Some of the lectures were apparently given off-hand; and, among their marked characteristics, just discrimination and careful scholarship are not conspicuous. The lecturers spoke as to those who would make no reply, and as if in forgetfulness or disdain of the fact, that in their audience sat three at least who were following them into whatever highways or byways of learning; who would expose the fallacies of their ungirt logic, and call their careless words into judgment. Even in the better portions of the volume, the occasion seems hardly met. Among the thirteen were men of academic honors, who in scholarly and thoughtful speech declared their convictions; but there was not at that day a learned prelate in all England who would not have added to his fame by a polemic victory over Martineau and Thom; indeed there were very few who could have risked their fame in such an encounter. All along the line the contest seems unequal,—the squires of the church doing battle where her best trained and most valorous knights were demanded. This is only to be regretted; for in polemic contests truth prospers from the equal match, and even party faith is too cheaply vindicated where the combat is one-sided.

If this seems severe judgment, it may be shown that the studious public have judged the volume yet more severely. The book has passed out of sight, is unread and unhonored.



Yet does it contain pages of earnest thought and brave sincerity, and incidental discussions not lightly to be pondered.

In *Unitarianism Defended* we enter another atmosphere. Occasionally the old Adam gets in a word, and there are certainly pages that would wear a more dignified look after a considerable excision. Yet in its prevailing tone the book is perhaps as near to the model of a polemic as ever issued from a debate so earnest. With especial emphasis may this be said of the part borne by Mr. Martineau. In the letters from which we have quoted, the evidence is plain enough that his hand held the pen that wrote them; and under those polished sentences there lurks at times a tone of irony that may suggest Izaak Walton's instruction for the use of the frog: "Put your hook . . . through his mouth and out at his gills; and in so doing use him as though you loved him." In his lectures, however, he lifts himself into the atmosphere of knowledge and of thought, where the loftiest aim and the noblest feeling rule him. Only once does he make a personal reply, and that reply from its uniqueness should be quoted. A venerable and much esteemed but over-earnest lecturer had indulged in something like a tirade against him, in answer to which he may have read: "As to that excellent man who, on Wednesday last, treated in this way our most cherished convictions and most innocent actions, I have said nothing in reply to his accusations; for I well know them to have failed in benevolence, only from excess of mistaken piety. Had he a little more power of imagination, to put himself into the feelings and ideas of others, doubtless he would understand both his Bible and his fellow-disciples better than he does. Meanwhile, I would not stir, with the breath of disrespect, one of his gray hairs; or by any severity of expostulation disturb the peace of an old age, so affectionate and good as his. He and we must ere long pass to a world where

the film will fall from the eye of error, and we shall know, even as we are known."

In the discussion of the various problems the Unitarians drew prevailingly from three sources,— Nature, the Moral Consciousness, and the Bible. From their use of the Bible one would hardly suspect that they read it on their knees, as was once the practice of a famous theologian; yet it is clear that they held it up to the light in studious and reverent scrutiny of its page. To them it was a Revelation from God,— no less a Revelation because given through men from whom it received a human element. But if the Bible is a Revelation, Nature is that too, and Conscience likewise, when its oracle is distinctly heard. These three revelations, alike from God, cannot contradict, but must rather supplement and explain one another,— their concurrent testimony to any doctrine, our certitude of its truth, the clear remonstrance of any one, a not-to-be-doubted proof that we have misconceived the other two. Hence a largeness in their reasonings and a strength in their conclusions, quite in contrast with those of their adversaries, who of these grounds of argument knew only one, and from this limitation were denied the essential condition of knowing even that. In one of Mr. Martineau's most earnest passages he protests against the "infidel rejection" of Nature's ancient oracle. It was something to him well-nigh incredible, the scepticism that denied two Words of God to the misunderstanding and even perversion of a third. And those who pronounce against Unitarianism as a negative faith he asks to justify the positive character of a system that "disbelieves reason, distrusts the moral sense, dislikes science, discredits nature."

Not only were these defenders strong men; it is evident that of their strength they were not sparing. They did not aim merely to repulse assaulting arguments, but to give their faith the noblest presentation. Their themes were

worn and hackneyed, yet they seized upon them as though they had never before been treated; and by the vigor of their thought and their ample learning they gave them a statement remarkable for nothing more than its freshness. In the main, they answered their opponents, not by rejoinder, but by implication, building a structure of doctrine over against which the Orthodox doctrines seem incredible. Thus peculiarly it was with Mr. Martineau. Three of his lectures were reprinted in America, in *Studies of Christianity*; and of the many who have read and admired them, probably not one to whom the fact was not told has ever suspected that they came out of the hottest of controversies. They suggest the scholar and thinker coming from his study with his most careful, albeit his most fervid word. He discredits the Orthodox doctrines somewhat as Newton in his *Principia* discredits the mediæval astronomy, which, without noticing, he annihilates. Surely on the lines which he traversed no one who heard him or who read him needed afterwards to ask the positive attitude of the Unitarian mind. The only qualification to this statement might be in the fact that his presentations were somewhat in advance of the Unitarianism of the time. Indeed, with slight touches here and there, they might do service as Unitarian tracts even now; nor have Unitarians in their theological literature discussions of a similar character more nobly or more reverently toned.

Among the marvellous features of this controversy was the vast labor it implied in a period so brief. Taken in connection with the many other duties that engaged, it was an exhibition of intellectual prowess not often paralleled. The first lecture was given on the Orthodox side on the sixth of February; the last was given by Mr. Martineau on the seventh of May. Between these dates the whole labor must be compressed. Yet the shortest of Mr. Martineau's lectures, if given in full, could fall but

little short of three hours in average pulpit delivery, and one of them would reach four. His discussion of the Atonement, together with preface and appendix, reaches nearly to one hundred quarto pages. Mr. Thom's presentation of the Trinity is nearly as long. Mr. Martineau's five lectures with their prefaces and appendices would make a quarto volume of a little less than four hundred pages; and this, it should be remembered, not thought and learning crudely thrown together, but thoroughly organized, nobly elaborated and adorned.

CHAPTER V

MINISTRY IN LIVERPOOL (*continued*)

IT is safe to affirm that Mr. Martineau emerged from this controversy with a glad sense of relief. We can enter into the satisfaction with which he resumed the less distracted exercise of his regular and more congenial offices, the new delight of unhurried study and intercourse with friends.

But neither in his own consciousness nor in general esteem could he come forth from such a contest as he went into it. As well might he think to turn his dial back, as to be again the man that he had been. Shape it to his thought however modestly he might, there was the consciousness of powers which, though severely tried, had not failed; powers, therefore, that to other arduous tasks could be confidently applied. Abroad there was on the one side the new admiration of his friends and followers for the manifest splendor of his genius; on the other side a sort of admiration by inversion of the brilliant and powerful heresiarch that Satan had let loose for a season. It was, in a sense, a new attitude in which he stood; there was a new part that he must bear. A new part was, indeed, not far before him, in which his proved powers should be brought to other and severer proof, in which expectation should again be distanced by achievement.

Meanwhile there were sermons to preach, the young people to instruct, his parishioners to visit, the sorrowing

to comfort, the morally lame and blind to heal and restore as he might. With these offices, together with his books and his pen, we take courage to hope that he did not suffer from *ennui*.

Our next meeting with him outside his appointed walk is in the September following the controversy, at the opening of a new chapel in Manchester, on which occasion he preached a sermon on *The Outer and the Inner Temple*, which they who heard surely did not soon forget. He drew his lesson out of the Messianic idea, which, divested of its Jewish coloring, he showed to be not especially Jewish, but the property of mankind. It is involved in the great trust in Providence that ever looks for a better that shall come. Ignorance and sin shall pass; where now is strife the dove of Peace shall hover; and whatever power works to this end is the Messiah of God's appointing. But over against the Messiah that God in his wisdom appoints, we meet the Messiah which man in his foolishness expects and insists on having; and the two come into sorrowful collision. And the error being not national but human, it is ours to-day as it was theirs with whom Jesus walked and suffered. Then, turning to the times of Jesus, and placing the expectations that met him in contrast with the reality he was,—God's Messiah and man's,—he draws out the impressive lesson:—

“See, first, how the great Father rebukes every plan of partial and exclusive deliverance; and declares that any rescue of his must fold the earth in its embrace. The Hebrews would have had a divine Emancipator to be theirs alone; the child of a nation; the property of a class; the personal concentration of their collective peculiarities; the punisher of other men's hatred and contempt, by adopting and indulging their own. . . . He takes a village Christ, whose soul is human, and not Hebrew; whose spirit has become acquainted with men in the retreats of families,

not in the schools of Priests and Pharisees; and felt the presence of God in the stainless breath of his native hills, and the lilies of his native fields, more than in the smoke of altars, and the withered fragrance of incense; — one who would neither strive nor cry, who had no scorn except for narrow affections and mean pretences; from whose voice hearers, listening for denunciation, receive the tones more piercing far, of a divine forgiveness; and whose eye, when spectators look for the flash of resentment, fills only with silent tears. Nor was this all; for when his countrymen, enraged that his *mind* is not exclusively theirs, led him away to Calvary, God does but take the occasion to wrest from them his *person* too; permits his executioners to destroy the only part of his nature in which he resembled them, and then redeems the everlasting elements of his humanity for a blessing to all people and all times; and says to Death, ‘Take now the son of David, but leave the son of Man; the Israelite is thine, but I suffer not my holy one to see corruption.’ And so, the cross, which was to disown him as the Messiah of Jerusalem, made him the Messiah of mankind.”¹

The following year, 1840, he did great service by bringing out a second hymn-book. It was entitled *Hymns for the Christian Church and Home*. It was a careful and toilsome collection of six hundred and fifty-one hymns. The book contained, besides the ordinary conveniences for its special use, a reference to Scripture texts, of which the hymns are the designed or unpremeditated utterance, and a preface which no student of Hymnology can afford to pass. It attracted wide attention, and came into very general use in the Unitarian churches in England. It ran through a large number of editions, was in use, indeed, for a third of a century, till he himself superseded it with another collection.

¹ *Essays, Reviews, and Addresses*, vol. iv. pp. 375-377.

A discussion of this book, though very tempting, must not be indulged in here; it contains two hymns, however, which we must note for their peculiar interest. They are widely known now, but their first appearance was in this volume. One, uttering in verse the deep sentiment of the Scripture, "with his stripes we are healed," begins with the familiar stanza, —

"A voice upon the midnight air,
Where Kedron's moonlit waters stray,
Weeps forth in agony of prayer,
'O Father! take this cup away!'"

The other, a song of trust, drawn out of the text "Though he slay me, yet will I trust in him," sings to the experience of how many hearts, —

"Thy way is in the deep, O Lord!
E'en there we'll go with thee:
We'll meet the tempest at thy word,
And walk upon the sea!"¹

Both these hymns are entered as anonymous; yet was their author well known to the compiler, for he was none other than Mr. Martineau himself.

We come now to the "new part" he was to bear; this year, 1840, he was appointed Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy and Political Economy in Manchester New College. This event determined his life to Philosophy conjointly with Theology. Here for forty-five years he was to toil at the deep problems of the sages, subjecting their doctrines to the severest analysis, and dropping his plummet into deeps they did not sound.

¹ This hymn has been widely appropriated, and prevailingly with a departure from Mr. Martineau in the first line by the use of the preposition "on" instead of "in," — "on the deep" rather than "in the deep." Whether this is from mistake, or through the exercise of that very questionable right, which many compilers claim, to reconstruct hymns, I cannot say; but the sense is materially different.

It is with peculiar interest that we look back from the nonagenarian sage to the thinker of thirty-five. It was at the opening of the October session of the College that he gave his introductory lecture, in which we may divine something of the spirit of Sir Galahad going forth in search for the San Greal. Easily and naturally, but with a sustained eloquence, he told his hearers how Philosophy arose, outlined the vast tracts it was his hope to explore, enjoined the severe method by which alone philosophical studies can be successfully pursued, and justified the claim of Philosophy to be the promoter of man's higher welfare. "Complaints," says he, "are often made of the uncertain and shadowy results from all speculative science: and certainly it will construct no docks; lay down no railways; weave no cotton; and, if civilization is to be measured *exclusively* by the scale and grandeur of its material elements, we can claim for our subject no large operation on human improvement. To use the words of Novalis, . . . 'Philosophy can bake no bread; but it can procure for us God, freedom, and immortality.'" He makes his own the question of the German, "Which, now, is more practical, philosophy or economy?" Still further does he press claim for its dignity and usefulness: "What periods could be least well spared from the progress of civilization? Surely, the golden ages of philosophy in Greece, and its revival in modern England, France, and Germany. What are the names, whose loss from the annals of our race would introduce the most terrible and dreary changes in its subsequent advance? Those of Plato and Aristotle in the ancient world; of Bacon, Locke, and Kant in more recent times: and it is surely easier to conceive what we should have been without Homer, than without Socrates."¹

Mr. Martineau had now vocation and avocation, and to both he brought a consecrated genius. The toiling pro-

¹ *Essays, Reviews, and Addresses*, vol. iv. p. 17.

fessor would leave in his church no duty unperformed; the hard-worked minister would go with no slipshod preparation to the professor's chair. The College had just returned to Manchester after its thirty-seven years in York, and he was here one day each week for the delivery of his lectures. These must perforce be freshly prepared; and under any circumstances they could have cost him no trifling toil. There was, too, a feature of his situation that must have added not slightly to his labors. The keeper of a lighthouse knows always where he is, and with ready tongue can name the headlands and islands he looks out upon; but a sailor on the deep must take frequent and careful reckonings if he will know his longitudes. Mr. Martineau was on the deep, and, as a pilot to other mariners, he had now a peculiar interest in his reckonings. The truth was that he was somewhat out of his reckoning, and was embarrassed in consequence. He had early settled, as we have seen, on the creed of philosophical Necessity, and this he supposed himself to hold; but somehow preparation such as he had did not satisfy, and former opinions needed to be qualified. The fact was that, without clearly seeing it, he was in process of transition: the faith to which he thought he was leading others, he was himself abandoning. Curiously, but not unnaturally, the true *status* of his mind was shown him by another rather than discovered by himself. The *syllabus* of his first course of lectures came into the hands of his friend, John Stuart Mill,¹ whose searching glance measured his departure from the Necessarian standards, and detected the direction in which his mind was moving. Mr. Martineau pleasantly remarks: "Though he saw to the bottom of my apostasy, he did not cut me off as a lost soul. On the contrary, his manifestation of friendly interest in my future work at old problems on new lines was gracious and respectful."

¹ Preface to *Types of Ethical Theory*, p. xi.

Thus doubly occupied as minister and professor, it is not surprising that during the next five years he did little outside critical labor. In 1841 he printed an essay, which had evidently done service as a lecture, on *Five Points of Christian Faith*,¹ a very eloquent presentation of his attitude as a Unitarian theologian. During the same year he wrote the letter on Lant Carpenter published in the *Memoirs* prepared by Dr. Carpenter's son, one of the fairest tributes a pupil ever bore his master.

The next year he printed nothing of importance; the year following, 1843, dates a blessing to many minds and hearts, the first series of *Endeavors after the Christian Life*, a selection from his pulpit discourses. Hitherto his printed words had been mainly critical or polemical; here was the message of the religious teacher, spoken to the faiths and hopes of men.

This book we shall meet again when we shall linger over its pages. To-day we place it on our library shelves with the classic literature of devotion,—different enough from the *Theologia Germanica*, yet rightfully in its companionship; not at all like *Holy Living and Holy Dying*, yet worthy to stand beside it; yet at its coming those in the judgment-seats of criticism betrayed no special enthusiasm. To English Churchdom it was a light that did not shine through cathedral windows; hardly, therefore, to be seen; and those who from their position might have been supposed to see, apparently saw rather dimly. The *Christian Reformer* smiled dubiously; the *Christian Examiner* was critical rather than cordial; the prevailing approval was the faint praise that damns. A good book, however, is a magnet that attracts its own; and neither critical indifference nor critical disparagement can permanently annul its influence. This book found readers, and after more than fifty years it finds them still. The edition now selling in America is printed from the eighth English edition.

¹ See *Studies of Christianity*, edited by William R. Alger.

In 1845 he resumed those critical studies by which he was to become so widely known. The *Prospective Review* of that year was enriched with elaborate and eloquent discussions of the *Life and Correspondence of Thomas Arnold*, *Church and State*, *Whewell's Morality*. The following year he contributed to the same magazine a discussion of *Whewell's Systematic Morality* and *Theodore Parker's Discourse on Matters Pertaining to Religion*.¹ In 1847 appeared the second series of *Endeavors*, too like the first to need special comment, and in the *Westminster Review* a paper on *Strauss and Theodore Parker*. In 1848 the readers of the *Prospective Review* met articles from his pen on *William E. Channing* and *Philosophical Christianity in France*, and thence on such, in the main, is the story!

Such, in the main, the story! Alas for his biographer who would fain give the charm of variety to his narrative that it is such! Were there only some conspicuous intellectual gyrations of which to tell, some striking eccentricities to explain, a few wrong deeds for which to apologize, how might they add interest to these pages! Just the labors of the Christian teacher and scholar,—that is all; and of these how monotonous the tale! This day-by-day sunshine is very well; but it is in the narrative of simooms and cyclones and thunder-storms that we are interested. Very possibly some one who has lived near that life, in the record of personal incidents and experiences,—joys, pains, friendships,—may find a variety these pages cannot offer. But even here, from the prevailing evenness and decorum there must be limitations. In a Bentley not even a Boswell should have found a Johnson.

We do, however, approach here an incident of interest and importance. Under his faithful and able ministry his church had prospered; but the rapid growth of Liverpool,

¹ All these papers are reprinted in the four volumes of *Essays, Reviews, and Addresses*.

by enlarging the business quarter, had sent the residents farther away, and the Paradise Street Chapel had become inconveniently distant from the congregation that worshipped within it. It was determined, therefore, to build a new chapel in Hope Street; and of this the foundation stone was laid in May, 1848. Worn from excessive toil, Mr. Martineau seized upon the opportunity for a period of rest and study in Germany. He took with him his entire family; his eldest son, then at University College, London, he transferred for the time to the University at Berlin.

In May he assisted in laying the corner-stone of the new chapel. In July he went to Dresden, where in the art galleries he found both profit and recreation. Thence he went in October to Berlin, where he settled down to study. Trendelenburg was then there, and of him he took lectures in logic and the history of philosophy. Trendelenburg was an able expounder of the Stagirite, and this circumstance brought Mr. Martineau to Greek philosophical studies, the effect of which was, in his own language, a "new intellectual birth." "I seemed to pierce, through what had been words before, into contact with living thought, and the black grammatical text was aglow with luminous philosophy."¹ He also bestowed a good deal of attention upon German Philosophy, and his friend, R. H. Hutton, who was with him, tells how in the depths of a German winter they toiled in a fruitless chase after Hegel's "pure being and pure nothing." Together also they bent over the more luminous page of Plato. He found it of great advantage to pursue Greek and later German thought together, for the light they shed upon each other. He once told a friend that he never understood Aristotle's *Ethics* till he translated it into German in Trendelenburg's classroom; and in the preface to the *Types* he tells us that the "new way of entrance upon ancient literature . . . lifted

¹ Preface to *Types of Ethical Theory*, pp. xii-xiii.

the darkness from the pages of Kant and even Hegel." The effect of these studies, however, was something more than enlarged knowledge; from their influence the deflection from the Necessarian view which Mill had detected reached to conscious and complete repudiation. He was converted to that spiritual philosophy of which, through all his toilsome life he was to be a fervid apostle. In the preface to the *Types* he tells us: "The metaphysic of the world had come home to me, and never again could I say that phenomena, in their clusters and chains, were all, or find myself in a universe with no categories but the like and unlike, the synchronous and successive. The possible also is, whether it happens or not; and its categories, of the right, the beautiful, the necessarily true, may have their contents defined and held ready for realization, whatever centuries lapse ere they appear."¹

This vacation period was not without its distractions. He had illness in his family, the excitement of war was in Germany. It was, however, a period of intellectual activity of which the results were of great significance. It brought him also somewhat of diversion. There was the kindling spectacle of the Bavarian Alps; there was a residence of six weeks in the secularized convent of St. Zeno; a sail in a private boat down the Danube, a brief stay in Vienna. There was also inspiring intercourse with great minds, among them Trendelenburg, the Zumpts, Von Ranke.

He returned in October, 1849, after an absence of fifteen months. The beautiful Hope Street Church was ready for him. In his opening discourse he remembered those who had died in his absence, in a passage of tenderest significance: "Those close-filled ranks cannot hide from me the vacancies in their midst; and I miss *here* the sweet attentive look of maidenly docility, *there* the dear and venerable

¹ p. xiii.

form of one from whose eyes age had exhausted the vision but not the tears." This dear and venerable one was his mother.

The church and the college labors were both renewed with the wonted tireless industry. To the College he must carry the new light; and to this end his lectures, laboriously prepared, must be superseded by new ones, or reconstructed into congruity with the "metaphysic of the world." His critical labors were renewed, if, indeed, they had been intermitted. In 1849 he printed a second paper on *Channing*. The following year he wrote the noble papers on *Letter and Spirit* and F. W. Newman's *Phases of Faith* and the *Church of England*. The year following came the essays on *The Creed of Christendom*, *The Battle of the Churches*, *Europe since the Reformation*, and the sadly famous essay on *Mesmeric Atheism*. These were all notable papers.

We come now to a passage in his life of which we would willingly be silent, did it not seem cowardly to be so; I mean the estrangement between him and his sister Harriet; or, perhaps I might better say, her estrangement from him; for through all the dismal years of banishment from her sympathy he preserved for her the fraternal heart.¹ Besides, simple right seems to require that the story be told again. All the world has heard it, but, in the main, they have heard but one version of it; and here, as ever,

“One man’s word is no man’s word,
Justice asks that both be heard.”

The name of Harriet Martineau is one to be spoken

¹ I never reciprocated the alienation from which I suffered, and should have escaped a real sorrow, had the efforts to remove it been successful. It has simply counted for me as an instance more of my sister’s liability to oscillate between extremes of devotedness and sympathy, and has in no way disenchanted the old affection, or impaired my estimate of her high aims, her large powers, and her noble private virtues. (Dr. Martineau in the London *Daily News*, December 30, 1884.)

with admiration. She was a woman of large powers and generous sympathies, and through toilsome and suffering years she consecrated both to the service of humanity. Her intellect had not the penetration of her brother's, but it was more versatile; and though we would rather meet him on the judgment-seat where ethical justice must be given voice, in her was the more cosmopolitan sympathy. While he would wage unrelenting battle with the wrong that smites, she would meet the sufferer with the readier smile.

She was a great and noble woman, but to all their limitations. Her devotion to truth was unquestionable; the patience that searches for the simple verity of things was not so marked in her. She was of the stuff of which martyrs, not philosophers, are made. Her judgment, whatever it was, she would stand by at any cost, but she was not sure to come to it by the way of careful discrimination. Hence her opinions, whether of men or of doctrines, wear often a *per saltum* and even a capricious look.

She had a twofold physical affliction, ill-health and deafness. In spite of these she achieved her brave and brilliant career; but none the less it is difficult not to believe that they gave a color to her spirit by which things and people were sometimes *discolored* to her apprehension. Such extenuation it is easy to exaggerate, and she would be the last to ask it; and few who have suffered as much have needed it so little. But few spirits are so stoical or so Christian as to be lifted above a rasping pain or a tormenting malady. Emerson with Carlyle's dyspepsia very likely had not scolded like Carlyle, but we fear he had been a different Emerson.

She had a will whose servant she was, and others who would prosper with her must needs be; her conscientiousness was absolute, but needed now and then to be toned with "sweet reasonableness;" her charity was large, but of the kind that sometimes faileth.

As is known to all the world, she experienced a great change in her religious and philosophical attitude. She began life a very devout Unitarian, mildly shading off from the Presbyterianism of her family. She became the disciple and translator of Auguste Comte; later she sat down at the feet of the phrenologist and mesmerist, Henry George Atkinson.

Though it was from her relation with Atkinson that the estrangement culminated, they mistake who suppose it began there. The relations between her and her brother in earlier years had been peculiarly sympathetic; in all her heroic struggle he had braced her with his counsel and encouragement. Correspondence had flowed on between them, unreserved, fraternal, tender; domestic interests, financial perplexities, literary aims, personal ambitions, religious doubts and hopes, they had laid before each other with a freedom which only the warmest sympathy can make possible. At length she issued a mandate to her correspondents that they should destroy her letters. The penalty of disobedience was that they should receive no more. Her brother remonstrated. The letters he had were the record of a brave struggle which should not be lost; they were besides very dear to him, and he could not part with them. Her threat was not at first executed in full; but her "letters became notes, ever fewer and more far between, limited to matters of fact, comparatively dry and cold." They ceased altogether before the Atkinson episode to which now we come.

Henry George Atkinson was a man not without intelligence of a certain order. He seems to have studied Bacon; he had acquaintance with physiology; he had given special attention to phrenology and mesmerism; from the only writing we have from him one may gather many illustrations of the mentally strange and abnormal. But one who may astonish in a drawing-room may be

quite out of place in a congress of sages; and the efforts to sustain him in the rôle of unappreciated genius have been wholly abortive. The one thing he did discredits such an estimate of him, and the fact that he did nothing else still further discredits it. Men with doctrines as unpopular as his have conquered admiration; yet, in cultivated English society, inquire for Henry George Atkinson, and there may be remembrance of him as one who had a little cheap notoriety many years ago, which a peculiar relation with Miss Martineau gave him, and little more is known of him. Left to himself, he sank to a natural obscurity, out of which she had lifted him for a brief period. Yet this man Harriet Martineau, immeasurably his superior, whom they of regal intellect most justly honored, accepted as her philosopher! At his feet she sat down as a learner!

The result of this intellectual *mésalliance* was a book on *The Laws of Man's Nature and Development*. It comprised a series of letters that passed between them, in which Mr. Atkinson assumed the tone of the most confident of masters, and Miss Martineau that of the most docile of disciples. It was in large part a crude and superficial handling of man's deepest and dearest faiths. "Philosophy finds no God in nature," it tells us, "no personal being or creator, nor sees the want of any; nor has God revealed himself miraculously." The belief in another life is a harmless delusion "so long as it does not interfere with our conduct in this." "Free will! the very idea is enough to make a Democritus fall on his back and roar with laughter, and a more serious thinker almost despair of bringing men to their reason." The doctrine of moral responsibility is declared "untrue and immoral." The outlook for man's better condition is not in allegiance to a high and Holy One, not in incentives enkindled by the hope of immortality, not in obedience to the sense of obligation, not in all together; but in the study of the laws of man's nature,

which in their last statement are physical laws. The clue to this study, the light among lights of superlative brightness, is *mesmerism*.

The book, bearing simply the name of Henry George Atkinson, had surely fallen flat. Had the name of Harriet Smith or of Harriet Jones been coupled with his, its fate had been no better. It bore, however, with his the name of Harriet Martineau, at that time the most prominent woman in England. The attention that it received and the impression that it made were, therefore, out of all proportion to its interior significance. In such cases, too, names do not stand for individuals alone, but for family and affiliations also. Miss Martineau was not merely Miss Martineau; she was the sister of James Martineau, who was fast becoming one of the most potent forces in English thought and letters; she was a member of a circle; she had come out from a sect of which, or of whose tendencies, however absurdly, she was held to be representative. These circumstances gave significance to her position and weight to her words.

Mr. Martineau was at that time one of the editors of the *Prospective Review*, and the book required notice in its pages. Thoroughly to have reviewed the book could not have been a labor of love to any one of his editorial associates. Besides, in the general division of labor, the treatment of books and subjects of a speculative character was peculiarly his office. Most unwillingly, therefore, he sat down to the task it seemed ignoble to shirk, and the result was the article on *Mesmeric Atheism*. It was a trenchant and searching review, certainly within the requirements of polemical morality, but remorseless in the exposure of flimsy logic and shallow sophistry. It was not merely an answer to the book; it was its complete annihilation. Of his sister he spoke most gently, but Atkinson fared somewhat hardly at his hands. He

had offered himself as a philosopher; his credentials had been examined and he was dismissed as a charlatan. At this treatment of her hero Miss Martineau was deeply offended, and to the end of her life repelled all offers of reconciliation.

Such is the story of that estrangement which, with various coloring and distortion, is known as widely as the sufferers from it. It suggests questions of mental peculiarity and moral temperament for which I will not pause. I will here only remark that the measure of offence conceived seems far beyond any rational estimate of the offence committed. A brother's refusal to destroy a sister's letters because they are dear to him may be a mistake; but surely it would oftener give pleasure than provoke resentment. A few passages in the criticism might have been more gently toned, though the admirers of Miss Martineau could hardly plead her example in asking it. To the plea sometimes put forth that the criticism did violence to private affection, the answer is obvious: Truth, like the Christ, knows no private affection, a dictum which Harriet Martineau surely would have allowed. And I cannot help feeling that she would have been truer to herself and to her great intellect and heart, if, instead of thus resenting, she had kindled with admiration for the brother whose affection, often tried and always true, could not deflect him from that unsparing truth which his conscience summoned him to declare.

CHAPTER VI

LONDON

THE decade of the fifties was with Mr. Martineau a period of great literary activity, and in it he brought forth some of the noblest of his essays. The papers on Hamilton, Mill, Mansel, Comte, Lessing, Schleiermacher, the remarkable paper on *Personal Influences on Present Theology*, were all within this period. He wrote for the *National Review*, the *Prospective*, and the *Westminster*, commonly three or four papers yearly, elaborate and brilliant discussions of great problems of thought. This writing alone would seem task sufficient for high talent when ordinarily industrious. In his case it was the by-play of one who kept regular appointment with the pulpit and the professor's chair.

As has often been the case with distinguished English men of letters, he won his first more emphatic recognition in America. In 1852 Crosby and Nichols of Boston brought out a volume of his essays with the title of *Miscellanies*, under the editorial care of Thomas Starr King. In 1858 the American Unitarian Association brought out another and fuller volume entitled *Studies of Christianity*, edited by William R. Alger. A little later he was invited to visit Boston and give a course of lectures before the Lowell Institute, and had he come these profound and brilliant books would have prepared for him a flattering welcome. He gave the invitation a favorable answer; but the first interest of our people was drafted into the stern

issues of the Civil War, Mr. Martineau, like many another Englishman, was of South-side sympathy, and the engagement was postponed to another day that never dawned.

There came a change. University College had been established in London on that broad principle of "free learning" which Manchester New College had struggled so long and so heroically to make secure. To a certain extent the two institutions became competitors, and Manchester New College suffered from the competition. Lay students were attracted to the younger and better equipped institution. The decision was made to make the rival an ally; and in 1853 Manchester New College was moved to London. She here gave up in the main her secular courses, for which the confederate institution could the better care, and confined herself to theology and allied studies.

This change brought extra tax upon Mr. Martineau. Manchester was one hour from Liverpool; London was six hours; and this long journey must be taken to keep appointment with his classes. He was obliged to make longer and less frequent visits, compressing into a day or two days work that would better have been distributed through four or five. Of course the arrangement was wearisome and unsatisfactory.

For four years, however, it continued, until 1857, when he was invited to come to London and devote all his time to the College. The invitation was accepted; and the relations with his church, which twenty-five years of faithful toil had consecrated, were sundered. On the second of August he gave his parting sermon, in which he told his people that the one deep faith that had determined his word and work among them was the "living union of God with our Humanity." This further passage for its touch of mental history should be quoted: "Long did this faith pine obscurely within me, ere it could find its way to any

clear joy. It was not enough for me that God should,—as they say, '*exist* ;' it was needful to have assurance that he *lives*. It was a poor thought that he was the *beginning* of all, if he stood aloof from it in its *constancy*. It withered the inmost heart to believe that he dwelt and never stirred in the universal space, and delegated all to inexorable 'Laws ;'—laws that could never hear the most piercing shriek, and looked with stony eyes on the upturned face of agony. It seemed to stain the very heaven to charge him with the origin of human guilt, and represents him as first moulding men into sin, and then punishing them out of it. A mere constructing and legislating God, satisfied to adjust 'co-existences' and establish 'successions ;' who filled the cold sky, and brooded over the waste sea, and watched upon the mountain-head, and embraced the waxing and waning moon, and suffered the tide of history to sweep through him without heeding its most passionate and surging waves ;—a God who wrung from us a thousand sighs that never touched him, who broke us in remorse for ills that are not ours,—who drew to him, day and night without ceasing, moans of prayer he never answered ;—such a One it was a vain attempt really to trust and love. At times the faith in him appeared but to turn the darkness of atheism into flame; and, in its light, the face of this blessed life and universe lost its fostering look, and seemed twisted into an Almighty sarcasm. Nor could I ever feel that the permanent stillness and personal inaccessibility of God was at all compensated by exceptional miracle. An occasional 'message' rather serves to render more sensible and undeniable the *usual* absence and silence; nor can the 'sender' well say to his servant, 'You go there' without implying, 'I stay here.' Merely to fling in to the Deist's 'God of nature' an historical fragment of miracle does little to meet the exigencies of human piety. It is not 'once upon a time,'

it is not 'now and then,'—nor is it on the theatre of another's life to the exclusion of our own,—that we sigh to escape from the bound movements of nature into the free heart of God. We pine as prisoners, till we burst into the air of that *supernatural life which He lives eternally*: we are parched with a holy thirst, till we find contact with the running waters of his quick affection. Him *immediately*; him *in person*; him in whispers of the day, and eye to eye by night; him for a close refuge in temptation, not as a large thought of ours but as an Almightiness in himself; him ready with his moistening dews for the dry heart, and his breathings of hope for the sorrowing; him always and everywhere living for our holy trust, do we absolutely need for our repose, and wildly wander till we find.”¹

The invitation to move to London was attended by an incident that should not be passed unnoticed. English Unitarianism was then, as ever, of old school and new; and at the head of the College was John James Tayler. Against Mr. Tayler it was possible to allege a wide departure from Orthodox opinion; but even theological animosity could do no more. His learning was large, his insight profound, his candor unflinching. Few have ever met their fellow-men with gentler spirit or looked to God in sincerer worship.

At this time he had not written in support of the Tübingen view of the Fourth Gospel, but he was known to be in sympathy with German culture, and through him more, perhaps, than through any other man was the influence of Germany being felt in the liberal churches of England. In fact, while as a worshipper he was of all schools, as a scholar and thinker he was emphatically of the new. Mr. Martineau was of the new school also, and known of all men to be so;—hence an old-school panic. By the side of such a man as Mr. Tayler shall we place such a

¹ *Essays, Reviews, and Addresses*, vol. iv. pp. 516–517.

man as Mr. Martineau? Will it not be giving to new-school opinions too preponderant an influence? Should not Mr. Tayler be counterpoised by a representative of less radical views? In pursuance of this feeling a protest was circulated against Mr. Martineau's appointment. It was signed numerously and by some of the best of men, friends and even relatives of Mr. Martineau, who knew the difference between truth and affection, and could be faithful to both without confounding their offices. Indeed, if we may judge from the prints of the time, a considerable feeling was stirred, and the measure of Mr. Martineau's departure from the standards of orthodox Unitarianism was freely and even earnestly canvassed. The flurry passed like a summer squall, after which all nature beams again.

Though the beginning of Mr. Martineau's connection with the College in London was not free from anxiety, yet on the whole his relations with it were exceedingly pleasant. At its head and in the chair of Biblical and Historical Theology was one of the most personal of his personal friends, a brother of his heart; in the chair of Hebrew Language and Literature was his own gifted son. Happy the council of wisdom to which affection brings a grace!

The number of students was not large, — in fact it was very small. The catalogue, however, of those years bears names that have since been widely mentioned, among them Alexander Gordon, R. A. Armstrong, J. Estlin Carpenter, Philip H. Wicksteed, — men who must have met him with receptive and appreciative mind. In the work of instruction it was his custom to begin in Ethics with annotating Paley and Butler; and where lay the emphasis of his dissent from the one and of approval of the other, it is not difficult to divine. For more advanced students he wrote elaborate courses, blending a discussion of principles with an account of systems that stood for them; in which who will may see the incipient form of the great *Types of Ethical*

Theory. In the Philosophy of Religion it is easy to divine what the instruction was from the mighty *Study of Religion* it grew into. His lectures were revised and revised so as to give due recognition to the last discovery and the latest thought.

In logic he did not give himself the like laborious preparation. Here text-books would serve him. He used not one but many,—Hamilton, Mill, Mansel, Bain,—that the student from “familiarity with several nomenclatures might be the slave of none.”¹ For its great value as discipline he brought his classes to the page of Aristotle.

Some of his pupils tell with special satisfaction of readings with him from the Greek,—mainly, if not wholly, of Plato. It was an informal exercise, and for that reason the more enjoyed. They tell of an accurate yet poetic rendering, and a fine classical appreciation.

His lectures were read slowly, so that a student with nimble fingers might take them very nearly as given. His manner was grave and unimpassioned; where great themes are discussed before an audience of four or five the word of wisdom may be spoken, but eloquence would look quite foolish on the wing.

Yet another period of service as a minister was before him. In 1858 Edward Taggart, for thirty years the minister in Little Portland Street Chapel, died. Little Portland Street Chapel, under his ministry, had stood for the older and more dogmatic type of Unitarianism; and the action of the congregation at this juncture was a matter of denominational surprise. The two men who more than any others in England represented the newer and more elastic views were J. J. Tayler and Mr. Martineau; and to each the pulpit was offered. Neither, however, in connection with college duties was willing to undertake it alone; and so both were called to a joint pulpit service. In the terms of

¹ Charles Wicksteed.

settlement there was the stipulation that there should be expected of them no pastoral labors.

Little Portland Street Chapel should satisfy the most austere demands for modesty and simplicity. As one measures it with the eye, five hundred should fill it, and it is plain almost to rudeness. When, however, one might be sure of finding Mr. Tayler or Mr. Martineau in the pulpit, there was no question where in London the largest and loftiest word would be spoken; and those seeking this, in indifference to any standard of faith, were apt to find their way thither. They came from far, not the many but the chosen. Unitarianism, however, is not a favored faith in London, and the great word without popular accessories draws the masses nowhere. Mr. Tayler with his great intellect and great soul had yet a feeble voice; Mr. Martineau had voice enough, but in his utterance there was no declamation; and it required the alert intellect to keep pace with him. It was, however, a remarkable audience. Not unnaturally the students of the College came to hear their professors; in one part of the assembly sat Charles Dickens; in another Frances Power Cobbe, who found the place with all its baldness a fitting one "for serious people to meet to think in;" in yet another Sir Charles Lyell, who spoke with bitterness of the place where England hid her greatest preacher; and withal there was a very plentiful sprinkling of those toiling at the higher tasks of thought and learning.

This arrangement continued till 1869, when Mr. Tayler died. Mr. Martineau succeeded to his place as Principal of the College, and at the same time took the pulpit charge alone. In the two offices he continued till 1872, when, from the strain of unrelaxing labor, his health was beginning to give way; and he laid down the pulpit burden.

During the sixties and seventies the busy pen toiled on as heretofore, and many a page of the *National* and the *Theological* reviews he ennobled and adorned. In 1860

came the splendid paper on *Nature and God*, also a searching review of Bain's *Cerebral Psychology*. In 1862 he published the tremendous paper on *Science, Nescience, and Faith*, a challenge of certain aspects of the philosophy of Evolution, as presented in the newly published *First Principles*. In 1863 he put forth a critique of Renan's *Vie de Jésus*, in which we meet the first distinct avowal of his affiliation with Tübingen. During this and the following year he printed two papers on *Early Messianic Ideas*, which the reader will find profit in comparing with his treatment of the same theme in the *Seat of Authority*.

In 1866 and 1867 W. V. Spencer of Boston brought out two volumes of Mr. Martineau's magazine papers under the title of *Essays, Theological and Philosophical*. These won, from thinkers of all ranks, a grateful recognition. The subject of Hymnology was ever near his mind; and in 1874 he brought out another hymn-book under the title of *Hymns of Praise and Prayer*. His mind had undergone many changes in the thirty-four years since the last hymn-book was published, and Hymnology had been enriched by the writing of many hymns of great value. The new book was the old one revised to date by excisions and additions. In the English Unitarian churches it had mainly the old one to supplant, which it has very largely done, but not entirely. In 1876 he published the first series of *Hours of Thought on Sacred Things*, and in 1879 the second series. These are collections of sermons of his later years, not stronger than those in the volumes of *Endeavors*, but riper, and surpassing them in mystic glow. In 1882 came the volume on *Spinoza*, embracing the pleasantest account of his life and the toughest analysis of his doctrine.

It was his biennial wont to open the college year with an address to the students and alumni and friends. The address opening the session of 1874 was notable both for itself and what followed it. His subject was *Religion as*

Affected by Modern Materialism; and his treatment of it embraced a review of certain evolutionary doctrines then much in vogue. His strictures upon these doctrines were weighty, and Professor Tyndall, knight ever ready to do battle for his faith, took up the gauntlet. The contest, though ruled by all chivalries, was inspired by all ardors; and the author and defender of the *Belfast Address* did Truth inestimable service by provoking *Modern Materialism : its Attitude towards Theology*, a rejoinder that honored and overwhelmed him.

To follow his career in close detail is perhaps not desirable. One day at the College was much like another; the occasional address or essay was but a variation of a familiar nobleness; his domestic peace and social intimacies were too beautiful to be eventful.

In the main, his days passed in quiet joys and ennobling labors. In 1866, however, he became the centre of a contention which was earnest, and not unattended with ill feeling. The chair of Logic and Mental Philosophy in University College was made vacant, and Mr. Martineau was put in nomination for the place. The professorial body, the senate of the College, were unanimous in his favor; and with their indorsement his name went to the Council, with whom was the final decision. Here opposition was encountered, led by none other than George Grote.

Nobody questioned Mr. Martineau's ample attainments; and no one would more surely than he have restricted himself to his appointed tasks, and held aloof from his lecture-room all themes that were irrelevant. There are names, however, that are a red flag in themselves, and Mr. Martineau's in this issue was such. University College was founded on a secular basis; Mr. Martineau was a theologian, bearing a very active part in a theological institution; he was also a pronounced and influential Unitarian. Neither nor both these objections could satisfy pure reason; but the latter alone was enough to satisfy

a theological, the former an anti-theological, antipathy; and both were here. Mr. Martineau's friends urged that the principle of secularization did not require that a man be held disqualified for the position because of his theology, but that he should receive appointment without regard to it; nay, that to deny appointment because of one's religious faith was to set aside that principle. The point was well taken; but Mr. Grote wanted no theologian, and there were others who wanted no Unitarian, — who felt that Unitarian influence in the College was already sufficiently great, or who feared that the appointment of a Unitarian so prominent as Mr. Martineau would be the occasion of popular suspicion from which the College would suffer. The debate was taken up by the press, and language was used too emphatic to be inoffensive. Some of the best men in England were on Mr. Martineau's side, among them Mr. Gladstone. In the Council the vote was a tie, and the issue was decided against Mr. Martineau by the chairman. In indignation at the result, one of the most distinguished professors in the College, Mr. De Morgan, threw up his position.

The position of itself was not one for which Mr. Martineau could have greatly cared; it would have added little to his income and nothing to his honor. The loss was clearly with the institution whose custodians had denied to it his splendid powers. That the contest, however, gave him a transitory pain there is reason to believe; and not unlikely, with him as with so many others, the keener regret was that an institution so great should have so failed of the nobler standard.

A little later, in 1869, Mr. Martineau had a good deal to do with the formation of a Metaphysical Club which gained a wide celebrity. The origin of the Club is interesting. The plan seems originally to have arisen in the mind of Tennyson, though it owed much to the further-

ance of Mr. Knowles, editor of the *Nineteenth Century*.¹ Its purpose, as originally conceived, was to combat agnosticism. Several had been found willing to join it, among them Archbishop, afterwards Cardinal, Manning, when Mr. Martineau was invited. Looking into the plan, he demurred. He was willing to join a club to combat agnosticism, but it must not exclude agnostics whose doctrines were to be combated. He would meet them in a tournament of thought, knight against knight, but on no other plan could the Club interest him.

This revision of the plan seemed at first impracticable. As it was mentioned abroad, however, it met a favorable response, and on this basis the Club was founded. It was a society of leading metaphysicians, theologians, scientists, and men of literary pursuits, selected without respect to philosophical or theological bias. Archbishop Manning was of it; also the Archbishop of York, and the Bishops of Bristol and Peterborough. Professor Maurice was of the number, and Dean Stanley, likewise Sir John Lubbock, William B. Carpenter, Thomas Huxley, Professor Clifford, Frederic Harrison, with many others of not less celebrity.

¹ Of this Club Mr. Martineau wrote Mr. Alger, November 25, 1869: "A project, suggested I believe by Mr. Tennyson, has been started here, of a Metaphysical Society for the thorough discussion of the ultimate grounds of intellectual, moral, and religious belief. The scheme originated in a desire to bring together from different sides the scattered representatives of a theistical philosophy, and present a strong front of resistance to the advance of Positivism and the dogmatic Materialism of the newer science. On being asked to join, I urged the absolute reciprocity of inviting the heads of the negative party into the Society from the very first, and making the Society unreservedly one of philosophical *search*, for patient and impartial comparison of ideas among differing equals. This principle has been adopted, and Mill, Bain, and Tyndall have been asked to join, — with what result I have not yet heard. Already Tennyson, Browning, Archbishop Manning, Ward [Ultramontane editor of the *Dublin Review*], Dean Stanley, F. D. Maurice, R. H. Hutton, Sir John Lubbock, Knowles [author of the King Arthur legend, and friend of Tennyson], and, I believe, the Archbishop of York, Dean Mansel, and the Duke of Argyll have given in their adhesion."

These representatives of most diverse schools of thought became friendly and even sympathetic. "This," writes Professor Huxley, "was a great surprise. We thought at first it would be a case of Kilkenny cats. Hats and coats would be left in the hall before the meeting, but there would be no wearers left after it was over, to put them on again. Instead we came to love each other like brothers. We all expended so much charity that had it been money we should have been bankrupt." The same picturesque pen also describes the society as "that singularly rudderless ship, the stalwart oarsmen of which were mostly engaged in pulling as hard as they could against one another, and which consequently performed only circular voyages all the years of its commission."

The earliest meeting of the Club was June 2, 1869, and the last, May 12, 1880. After the first year they met quite regularly once a month; August, September, and October being always excepted. A dinner was served; a short paper was read, which was then made a bull's-eye for target-practice. Some of the subjects are suggestive. Professor Carpenter presents the *Common-Sense View of Causation*; Professor Huxley, the *Views of Hume, Kant, and Whately upon the Logical Basis of the Immortality of the Soul*; also another paper in which he raises the question whether the *Frog has a Soul*. Mr. Martineau brings inquiry whether there is an *Axiom of Causality*. Mr. Harrison discusses the *Relativity of Knowledge*; Mr. Froude, *Evidence*; Mr. Clifford, the *Scientific Basis of Morality*. Professor Huxley rises again to present his views as to the *Evidence of the Miracle of the Resurrection*. Mr. Harrison and Cardinal Manning both offer papers on *The Soul before and after Death*. Such are samples of the setting forth at this feast of reason.

Academic honors were slow in coming, but they came. In 1872 Harvard University crowned him with an LL.D.

In 1874 the University at Leyden gave him an S.T.D. Somewhat later Edinburgh made him a D.D. Later still Oxford honored him with a D.C.L. Last of all Dublin University conferred upon him a Litt.D. Honors enough surely to satisfy a reasonable ambition; and, if late in coming, they were the more indisputably earned.

In 1872 there came to him another testimonial, which, if not adding to the laurels of the scholar, was most gratifying to the man. At the close of the college session, as he was about leaving London, an interview was sought with him, and, after a little explanation, a cheque for 5000 guineas was placed in his hand, with the intimation that there was more to come. The sums that flowed in later swelled the amount to £5900. With his approval, a portion of this was devoted to the purchase of two pieces of silver plate for domestic use. On these was inscribed the following memorial:

PRESENTED
WITH
FIVE THOUSAND GUINEAS
TO THE
REVEREND JAMES MARTINEAU
BY A LARGE NUMBER OF
HIS ENGLISH FRIENDS
AS A
MEMORIAL OF PERSONAL AFFECTION
AND IN
GRATEFUL ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF HIS SERVICES
IN THE MAINTENANCE OF
SPIRITUAL FREEDOM,
IN THE PROMOTION OF
CHRISTIAN TRUTH,
AND IN THE INculcation OF THAT
PURE MORALITY
WHICH IS THE FOUNDATION OF
PRIVATE AND PUBLIC VIRTUE
AND THE SAFEGUARD OF
NATIONAL LIBERTY.

JUNE, 1872.

Accompanying the gift was an address from which I quote the following: "Originating in a desire that the shortcomings of the past may be repaired, however inadequately, in the case of one distinguished example of the material injustice usually sustained in England by the instructors of the intellect, and especially by men who become pioneers and leaders of thought and opinion, this movement nevertheless owes its force to mingled motives of gratitude, respect, and admiration. Some of the contributors belong to a generation older than your own, . . . many among them are your contemporaries; who have striven hard to keep near you in the struggle of Endeavor after the Christian Life, in which you have helped and led them."

To this Mr. Martineau replied: "You speak of mingled motives of this splendid gift. So far as it springs from personal friendship and generous affection it can bring me, however I may wonder at it, only the sincerest joy. But to accept it as an arrears of justice over-due would be to charge a wrong upon the past which I can in no way own. Far from having any claim to plead, I am conscious that, in account of services exchanged, I am debtor to the world, and not the world to me; and am half ashamed to have escaped so many of the privations on which I reckoned when I quitted a secular profession for the Christian ministry. My deepest disappointment has been from myself and not from others, from whose hands I have suffered no grievance I did not deserve, and received kindness far beyond the measure of my boldest hopes. Whoever dedicates himself to bear witness to divine things is the least consistent of men, if he does not lay his account for a modest scale of outward life, and a frequent conflict with resisting interests and opinions. Such incidents of wholesome difficulty attending the study and exposition of moral and religious truth are an essential guarantee that

its service shall be one of disinterested love." Wholesome words these, which it may not be in vain to commend to the whiners over the ingratitude of the world! A little later, on his retirement from the Little Portland Street Chapel, the flock to whom he had ministered presented him the sum of £3500, likewise a testimonial of "gratitude, respect, and admiration."

The ebbing strength, because of which he gave up the pulpit, did not speedily flood again; and as the years advanced, his friends became anxious respecting him. Still he kept to his appointed tasks, but the old vigor and spirit were not there. The cause may have been in part within himself, but it was more in a shadow that was hovering near, and a chilling anxiety and sorrow it was casting on his heart. The fact was that the companion of these many years, the sympathizer in his struggles, the comforter of his pains, and the sharer of his joys, was fading before him. At length, in 1877, after a lingering malady, she died.

After her death health gradually came back to him, seeming to show that by taxing his sympathies she was drawing him after her. For eight years more he held to his customary routine. At length eighteen hundred and eighty-five had come; the sands of eighty years were run down.

In full vigor of health and intellect, he yet realized that the octogenarian is not a young man; the feeling, too, pleaded persuasively within him that the time yet allowed him could be none too much to put in order the results of his long years of study. That year brought out one of the greatest of his works, the *Types of Ethical Theory*; but there were yet other tasks that required his undistracted attention. He, therefore, signified to the trustees of the College that at the end of the college year he should resign.

The announcement was not unexpected, yet regret was profound. For forty-five years he had given the institution the most faithful toil; it had been uplifted by his genius; it had become famous through his fame. All recognized the reason for his action, and, without vain remonstrance, yielded to a decision which must be "wise because it was his." One thing they would fain do: his name, even without his official service, was valuable; they would retain him as their Principal, yet relieve him of all toil and responsibility, a proposition to which he would not for a moment listen. He suffered himself, however, to be made president of the board of directors, in which capacity he served for three years.

Accordingly, at the close of the college year, the last of the following June, he laid down his office. The students' dinner was made an occasion of which the children of the young men present will surely tell the story. Various speeches were made, bearing testimony to Mr. Martineau's long and inestimable service to the College and to the faith. A letter was handed him, signed by a large number of his former pupils, testifying their gratitude and affection. As is not known to all, there is a considerable Unitarian body in Hungary with an Episcopal organization. From this came a most appreciative address, signed by their bishop. In it was this touching sentence: "Your greatness is great because you were great in little things." He also received an address from several former students from Hungary who had been in attendance at the College.

The address of Mr. Martineau on this occasion, evidently impromptu, was one of great tenderness and beauty. He spoke humorously of his long connection with the College; he went back to his own education and marked the many changes that the years had wrought; he compared the earlier with the more modern methods of education, in a

vein of smiling disapproval of some aspects of latter-day improvement. At length he got to himself, and thus poured out his heart:—

“ Though I speak no more within the old lecture halls, I carry away with me a garland of hope that will never fade; and when I count the group which I trust to rejoin,— not of parents, brethren, children only, but the guides and quickeners of a later spiritual life; Henry Turner, whose death was my conversion, and sent me into the Christian ministry; my fellow students, Franklin Haworth, John Hugh Worthington, Francis Darbshire, bound to me in common vows of duty and devotion; the venerated John Kenrick, who alone of my teachers lived on into my maturest reverence; Samuel Dunkinfield Darbshire, whose Grecian calm, like a lake sleeping on a volcanic bed, covered the *ignes suppositos* of a noble enthusiasm; my predecessor, John James Tayler, in whom the amplest learning was steeped in purest sympathy, and held in devout simplicity; with others no less congenially present in that sacred light;— death softens the shadows of its partings here, and meets me with a mild countenance of welcome.

“ But meanwhile, I have not yet quite done with the world, or lost one jot of my interest in its persons and affairs. Nor do I wish to turn the remainder of my days into a siesta or a holiday. That, indeed, would be but a graceless return for immunity from the infirmities of age; the strength unspent it would be unfaithful to leave idle or unused. Some feeling of this kind, at least, it is that commends to me Cicero’s advice, *Resistendum est senectuti*,— resist it, that is, not with rebel pride as against a wrong, but with delayed acceptance of a privilege. Welcome the disability of age, when come it must, but do not invite it by a lazy will.”

To the Consistory of Hungarian Unitarians he wrote a

touching reply. Speaking of the profound impression made by their address upon the audience, he goes on to say: "If this was the feeling of an audience personally unconcerned, how much more deeply moved must I have been, to whom your words of tender greeting and benediction were addressed. I thank you for them with all the fervor of a heart which age has not yet chilled, and with the surprise of one who has earned no such distinguished recognition at your hands.

"True it is that from youth the history of your venerable Church has attracted me with all the interest of romance, and served as a favorite example of reverent freedom and heroic conscience, upheld and blended in the love of God. But in thus directing my admiring gaze to the far East of Europe, little did I dream that my look thitherward would ever be returned, and that you would find out and meet the quiet eye that wondered at your past and watched your present life.

"It is without anxiety, therefore, that I quit the stress of life and turn to the few possibilities that await my finishing hand. That they are small and final brings me no sadness. The merest remnants of the 'Great Taskmaster's' service are sacred, like the rest, and may still be wrought out in love and prayer."

To the group of Hungarian students he wrote: "Towards all other doctrines of the schools I have honestly tried to maintain the expositor's attitude of impartial suspense, till a position has been gained for final, critical judgment. But one thing I have deemed it imperative to assume and hold exempt from doubt, viz., — that Truth is to be found, and that the instinctive prayer of the human soul for vision is not itself the only gleam in an Eternal darkness. Intellect itself would be an illusion, unless the faculty to seek were the pledge and measure of the faculty to learn, and in the catechism of the Reason no

question stood without an answer. . . . The faith which, as prior to all reasoning, no reasoning can impair, is the condition of all intellectual enthusiasm. . . .

“ What can I add but an old man’s blessing? My sympathy is with you all; your callings are without exception worthy and noble; though of deepest interest to me, from personal experience, is the mission of those who bear the message of Christ to men. His faith, his love, his self-sacrifice, his life eternal, are to me the sanctifying crown of all philosophy, the secret of union with God for the individual soul, and the hope of redemption from the sins and sorrows of mankind. My race is nearly run; the fire given me to bear flickers between dark and light; but if, ere its last spark drops into the stream, it should have sufficed to kindle any torch of yours, and send it aglow through its appointed stage, the prayer of my heart will be fulfilled, though my name should but touch the water with that momentary trace to be seen no more.”

Thus answering applause with benediction, he laid down his academic toils.

CHAPTER VII

LATER PUBLICATIONS; A REMARKABLE TESTIMONIAL.

WE have noticed, as our narrative has brought us to them, his various books: the *Rationale of Religious Inquiry*, his hymn-books, the *Endeavors after the Christian Life*, the three collections of essays brought out by American publishers, the two volumes of *Hours of Thought on Sacred Things*, the *Study of Spinoza*. These in their appearance belong to the period of his activity, — all noble and useful, yet none except the *Spinoza* representing long-sustained and elaborate work. They were fruits wanting nothing of ripeness, but dropped from the tree in advance of the harvest. With these alone he had been known abroad as the noblest of preachers, the most studious of hymnologists, the most incisive of critics; but, save within the favored circle of his immediate acquaintance, he had not been known for the vast range of his scholarship and his great powers of thought. The harvest through which these were to be made known, was for the period of his retirement. It began with the publication of the *Types of Ethical Theory*, which was in 1885, and very nearly synchronous with his sundering of his college relations.

The work was brought out by the Clarendon Press in two heavy volumes, and at once drew attention as a great contribution to ethical thought. Considered not as a system but with reference to its scholarship and range, the century has hardly produced another ethical treatise that is its equivalent. As a preparation for dealing with the

great ethical problems, there is probably no better work in the English tongue than this, and its publication placed him in the front rank of moral philosophers.

It is the work of many years; in the main it had been proved in the college lecture-room, and that year after year,—its judgments tested, its learning enriched, its statements chastened. While its logic is the severest, yet on every page it glows with ethical enthusiasm. Then its scope! Of course it presents Dr. Martineau's own ethical doctrine; but this in relation with many other doctrines, and all in one vast organism of thought. His primary classification shows ethical systems to take their origin from the *study of the universe* or from the *study of man*. He first deals with those drawn from the study of the universe. These he distinguishes as Physical or Metaphysical, according as they build upon the outward and phenomenal aspect of the universe or the metaphysical and real. Of the former, or Physical type of doctrine, he finds a consistent representative in Auguste Comte, and devotes to him a searching and copious page. The latter, or Metaphysical type, he finds divided into two branches, according as man is conceived as a pre-existent entity, or as a modal presentation of the Eternal Essence and Only Reality. The first of these he distinguishes as Transcendental, the second as Immanential. The Transcendental type of doctrine, Plato by his genius has for all time stamped as his own; and to his teaching Dr. Martineau devotes an exhaustive exposition. The Immanential, of course, takes us to Spinoza. Spinoza's roots, however, are in the movement of thought he brought to a conclusion, and so the better to exhibit him the great Cartesians are severally reviewed. This section is not easy reading, but he who masters it has made his own, not only the ethical outcome of the doctrine, but the cardinal features of the Cartesian philosophy.

To these types of doctrine, the Physical and the Metaphysical, the first volume is devoted. Its aim is to show that, making the point of departure some aspect of the universe, no satisfactory ethic can be won.

With the second volume he changes his point of departure; instead of an *aspect of the universe* he begins with the *study of man*; and here we are introduced to a system of intuitive doctrine which is Mr. Martineau's own. Of the wealth of thought and the sustained eloquence of this section of his work it were vain to attempt to tell. It is not merely a thinker's conclusion; it is a prophet's burden. Completing his exposition, he passes critically upon modern systems of Hedonistic and Utilitarian doctrine, especially as set forth by Bentham and Mill and Spencer; and these great thinkers were perhaps never brought to a more searching arraignment. These, too, take their departure from man; but instead of recognizing in the "*springs of action*" a guiding principle, as Conscience, they put all these "springs" under the rule of one dominant end, which is Pleasure or Utility. *His* doctrine is strictly Psychological, *theirs* he distinguishes as Hetero-psychological; and in his struggle with them he fights the good fight for the Sovereign whose voice he hears within him. But the Hedonistic and Utilitarian are not the only forms of Hetero-psychological doctrine; there is the Dianoetic doctrine of Cudworth and Clarke and Price, and the Æsthetic doctrine of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson; and to these he devotes the last quarter of the volume. Such is the scope of this great work. In this vast tract of discussion there is hardly an important phase of ethical theory, whether of the ancient schools or the modern ones, if we may except the Hegelian, which is not exhibited either directly or by implication. To know this work is to know ethical philosophy, as it can be learned probably from no other single treatise.

The preface to this work has attracted special interest for a passage or two of mental history which it contains, and in which the general bearing of the work is incidentally shown. "When," says he, "I first woke up, before and during my College life, to the interest of moral and metaphysical speculations, I carried into them, from previous training for the profession of civil engineer, a store of exclusively scientific conceptions, rendered familiar in the elementary study of mathematics, mechanics, and chemistry. Small as it was, it was my all, and necessarily dictated the only rules of judgment which I could apply. I had nothing to take with me into logical and ethical problems but the maxims and postulates of physical knowledge; and as the instructions of the philosophical classroom, excellent of their kind, moved strictly within the same limits, I was inevitably shut up in the habit of interpreting the human phenomena by the analogy of external nature. Steeped in the 'empirical' and 'necessarian' mode of thought, I served out successive terms of willing captivity to Locke and Hartley, to Collins, Edwards, and Priestley, to Bentham and James Mill; and though at times I was driven to disaffection by the dogmatism and acrid humours of the last two of these philosophers, my allegiance was restored and brightened by literary and personal relations with the younger Mill. His vast knowledge, his intellectual conscientiousness, his analytical skill, his sincere humanity, presented the excellences of his school in so finished a form as to proclaim him its undisputed coryphaeus, and reanimate the confidence of its disciples."

A little further on he writes: "It was the irresistible pleading of the moral consciousness which first drove me to rebel against the limits of the merely scientific conception. It became incredible to me that nothing was possible except the actual; and the naturalistic uniformity could no longer escape some breach in its closed barrier

to make room for the ethical alternative. The secret misgivings which I had always felt at either discarding or perverting the terms which constitute the vocabulary of character — ‘responsibility,’ ‘guilt,’ ‘merit,’ ‘duty’ — came to a head, and insisted upon speaking out and being heard; and to their reiterated question, ‘Is there then no *ought to be* other than *what is?*’ I found the negative answer of Diderot intolerable, and all other answer impossible. This involved a surrender of determinism, and a revision of the doctrine of causation: or rather, I should say, a recall of the outlawed causes from their banishment and degradation to the rank of antecedents; and constituted therefore a retrograde movement on the line of Comte’s law, back from physics to metaphysics; terminating in the definition that a cause is that which determines the indeterminate.” The full significance of this transition even these two great volumes are not enough to show.

In his letter to the Consistory of Hungarian Unitarians, he spoke of the “small and final” “possibilities” that awaited his “finishing hand.” Can it be possible that in these terms he refers to the *Study of Religion*? This was the next work, and appeared in two volumes in 1888. It was welcomed by leaders of all schools of religious thought as one of the mightiest defences of fundamental truth. As the *Types of Ethical Theory* brought him to a leading place among Moral Philosophers, so this placed him in the foremost rank of Philosophers of Religion. In the main, it is laborious reading; there are portions of it over which even the trained student must linger, and sometimes long. The statement lacks nothing of clearness; illustration is felicitous; but the severities of style, the profound analyses, the deep insights, the vast marshalling of knowledge, impose exactions which only the alert and patient intellect can meet.

To give a detailed account of the work in a notice so brief is, of course, impossible. It traverses the great themes with which the Philosophy of Religion must deal, — Knowledge, Cause, the Intellectual and Moral Aspects of the Universe, Personality, Pantheism, Freedom, Immortality, — with a scope too large and a presentation too deep for brief and intelligible summary. There is, however, a brief section of the work in which the spirit and general philosophy of the whole are compressed, and from which a few quotations may be made; and that is the invaluable Introduction, by common consent one of the most eloquent passages of all his writings.

He begins by defining Religion as "belief in an Ever-living God, that is, a Divine Mind and Will ruling the Universe and holding Moral relations with mankind." It is, he tells us, "at once a mode of thought and a mode of feeling; nor does it matter to their indissoluble union which of the two you put into the prior place; whether you trust first the instinct of intuitive reverence, and see the reality of God emerge as its postulate; or whether, having intellectually judged that He is there, you surrender yourself to the awe and love of that infinite presence. These intense affections, rich in elements of wonder, admiration, reverence, culminate in worship; and, breaking thus into visible expression, reveal to others the invisible faith to which they inseparably belong. It is only our artificial analysis that separates the two, and insists on calling the intellectual side of the fact a *theology*, the affectional a *religion*."¹

An Ever-living God, a Divine Mind and Will! a Personal Creator and Ruler! — for the validity of this conception, and its supreme significance in any religion worthy the name, he rises to the great argument.

The conception is an old one, it is the widely prevalent

¹ p. 3.

one; but it has been fiercely challenged in recent years, and its absolute importance to religion has been called in question by men held great and wise. Among these is J. R. Seeley, who in his *Natural Religion*, "waters" Religion down to "*habitual and permanent admiration.*" Consistently with this definition he makes devotion to art or science or letters or morals a form of Religion, though in the outlook upon the universe there be recognized only the "sequences" and "coexistences" of phenomena, no Causal Intelligence being discerned within them or behind them. This devotion he dignifies with the name of *Theism*. To a man of science to whom, as to Comte and Laplace, the "cosmos is all in all," God is a "synonym for nature;" and, contemplating it, he is as if in the "presence of an infinite and eternal being." This extraordinary "watering down," Dr. Martineau meets early in his page, and honors with reply: "There might be some excuse for this paradoxical statement, if its author were dealing with the Poet's personification of nature as an infinite organism, looking with deepest expression into the human soul; for the conception does really, for the moment, both unify and animate the world, and brighten up its face as with a flash of inner meaning from beneath its form; and, while this vision lasts, there is a transient immanence of mind with which the seer may commune. But, the assertion is expressly made of that lowest view of nature which, like Comte's, rids the observer of all ideas of causality or power, and resolves the All into phenomena, related only in time and place, in resemblance and difference, and simply grouped into sets under these heads. The deification of such bundles of facts [and 'laws' are nothing else], the transference of the name *God* to the sum of them, the recognition of their study as *Theism*, involve a degradation of language and a confusion of thought, which are truly surprising in the distinguished author of '*Natural*

Religion.' The subversion of established meanings for familiar terms is already begun in the very title of his book: by 'Natural Religion' has hitherto been understood '*what may be known of the invisible God through the things which he has made, even his everlasting power and divinity;*' but here it means, instead of the teachings of nature about God, the *substitution of nature for God*, the actual dispensing from thought of everything but nature, and the attempt to concentrate upon it the affections previously reserved for him: in other words, *nature-worship* in place of *divine worship*."¹

Mr. Seeley's mind is drawn to the familiar alternative of *miracle* and *law*, with a decided bias in favor of the latter, as the exponent of the ultimate truth of the universe; and he seems to feel, as careless thinkers have often done, that where all is ordered there can be no supernatural. To this Dr. Martineau makes answer: "If we were simply classifying phenomena, certainly the author's bifurcate division would hold good: they must come about either conformably, or inconformably, with some given rule: they would be either natural, or extra-natural: the affirmation of the one would be the negation of the other. But the question whether 'Nature' [in the sense of *all that happens*] is indeed the totality of existence, is a question not between one mode of happening and another, but between all happenings and the never-happening whence they come, between the time event and its eternal ground, between the phenomenal sum, from end to end, and the non-phenomenal presence without which they cannot emerge into thought at all. Change has no meaning, and no possibility, but in relation to the permanent, which is its prior condition; and pile up as you may your 'co-existent and successive' mutabilities, that patient eternal abides behind, and receives an everlasting witness from them, whether

¹ pp. 5-6.

heeded or unguessed. Here it is, in this intellectual pre-supposition of any emerging world, this prior condition of the natural, that we meet a persistent 'supernatural,' in the idea of which the very essence of the religious problem lies, and without reference to which the order of nature can tell us of nothing but itself; for God is not there. Nature therefore can never swallow up the supernatural, any more than time can swallow up eternity: they subsist and are intelligible only together; and nothing can be more mistaken than to treat them as mutually exclusive. . . . But though there is no *antagonism* between them, *antithesis* there certainly is; and nothing can be more misleading than to say that 'God is merely a synonym for nature.' The attributes of nature are birth, growth, and death; God can never begin or cease to be: nature is an aggregate of effects; God is the universal cause: nature is an assemblage of objects; God is the infinite Subject of which they are the expression: nature is the organism of intelligibles; God is the eternal intellect itself. Cut these pairs asunder; take away the unchangeable, the causal, the manifesting Subject, the originating Thought; and what is left is indeed 'Nature,' but, thus bereft and alone, is the negation and not the 'synonym' of God."¹

It is the manifest aim of *Natural Religion*, by broadening the conception of Religion, to mitigate its contentions. By embracing art and science within its demesne the author would bring an end to the antagonism between it and them. This aspect of the book draws from Dr. Martineau the following eloquent passage: "Heartily as I would welcome the enthusiasms for knowledge and for art, as well as for Right, into the circle of religious affinities, and recognize in their noblest representatives an inspiration akin to that of genuine piety; emphatically therefore as I deny that there is any uncongeniality between the modern culture and the

¹ pp. 7-8.

ancient sanctities, I yet must hold that, in the order of dependence, these minor forms of devoutness hang upon the major; and that if we are to give them a home in the widened category of Religion, it must be as children of the house and not as wielding its supreme authority. Their functions are sacred, because concerned with a universe already consecrate by a Divine presence, gleaming through all its order and loveliness: suppose its inner meaning gone, let its truth be only useful and its beauty only pleasant, and would any lofty genius be taken captive by them, and bow before them? Rightly enough are the man of science and the true artist called ministering priests of nature: but this they could not be, unless nature were a temple filled with God. If there be no sanctuary and no Shekinah there, there is no inner meaning for them to interpret; and the account of it is complete in the measure of its proportions and the inventory of its contents. If you place me face to face, not with an infinite living spirit, but only with what is called '*the Great Necessity*', what enthusiasm do you expect the vision to excite? Can there be a more paralyzing spectacle? and shall I fling myself with passionate devotion into the arms of that ghastly physical giant? It is impossible: homage to an automaton-universe is no better than mummy-worship would be to one who has known what it is to love and trust, and embrace the living friend. In short, a human soul so placed would itself be higher than aught it knows within th. immensity, and could worship nothing there without idolatry."¹

Thus the wonderful page goes on,—philosophy enraptured with the poet's vision and touched by the prophet's fire. Towards the close he consecrates the universe in these words: "The rule of right, the symmetries of character, the requirements of perfection, are no provincialisms of this planet: they are known among the stars: they

¹ pp. 11-12.

reign beyond Orion and the Southern Cross: they are wherever the universal Spirit is; and no subject mind, though it fly on one track for ever, can escape beyond their bounds. Just as the arrival of light from deeps that extinguish parallax bears witness to the same ether there that vibrates here, and its spectrum reports that one chemistry spans the interval, so does the law of righteousness spring from its earthly base and embrace the empire of the heavens, the moment it becomes a communion between the heart of man and the life of God.”¹

With the publication of this great work it was generally supposed that his labors were ended. He was eighty-three years of age,—time, as we ordinarily think, not to “take in sail,” but to cast anchor in the harbor. Astonishment was wide when two years later appeared the *Seat of Authority in Religion*. Several years before he had published a series of theological papers in the *Old and New*, a magazine of noble promise that died ere the fulfilment of its expectation; and these we were pleased to meet again in the earlier section of the volume. The remaining portion, however, more than five hundred ample pages, had been written since the publication of the *Study*.

That in range of knowledge, keenness of insight, vigor of statement or nobility of feeling, this volume falls behind its predecessors, no competent critic could maintain. It traverses themes, however, in dealing with which the average Christian mind is more sensitive,—the nature of Religious Authority, the Authority of Scripture, the Genuineness of the Canon, the Person and Work of Jesus, Union with God; and in the treatment there is a peremptory challenge of prevalent modes of thought. Not unnaturally, therefore, it brought upon him a tempest of criticism, though for most part of the feebler sort. In reading it over it is astonishing to find how prevailingly it

¹ p. 26.

is partisan depreciation rather than a valiant grappling with his teachings.

Though written so late in life, it shows his intellect at full vigor; it has the freshness of new enterprise. Of all his works it is the most variously learned, and of no other is the style so popular.

Another important task was before him: soon after the publication of the *Seat of Authority* he set about bringing together a selection of his literary papers. These appeared in four goodly volumes, under the title of *Essays, Reviews, and Addresses*. Next came a volume of *Home Prayers*, his *Pax Vobiscum*.

We have passed an incident which it were hardly pardonable not to narrate. We have noticed very significant testimonials to his worth and service; here is another testimonial of which it were not easy to find a parallel. Soon after the appearance of the *Study of Religion* a movement was set on foot, under the guidance of Prof. William Knight of the University of St. Andrews, to greet him on his eighty-third birthday with an appropriate tribute. The form conceived was that of an address, signed by leading scholars and thinkers of Europe and America, without distinction of sect or party. The time was short, and so the intent was not realized in the fulness of its scope; yet was the enterprise a most notable success. The Address, drawn up and sent to various friends for criticism, received its final revision at the hand of Benjamin Jowett. After the introductory paragraph it went on to say: "We thank you for the help which you have given to those who seek to combine the love of truth with the Christian life: we recognize the great services which you have rendered to the study of the Philosophy of Religion: and we congratulate you on having completed recently two great and important works, at an age when most men, if their days are prolonged, find it necessary to rest from their labours.

"You have taught your generation that, both in politics and religion, there are truths above party, independent of contemporary opinion, and which cannot be overthrown, for their foundations are in the heart of man; you have shewn that there may be an inward unity transcending the divisions of the Christian World, and that the charity and sympathy of Christians are not to be limited to those who bear the name of Christ; you have sought to harmonize the laws of the spiritual with those of the natural world, and to give to each their due place in human life; you have preached a Christianity of the spirit, and not of the letter, which is inseparable from morality; you have spoken to us of a hope beyond this world; you have given rest to the minds of many.

"We admire the simple record of a long life passed in the strenuous fulfilment of duty, in preaching, in teaching the young of both sexes, in writing books of permanent value, a life which has never been distracted by controversy, and in which personal interests and ambitions have never been allowed a place.

"In addressing you we are reminded of the words of Scripture, 'His eye was not dim, nor his natural force abated,' and we wish you yet a few more years both of energetic thought and work, and of honoured rest."

It bore between six and seven hundred signatures of those whose "praise was fame." The first signature was that of Tennyson; the next was that of Robert Browning, followed by the names of Benjamin Jowett, G. G. Bradley, Dr. E. Zeller of Berlin, F. Max Müller, W. E. H. Lecky, Edwin Arnold, E. Renan, Otto Pfleiderer; a long list of Professors of St. Andrews, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Aberdeen, Oxford; of the Universities of Jena, Berlin, Gröningen, Amsterdam, Leiden; of Harvard University, the Andover Theological School—its entire board of instruction, of Johns Hopkins University; of members of Parliament in

long array; of distinguished Americans,—James Russell Lowell, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Frederic H. Hedge, Phillips Brooks, Philip Schaff; a great number of clergymen, of England, France, Germany, Holland, America,—the leaders of all schools of Protestant Christian thought. Party distinctions were lost to view in the common recognition of a common benefactor. As one scans the list of names and marks the many that are the lustre of our age, leaders in letters, science, philosophy, theology, and public service, he is likely to query whether a nobler tribute could have been offered. The only names conspicuously absent are those of men of science, especially of those of agnostic tendencies; and some of these, unable to subscribe to all the terms of the Address, sent him their personal acknowledgment. The Address and signatures were offered him in a book of surpassing elegance.

Dr. Martineau's reply was characteristically modest; and whoever can, may believe the free movement of his pen was not interfered with by a throbbing of his heart: "You will not wonder that the Address which you sent to me on the 21st ult. has overwhelmed me and put me to silence for some days, rendering as it does my eighty-third birthday the most memorable of my life. But I must not longer wait for what can never come,— the power of fitly expressing the wondering gratitude with which I read, in its paragraphs and signatures, assurances of respect and affection impressive from their number and priceless from their source. To be held of any account by the élite of those to whom I have habitually looked up, including representatives from the foremost ranks of literature, science, philosophy, religion, and personal character, is an honour simply mysterious to me. '*Ea est profecto jucunda laus, que ab iis proficiscitur, qui ipsi in laude vixerunt.*' To such an escort down the declining path of life, what can

an old man do but throw out a few faltering words of thanks, and love, and reverence?

“The studies and duties of my life have centered upon subjects which at once draw men into closest union, and part them in widest severance, and so render the due combination of intensity with catholicity of affection, one of the rarest of human excellences. All the more striking is the abounding evidence of its presence in the list of names attached to your Address — names, not only supplied from variously contrasted schools of thought and faith, but even sent in by the very authors whom I have had occasion to criticize and controvert. Deeply as I am touched by this as a trait of personal generosity, I honour it no less as an insight into the philosopher’s secret — that, often, differing conceptions, if in one direction opening into divergencies of opinion, converge in the other and close upon the truth.

“To those who, though unable to subscribe to every clause in the Address, have yet signified their wish to be associated with its general purport of sympathy and congratulation, I cannot refrain from tendering my cordial acknowledgments, not only for what they express, but for the solid guarantee for its serious meaning and sincerity in what they withhold. Such residue of approval as, in hearts thus scrupulously honourable, can still be spared to me, is all the more precious from its fidelity to truth.

“Among the signatures from foreign lands are some names dear to me as those of former pupils, now occupying posts of honourable service, whether for Church or University, in the East of Europe. But I also see the autographs of many distinguished scholars and philosophers whom I have long regarded with the homage due to intellectual benefactors. In several instances the appearance of their names is the more grateful to me because, as I know it does not imply philosophical agreement, it can

only mean that, in what they have seen of my writings, they find something to approve in the matter or the spirit of the discussions. To no ampler encouragement do I aspire than such witness from such men."

The life had yet other years before it; but here the story of the labor endeth. With his last book his task was performed, his message was delivered; and there now awaited that period of "honoured rest" which the Address prayed for him. Not, indeed, a period of idleness; offices of love and blessing he was still to find and to discharge. Yes, and something of the old service too: when the newly discovered *Gospel of Peter* was a dominant interest, his eager mind plunged into its study, and his facile pen enriched the *Nineteenth Century* with a critical judgment of it. When Balfour's *Foundations of Belief* was a fresh wonder, though at the great age of ninety, he appeared in the same magazine with an elaborate discussion of its contents, which showed nothing more clearly than that "his eye was not dim, nor his natural force abated." For a volume of sermons¹ by his friend and early comrade, John Hamilton Thom, he furnished a Memorial Preface of great interest and tenderness. Still the strenuousness of life was past; the sunrise could bear him cheer, and not at the same time a summons to an exigent and relentless service. He had opportunity for the greetings of love and the testimonies of appreciation; opportunity, too, to note in its trace upon other minds the significance of his labors, and to gain some foretaste of the fame that posthumously awaited him.

¹ *A Spiritual Faith.*

CHAPTER VIII

HIS INTELLECT

AMONG the impressions derived from the preceding pages must surely be that of unusual work, unusual both in amount and in variety. By his labors must one prove himself a Hercules or no; and here we come to a provisional estimate of Mr. Martineau's powers. For twenty-eight years he discharged all the offices of a metropolitan clergyman, answering, too, the numberless calls which conspicuous ability and acknowledged leadership brought him. For ten other years, alternating with a colleague, he kept regular appointment with a pulpit; and for yet four other years he bore the burden of pulpit toil alone. We thus foot up forty-two years of clerical service. Taking into account the severe standard to which he held himself, here, according to our common way of thinking, is a very fair life's work; and one should pass unchallenged to the kingdom of Rest who has this record for credential. But we have to add forty-five years as college professor, during eleven of which he was also college principal. His department, too, was one that laid upon him the severest exactions: he was surrounded by inquisitive young men who must be instructed in the lore of Plato and Aristotle, who must be led in paths hewn out by Descartes and Hume, and to whom the vast regions of German Philosophy and Theology must be laid open. From his position, also, he must keep a watchful eye on contemporary movements of thought, ready to meet any Mill or

Mansel with critical challenge or approval. Through this long period worthily to have filled this office and done no more, filled it as he filled it, had been to perform the life-work of an able and industrious man. He had then left a memory rather than a record, but it had been a memory of faithful and laborious years. But we have now to add his literary labors, which, as measured by his published works, are in amount not less than the score of volumes it taxed the great powers of Carlyle to bring forth. His writings, too, wear never a slipshod and extempore look, but show always the thinker's toil, the scholar's diligence, the rhetorician's care. A part of this work is, indeed, the outcome of pulpit and professorial labors; yet a complete collection of his printed writings should show a dozen goodly volumes, produced without reference to either. Hardly a theological movement, hardly a philosophical problem, during the last sixty years has broadly engaged human thought, to the discussion of which he did not contribute. The names of a few of those with whose work he critically dealt — Comte, Bentham, Mill, Whewell, Spencer, Tyndall, Bain, Mansel, Grote, Hamilton, Strauss, Renan, Parker, Newman, Lessing, Schleiermacher, Coleridge, Carlyle — indicate the latter-day problems, how many and of what scope, which his tireless mind toiled to elucidate. This literary labor alone would seem enough to entitle him to a conspicuous place among the workers of the world.

To have performed any one of these services had been to acquit himself worthily; to have performed any two of them had been enough to challenge our admiration and gratitude; the fact that he performed them all places him, of course, among the phenomenal men. In the presence of such achievement, question as to the greatness of his powers were like question as to the strength of Atlas while poising the globe on his shoulders.

Such estimate, however, is somewhat gross; it is like giving account of the Corliss engine by telling the number of its horse-power, whereas it is the interior structure of its wonderful machinery of which men want to learn. What account can be given of the powers of that intellect through the toils of which such marvellous labors were accomplished?

i. The portrait of such a mind, however faithfully taken, is likely to satisfy not many; it wears such different aspects according to the position from which it is studied. All, however, will allow to Mr. Martineau an acquisitive power remarkably great and varied. The diverse fields in which this faculty seemed at its best especially impresses us, as setting aside, or rather, by a notable exception, proving, the current theory that will not allow us to expect a many-sided cleverness. That Prescott and Macaulay should find no joy in mathematics, that Spencer should be an indifferent linguist, and that Darwin in his later years should lose all relish for poetry and music, seems natural enough; while a mind that can pass from deep absorption in the differential calculus to an absorption no less deep in a Greek chorus, and turn without a sigh from Æschylus or Sophocles to the logic of Hamilton or Mill; take up in turn with no less interest the details of any science that a Carpenter or Youmans or Lockyer may offer; meet as if the one and only enthusiasm the reasonings of Pascal or Butler, the dialectic of Plato or Kant, the generalizations of Comte or Spencer; that is at home in the minutiae of Biblical learning, happy in ethnological research or historical investigation, finds problems of political or social economy exhilarating, turns with joyful appreciation to art or music, draws quickening and solace from *Tintern Abbey* and *In Memoriam*, seems to us a splendid anomaly. The compensation which experience teaches us to look for, whereby the man is sacrificed in one direction that he may be mag-

nified in another, seems happily put by. And this description illustrates the intellect of Mr. Martineau in its wonderfully varied capacities. In his native aptitudes nature made provision for a universal scholar. And when we turn from the range of his aptitudes to the mass of his acquirements, the spectacle is even more suggestive. We hear, indeed, of none of those prodigious achievements which astonish us now and then, as of Theodore Parker, who would absorb the contents of a heavy volume at a single sitting; his powers seem natural rather than preternatural,—large, facile, ready, and to their tireless application we must refer the amazing amplitude of his learning. All readers remark the ease with which he draws from mathematics, as if the calculus and analytical geometry were a pleasant substitute for Addison or Montaigne, for the diversion of his leisure. His linguistic attainments were large and profound, and justify the feeling that he might have become the companion and peer of Whitney and Max Müller had he not chosen rather to wrestle with the problems of Plato and Spinoza. In the domain of physical science he was widely at home, and to the last revelation any Proctor brought from the stars, the last discovery of any Lyell, the last experiment of any Faraday, the last fact of any Darwin, one was almost certain to find his quick mind adjusted. He had a firm grasp upon history, its details and forces; political and social systems were given large scope in his studies; in political economy he read exhaustively; religious institutions, ancient, mediæval, modern, he explored to their foundation-thought; of schools of Biblical criticism, theological systems, in their genesis, history, substance, he spoke with expert authority; while in ethics and philosophy he had travelled all the meandering way from the Athens of Plato to the Concord of Emerson. He found place also for more genial letters: from the essayists and poets and novelists he drew solace

and inspiration. He wrote so much, it is difficult to see how with the burden of his most onerous duties he ever found time to read; yet he read so much that it is matter of simple wonder how he ever wrote at all. Over a congress of sages no other of his time could more fittingly have presided; a dozen specialists might have been equipped out of his vast erudition.

The strength of the strong man is seen not merely in the burden that he carries, but also in the manner of the carrying. Such a mass of erudition may make one simply one of the "asses of Parnassus," a not valueless, but a comparatively ignoble animal, which of all things Mr. Martineau was not. This weight of learning he carried with an ease that suggests that it might have been his toy had it not been his tool. While no burden, neither was it a hindrance to his movement. His treasures, gathered always for use, his quickly organizing mind distributed to their several places to await their call. Here we reach the supreme proof of a great scholar, in that a vast and multifarious learning is never *impedimenta*. Turn for comparison to that wondrous scholar, Theodore Parker, who, like Bacon, seemed to take all knowledge for his province, but who certainly failed in the test of his powers here provided. His mind was not unlike some vast museum, on whose shelves are indeed many specimens duly classified and labelled, but on whose floor are heterogeneous piles, specimens of many genera confusedly mixed, a learned litter which the master's hand has not yet disposed to order. Mr. Martineau's museum, not less rich in accumulation, is yet always in order. His specimens are always in their place, and never an obstruction.

2. Behind Mr. Martineau the scholar was Mr. Martineau the thinker. This vast power of acquisition was associate with the genius of patient and toilsome meditation. Learning, much as he loved it, was subsidiary,—torch, com-

pass, telescope, to light him and guide him in the arcana of ideas. No beauty of flowers could blind him to the botany that organizes them, and no glory of stars, to the astronomy that explains them. There was in him, indeed, that of which, left to itself, the pedant is made: an extreme care for the trivialities of learning, or what we call such, like that which Professor Agassiz once humorously drew to himself, when, asked by a lyceum committee to lecture on fishes, he declared it a thing impossible; he could not give a lecture on fishes, but he would like to give a "course of lectures on a scale." In Mr. Martineau's case, however, it was like the care of the mathematician for his formulæ, mindful of the eclipses he must calculate and the planetary orbits he must measure. As of learning, so of the very lords of thought and knowledge. He had many teachers, but never a master. He gathered the regal of all time at his board; yet was he ruler of the feast, and, with whatever deference in his tone, he firmly directed, "Aristotle, sit thou here;" "Spencer, sit thou there." As the discourse flowed on, and one after another held attention, the issue was the host's predetermined conclusion; as in the Platonic dialogues, Socrates may question and Glaucon answer and Adeimantus join in the argument, yet in the end it is only Plato that we hear.

With respect to the order of his mind he was logician, that is to say, he was not diviner. He held affinity with Mill rather than with Emerson; he was philosopher, not seer. This is not saying that visions were not given him; it is noting the nature of the receptacle into which they came. He deduced conclusions; he did not announce oracles. Indeed, there is chance to suspect that from the strength of his logical sensibility it was possible for him to fail in appreciation where there was conspicuous want of it. Thus, of his great contemporaries, Emerson seems least of all to have moved him. He had a smile for Emer-

son, but he had applause for Parker. Recognizing his genius, it is yet doubtful if he was entirely happy in that no-method by which our seer reached stars indeed, but left no orderly track by which to follow after him. He believed in feet and careful and toilsome climbing, but the winged kind were to him the children of Icarus and heirs to his fate.

There is a peculiar charm in his logic; it seems not an instrument that he uses, but an instinct that rules him. It is his life, not his rule; by it his structure grows rather than is builded. The works of the great logicians are apt to suggest the carpenter whose edifice may be imposing, but the careful jointings of which are none the less plainly apparent. Mr. Martineau's edifice suggests an immanent reason that works thus and not otherwise. Of its range, too, a word should be spoken. There is one power which we look for in a telescope, another in a microscope; and among logicians there is an analogous contrast. The two powers Mr. Martineau's logic combines; it is equal to solar systems of thought and the finest reticulations of argument. Behind it, too, is an intrepid daring and an intense conviction, from which it becomes "logic on fire," which Demosthenes defined eloquence to be.

He was strong in induction; his ability to scrutinize facts and detect the law that binds and interprets them, sedulously cultivated, should have enrolled him with the Lyells and Faradays, as a master of inductive knowledge. He was, however, more characteristically deductive. Indeed he seemed never quite at his best save when his feet were planted on *a priori* ground. Here he was a mailed and dauntless knight ready for any tournament of thought. To apply a fundamental truth to diverse problems of human interest, to prove systems by their congruity with it, to build by it so that his structure in all its parts should be like the tree whose roots, trunk, branches, twigs,

leaves, are informed by one life, was the aim by which his noblest labors were accomplished.

3. Whoever reads him is sensible of the strength of his imagination, and how it co-operates with his clear thinking to give vividness to his thought. And not only vividness, but definiteness. He had a genius for outline and boundary. He was a surveyor who traced the border line between contiguous provinces of thought, and, through whatever wilderness, left a *Via Appia* behind him.

We touch here upon that quality which some have called his cleverness, and others have named — perhaps less happily but not without good reason — his Frenchiness ; a quality which his peculiarly vivid imagination must explain. In some of his mental characteristics he seemed of the German type. Yet was he French in his origin ; and it may well be that the moulding of generations by which he became an Englishman left in him something of the genius of his ancestry. He once spoke of his friend, J. J. Tayler, as the English Schleiermacher, a designation which the admirers of both would the rather give to Mr. Martineau. Yet were the designation improved by a significant addition. Schleiermacher, — yes ; but Schleiermacher with an infusion — shall we say? — of Bossuet. The combination may be illustrated thus : The German rolls down a mighty stream, but, like the Mississippi, its waters are apt to be murky ; there are snags to vex the navigator ; the channel is inconstant ; the banks open into bayous ; and the unpractised sailor may often be in doubt whether it is river or bottom-land over which he is sailing. The Frenchman's river may be somewhat less in volume, but its waters are clear ; its channel is not to be mistaken ; and its banks after whatever rains are sure to restrain the flood. Mr. Martineau's river is a Mississippi, but a Mississippi of clear water. Its channel is constant ; its banks are never broken. It bends, too, in many a curve of beauty ; and

where it rolls through realms of metaphysic darkness, as to many a sailor metaphysic realms must be, there is no want of guiding lights that gleam upon the headlands.

4. He had a genius for criticism, and that of the nobler sort that honors while it disapproves and creates while it destroys. It was, indeed, no trifling circumstance to be brought before his tribunal, and one who sustained there his examination well needed to have no dread of Rhadamanthus. There was a justice that gave the full meed of recognition, but which with the feeble theory or the inconsequential reasoning dealt inexorably. Often his criticism suggested the glacier, radiant in sunshine and sending irrigating streams down the valleys, yet grinding the very boulders into powder.

In his critical labors he aimed at two results: a clear presentation of an author's teaching in which its limitations must of course appear, and a large view of its relations. With respect to the former his method was simple: he seized upon some pivotal idea, and by that, its absolute worth and the success of its application, was the work justified or no. Such criticism, executed in his thorough fashion, is most helpful, and after following the ramifications of some treatise, the student may turn to him as the ship out of reckoning may hail a passing voyager. A venerable sage once testified that of all his reading of Plato, the Platonic writings included, Mr. Martineau's discussion in the *Types of Ethical Theory* had yielded the most luminous view of him. It is, however, in the relations he opens before us that most have found his criticism especially helpful. The average Briton, type of human nature in more senses than one, easily magnifies his island to the proportions of a continent,—to all intents and purposes he may think it the world; and dwellers in Nepaul may doubt whether above their Himalayas is any height worth mentioning. Our infinite is apt to be practically

that beyond the limits of which we do not see. Mr. Martineau never minimized his islands, but he had the knack of embracing island and embosoming ocean in one view. He never depreciated his mountains, but, at whatever height, saw the blue dome above them, and the measureless vacancy around them. When the Philosophy of evolution first beamed upon us, and to our bewildered sight seemed to take all things within its embrace, Mr. Martineau, surveying its boundaries, showed us a bordering infinity which its very genius excluded from its embrace.¹ Perhaps we still believed in Evolution, but he verily compelled us, in seeing it, to see also more. Turn to his splendid critique of Sir William Hamilton, a planetary man, shown in all his planetary proportions; yet shown in a heaven of ideas in which is space for a million orbs as large.

5. He was a born polemic, and there was in him a forward eagerness in this kind of warfare. He was apt at fence; his attack, had it not been of the kind to be coveted, had certainly been dreaded. In intellectual combat no man was ever more observant of the chivalries; indeed he was in controversy our knightly Bayard.

6. But how of his literary style?—for while royalty in homespun is royal, we yet like to meet our king in kingly attire. And it is in kingly attire that we meet Mr. Martineau. We may like to vary the cut in some particulars, and change a decoration here and there, yet the material of the robe is unmistakably Tyrian purple.

It is a unique style, and a passage of Shakespeare is hardly more easy to distinguish than a passage of Martineau. Not only is it unique, it is profoundly personal. As Schopenhauer would say, it is a "physiognomy," not a "mask." Respecting no other can be more safely

¹ "Science, Nescience, and Faith," in *Essays, Reviews, and Addresses*, vol. iii.

quoted the dictum, "The style is the man." As a unique style is almost sure to do, it has drawn the reproach of being far sought and artificial. Yet its characteristic features, as met in sermon or essay, appear also in his letters, his extempore talk, his conversation; and whoever will give adequate account of it must take his very soul into the reckoning. As a "physiognomy" it is only luminous from an inward light.

It is not the grand style, like that of Frederic H. Hedge. It is, however, a full style; his sentence is a golden beaker flowing to the brim. What he aims to express may be the smaller part of what he conveys; allusion, metaphor, open how many side-lights of detaining suggestion. He is not especially sententious; he does not deal largely in aphorisms; yet few writers tell so much that they do not say.

It is, too, a poetical style. The "faculty divine" was not given him, but the "vision" was; and in no meagre degree it ruled his utterance. All readers of him observe an habitual cadence in his sentence, as if dictated by an interior rhythm. Within him was a sensibility that felt an inharmonious structure as a poet feels a faulty measure, or a musician a discord. His language and illustration, too, make it plain that a beauty haunted him; yet is the poet within him severely ruled by the artist. In his loftiest flights he indulges in no rhapsody. It is prose that he writes, prose that his naïve poetry animates, decorates, illuminates, but leaves always prose.

He is elaborate, but not diffuse; not lavish in language nor yet parsimonious; every figure is organic, every word is vital. His page betrays ever a painstaking accuracy; yet there are those who complain that he is obscure. Such might often well recall the saying of Goethe, "In the dark the plainest writing is illegible," and ask whether the obscurity is in Mr. Martineau or in themselves. To

scale his heights or to descend into his depths no ordering of the pathway can make always easy. However plain the statement, there are yet thoughts that tax our thinking; and Mr. Martineau's are apt to be of them. His page is for the studious, not the indolent hour. Yet in a single aspect the complaint is not without reason; there is an obscurity that comes from his exuberance of metaphor. His metaphors are most admirable in themselves, never commonplace and always luminous, but they are sown upon his page in such profusion! They come like flashes of heat lightning, and bewilder from excess of light.

Though the most serious of writers, yet not infrequent gleams of humor relieve his page. He deals little in incident, is sparing in anecdote; but a happy turn in a sentence will provoke a smile,—likewise call forth a tear. He has, too, resources of satire which he draws from not frequently. He is strong in antithesis, and his words have a knack of running together into golden sayings, which cling to the memory like passages of Emerson.

It is a style wonderfully varied to express a many-sided man,—the scholar and thinker who must feel the rock beneath him as he builds, and see his walls reared true; the man, too, of aspirations that want a temple and of affections that want a home; so different from that, for instance, of Herbert Spencer, also a “physiognomy,” but which expresses only a clear and passionless intellection. The latter we might liken to the Bank of England, solid, massive, but on whose granite cubes we see no suggestion of a heaven or a soul. The former we might liken to the dear and venerable Abbey, built on granite foundations and its walls reared true, but also with towers and arches which tell of a various aspiration and rapture and ideal.

CHAPTER IX

PERSONAL FEATURES

IN his figure Dr. Martineau was tall and spare. Of adipose tissue he had no superfluity. One meeting him in later years observed a slight stoop, though it seemed rather the stoop of the scholar than of the octogenarian. His features were thin, his complexion delicate. His eyes, which were "changeful blue," were not particularly noticeable until he became animated; and then his very soul seemed shining through them. His head was not much beyond the average in size, but compact, and perfect in its poise. His perceptive organs were large; his hair, always remarkable for its abundance, in later years was bleached almost to whiteness. Grace Greenwood, writing of him in 1854, spoke of his head as wearing a "classical and chiselled look," and of his features as "finely and clearly cut;" a description as true at eighty-five as at forty-nine.

His personal habits were always natural and healthful. So far from being self-indulgent, his general conduct was mildly suggestive of asceticism. He was indeed no John the Baptist, to make a diet of locusts and wild honey; yet one to rule his breakfast by consideration of his morning toils, and in dining not to forget the evening hours of study and of thought. And while in his conduct we may see here the ruling of prudence, it is not difficult to believe that his simple tastes were thus satisfied. A dinner with a few friends, with moderate abandonment to its

enjoyment, he may have found agreeable; a revel he would have found unendurable. He had no artificial appetites: tobacco he never used; without being pledged to total abstinence, his use of wines and liquors was almost wholly medicinal. His only intemperance was intemperate work, if that can be called intemperate which, though vast in amount, he sustained to extreme age unfalteringly. All his pleasures were of the rational and ennobling sort. Good art afforded him agreeable diversion; he enjoyed music and sought its solace; he delighted in conversation with the wise and good. His home was the magnet of his heart; and in the shelter of its domesticities was his rest, his solace, his joy.

He had a fondness for mountain scenery, and a favorite diversion was walking. His summer home in Scotland afforded him special delight for the wild and rugged country he could there explore. In his seventy-eighth year he wrote of the "annual delight" not yet forbidden him of "reaching the chief summits of the Cairn Gorm mountains." They tell in England of his achieving twenty miles of mountain rambling in a day. There is a story of an American visiting him in his Scottish home. One morning there arose a question of diversion: should they walk or drive? Something was said of a walk, and Dr. Martineau, pointing to a mountain eleven miles away, proposed a walk thither and return. Those mindful of our ways hardly need be told that the American, who as guest had the determining vote, gave it in favor of a drive.

His hospitality was most cordial; his manners, suggestive of the older and more elaborate style, were charmed by a spirit that would make any style, or even want of style, delightful. His voice, not loud, was admirably focalized and melodious; his enunciation was leisurely though not slow, and perfectly distinct; he had a vein of humor; he laughed heartily but not noisily. His conversation,

more it is said in later than in earlier years, tended to monologue, and this for two reasons: first, from the amplitude of his knowledge, approaching him with almost any subject was like taking a line of verse to one who holds the whole poem in memory, and who needs only the prompting of the one line to go on to the end; and secondly, ninety-nine out of a hundred, sitting down with him, were likely to act as if on the reflection, If *he* will talk, why should I? That reverend look, that gracious manner, that quiet and melodious speech, fit vehicle of the noblest wisdom, were almost sure to banish all inclination save to listen. But then, in the sequel something happened which you scarce understood, which you doubted if he did, and which the fitness of things seemed hardly to warrant. As you rose to go, he expressed to *you* his gratitude for the favor you had done *him*; which, if of ordinary sensibility, made you only more sensible of the nothing you had done except to receive from his immeasurable store. You received the due of an Esau who had brought a kid, and went your way with the feelings of a Jacob who had purloined a blessing.

His general manner was one of calmness slightly verging upon severity. With a friend, or one who had rightful dealing with him, the severity dropped away and left a smiling affability. Against the intruder, however, it may have been a defensive armor. And from another class it may have protected him, — the destitute, the wretched, from whom, for the great sympathy of his heart, he could not always have wished to be protected. A patient ear he might give to the tale, a thoughtful consideration of what was expedient; but of the effusive sympathy, the unconsidered aid, for which such are likely to be looking, they could have seen little promise in that grave and austere countenance. And it may as well be said, that what was thus apparent at the surface was probably true of the

depths of his nature. That is to say, this large class of needy ones he could feel *for* more easily than *with*. In other words, the possible union of Plato and Father Taylor was not realized in him.

Friends and pupils, the latter with especial emphasis, tell of his severe regard for minutiae; and illustrative of this they dwell affectionately upon special incidents that have fallen under their observation. Trust their report, and you conclude that he ruled his life by Michael Angelo's maxim: "Trifles make perfection, and perfection is no trifle." Whether in the niceties of scholarship, the care for his intellectual judgments, the discharge of official duties, the regulation of private affairs, in his appointments, in his courtesies, they maintain that it was the same,—nothing slighted, nothing forgotten. Like Thoreau, he might have "left a Greek accent slanting the wrong way to right up a fallen man;" but, the man fairly set upon his feet, he would have returned at the earliest moment to his Greek accent, whose mistaken slant could not have left his memory. And the casual observer saw something of this in the little nameless touches of personal conduct; in his conversation, which in his lightest moods was faultless; in his letters, which, however hasty or however brief, were never careless. Most men, though scrupulous enough in dealing with the matters that especially engross them, hold yet their realm of order within an unconquered chaos; so that the slovenly scholar, the boorish philosopher, the statesman who forgets appointments, and the saint who does not answer his letters, are characters with whom we are all acquainted. They keep their planets under exact regulation, but leave their asteroids outside the controlling law. Dr. Martineau, on the contrary, illustrated a unity of character in which large and little, planets and asteroids, were subject to the same rule; so that he answered his letters as he wrote his books, and was the same where affection laid

light exaction as in the courtliest circle he was invited to adorn. And this trait was apparent in all about him. As these words are written, there floats into memory an illustrative contrast. I recall a pleasant hour in the study of a London man of letters, whom a grateful world recognizes among its benefactors. The library, rich in the lore of many tongues, stood on the shelves in utter disregard of order. Bacon was flanked by Douglas Jerrold and Henry George, Homer was crucified between Akenside and Martin Tupper, and Plato was standing on his head beside Jouffroy. Books and pamphlets were on the floor, in the chairs, upon the sofa. The study table was a confusion of letters, cuttings from newspapers, books, pamphlets, magazines, sheets of manuscript scattered like the Sibyl's leaves, a pipe or two, a pouch of tobacco, the stumps of several cigars. That room was a Teufelsdröckh's lair, which many studious men with good reason may forgive, but which none would have the courage to commend. An hour later I was in Dr. Martineau's study, which, in comparison, seemed heaven's first law in miniature.

No feature of the man was more apparent than his modesty. Of the guerdon he had won he had seemingly no appreciation. That on the battle-fields of thought he had been more than a faithful soldier, that he had been a leader and a conqueror, seemed never to occur to him. The encomiums that came to him impressed him with a sense of the generosity of others, not a greatness that was his own. With this modest self-estimate he combined, as was but natural, the most generous appreciation of others. Differences of opinion could not blind him to the reality of merit, and the very knight he might unhorse he would thank for the example of his prowess. The teachers he confessed were often those whom he had taught, very likely accrediting to their originality a wisdom that was first his own. A lifelong friend, speaking of earlier days,

once humorously illustrated this aspect of his character. He would meet, said the friend, some commonplace woman, and, in a half-hour's talk, fill her mind with ideas of which she had never dreamed before. Three months later he might meet her again, and she would in some measure give him back the thoughts he had lavished on her; and he, never suspecting the sun she was reflecting, would go his way telling of her wonderful intelligence.

Temperamentally he was not always on the heights. Readers of his sermons, notwithstanding the exultation and the joy that are in them, are likely to feel an undertone of sadness. It is there, and those who were nearest to him know that it does not misrepresent him. In such as he, too, it is peculiarly natural. A heart so large and tender, while quickened by the gladness, must also feel the sorrow, of the world; and one who at intervals is caught up into the heavens must be sensible of the transition to earth's damps and shadows. On the other side of life, however—the practical as distinguished from the ideal—his serenity was worthy of Seneca himself. Whatever volcanoes might boil within him, at the surface there was no eruption. His wishes might be thwarted, critics might misrepresent him, partisans disparage, yet still was he cheerful, dignified, reasonable.

Of the general atmosphere of the man, the impression that came from the blending of these various qualities, how tell? All readers of him know the clearness and the nobleness of his ethical judgments; in his presence one was simply sure that he was worthy of them. In his wonderful sermons we are familiar with the mystic heights to which he climbed; in his presence we felt their reflected sunshine. To him as to all men were the “tides of the Spirit,” its ebbs as well as floods; yet failing to meet him on the Mount of Beatitudes, we should have looked for him on the slopes of Sinai, and wondered not to find him there.

It was my privilege to form acquaintance with him in extreme age,

“When the soul declares itself, — to wit,
By its fruit, the thing it does.”

Of course I expected to meet a scholar; but a scholar may be a Johnson. I knew I was to confront a thinker; but a thinker may be a Schopenhauer. I held him a man of genius; but a genius may be a Byron or a Carlyle. I hardly need say that from these endowments acquaintance demanded no abatement, and that these examples could only serve for contrast. Over against the coarseness of Johnson one saw in him refinement refined. In contrast with the selfishness of Schopenhauer one saw in him consideration for others that was almost self-effacement. In place of the cynicism of Byron we met in him the serenest charity; instead of the rudeness of Carlyle the soul of courtesy and grace.

The thought of meeting one so crowned with honors was attended with natural anxieties. Two hands extended in welcome, a gracious smile, a cordial word, and all anxieties were gone. The happy discovery was made that his greatness was of the kind that lifts but does not overpower. Of the quiet hours spent with him I need not tell. Suffice that they fixed in my mind the impression of a sage, a hero, and a saint; of one who might converse with Plato, and dare with Luther, and revere with Tauler; an *habitué* of the Academy, who thrilled to the Categorical Imperative, and who knelt at the Cross.

BOOK II
THE RELIGIOUS TEACHER

CHAPTER I
THE PREACHER

FROM the account of the man, we come to the severer task of exhibiting the religious teacher and philosopher. Dr. Martineau began his career as a preacher; and it seems fitting that to his work as such we devote a few pages.

When our minds are drawn to a noted preacher, our first thought is likely to be of his pulpit effectiveness; and this is likely to be estimated, not in terms of thought, but of magnetism and manner. Three-fourths of the gossip about Channing relates to how he talked rather than what he said; and Beecher's wise words are forgotten while men tell of the look, tone, gesture, with which he uttered them. Indeed, the substance of doctrine may be obscured by the grace of its proclamation, and the very Gospel be eclipsed by the histrionics of the apostle. There are preachers, however, with whom thought and manner are so blended in a composite effect, that any account of the effect must linger largely on the thought; and of such was Dr. Martineau. Certainly we know preachers who from their graceless and spiritless utterance could make little impression, even with sermons like Dr. Martineau's in manuscript before them; which is another way of saying

that he was never such as they. At the same time, it is probably true that he owes his fame as a preacher to the greatness of his message. A Talmage, talking whatever emptiness, will have thronging audience; Dr. Martineau had hardly been a marked figure in the pulpit but for the intellectual and spiritual quickening he gave.

Few school-boys read far into Cicero's *Orations* without speculating as to their probable impressions, could they have sat in the Senate or stood in the Forum on some momentous occasion when the great orator was speaking. Readers of the *Endeavors* or the *Hours of Thought* may have indulged the like speculation as to their impressions in the church where Dr. Martineau was ministering. Of course these would vary according to the period of his life; but in general such as should come from an *ensemble* like this: A tall, spare figure robed in the scholar's gown, and wearing the dignities of his office as a natural grace; a thin face, suggestive of the cloister, and traced with deep lines of thought; a voice not loud, but musical and reaching; an enunciation leisurely but not slow, and perfectly distinct. The opening services are somewhat long, but informed by a spirit that lifts them above tedium. The hymn is read in tones that reveal a soul that vibrates to its melody and thrills to its joy. There is reverent reading of the Scriptures, reading not obtrusive as to its emphasis, but which reveals their meaning and conveys their power. The prayer is quiet, tender, appealing, a strain of rapture and love and longing. And now the sermon; from the beginning it is plain that it is to serious thought, yes, and hard thinking that you are invited. The preacher has taken the philosopher into service; at need, the scholar's stores are brought into requisition; rhetoric contributes of its strength and grace. In his manner there is calmness: gestures are few, speech is quiet. It is, however, a calm-

ness at the surface combined with fervors in the depths, which kindle the eye, light the countenance, and which the tones reveal. Here is no logic-grinder, but a soul swayed by a holy passion; and these thoughts so severely stated are a prophet's burden. The theme is laid open; the awful sanctities are made plain; the moral depths are explored; the mystic heights are gained. In America a preacher is sometimes told that his service has been entertaining; and often that word describes it well. Dr. Martineau, as a preacher, never entertains; he has serious business with you, and to the consideration of that he holds you with little thought whether he entertain or no. You have been living in some castle of worldliness or pride;—there it is a hopeless débris around you, and you a shivering and unsheltered soul in the bleak desert of the world. You are suffocated with the dust of life; you are borne away to some Alpine summit where the air is free and a glory thrills you. You came hither, as you felt, deserted and alone; you go home with—God!

Such the preacher, and such the natural effect of his great message. Yet this effect, however provided for in the sermon, was only for such as could receive it, who, we fear it must be admitted, were the comparatively few. Dr. Martineau never drew large congregations. That manner, so wholly undramatic, was little calculated to lay a spell upon the popular mind. Then, even with the manner and tones of Whitefield, he could hardly have drawn the multitude with such sermons as he habitually gave. The clever interpreter may gather hearers from country farms or city streets, and beguile them with passages of Longfellow; but Dante with whatever accessories of elocution only the trained intellect can receive; and Dr. Martineau in heights and depths may fairly be called our Dante of preachers. To some, who read that the common people heard Him gladly, and remember how

common and uncommon people have since found life in His word, this may carry the force of an adverse criticism. In the experience of His apostles, however, common and uncommon have needed to be treated differently. Certainly the discourses in the *Endeavors* and the *Hours of Thought* would have been ill-suited to the hillside where Whitefield preached; and the exhortations that brought the colliers to repentance would have evoked but a feeble reponse in the Hope Street Church or the Little Portland Street Chapel.

We will take a closer scrutiny of the sermon. Of its style, considered as a composition and with reference to pulpit effectiveness, it is possible to entertain two opinions. A student of divinity, in an American school, opened for the first time a volume of the *Endeavors*. Presently he was in a realm of wonder. Vision opened upon vision. The sentences seemed but translucent media for stars to shine through. On the current of thought he was borne almost as resistlessly as if afloat on the whirlpool of Niagara River. That hour's reading brought him in contact with one of the master influences of his life. He closed the volume with a feeling not unlike that of General Wolfe, floating down the St. Lawrence River, reciting the immortal *Elegy*. A few days later the student was turning over a sermon of his own with the homiletical professor, when conversation led to the general subject of sermon style. The student asked, "What do you think of the style of Dr. Martineau?" The prompt answer was, "The worst in the world." The student went his way doubtful for once of his professor's infallibility. Now, if we take into consideration the two attitudes of mind, that of the student and that of the professor, there is in Dr. Martineau's sermon sufficient reason for these diverse judgments. The student, in daily contact with studious books, welcomed a challenge to his thought which the

ordinary sermon was not sure to offer; was well pleased, indeed, to drink the wine of life without watery dilution. Then, being of an imaginative mind and mystic temperament, the imaginative and mystic features he everywhere met in Dr. Martineau's discourse awoke in him responsive raptures. If the beauty was bewildering, why, it was a bewildering beauty; if the heights were ethereal, to breathe ether in exchange for common air he found exhilarating! The professor, however, mindful of the common life which the preacher must somehow reach, of men who must come to the altar from the plane, the forge, the farm, the shop, the office; of women who must be the Marthas of domestic arrangement before as Marys they can sit down at the feet of Jesus, might well caution his pupil against a style which would be often to them, at best, a beautiful bewilderment; and if the caution was in terms the strict truth would not warrant, why, error, like wisdom, may sometimes be justified of her children. It may as well be said that Dr. Martineau's style, even for people of high intelligence, would have been more effective if something less imaginative, before all things, could he have restrained his exuberant use of metaphor. His beauties are exceedingly beautiful, but their profusion is excessive. You linger to admire a pearl and a shower of diamonds is falling around you. Even the reader, and how much more must have been the listener, is often bewildered by the splendors that in swift succession burst upon him. You encounter a passage like this: "The soul, as it sings, cannot both worship and beat time. The rainbow, interpreted by the prism, is not more sacred, than when it was taken for the memorandum of God's promissory mercy, painting the access and recess of his thought. The holy night, that shows how much more the sunshine hides than it reveals, and warns us that the more clearly we see what is beneath our feet the more astonishing is our blindness to what is above our

heads, is less divine, when watched from the observatory of science, than when gazed at from the oratory of private prayer ; ”¹ you are surely a veteran reader if you are not drawn by the splendor of the illustrations from the thought they illustrate. Two or three such passages in a sermon were certainly enough for the trained and attentive listener ; and even he would hardly fail to find it difficult to turn at once from such a series of pictures to resume the thread of the argument. Passages such as this are met everywhere in the pages of Dr. Martineau’s sermons. To be lost amid such joys may not be without compensations ; yet in thought, as in life, to lose the way is to fail of the destiny. Lost in a garden is lost. Lost amid Sierra glories is lost.

Another aspect of his discourses calls for notice. For the ordinary hearer or reader they are found difficult, not only because of their highly imaginative style, but also because of a uniqueness in their structural principle. In an important respect they are unlike most other sermons, and the rules of the commonly received homiletics cannot be applied to them. You ask respecting them, with what aim were they preached, what motive ruled his mind in the preparation of them? You see very clearly why Edwards preached his terrible sermons : there before him were souls to save from the hell that was gaping for them. You do not need to be told why Channing preached his sermon on “ Unitarian Christianity most Favorable to Piety ; ” it is sufficiently manifest that he would vindicate a form of doctrine which was dear to his heart. So, in general, upon the sermon of almost every preacher is impressed the purpose that called it forth. With Dr. Martineau’s sermons, however, it is otherwise. They are not doctrinal : what may be his Christology, what his attitude towards the Bible, how he views miracles, why he is a Unitarian, one must be a sharp-eyed critic to detect in his pulpit utter-

¹ *Endeavors*, pp. 446-447, American edition.

ances. While not doctrinal, neither are they, in the ordinary sense of the word, practical. Practical, indeed, they are, as fresh air and sunshine, as art and music and poetry are practical; but not practical as addressed to the specific needs of men, to move their will or instruct their understanding for instant action. They lead into the realm of elevated thought, which may be to our souls as a holy enchantment; yet, however they may nourish, stimulate, comfort, constrain us, we hardly feel that they are spoken to us. This is their distinguishing characteristic: In the intent of the preacher they are *not* spoken to us. Their aim is not address, but self-utterance; not primarily to move another's soul, but to tell the visions, raptures, longings, and imperatives within his own. Spiritual communication in the deep and literal meaning of the word,—that is what they are intended to be. He looks not about his congregation to discover what they have need to hear, but within himself to find what God has given him to say. There is hope, indeed, that the word whispered in his soul, through his utterance may reach the soul of another; it is the hope, however, of the artist who traces his beauty on the canvas, trusting that another may thrill to its joy. He uses the ordinary form and method of discourse, and so makes into a sermon what were otherwise a psalm. This is not merely a characteristic traced upon his sermon; it is his theory as to the method in which a sermon should be brought forth. In the preface to the second series of *Endeavors* he writes: "In virtue of the close affinity, perhaps ultimate identity, of religion and poetry, preaching is essentially a lyrical expression of the soul, an utterance of meditation in sorrow, hope, love and joy, from a representative of the human heart in its divine relations. In proportion as we quit this view, and prominently introduce the idea of a preceptive and monitory function, we retreat from the true prophetic interpretation of the office back

into the old *sacerdotal*:— or [what is not perhaps so different a distinction as it may appear] from the properly *religious* to the simply *moral*. A ministry of mere instruction and persuasion, which addresses itself primarily to the understanding and the will, which deals mainly with facts and reasonings, with hopes and fears, may furnish us with the expositions of the lecture-room, the commandments of the altar, the casuistry of the confessional; but it falls short of that ‘true testimony of God,’ that personal effusion of conscience and affection, which distinguishes the reformed *preaching* from the catholic *homily*.” This conception of the true nature of the sermon raises in his mind an objection to extemporaneous preaching, “which may be the vehicle of admirable disquisitions, convincing arguments, impressive speeches; but is as little likely to produce a genuine sermon, as the practice of improvising to produce a great poem.” “The thoughts and aspirations which look direct to God, and the kindling of which among a fraternity of men constitutes social worship,” he declares to be “natives of solitude.” Such is his theory both as stated and exemplified. There comes of it a tendency to soliloquy, to rhapsody, beautiful and ennobling indeed, but quite the opposite of that directness of speech by which attention is easiest won and held.

There is another result of which it is impossible not to be sensible. In the sermons of few preachers is there so little lecturing; few indeed there are whose organized thought is so completely a vessel in which the spirit is offered us. Sermons, like men, must have the defects of their qualities; and it is doubtful if they can be the oracles of the soul and at the same time always easy for the intellect to grasp. Pouring out the heart is something other than addressing the understanding; psalm and homily have different qualities. There are preachers who deftly blend

them, as Channing usually, as Dewey frequently, as Beecher occasionally. But so far as the homily is obtrusive the psalm will be sacrificed; so far as the psalm is overpowering the homily will falter. This brings us to the doubt whether, save by Dr. Martineau's method, sermons can ordinarily be produced so profoundly and loftily religious as his. We give them place with the classic literature of devotion; with the volumes of Tauler and Taylor and the *Theologia Germanica*. We pass from any of these to the *Hours of Thought* or the *Endeavors*, sensible of no decline in spiritual altitude. The manner is different, the tone is different; but through these, as those, the like heights gleam, the like raptures thrill. By spiritual consanguinity he is the kinsman of Eckhart and Thomas à Kempis, and draws his sermons from the like spring as they their meditations. In him, as in them, is the mystic soul, out of which alone the mystic utterance can come. The understanding can offer what is understood, the reason can furnish reasons; and thus the intellect may be guided into ways that shall please it well; but whoever will speak the oracular word must retire within the shrine where oracles are given. This secret of his office, Dr. Martineau, beyond all contemporary preachers, seemed to know; and hence the well-nigh incomparable appeal with which his words speak home to us.

From the general character, we pass to the more special features of his discourse. Drawing ever from the deepest deeps, he naturally seeks utterance through the treatment of those feelings and experiences that give utterance to them,—the faiths, dreads, longings, raptures, of men. His characteristic themes are suggestive: "The Besetting God," "Christian Peace," "The Tides of the Spirit," "The Sorrows of Messiah," "Where is thy God," "The Discipline of Darkness," "Christ the Divine Word." They are themes, indeed, on which the mere polemic might exer-

cise his dexterity, and the priest expound his homily; but which are peculiarly suited to the mystic contemplation which Dr. Martineau brings to them.

His theory of a sermon implies a theory of man: his competency to know God. Not merely to know *of* him, but to have immediate acquaintance *with* him; not merely to know His word, but to hear His voice. This is an initial truth with him, the implications of which are manifold and vast. As a preacher, he dwells much on the immanence of God, but before God is seen in his manifestations he must be known at home. Until met in consciousness nature cannot reveal him, prophets speak to little purpose, Bible records are a tale of old. And this immediate acquaintance is for the diligent seeking,—not with the lamp of science, which would restrict it to the learned; not with the eye of philosophy, which would make it the special privilege of the wise; but in the silent retreats of holy meditation, which are accessible to all. Here we may come “eye to eye with the saints, spirit to spirit with God, peace to peace with Heaven.”¹ Like one of the old mystics come again, he maintains that if one, putting by all worldliness and self-assertion and pride, will enter the silent confessional within his breast, he shall meet and know his God.² The earnestness with which he enjoins this impels the conviction that it is out of his experience that he enjoins it. Thus a clue to a truly theistic world is realized. God a direct and first-hand acquaintance in the breast;—every sod of earth reveals him, and the heavens tell his glory. You are dealing then, not with a cosmic force, but with a living God, known within yourself and therefore recognized in the thrilling life, the glowing beauty, the unvarying order, the unbending righteousness of the world. You spend with him the cloistered hour, then, looking out upon the universe, you are prepared to say, “Lo, these are his ways.”

¹ *Endeavors*, p. 164.

² *Ibid.* pp. 164–165.

Let the order be ever held in view: first the interview in the confessional, then the vision of a transfigured world; first within the soul the great Name whispered, then stars flame it, winds quire it, waters murmur it; first the assurance born of mystic communion, then for every pain its comforter, for every sorrow a consoler close at hand. This again and again he urges, lingering in eloquent warning on the truth, that if the inward eye be darkened to His light the outward eye shall not behold His glory. You shall see no transfiguration till acquainted with the light that transfigures, or even read your Bible wisely till you know your God. Our light, such as we have, we carry within us; and he who in his soul knows not God is still in darkness, though, "like the angel of the Apocalypse, he were standing in the sun." Hence in his discourse there is often a tone of severity towards those who, neglecting the easy and obvious means, do thereby forfeit so great a joy. Their God, such as they have, is a cosmic force, an issue of a syllogism, a record in history, a priest's report, a propriety of belief, not a present and living and loving Friend. Hence he remonstrates: "You say, He is *everywhere*: then show me *anywhere* that you have met him. You declare him *everlasting*: then tell me of *any moment* that he has been with you."¹ With the thought of thus meeting God in the confessional there comes also the thought of spiritual fitness, which he presses with solemn earnestness. To be ready for that august interview, what is required of us? A mind with habitual intent upon the trivialities of life does not turn with ease to its more serious concerns, and with the spirit it is the same. It is only the disciplined eye that shall behold the Invisible Presence; it is only the disciplined ear that shall hear the Silent Word. An indolent, careless, drifting soul, a soul from which all earnestness has oozed away, whose meditation is but a disordered reverie or

¹ *Hours of Thought*, second series, p. 107.

a vacant dream,— what fitness can it have to hold converse in the Holy of Holies? For that mystic meeting it is utterly without preparation. So he tells us that “the heavens, with their everlasting faithfulness, look down on no sadder contradiction than the sluggard and the slattern at their prayers.”

This thought of the immediateness of God’s presence, and the possibility of immediate knowledge of him, ever hovers near his mind; and he iterates it and reiterates it with great power. His labor is to bring men to a first-hand acquaintance with the Father of their spirits. To this end he strives to show them that God is here, not merely there; that He *is* as well as *was*. Not that he doubts of earlier inspirations, but that he is so sensible of the need of new ones. He sees a prevailing tendency to put the meeting of the human and the Divine far off in the past,— “there, in old Palestine, we think, the august voice broke for a moment the eternal silence,”— a tendency which means for the present an atheistic divorce from God. We live, indeed, “in the house He built; but we work in it alone, for He has gone up among the hills and will only come to fetch us by-and-by.” Our worship, therefore, is not “bathed in the flowing tides of Deity, but keeps dry upon the strand from which he has ebbed away.” “It has become a *commemoration* telling what once He was to happier spirits of our race, and how grateful we are for the dear old messages that faintly reach our ear, . . . the fragile and consecrated links between his sphere and ours.”¹

Thus he pleads for what is with him the ground of all conviction; and thus he expostulates with those— the many, not the few— who fail of its assurance.

But let us note his application of his truth to the problems of the interior life; and, first, that of duty. It is

¹ *Endeavors*, p. 310.

evident that with such thought in the background, he will find for duty's supreme imperative something other than an earthly origin. Neither the utilities of life, nor any inferences men may draw from them, speak to him the ultimate word. Nor will he receive it from any Moses coming down from Sinai; but only at first-hand in the temple where the Divine Voice declares it. So persistent is this Voice, so constant its iterations, that even the inattentive ear cannot wholly miss its tones. In the pleadings of virtue, in the exaltations of self-sacrifice, in the remonstrances of conscience, there it is. Whoever will explore his thought on the great problems of moral obligation in their profounder and larger statement may turn to the *Types of Ethical Theory*; but whoever will see how in his daily conduct — his weak surrenders, his victorious sacrifices, the virtues that attract no notice and the faults he tries to think are of no consequence — he has directly to deal with God, may turn to his sermons. Your duty, simple and lowly as men may regard it, in the last account of it, is a mandate from the Universal Throne. The sense of obligation that stirs within you is a "piercing ray of the great Orb of souls."

To what heights he will raise duty, with what sanctities he will clothe it, is sufficiently clear from this. Rendered to such an one, its lowlier as its lordlier offices are sacred, and they who dust the chambers, or carry the brick and mortar of the world, kindled by his word, should feel their humble service consecrate.

From duty we pass to worship. As the former in its ultimate spring is a mandate from God, so the latter is our free offering to him. In its nobler conception it is not addressed to a heavenly Dispenser of Favor, but to a Righteousness and Love, whom we meet in the cloistered seclusion of our souls. Here, not merely manifest but in very essence known, we contemplate him and adore.

Perhaps there is no other theme on which he is so sure to kindle as this. Worship is the soul's "surrender of her narrow self-will, her prayer to be merged in a life diviner than her own." Of all attitudes that which it implies is at once our lowliest and our loftiest. "We never hide ourselves in a ravine so deep; yet overhead we never see the stars so clear and high." There are two promptings to it: the one the vision of Perfect Holiness; the other the sense of sin. Hence it is marked by a two-fold aspect, "breaking into strains, now penitential and now jubilant," "pale with weeping, flushed with joy." "Were we haunted by no presence of sin and want, we should only browse on the pasture of nature: were we stirred by no instinct of a holier kindred, we should not be drawn towards the life of God." A little deeper does he sink his plummet. Speaking of the communion of the human spirit with the Divine, he says: "If communion, then sympathy and resemblance too: for like only can commune with like: when eye meets eye and knows it, the same fire is alive in both: when affection answers to affection, there is a common language of intelligence between them; and *something* in us there must be, some possible love or thought or goodness, akin to the Infinite Perfection and flowing *forth* to meet it." And "this it is — this best element of us, that asserts its rights and struggles to its place in every expression of religion." "Devotion" — and here is the final statement — "instinctively tries to lay down whatever separates from God, and to pass wholly into what unites with him."¹ Thus it is the soul seeking her own, contemplating the Supreme Beauty and yearning for its embrace. It asks no special favors, — ease, comfort, the poor utilities men are wont to pray for; it asks only to be merged and lost in God. As the legend tells us, St. Thomas Aquinas once wrestling in prayer be-

¹ *Hours of Thought*, second series, pp. 334-335.

fore the crucifix, the imaged Saviour spoke down to him: "Thou hast written well of me, Thomas; what reward wilt thou receive from me?" The ecstatic saint replied, "Lord, only thee."

But the sense of sin and of its guilt, how of this? Of all liberal preachers of modern days he has perhaps dwelt most upon this dark theme; and he has taxed his wondrous rhetoric to make his lesson vivid. In his tone on this theme, he often reminds one of the older theologians. It is much the wont of our modern liberals to view sin from the outlook of earth, from which it often seems much like the mistakes of ignorance, the blunders of immaturity. He, on the contrary, is wont to view it from the outlook of heaven, where it is seen over against a perfect holiness which it has affronted. "If I had not come and spoken unto them, they had not had sin." But for the holiness that confronts us our sin were not revealed to us. In that confrontation, however, we are like the lying Peter under the eye of Jesus, whose pure presence is a mirror to our shame, in the dark consciousness of which we are only capable of a biting and burning remorse, never mitigated, all the more poignant, for the sorrow and tenderness with which Jesus looks on Peter. Useless to plead that we could not have done otherwise; the soul by its very grief and humiliation refuses to entertain the plea. However the intellect may sophisticate, in the presence of that Holiness, the soul is sensible of the dark disparity, wrought by surrenders it has not made, admonitions it has not heeded, beauties within its reach which it has not put on. So Dr. Martineau is wont to preach.¹ First the Holiness into whose presence you are brought; next, by contrast, the approximations to it which you have not made. Here the Perfect Mirror; out of it reflected to you the warts and

¹ See especially "Christ's Treatment of Guilt," *Endeavors*, p. 129; "The Soul's Forecast of Retribution," *Hours*, second series, p. 132.

wens that disfigure you. Over against you, the Father robed in compassion and benignity, which make you sensible of the unseemliness of the rags you wear. In such confrontation what more natural than the cry: "Oh wretched man that I am!" Hence the interpretation he gives to those protestations of unworthiness in which all higher literature abounds, and which are characteristic, not of the weakest, but of the best and bravest. Modern liberalism is wont to treat them as exaggerated self-depreciation, in less enlightened days quite the vogue of religious utterance, now happily gone out of fashion. Dr. Martineau sees in them the spontaneous and natural utterance of the soul in the contemplation of the Supreme Excellence, and is awed into humiliation before it.

But the problem of human pain — how of that? It is one Dr. Martineau recurs to perhaps more frequently than any other, as if the burden of human suffering were heavy on his heart. His tone is not one of extravagant optimism; he does not commend the stoic's endurance; his endeavor ever is to lift the suffering into "conscious affiliation with God." Thus, "as he pervadeth all things, a unity is imparted to life and a stability to the mind which put not happiness, indeed, but character and will above the reach of circumstance." He draws illustration from the example of the Christian's exemplar: "What difference did it make to Christ, whether in the wilderness he did fierce battle with temptation or sat on the green slope to teach the people, and send them home as if God had dropped upon their hearts amid the shades of evening: whether he stood over the corpse, and looking into the dark eyes, said, 'Let there be light,' . . . or saw the angel of duty approach himself in the dress of the grave, and on the mournful whisper, 'Come away,' tendered his hand and was meekly led: whether his walk was over strewn flowers, or beneath a cross too heavy to be borne; — amid

the cries of 'Hosanna' or the murderous shout? The difference was all of pain; — none was there of conscience, of trust, of power, of love."¹ It is to the like self-poise, won through the consciousness of the Infinite Presence, that he would lead the suffering; — not to any mere comfort of their sorrows, but to a strength through him who alone can impart it, serenely and patiently to bear them. His ideal is not the unsuffering, but the unshaken man; and such he may be with whom there is direct and personal intimacy with God.

Of fear, too, when the crisis comes, the same preventive. In his sermon on "Faith the Deliverance from Fear," is a remarkable passage, it can surely be no mistake to quote in full: "When, for instance, the ship has struck and broken up, and its human shriek has gurgled away into the relentless splash of waters; and a single voyager, by some marvel of escape, finds himself adrift in a boat alone; when the night settles down upon him and shuts him in between the darkness above and the black deep below; when the bursting wind and the slanting hail and the plunging waves show that he is but reserved from the common fate to perish deliberately and in the private wilds of nature: what, think you, has been the history of his thought in such an hour? There may be many who might await the moment with outward steadfastness; but only one, I suppose, who would sit there with a real light of inward calm; — namely, he to whom that solitude was not absolute; who could converse with a Presence behind the elements, and listen to a voice other than the wind's; who knew the night to be but a seeming darkness, and, though the stars were blotted out, felt the pure eye of the Infinite upon him; who could welcome the terror, not as the end, but as a beginning, the pangs of an everlasting birth. Such a one is but flung by the wildest

¹ *Endeavors*, p. 103.

delirium of nature into the closer embrace of the eternal God."

Thus, as preacher, may we illustrate his aim and show the trend of his influence. By such preaching it is plain that he could hardly have grounded men in the dogmatics of his school; in fact, in his preaching days, he was sometimes criticised for failure in this direction. The priestly homily of daily behavior, likewise, you will not frequently look for in one who is the enthralled oracle and bard of such truth. His leading, rather, is to a contemplative and mystic piety. The atmosphere you breathe with him is most elastic, the views he opens before you are most expansive; yet he leads you to live directly from the Supreme Source of life. Under his spell you become an *habitué* of the cloister; you learn the significance of meditation, of communion, of prayer.

Of course it is not thought that the lesson thus emphasized by him is in form any novelty in the Christian pulpit. It may, however, be most confidently said, that the persuasiveness and intense and burning reality with which he presents it give his sermon a place which probably that of no other modern preacher may claim. In doubt, sin, loss, pain, fear, grief, his thrilling admonition is, Seek the presence of your God.

Seeking, too, you shall ever find him. No, not ever; for there are times and seasons when that high joy is denied us. The movements of the spirit are tidal. We repair to our Bethesda, but the angel that is wont to trouble the waters has not come, or has gone. "In every earnest life, there are weary flats to tread, with the heavens out of sight,—no sun, no moon—and not a tint of light upon the path below; when the only guidance is the faith of brighter hours, and the secret Hand we are too numb and dark to feel."¹

¹ "Tides of the Spirit," *Hours of Thought*, first series.

Frances Power Cobbe pleasantly tells how many of the congregation that listened to him in the Little Portland Street Chapel sat with open note-books to jot down the brilliants of thought that fell from his lips, and which they could not suffer to float away upon the air. Certainly, if they caught them all, they toiled with nimble pencils. The language of no other preacher we can recall has such frequent trick of running into poetic aphorisms. Emerson himself is scarcely more quotable; and the quotations that cling to us as we read him are pregnant, not with the wisdom of the intellect alone, but of the conscience and the soul. In the pursuit of our gains or pleasures a voice solemn and authoritative commands, "Take up thy free-will, and come along." Is there a cruel cynicism within you? "No grief deserves such pity as the hopeless privations of a scornful heart." Elsewhere and further on are you looking for associations that are holy? "Those to whom the earth is not consecrated will find their heaven profane." For the proper ordering of the humblest duties, great principles are needed; "to keep the house of the soul in order due and pure, a god must come down and dwell within, as servant of all its work." The great achievements which we honor come forth from vicissitude, without which history were a dreary commonplace; a truth which he states in brief, "There is no Epic of the certainties." Are you haunted by a pessimistic misgiving? "Be it ours to doubt the glooms and not the glory of our souls." Are you troubled by the inconstancy of your better moods? Be comforted. He who gave to the moon her phases and its summer and winter to the year, in all the provinces of our nature has appointed the like alternations. "God has so arranged the chronometry of our spirits that there shall be thousands of silent moments between the striking hours." Such are specimens of the jewels that everywhere adorn his page.

Miss Cobbe likens his discourse, not to an "Alpenstock," but to a beautiful, inlaid "crozier." An Alpenstock it rather seems to us, strong to lean upon in the most venturesome climbing, yet with ruby and pearl and jasper for accessories. The strength is surely nowise impaired by the beauty that adorns it. Where it ceases to be Alpenstock for climbing it becomes wings for flying, on which without conscious effort we gain summits far more than Alpine.

CHAPTER II

THE CHRISTIAN THEOLOGIAN

FROM the preacher we turn to the theologian. Dr. Martineau's theological attitude was always Unitarian; and the history of English Unitarianism on its doctrinal side is almost ideally reflected in the history of his mind. He received it as its earlier prophets, Priestley and Belsham, left it; and early became the pioneer of its advance. From the Liverpool Controversy to the publication of the *Seat of Authority*, asking where Mr. Martineau stood was very nearly the same as asking in what direction Unitarian thought was moving. It was rarely up with him, but, often with manifest impatience, following after him.

I. The history of a moving intellect, and none other can have a history, must be a record of changes. Of Dr. Martineau, the theologian, therefore, our task requires that we undertake such a record. We have seen where he began. The services of his ordination reflect the attitude of the church that ordained him; and his, beyond the shadow of a doubt, was in all essentials an accordant mind. The conservatism that would fain hold liberal views under ban at Andover or Columbia would be more than satisfied were the out-going students assuredly no further away from orthodox standards. There was a God, the Creator of all things, infinitely powerful, wise, and holy; and if the close student may see reason to suspect that eighteenth-century Deism colored the general conception of him, why, so it does that of many an orthodox preacher even

now. The Bible was given by inspiration, and, rightly interpreted, an unerring guide. Christ was a divinely appointed teacher, whose commission was authenticated by miracles; who came by his teaching, life, death,—pre-eminently by his death,—to provide salvation for mankind. Christian discipleship could be allowed to those only who could thus receive him. There was also a judgment to come, of which heaven and hell were the issues. To readers who have orthodox traditions these statements look familiar enough, and they are likely to ask how they who could consistently make them could have been held unorthodox. The point of departure from the orthodox standards in the declarations of this hour, which the trained theologian may detect but scarce any other, was in the conception of Christ. This departure was not on the view of his character, his powers, his office, or the reverent and loving fealty due him; but, in the supreme and metaphysical meaning of the word, of his nature. What say you of Christ, — was he simply man? Had this question been asked him by the council, Mr. Martineau would have answered unequivocally *no*. Was he very God? Again the answer would have been *no*. There was for him, then, only a midway conception of a nature more than man, yet a created nature, and so, far less than God: a divine nature poised between the two. Mr. Martineau has himself told us that the “departure from the orthodox Confession of Faith went no further than Arianism;” and he adds that “so resolute was the aversion to any further step, that, on letting fall an expression implying the simple humanity of Christ, I had lost in Dublin the most attached friend I had among my hearers, who took his household away from me with lamentation and tears.”¹ Now, Arianism, though

¹ *A Spiritual Faith*, Memorial Preface, p. viii. It may be well to remember that the pioneers of English Unitarianism — Lindsey, Lardner, and Priestley — had several years before this event reached a Humanitarian view.

often enough embraced, has never been a stable doctrine. The being more than man, less than God, is reasonably sure to be surrendered to one or the other. Either he will be lifted into Deity, and so orthodox faith be triumphant, or he will be brought down to man, with the surrender of everything distinctively orthodox. Reasoning from experience, we should say that Mr. Martineau and his fellow-believers must either retreat from their Arianism or go forward to Humanitarianism, with the probabilities much in favor of the latter.

But there is another feature of their case that needs to be kept in mind. These Presbyterians — we have already noticed that it was as an English Presbyterian that Mr. Martineau was ordained — were without a creed. As their doctrinal standard they accepted simply the Bible ; and they adopted with it, in the broadest meaning of the word, the Protestant principle of free interpretation. To be sure, there was an understanding that the free mind would “orb about” within the Bible ; that while searching for its contents it would never question its authority. The free mind, however, cannot stipulate thus to behave. Freedom to find truth in Matthew must imply freedom to detect error in Paul ; freedom to inquire with result in any sense pre-determined : freedom to find the contents of a book, yet freedom only to find them true, may be to some a pleasant ideal, but it is one on which experience has bestowed no continuous smile. So much freedom is always perilous to such limitation. The Mississippi is only kept to its channel as the banks are high or the levees strong. The Protestant principle has a noble sound ; yet Protestant wisdom has prevailingly imposed upon it the restraints of creeds, that its rising floods may not spread too wide. It is not probable that an intellect so restless and so virile as Mr. Martineau’s could have been held long within any barriers, and the stronger they had been the more disaster in their

breach. As it was, not only was the central doctrine of the faith an unstable one, but, save in a prevailing sentiment of those about him, there was no restraint at all upon his intellectual movement. As was natural, therefore, following his own self-directing, he very early began—at first we may well believe insensibly—to depart from the standard of his ordination confession. How much was really conveyed in the “expression implying the simple humanity of Christ” cannot now be shown; and it is not difficult to see how to his own mind it may not have seemed dissonant with the Arianism of his church. But it is also possible that his friend detected in him a real departure from the faith unsuspected by himself, just as several years later his greater friend, John Stuart Mill, detected his departure from the Necessarian philosophy to which he still supposed himself a faithful adherent. Our initial apostasies we are by no means sure to be the first to discover.

Other evidences are not wanting that his mind was early in motion. The doctrines of the faith he took up as fresh problems, of which, not content with received opinion, he would achieve a first-hand conviction; and the vigorous intellect that does thus is reasonably sure to depart somewhere from the standards. Very early, too, a new and peculiar influence flowed into his life, which, in any adequate account of his mental history, would require an ample page. It was the influence of Channing. We of later birth sometimes wonder how Channing's influence could have been so regal. We look into his books; there indeed is the quiet and transparent style, fit vehicle of the noblest wisdom; there is the organism of thought, in its wholeness so complete, so articulated part with part; there are the moral imperatives, the spiritual insights, the spiritual raptures, all calculated in their immediate effect to constrain, to comfort, to awaken and inspire. But the thought is so old that it

is difficult to realize that it once was new; it is with effort that we remember that it is now so familiar and every-day, only because it has so permeated and leavened the thinking of our time; because newspaper, essay, sermon, novel, poem,—read in its light, too, the New Testament and the Old, reflect it to us. To the contemporaries of Channing, however, it came with the glory of a fresh inspiration. It lifted them into another plane of feeling, in which the past lay in another perspective and the future glowed with another prophecy. Of this influence no one was more profoundly sensible than Mr. Martineau. The memorable discourses, preached at Baltimore in 1819 and in New York in 1826, reached Ireland just before he entered upon his ministry. Writing of his friend, John Hamilton Thom, then a young clergyman at Belfast, he quotes from him words that might do quite as well for himself: "Others had taught me much; no one before had unsealed the fountain in myself. He was the first to touch the spring of living water, and make me independent even of himself."¹ Like testimony to his own measureless debt to Channing Dr. Martineau bore to the present writer, when from the summit of his octogenarian years he helped him to a survey of that bright morning of his career.

From his ordination confession he hardly comes distinctly before us as a theologian until 1835, the year before the appearance of the *Rationale of Religious Inquiry*. In the January of that year he preached a sermon on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of Manchester New College,² near the close of which he says: "The plenary inspiration of the Scriptures was once an admitted tenet among our Churches. It was supposed that the evangelical authors performed only the mechanical process

¹ *A Spiritual Faith*, Memorial Preface, p. x.

² "Need of Culture for the Christian Ministry." Reprinted in *Essays, Reviews, and Addresses*, vol. iv.

of writing, and were, in fact, but amanuenses to the dictation of the Holy Spirit. . . . All this is now changed. The tendency among us [a tendency not, I think, likely to be arrested] is towards the belief that the Sacred Writings are perfectly human in their origin, though recording superhuman events; that the Epistles abound in the discussion of questions now obsolete; that the Gospels, with one exception, were constructed from earlier documents, whose origin it is impossible to trace, and whose fidelity rests upon their internal character; that even their preceptive parts will not yield the Christian morality pure to our hands, till a mass of local and temporary elements have been withdrawn." The cast of this passage makes it plain that while the more orthodox view had once prevailed in the liberal ranks, it had not recently done so, which is of course nearly the same as saying that it was not prevailing at the time of the ordination confession. Indeed, Unitarians, while very stoutly maintaining inspiration, very early conceived it to be found in the deeper meaning of the Sacred Writings, not in the form of their structure. They held it to be spiritual, not mechanical. And when we come to the *Rationale* we only meet in more elaborate statement the same general attitude. Its judgment of the New Testament books is that "they are perfectly human, though recording superhuman events; that they were written by good and competent men, who reported from their own memory, reasoned from their own intellect; who received impressions modified by their own imagination; who interpreted the ancient scriptures by their own rules, and retained the notions of philosophy which they had been taught, and of morals which approved themselves to their own conscience. They saw and felt what they wrote, and they wrote truly."¹ During the eight years since his ordination he has grown

¹ Third edition, p. 10.


much, but his faith has undergone no marked transition. He is bold and aggressive, and given to extreme comparisons; yet he is safely within the lines of earlier and more conservative Unitarianism. His attitude towards the Bible, if that of a freeman, is yet most reverent; Christ is the central orb of his system; title to the Christian name implies, not merely acceptance of him, but acceptance of him as a supernatural being, together with the wonders accredited to him.¹ This position, called in question by some of more radical mind, he defends in the preface to the second edition, and qualifies rather than departs from in the preface to the third edition, which appeared in 1845. The ruling contention of the book is for Rationalism against Orthodoxy,—against Orthodoxy in that it “makes belief a duty of the Will, and judges men by their creed;” for Rationalism in that it makes belief an “involuntary act of the Understanding, and judges them by their character,”²—and in this contention he is fervid, cogent, and convincing. Reply, however, might have been made to him, which his own later experience should have verified, that the reason that assumes to judge inspiration will anon usurp the throne of authority.

We come now to the period of the Liverpool Controversy, an event that summoned him to declare his mind on a variety of themes in a somewhat careful and elaborate manner. The preliminary correspondence, as we have seen, came to a sudden termination in consequence of the Unitarian party’s refusal to justify their position by the whole Bible as the “Word of God.” “We all drew our religious faith,” says he, “from the *Word of Christ.*”³ This was a very marked departure from the standard of the confession; and while there are passages in the *Ra-*

¹ *Rationale of Religious Inquiry*, p. 70.

² Preface to second edition, pp. viii–ix.

³ *A Spiritual Faith*, Memorial Preface, p. xiii.



tionale that may foreshadow such an attitude, it is ~~not~~ probable that he would have taken it, had the like exigency arisen at the time that book was printed. But personally he had gone further than this. All drew their religious faith from the "Word of Christ;" but what was that "Word"? "While," says he, "Mr. Thom found that Word in every saying which any Evangelist ascribed to him, I could not refer the Johannine discourses to the speaker of the Sermon on the Mount, or help feeling, in the very differences of the Synoptic reports, limits to their authenticity, not without traces of later thought."¹ How long he has been coming to this position he does not tell us, nor by what influences he has been guided; but it is plain that he has entered upon the way of which the Tübingen school and the *Seat of Authority* will be the issue.

To fix his attitude at this time more definitely, we will briefly follow him through his several contributions to this Controversy. His first theme was "The Bible: What it is, and What it is not." In this discussion the conception of a spiritual inspiration as opposed to a plenary and mechanical, "as much higher than your cold, dogmatical, scientific inspiration, as the intuitions of conscience are higher than the predication of logic, and the free spirit of God, than the petty precision of men,"² rules all his reasoning. This "great autobiography of human nature"—such he calls the Bible—is the "Word of God," but—a distinction at which spirits were troubled sixty-one years ago,—not the "Words of God." His teaching was that while the spirit of God moved upon the souls of the Bible writers, their understandings were left uncontrolled to use such language as they would, to group events as they might, to

¹ *A Spiritual Faith*, p. xiii.

² Letter to Rev. H. McNeile and others, "Unitarianism Defended," *Correspondence*, p. 41.

weave their own moral sentiments into the narrative of them, to draw their own inferences from them, to give them a color, not always of exactest verisimilitude, from what was local and peculiar to their time. The inspiration is met in the constant yet progressive lesson of the infinite power, the unerring wisdom, the unbending righteousness, the constant providence, the unvarying love of God. This it is that the Word of God proclaims, but through the words of men. But in this record of inspirations where is the culminating point? Why, in him of Nazareth. "He is the central object, around whom all the ages and events of the Bible are but an outlying circumference; and when they have brought us to this place of repose, to return upon them again were but an idle wandering."¹ To Christ he looked in the spirit of most reverent discipleship as one whom God had endowed with a far surpassing grace, and in whose utterance his Word became articulate as in that of none other. It had for him, too, this peculiarity, that it "plunges us into the feeling, that God acts not *there*, but *here*; not *was once*, but *is now*; dwells not *without us*, like a dreadful sentinel, but *within us* as a heavenly spirit, befriending us in weakness, and bracing us for conflict." "The inspiration of Christ," he goes on to say, "is not any solitary, barren, incommunicable prodigy; but difusive, creative, vivifying as the energy of God:—not gathered up and concentrated in himself, as an object of distant wonder; but reproducing itself, though in fainter forms, in the faithful hearts to which it spreads."² He surely is wanting in sensibility who, reading these words, detects no heart-throbs in them.

His evidence of inspiration is thus even at this early day not external, but internal; not in the letter of the Sacred Volume, whose inaccuracies he points out in long detail, but in its spirit. But how of miracles? Mr. Martineau

¹ p. 4.

² p. 7.

believed in miracles, at any rate the miracles of Christ. From the prevailing view of them, however, he takes a wide departure. The miracle, as he holds, can prove nothing true that is intrinsically incredible. "If, before your eyes," says he, "a person were to multiply five loaves into five hundred, and then say 'this is to prove the doctrines which I teach, that God is malignant, and that there is no heaven after death,' — should you be converted, and follow him as a disciple? Certainly not; the statement being incredible, the miracle would be powerless. And the inference I would draw is this: that the primitive force of persuasion lies in the moral doctrine as estimated by our reason and conscience, not in the preternatural act displayed before our senses."¹ What then is the significance of Christ's miracles? In answer he says, and his language conveys a doctrine that early Unitarians struggled hard to establish, "His miracles, surely, sprung from compassionate, not proselytizing impulses; had a practical, not a didactic air; were not formally wrought as preliminaries to a discourse, but spontaneously issued from the quietude of pity; they were not syllogisms, but mercies."² Another very current conception of miracles calls forth his protest. A year and a half earlier, Emerson had spoken of them as "one with the blowing clover and the falling rain;" and somewhat thus Mr. Martineau regarded them. A prevalent habit of thought then, and we should not need to look far to find it now, placed them in another category, and gave them another sanctity. "The falling rain"? Why, that follows upon the laws of nature, decreed when the world began. This miracle, on the contrary, is the immediate action of God, and is a token of his presence and his will. Against this Mr. Martineau inveighs: "In whatever form it is expressed, it rests upon a postulate which I hold to be false and irreligious; viz., that the

¹ p. 25.

² pp. 24-25.

supernatural is Divine, the natural not Divine; that God did the miracles, and since the creation has done nothing else; that Heaven gave a mission to those whom it thus endowed, and has given no mission to those who are otherwise endowed. All peculiar *consecration* of miracle is obtained by a precisely proportioned *desecration* of nature."¹ Here is obviously no attempt to depreciate miracle, but a desire to give to the operations of nature the like sanctity. His was not at all the deistical doctrine which divorces God from immediate relation with the universe, but the theistic conception that makes him immanent in its life, and so regards the miracle but the peculiar exercise of an Energy of which "blowing clover and falling rain" are manifestations. He does not question the exceptional, but would consecrate the familiar. It seems difficult to detect a heresy here, yet meditated in relation with a later attitude, it is difficult not to feel that the "way which they call heresy" is entered upon. He would hold the familiar as sacred as the strange; but before the publication of the second series of *Endeavors*, seven years later, he will prefer the "customs of heaven" to the "anomalies," "the dear old ways, of which the Most High is never tired," to the "strange things which he does not love well enough ever to repeat."² One more stadium, and from his preference for the "customs of heaven" he will discard the "anomalies."

Mr. Martineau's second contribution to this Controversy was an elaborate disproof of the proposition that "Christ was God." Here his attitude is negative, and his own view of Christ is not made prominent. Towards the close, however, he makes this striking statement: "Jesus Christ of Nazareth, God has presented to us simply in his inspired humanity. Him we accept, not indeed as very God, but

¹ p. 24.

² *Endeavors after the Christian Life*, p. 311, American edition.

as the true image of God, commissioned to show what no written doctrinal record could declare, the entire moral perfections of Deity. We accept,—not indeed his body, not the struggles of his sensitive nature, not the travail of his soul, but his purity, his tenderness, his absolute devotion to the great idea of right, his patient and compassionate warfare against misery and guilt, as the most distinct and beautiful expression of the Divine mind.”¹ Enough surely for spiritual affinity, but too fluid and indefinite for dogma.

His third lecture dealt with the “Scheme of Vicarious Redemption.” This was perhaps his crowning effort in this Controversy. Of course all turns on the interpretation of the death of Christ; so with a few vivid strokes he places before us the scene of the Crucifixion, and then asks what this means. The first impression is that it “requires no interpretation, but speaks for itself; that it has no mystery, except that which belongs to the triumphs of deep guilt, and the sanctities of disinterested love;” and with this view he is content. He conceives the death of Christ as “manifesting the last degree of moral perfection in the Holy One of God;” and believes that “in thus being an expression of character, it has its primary and everlasting value.” He conceives it as “immediately procuring the universality and spirituality of the Gospel; by dissolving those corporeal ties which give nationality to Jesus, and making him, in his heavenly and immortal form, the Messiah of humanity.”² The natural features of the Crucifixion, however, he is told present only the “mere outside aspect;” that they are “wholly insignificant compared with the invisible character and relations of the scene; which, localized only on earth, has its chief effect in Hell; and though presenting itself among the occurrences of time, is a repeal of the decretals of Eternity.” Thus he

¹ p. 57.

² pp. 5-6.

glides into the doctrine of the Atonement, summoning philosophy and Scripture to testify against it; and in his powerful exposition they testify as they have seldom testified. His philosophical argument is the most impressive, as probably the most congenial to his mind, but his Biblical is remarkable for its completeness. There is not a prominent consideration ever deduced from the Sacred Text in support of the doctrine, that he does not frankly challenge. The issue is such as we should anticipate: the death of Christ is spoiled of its dogmatic significance. Here is no God enduring an infinite penalty, but a man divinely appointed to show forth the measureless love of God, and so win human souls to his embrace. It does not placate the Divine, but lifts up and redeems the human.

His next theme is the "Christian View of Moral Evil." At this time he had not attained to the ethical doctrine of his later years; yet he is certainly a careless reader who does not find in this discourse germs of which the *Types of Ethical Theory* is the unfolding.

To exhibit the Christian view he does not exhibit it alone, but passes in review the doctrine of two principles that were held in Greece,—the philosophical doctrine which, giving God an absolute monarchy, makes evil an instrument in his hands for the furtherance of good ; and the doctrine which theologians have drawn from the Bible, which teaches a created spirit of evil or devil to which moral evil is ultimately referred. These he discusses,—the first two briefly, the last fully,—and discards as untenable. Of course, under the latter head he reviews the doctrine of the Fall with its manifold implications. Neither God directly nor "through his dependant Satan,"—neither "by his general laws" nor by "vitiating the constitution of our first parents,"¹—is he willing to conceive the ultimate source of sin ; rather he holds God, in his essential nature,

¹ p. 33.

its enemy. Where, then, is its source? The New Testament, reflecting the moral consciousness with its "profound sense of *individual responsibility*," guides to it. Christianity he finds pre-eminently a "personal" religion, "establishing the most intimate and solitary dealings between God and every human soul." "It is a religion eminently *natural*; eradicating no indigenous affection of our mind, distorting no primitive moral sentiment; but simply consecrating the obligations proper to our nature, and taking up with a divine voice the whispers, scarce articulate before, of the conscience within us."¹ This sense of personal responsibility he finds impaired by "all reference of the evil that is in us to *any source beyond ourselves*." "To look for a remoter cause than our own guilty wills . . . bewilders the simple perceptions of conscience, and throws doubt on its distinct and solemn judgments."²

The practical result of this scheme of doctrine he finds to be false views and fictitious feelings with respect both to our own characters and to those of our fellow-men. "That which can be vicariously incurred, or vicariously removed, cannot be guilt; cannot, therefore, be sincerely felt as such; can awaken no true shame and self-reproach, and draw forth no burning tears when we meet the eye of God. It is a shocking mockery to call sorrow for an ancestor's sin by the name of penitence, and to confound the perception [or, as it is termed, 'application,'] of Christ's holiness with the personal peace of conscience: the one can be nothing else than moral disapprobation, attended by the sense of personal injury; the other, moral approval, attended by the sense of personal benefit; and mean and confused must be the sentiments of duty in a mind which can mistake these for the private griefs of contrition, and

¹ p. 34.

² pp. 34-35. It may be worthy of remark that in this lecture Mr. Martineau reaches his first statement of the freedom of the will.

the serenity of a self-forgetful will."¹ Thus he maintains against the dominant theology, the fundamental principle of a true ethic, which makes man ever the ultimate source of his deed, and honors or abases him according to the measure of his obedience. This he finds the verdict of conscience, whose oracles the New Testament records and consecrates. He uses throughout the language of the philosopher, but he bears home upon the dominant creed the imputation of being fundamentally dissonant with a sound morality. At the same time he shows that the canons of righteousness, the ultimate judge of creeds and Scriptures, are within; that it must be a false creed and a spurious Scripture that a healthy conscience cannot ratify.

His concluding lecture was of "Christianity without Priest and without Ritual." He opens with a contrast of prophetic with priestly and ritualistic religion which it is still profitable to contemplate. The priest, as all cults present him, is the representative of man before God. He stands between the worshipper and his Deity; without his mediation there is no access to the grace of Heaven. His office no one else can exercise; there are intercessions that are only prevailing when he makes them; rites, ceremonies, incantations that are efficacious only when he employs them; and their aim is not to superinduce a healthier state within the worshipper,—a penitent heart, a surrendered will; but to win the favor of an unmindful or offended Deity. The Ritual, that is, is a "system of consecrated charms; and the Priest, the great magician who dispenses them." This system, indeed, is capable of great refinement as well as great grossness, yet in its better as in its poorer ministration the same essential features cling to it. It always implies an idea of God and his relation with humanity on which the nobler senti-

¹ p. 37.

² p. 6.

ments cannot prosper. Human nature is presented to us, "in contrast, not in alliance, with the divine;" and ever the tendency is to those arguments and appeals that impart a sense of widest separation. Man, instead of being consecrated by the immediate fellowship of God, is demeaned into an outcast from his presence.

In strongest contrast with the purely *priestly* religion is the *prophetic*. While the Priest is the representative of men before God, the "Prophet is the representative of God before men." Instead of carrying a petition up, he brings a message down; "instead of carrying the foulness of life to be cleansed in Heaven, he brings the purity of Heaven to make life divine. Instead of interposing himself and his mediation between humanity and Deity, he destroys the whole distance between them; and only fulfils his mission, when he brings the finite mind and the infinite into immediate and thrilling contact, and leaves the creature alone with the Creator."¹ As is the difference in end, so is the difference in means. While the Priest performs his rites or mutters his incantations, the Prophet speaks the burning and the cleansing word. The former is without forward vision: the sacerdotal system from its very nature is stationary; to the latter there is ever a fairer truth, a new obedience, a more radiant ideal. The latter cares not for the instituted, but for the true; not for rites, but for living worship; not for the temple, but for the temple's God; and the practical working of the two it is easy enough to see. The former involves a "distant Deity, a mean humanity, a servile worship, a physical sanctity, and a retrospective reverence;"² the latter, "an interior Deity, a noble humanity, a loving worship, an individual holiness, and a prospective veneration."³

¹ pp. 10-11. Also *Studies of Christianity*, p. 42.

² *Ibid.* p. 40.

³ *Ibid.* p. 45.

Mr. Martineau, while making his contrast, has hovering near his mind the Church of England, whose sacerdotal tendencies it was easy to expose, though they are in union with a prophetic spirit he might in justice have more fully recognized. But how of Christianity? Is it a religion of the *priestly* or of the *prophetic* type? His answer is unequivocal and strong. "Christianity, then," he says in closing, "is without Priest and without Ritual. It altogether coalesces with the prophetic idea of religion, and repudiates the sacerdotal. Christ himself was transcendently THE PROPHET. He brought down God to this our life, and left his spirit amid its scenes. The Apostles were prophets; they carried that spirit abroad, revealing everywhere to men the sanctity of their nature, and the proximity of their heaven."¹ Such was his view of Christianity, with all that it implies. It was intended to lift up man, not to reconcile God; to redeem from sin, not to save from hell; to awaken, encourage, comfort, rebuke; to win to the recognition of the Eternal Beauty and the embrace of the Infinite Love.

Such is the attitude of his mind during this memorable Controversy, which closed in the spring of 1840. Certainly he has moved far from the ordination confession; but, judged by the standards of to-day, he has reached no extreme of radicalism. His mind is most elastic, and it is restrained by no dogmatic barriers; but he holds to the moral, though not the plenary inspiration of the Bible; he still believes in miracles; the person of Christ is his central light; and in essentially this attitude he will for some time remain. In 1841, discussing *Five Points of Christian Faith*, he enumerates "Faith in the Moral Perceptions of Men," in the "Moral Perfection of God," in the "Strictly Divine and Inspired Character of our own Highest Desires and Best Affections," in "CHRIST" as God's "*perfect*

¹ *Studies of Christianity*, pp. 68-69.

and transcendent outward revelation," in "Human Immortality." Against what counter-theses these several points are maintained, there is no need here to state. In 1845, in a sermon on "The Bible and the Child," he disturbed the peace of more conservative spirits by urging that the Bible should not be crowded into the child's mind *en masse*, but should be offered him with discrimination. "This indiscriminate use of the Bible, as an infallible whole," he tells his hearers, "fills the mind with a system of confused and self-contradictory ideas, both of religion and morals."¹ In another passage he tells of three systems of morals which he finds in the Bible, "most at variance with each other in their general spirit and tendency." They are those of Moses, of Solomon, of Christ; "respectively perfect representations of the sacerdotal, the Epicurean, and the spiritual type of human duty;"² and he can see only moral bewilderment resulting from offering them to the child as on an equal footing of divine authority. Yet his attitude here is clearly implied in his Controversy lecture of a year before. In 1846 he records dissent from Theodore Parker's saying that if Christianity be true at all, it would be just as true if "Herod or Catiline had taught" it. The combination of a "true Christianity" with a "wicked Christ," "he finds no less absurd than revolting." On this principle, "the moral perfectness of Christ is not an essential, but a subsidiary, support to Christianity; — a delightful confirmation of his mission," but not a condition of our faith in him. The very contrary Mr. Martineau finds true. "Prove what you will against his life," Mr. Parker might be supposed to say, "his attested doctrine remains." "Prove what you will against his doctrine," Mr. Martineau would reply, "his divine life remains; and with more truth in it than in any proposition

¹ *Essays, Reviews, and Addresses*, vol. iv. p. 394.

² *Ibid.* p. 397.

in the Bible or out of it.”¹ In 1850, in a searching review of Francis W. Newman’s *Phases of Faith*, he maintains the moral perfection of Jesus, a view which in 1853, in a review of *New Phases*, he more elaborately defends. In the latter paper, too, he maintains the view that upon the person of Jesus Christendom furnishes an “indispensable commentary;” that a scrutiny of his lineaments as they were first offered to the world yields not the person that we know. “As Plato thought it needful, in his investigation of Morals, to study their embodiment in the magnified scale and conspicuous orders of the State, so it is impossible to apprehend aright the person of Jesus without watching the spread of his shadow over the ages, and throwing back upon him the characteristics of the Christian faith.”² The same year, reviewing R. W. Greg’s *Creed of Christendom*, with subtler and fuller statement, he maintains the like thesis respecting Christianity. We cannot know it in its seed, that is, the written word of evangelist or apostle, but only in its unfolding. “*Inspiration*,” says he, “in giving the intensest light to others, may have a dark side turned towards itself. There is no irreverence in saying this, and no novelty: on the contrary, the idea has ever been familiar to the most fervent men and ages, of Prophets who prepared a future veiled from their own eyes, and saintly servants of heaven, who drew to themselves a trust, and wielded a power, which their ever-upward look never permitted them to guess.”³ This truth he copiously illustrates from the Christian record by showing how Christianity, though realizing far more grandly, yet failed to realize the expectations of its founders. His conclusion is that the “*primitive* Gospel is not in its form, but only in its spirit, the *everlasting* Gospel.” In all this we see a mind reverently dealing at first hand with the problems of

¹ *Essays, Reviews, and Addresses*, vol. i. pp. 182-183.

² *Ibd.* vol. iii. p. 61.

³ *Studies of Christianity*, p. 286.

the faith ; not emancipate from the past, nor seeking to be ; yet calling no man and no creed master, and in the love of truth earnestly but serenely following its light.

II. Thus we have surveyed what we may call the tentative period of his theology. We meet in it no radical changes, but rapid modifications, and always away from the dominant standards of faith. The distance from the ordination confession to the essays of the earlier fifties is long, but the line of travel is a reasonably straight one.

We will now undertake to state his more settled and characteristic doctrine. Preliminary to this, however, we may observe that what we have called his tentative period reaches just a little past the time when the "metaphysic of the world" came home to him in Trendelenburg's classroom. One who carries to the study of Dr. Martineau's earlier theology a firm grasp upon his earlier philosophy must sometimes be sensible of a dissonance between them. Convictions deep as his life surge for utterance, which, placed beside the doctrines of Hartley and the Mills, wear an incongruous look. This conversion brought him to himself, and gave him that spiritual philosophy without which he could scarcely have known an intellectual harmony. We may venture to affirm even more than this. There is a connection, often enough observed, between a mechanical philosophy and a vigorous dogmatism, and a spiritual philosophy and intellectual freedom. Given the former, the soul seeks through conventional and appointed ways the God that otherwise it is not allowed to find. Given the latter, and in the security of immediate knowledge, the appointed ways — book, creed, ritual — lose their importance. In a strange country one takes the paths that are pointed out to him ; but

"He needs a guide no longer who hath found
The way already leading to the Friend."

That Mr. Martineau's philosophical conversion yielded him another theological creed we could not say; but another theological temper it surely yielded him. In a sermon already quoted, speaking of the "living union of God with our humanity," he said, referring to the earlier period, "Long did this faith pine obscurely within me, ere it could find its way to any clear joy." After his conversion, however, it pined no more, but became his ever haunting and enthralling conviction. At the same time he turned to the problems with which he had been accustomed to deal, with correspondingly altered spirit. Before there had been an apparent willingness to save what he might: while ready to dare anything for the truth, he was somewhat more than willing that certain things should be true. Now he faces his problems with scarce a prejudice as to the issue, concerned only that his facts shall be indisputable, his postulates sound, his inferences just. Meeting God as a daily friend, questions of miracle and inspiration, of the date of the Pentateuch or the authorship of John, may be tranquilly left to the issues of learning and sound reasoning.

The basal principle of Mr. Martineau's theology is his Theism. Many would say they are Theists because they are Christian: on the authority of Christ they believe in God. Mr. Martineau, on the contrary, is a Christian because he is a Theist. He believes in Christ, for he articulates a divine word which *he* has also heard. His conception of God is not of an infinite Somewhat beyond him, or of a Moral Ideal within him, but of a "Divine Mind and Will,"—distinctly that; and he meets with peremptory challenge whatever "substitutes" for this. Especially stern is he in dealing with pantheistic dissipations of it. Most Theists pantheize¹ at times; Mr. Martineau never pantheizes; and even the unsuspected tentatives towards pantheism, be sure he will detect and unmask. Thus in his

¹ See note, p. 403.

criticism of Theodore Parker in 1845, while giving him amplest recognition as a Christian thinker, he yet brings him to judgment for his pantheizing. The American, without due thought it may have been, was willing to merge all inferior causes in one Supreme Cause, a view which, rigorously followed, should have taken him quickly to the plane, if not the orbit, of Spinoza. To this Mr. Martineau replies that there is "one thing that must not be overwhelmed, even by an invasion of the Infinite Glory. Let all besides perish, if you will; but when you open the windows of heaven upon this godless earth, and bring back the sacred flood to swallow up each brute rebellious power, let there be an ark of safety built . . . to preserve the *Human Will* from annihilation: for if this sink too, the divine irruption designed to purify, does but turn creation into a vast Dead Sea, occupied by God."¹ The like reservation is one of the characteristic features of the great *Study of Religion*,² and is implied in his multifarious writings through all the forty years between. All causes operating in nature, in the last century called second causes, he is willing to lose in the First Cause; but the human will he must reserve as itself a spring of causal power. To the pantheizing flood this is a dyke that he always opposes. Gravitation may express a divine volition, but human activities have no remoter spring than the human personality. But there is another aspect of the problem which it is important to notice: many forget, but Mr. Martineau never forgets, that there is a doctrine of man that is essential to any doctrine of God that is not pantheistic. They may stoutly deny pantheism, but the view they present of man as mode or phenomenon — anything but substantive and real — makes pantheism the only tenable doctrine. In his essay on "Nature and God" Mr. Martineau, brought to this theme,

¹ *Essays, Reviews, and Addresses*, vol. i. p. 170.

² See vol. ii. pp. 170-171.

remarks in his pregnant way: "It is not enough that you save the Divine personality, if you sacrifice the Human; without relation to which lesser, as substantive moral object, the greater, left to shed affections only on its own phenomenal effects, cannot sustain itself alive."¹ That is to say, without a real man you have no support for the conception of a real God. Yet another aspect of the problem he is called to notice. In these latter days the tendency of thought is much towards the Immanence of God, which it is possible so to conceive as to obliterate His personality. Observing in nature how all her operations are necessitated, not free, how can we think of the immanent Source as free, not necessitated? He comes to this consideration in 1851, in his critique of Greg's *Creed of Christendom*. "With an intellect," says he, "entirely overridden by the ideas of Law and Necessity, no man can escape the force of the common objections to any doctrine of prayer, or of forgiveness of sin; and if those ideas possess universal validity, the very discussion of such doctrine is, in the last degree, idle and absurd. But what if some mediæval schoolman, or some impugner of the Baconian orthodoxy, were to suggest that, though Law is coextensive with outward nature, Nature is not coextensive with God, and that beyond the range where his agency is bound by the pledge of predetermined rules lies an infinite margin, where his spirit is free? And what if, in aggravation of his heresy, he were to contend that Man also, as counterpart of God, belongs not wholly to the realm of nature, but transcends it by a certain endowment of free power in his spirit?"² Thus together with the Immanence of God he maintains his Transcendence: beyond the realm of the ever conditioned, the realm of the ever free. This view is also a dominant feature of the *Study of Religion*,³ and

¹ *Essays, Reviews, and Addresses*, vol. iii. p. 169.

² *Studies of Christianity*, p. 280.

³ See vol. ii. pp. 138-142. Dr. Schurman sees in Dr. Martineau's doctrine

through all the years between, it was one of the constants of his thought. In all dealing with the theistic problem, he guards the idea of personality, no champion of theistic faith more valiantly. His man is a living soul, no sequent in an order of phenomenal succession, or modal apparition of another nature; his God is a living, a righteous, and a loving God; and the latter he would hold untenable without the former.

The Immanence of God provides for the stability of the cosmic order: the various law of the outward universe is the decree of the Immanent Will. At the same time His Transcendency provides for His free communion with the spirit in man. The fuller statement of this doctrine must be reserved for a later page;¹ enough to note here that while on the one hand it consecrates the universe with the Divine Presence, and yields that order which makes science possible, on the other hand it provides that possibility of personal relationship which religion ever asks. Thus it becomes the basal provision for a second doctrine which he maintains with great cogency and fervor, that of *inspiration*. We have seen how, in his tentative period, he wrestled with the prevailing standards of this doctrine, how against the theory of plenary inspiration, which made prophet or apostle but the passive agent of the Holy Spirit, he maintained an inspiration that left the prophet free to use language as he had learned it, to report facts as he had observed them, to reason according to his natural skill; an inspiration that moved the soul, but did not dictate to the tongue or pen. In his earlier tentatives towards this view, his teaching wears an indefinite look,—

of Transcendency "an unconscious survival from the deistic conception of God's relation to the universe." (*Belief in God*, p. 176.) Dr. Schurman is a writer who weighs his words; but one who places beside typical deism the theism of Dr. Martineau will surely be impressed, not by resemblance, but by contrast.

¹ See book iii., "Pantheism."

it needs must wear such when placed beside the old mechanical theory which he repudiated. He was brought, however, to a more definite statement through a challenge he was compelled to make of the indefiniteness of another, and that, again, Theodore Parker. Inspiration, says the latter, "is the light of all our being; the background of all human faculties; the sole means by which we gain knowledge of what is not seen and felt, the logical condition of sensual knowledge; our human way to the world of Spirit."¹ This is perfectly consistent with the pantheizing tendency we have already marked in him; and it is as an expression of this tendency that his speculation draws from Mr. Martineau the criticism in which his own maturer views of inspiration are first distinctly outlined. If so much is inbreathed by the Divine, what then, we may ask, is achieved by the human? If in such measure we are dependent upon God, our own resource is nothing, a view which no consistent theist could allow. "Were we to attempt a solution," says Dr. Martineau, "we should commence from the division of all Agency into the two categories of the Human Will, and the Divine Will: we should endeavor to determine the circle of the former; and whatever lay wholly beyond it, though still within the limits of Consciousness and of Law, we should refer to the latter. Not everything, however, that must be ascribed immediately to God, can be called *Inspiration*. He acts *out of* the Spirit, or in *Nature*, as well as *within* the Spirit, or in our *Soul*; and we must, therefore, again exclude the whole of the former sphere, and reserve only the *characteristic faculties of man*. If it were maintained that there were a plurality of these, a further reduction might be allowed, till the attribute alone remained which manifests itself in worship,—the consciousness of moral distinctions, and reverence for moral excellence and beauty. What-

¹ *Discourse of Matters Pertaining to Religion*, fourth Am. edition, p. 205.

ever gifts are found in this province of the soul, which are *not* the produce of human will; which have been neither learned nor earned; which, without the touch of any voluntary process, appear in mysterious spontaneity; are strictly the Inspiration of God.”¹ The like dissent from our American prophet, and the like affirmative doctrine, he puts forth again in the *Study of Religion*. “A reason,” says he, “that does no thinking for itself, a conscience that flings aside no temptation and springs to no duty, affection that toils in no chosen service of love, a ‘religious sentiment’ that waits for such faith as may ‘come in’ to it,” — all conclusions fairly drawn from Parker’s teaching, — “negative their own function and disappear.”² Again, in his wonderful discussion of “God in History,”³ he says: “In order to save the *personal* power in man, and to leave him any real partnership in history, we must concede him a mental constitution of his own, — a trust of both intellectual faculty and moral will; and must limit the divine part to the intuitive *data*, from which every activity of our inner nature must start.” “Each power of the soul,” he maintains, “has its own appropriate object to which it feels its way, — reason to truth, imagination to beauty, conscience to right. The presentation of these to us *is not our own doing*; the regular pursuit of them *is*.”⁴ This thesis, as he is writing of history, he illustrates in a large way by reference to the Greek, the Hebrew, and the Teutonic mind. To the Greek there was “a haunting feeling of an *indwelling divineness* embodied in the cosmos, and interfused through all its parts, including man as one of them; for, to the Greek, the universe and human life never appeared as in their essence *antithetic* to the divine, but rather a clothing and manifesting it, and moulded by its

¹ *Essays, Reviews, and Addresses*, vol. i. pp. 180-181.

² Vol. ii. p. 170.

³ *Seat of Authority*, p. 116.

⁴ *Ibid.*

inner thought; "¹ the Jew, ruled by a moral conception, bore witness to the "moral government of the world;" and, as the Greek "interfused the divine essence through the *cosmic space*," followed the "divine footsteps down the tracks of *historic time*," and made the "course of history a highway for his God;" ² while to the Teuton belongs peculiarly that "sense of personal relation between the single soul and the Spirit of God, which is the mainspring of private sanctities, and releases the heart from the constraint of law into the freedom of love."³

Thus he finds a threefold divine initiative,—in the sense of that glory that transfigures the universe, of a Righteousness that bends the curves of history, of perfection in the individual soul. These are given, not found. Herein, not in a mechanical controlling of men's faculties, he finds the truth of inspiration; and by a conviction of this, as firmly held as was the older doctrine by Melanchthon or Calvin, his own work is done.

Here then we have a relation of persons,—always that: a giver and a receiver; an upturned eye, a down-flowing light, the light of the eternal Sun. Of persons, be it again emphasized, not of Essence and mode, not of Reality and appearance, but of Soul and soul.

But more than inspiration is provided for in this relation. Between persons there may be communion,—mind responsive to mind, affection answering to affection; and though one be infinite and the other finite, the disparity makes the grace no less possible. Still

"The spirit of the worm beneath the sod,
In love and worship, blends itself with God."

This theme is much dwelt upon by Mr. Martineau, though less in the way of doctrinal exposition than of mystic contemplation. The truth is avouched to him by experience;

¹ *Seat of Authority*, p. 117.

² *Ibid.* p. 119.

³ *Ibid.* p. 123.

in the private confessional he has met his God too often to allow question as to the possibility of the interview. Rather he would contend that of all persons in the universe, God is the most easily accessible. Herein, we hardly need say, is involved his view of prayer. A superficial scepticism, instructed only by natural law, cavils at prayer. It does not avail to feed the hungry, stay the storm, hold aloof the canker-worm, keep the pestilence at bay. No, Mr. Martineau would say, what the decrees of the Infinite Will have fixed, prayer cannot avail to unfix. The laws of physical nature relent not in their sway, and man, so far as a physical nature, is subject to them. But in the realm transcending nature which as a spiritual being is his home, and where God in His transcendence is, the two meet on other terms.¹ Here is not fixity, but freedom. Here the soul meets not decrees, but admonitions; is shown not an order, but a beauty; and here it may pour out its needs and God dispense his grace, while all the functions of the physical nature go on. The pantheist who allows God and man to meet only in nature, and the deist who, banishing God wholly from nature, leaves man wholly within it, may find no easy reconciliation of law and prayer. But a theist of the type of Mr. Martineau finds no call for reconciliation, for there is not even an apparent dissonance between them; and he can say, as Mr. Martineau has said, "I know of nothing in the constitution of the universe at all at variance with our natural faith in a personal intercourse with God, in his openness to our appeal and our susceptibility to his spirit."² Man so far as he belongs to nature must experience according as God has decreed; as a spiritual being he may receive as God may give.

¹ See *Study of Religion*, vol. ii. pp. 179-181.

² Sermon, "The Prayer of Faith," *Hours of Thought on Sacred Things*, second series.

Prayer may not avail to neutralize the malaria's poison, or to float the shattered vessel to the haven; it may, however, bring strength to the tempted, courage to the fearful, comfort to the sorrowing, resignation to the rebellious, faith to the doubting, peace to the troubled; and these through God's answering grace.

But more yet is implied. A relation of persons opens the way to a relation of ruler and subject, and hence, through the self-ordering of our conduct, obedience or disobedience. We can submit to a fate, we can yield to a law, but we can obey only a person.

We must defer to a later page Mr. Martineau's justification of the supreme holiness of God; suffice it here to say that in the presence of that holiness we recognize the rightful disposer of our lives. It is ours, indeed, through the august prerogative of freedom, to elect the disposal; His will, as communicated to us, we may make our guide unto righteousness, or we may repudiate it unto sin; but there *is* the alternative, offered to every one to whom a vision of right has been given. This or that, this better or that poorer,—soul, which wilt thou? and according to our choice is our spiritual alignment. Sin,—that is Mr. Martineau's oft-used word, and he speaks it with an impressive solemnity. Liberal preachers have been wont to shun it. Man they have treated as half-educated, over-tempted, a blunderer; Mr. Martineau says plainly *sinner*; and, like Wesley or Whitefield whose example he often recalls, he directs his burning speech to the awakening of a sinning nature to the saving sense of its condition. His sin, indeed, is not like that of Calvinism, corruption through another's transgression; it is a defilement or disease self-incurred, and for which no extenuating plea can be offered. Long practice of disobedience may numb us to the sense of its enormity; for "it is of the essence of guilty declension to administer its own anæsthetics;" and so the soul

may suffer less the deeper is its ignominy; but the downward way was entered when first, a nobler and a baser offered, choice was made of the baser, and the deeper and deeper turpitude was only incurred as the like choice was repeated. In another feature too he departs from the customary tone of many liberal theologians: in disobedience he allows no gradations. As spiritual beings we are judged not by the thing we do, but by the service we render, whether it be to God or devil; and this he holds that the unhardened soul, by its sense of guilt and remorse, confesses. In a vivid picture of Peter's anguish¹ after the denial of his Master, he imagines the customary palliatives addressed to him: This, indeed, Peter, is very bad, but take heart; you could have done much worse. To be sure, you told a lie, but you did not tell two. You only denied your Master, you did not traduce him, you did not kill him. There is Judas now; think of his betrayal and how much worse was that. To this, Peter, speaking true to the witness within him, can only reply, — and these words Mr. Martineau puts upon his lips: "Go to, thou fool and blind; Satan gave me the lie to tell; but he put no murderer's dagger in my hand; what more then could I do for him than I have done?" A little further on he says: "Appealed to by the actual competitors for our will, we well know which is the higher, expressing the will of God; and which the lower, representing his aversion. There is no third thing present; and the difference between the two is all that there can be: it is something infinite, being beyond all *quantity*, and giving an antithesis of *quality*, contrasted as beauty with horror, as the zenith with the nadir, as the smile of heaven with the frown. There is then no *second best* in Duty; and the remorse which makes us feel, when we have fallen, as traitors and accursed, flying from the tempestuous face of God, reports to us the awful truth:

¹ *Hours of Thought*, second series, p. 142.

had we been devils, we could have done no worse; we did the whole evil we were bid to do."¹

But if sin, there may be pardon; on the placability of God he delights to dwell. Sins forsaken are the Father's smile regained. But there is also punishment: and this not mere consequences of wrongdoing such as we daily experience,—poverty from wasteful indulgence, loss of confidence from dishonest dealing, impaired health from dissipated habit,—it is something more strictly penal, more retributive. Though sin may administer its "anæsthetics," and the drugged soul become insensible to its shame, yet it shall somehow and somewhere be awakened from its torpor; its dark record it shall read; its evil deeds it shall confront, and have full and clear experience of the holiness it has insulted. The doctrine of the older Universalists which, after the experience of this life, allowed saint and sinner to begin all over again on equal terms in another one, is none of Mr. Martineau's; rather the inevitable workings of sin, the fact that "guilty declension administers its own anæsthetics," so that deeper guilt may make well-nigh insensible to guiltiness, and remorse at last may lose its fang, carries his mind to the future for the experience of that justice which in this life is not executed. Future punishment, *that* he teaches. *How* that may be in the future which cannot be now he does not affirm with definiteness, but he has his visions. The "transition of Death" he holds to be large enough to "open free play for many a penalty that has remained only potential here." With the changes of "body, mind, society and scene" that it brings, "the old resources for slighting contrition and evading the misery of wrong may well have come to an end." To this thought he recurs again and again, and his vivid eloquence carries it home with a power that is sometimes terrible. R. H. Hutton, recounting Mr. Martineau's ser-

¹ *Hours of Thought*, second series, pp. 142-143.

vices to himself, said that he had inspired him, as the Calvinists had failed to do, with the "fear of hell." "There are passages in his writings," said he, "which have filled me in moments of temptation and trial, with a dread which hardly any living writer could have produced." He made special reference to the vivid picture of the "maniac of remorse" at the close of the sermon on "Christ's Treatment of Guilt,"¹ a passage which it cannot be amiss to quote in full: —

"It is remarkable how slight a suggestion is occasionally sufficient to bring back vast trains of emotion. There are cases in which some particular function of the memory acquires an exquisite sensibility: and usually, as if God would warn us what must happen when our moral nature is divorced from the physical, it is the memory of conscience that maintains this preternatural watch. In many a hospital of mental disease [as it is called] you have doubtless seen a melancholy being, pacing to and fro with rapid strides, and lost to every thing around; wringing his hands in incommunicable suffering, and letting fall a low mutter rising quickly into the shrill cry; his features cut with the graver of sharp anguish; his eyelids drooping [for he never sleeps], and showering ever scalding tears. It is the maniac of remorse; possibly indeed made wretched by merely imaginary crimes; but just as possibly maddened by too true a recollection, and what the world would esteem too scrupulous a conscience. Listen to him, and you will often be surprised into fresh pity, to find how seemingly slight are the offences, — injuries perhaps of mere unripened thought, — which feed the fires, and whirl the lash, of this incessant woe. He is the dread type of hell. He is absolutely sequestered [as any mind may be hereafter], incarcerated alone with his memories of sin; and that is all. He is unconscious of objects and unaware of time: and every guilty

¹ See *Endeavors after the Christian Life.*

soul may find itself, likewise, standing alone in a theatre peopled with the collected images of the ills that he has done; and turn where he may, the features he has made sad with grief, the eyes he has lighted with passion, the infant faces he has suffused with needless tears, stare upon him with insufferable fixedness. And if thus the past be truly indestructible; if thus its fragments may be regathered; if its details of evil thought and act may be thus brought together and fused into one big agony,—why, it may be left to ‘fools’ to ‘make a mock at sin.’”

Whoever lingers over this passage sufficiently to take home its meaning will surely feel that the punishment it implies lacks nothing of severity. The older theologians used different terms, but, a few lurid spirits excepted, it may be doubted if they provided a hell more terrible than this. For an evil soul to awaken out of a spiritual torpor, and with clear vision see the evil it has done; to become vividly conscious of low appetites that have been given rein, of passions that have not been restrained, of griefs that have been cruelly inflicted, of perfidies that have been practised, of lies that have been told, the compunctions that should have saved from them being smothered for the while; for the seducer to realize the baseness of his deed, the traitor the enormity of his offence, the murderer the horror of his crime; the veil of forgetfulness so securely drawn over the past suddenly lifted, the turpitude all plain, and the soul seeing itself in its revealing blackness,—is there other torture it would not take in exchange for its utter self-loathing and remorse? With this punishment in its moral aspect also there is absolutely no fault to find; it is only right: it is the soul’s own record that it contemplates; it is itself it sees mirrored in its own deed, itself as it is, but did not need become. The old doctrine of retribution offends the moral consciousness, and so clouds the righteousness of the universe; this one the moral

consciousness ratifies, and so sees in it a manifestation of that righteousness. Between the two there is another difference: the older doctrine stipulates the suffering as a finality; to Mr. Martineau, here as there, it has an inseparable relation with remedy. The doctrine of Plato, that the wise transgressor will seek, not shun, his punishment, has seemed to many rather ideal than practical; to Mr. Martineau, suffering for sin if dreadful is yet altogether desirable, not to be asked reprieve from, but to be prayed for,—Smite, Lord, for thy mercy's sake spare not. Through the punishment a sense of the soul's estate is borne in upon it; the truth and right of the universe, otherwise trampled and discredited, are vindicated. The soul, forever denied such suffering, he would hold, indeed, not favored, but defrauded. But more and deeper, in the nature of things, suffering must ever attend the awakening of the soul to its ill estate, the realization of the purity and high joy it has put by. As one numbed by cold and at length become insensible, awakened by medicinal arts from stupor nigh to death, has experience of a searching agony, the attendant and the witness of returning life, so with the sinning soul, aroused to a consciousness of its estate: its contrition and its shame are incident to the way of recovery. They imply that at least a thrilling glimpse of the higher beauty has been given it, in contrast with which its unseemliness is manifest. That beauty is its possible attainment; but its *via sacra*, for a period, at least, must be a *via dolorosa*. Before it hard and dark looms the mount of Purgatory, and only up its steep ascent and through its cleansing fires can the forsaken Paradise be regained.

Thus these several items of doctrine, inspiration, communion with God, prayer, sin, forgiveness, punishment, flow from that relation of persons which he maintains so strenuously.

It needs not to be shown that these doctrines, though philosophically maintained, are Christian; in their ultimate thought, however unique in their explication, they are the staple of Christendom. But what in its later stages is his view of Christ? The Arianism of his ordination confession went, and a Humanitarian view — strictly that — came to its place. Christ became to him distinctly man, not a celestial somewhat between man and God. With the change of nature there was a corresponding change of office: Christ ceased to be Lord and Saviour; he became teacher, exemplar, guide, brother, friend.

Was this change attended with a lower tone of feeling? Did it make Jesus less dear to him, his word less persuasive, his example less inspiring? The contrary were the rather true: the critic and philosopher experienced the ever-intensifying ardor of the disciple's loyalty. Settle the question of Christ's nature as you may, and define his office as you will, the personality that transfigures the Gospels had ever the homage of his heart.

Those who have been troubled by his arraignments of prevailing forms of theology have often had but dim perception of the hold that Jesus had upon him. In 1850, in his review of *Phases of Faith*, he fervidly maintained Jesus' moral perfection. "We must persist," says he, "in presuming Jesus to be perfect till shown to be imperfect. We derive our estimate of him wholly from the picture presented in the Gospels, . . . and so long as this picture presents no moral imperfections, we must decline supplying them out of the resources of fancy. In *presuming* Christ to be perfect, we simply refuse to suppose a drawback on what we see from what we do not see, and insist on forming our judgment from the known, without arbitrary modification from the unknown. No doubt Jesus, as a being open to temptation, was intrinsically capable of

sin: but this, as a set-off against the positive evidence of holiness, no more proves *actual* imperfection, than the mere capacity for goodness in the wicked proves their *actual* perfection." A little further on he adds: "Christ had the *liability* to sin, not because he was *human*, but because he was *free*; and whatever presumption of imperfection arises hence, would have arisen no less, had he been an angel of the highest rank. All souls are of one species: or rather, are lifted above the level where diversity of species prevails, so as to range, not with Nature, but with God."¹ Three years later, in reviewing a second edition of *Phases*, he maintains the same attitude, but wishes to form judgment, not alone from the lineaments of Jesus as shown in the New Testament, but also from his grace as manifest in Christian history. "We admit," says he, "and maintain that to the Person of Christ Christendom supplies an indispensable commentary; and that to judge of him as of a private neighbour by puzzling out his lineaments beforehand, instead of observing the action of his individuality upon mankind and the mingling of his influence with the currents of time, is not unlikely to lead to an estimate of him other than that which we defend. But the measure of the grandest beings cannot be taken by any private standards or contemporary memoirs: and history is their biography writ large. . . . As Plato thought it needful, in his investigation of Morals, to study their embodiment in the magnified scale and conspicuous orders of the State, so it is impossible to apprehend aright the person of Jesus without watching the spread of his shadow over the ages, and throwing back upon him the characteristics of the Christian faith."² In his review also of Renan, ten years later, the like august moral estimate, if less speci-

¹ *Essays, Reviews, and Addresses*, vol. iii. pp. 38-39.

² *Ibid.* p. 61. See also essay by Edward Caird, "Christianity and the Historical Christ," *New World*, vol. v.

fically emphasized, is yet implied ;¹ and yet again in 1890, in the *Seat of Authority*, though the language is not so unqualified, it is plain that Jesus wears to him a moral grace that lifts him to a peerless height.² This attitude does not imply the belief that all moral insights were given Jesus, nor that all moral issues lay clear before him ; it does not imply the absence of temptation and struggle ; nay, these limitations may be conditions of being, in the strict sense, moral at all. It does imply, however, that whether insights were clear or dim, in whatever struggle or whatever pain, he was faithful to the Higher Will. This aspect of his character held the heart of Dr. Martineau in steadfast discipleship. No critic has dealt with the Christian record more unsparingly than he ; and no cloistered saint was ever more responsive to its central light.

Some of the more special and individual attitudes of his mind respecting Christ are very interesting. A few years ago there was undertaken a revision of the *Common Prayer* in use among English Unitarians, a book first published in 1862, and of which "insensible changes" of sentiment made desirable some "changes" in the text. Naturally Dr. Martineau's views were solicited, and he wrote out in full the changes he would have made. In transmitting them to the clergyman who had the enterprise in hand, he wrote, "I can take no interest in any book of common prayer that does not recognize the unique place of Jesus Christ." When eighty-six years of age, he was asked if this language was still true to his mind, and he answered that it was. That "unique place," however, must be such as Dr. Martineau could give, and that was quite definitely shown in his critical emendations. It is no very uncommon circumstance to meet a Unitarian clergyman who dislikes the name Christ; it

¹ *Essays, Reviews, and Addresses*, vol. iii. p. 333.

² See especially p. 651.

designates an office which he feels that Jesus did not hold. Dr. Martineau, on the contrary, though he long ago repudiated the Messiahship of Jesus, and was anxious to relieve him of all pretence to it, yet held on to the name, and used it freely and reverently. In the case of one so scrupulous as he in the use of terms, this cannot be thought to follow as mere habit from the usage of an earlier day; and had he been questioned, he not improbably would have claimed, that while Jesus was not at all the Christ of Old Testament prediction, he yet holds, by a holier anointing, the office of Christ in the trust and affection and reverence of Christendom. The name Son, too, as applied to Jesus, is one that he very frequently used, and for which he had a very evident liking. He had, indeed, a profound conviction of universal Sonship, as he who reads his sermon on "The Finite and the Infinite in Human Nature"¹ may learn. The Pauline distinction between "creature" and "sons," a created nature seen in all structures around us and in the physical organism of man, and a begotten nature, met in man's inmost spirit, he accepted and illuminated and glorified. But of this latter he, like Paul, found in Christ the supreme illustration; nay, as he taught, it is the penetrating radiance of his life that awakens us to its more vivid realization. On the other hand the terms "Lord" and "Saviour" he disliked and would not use; they were impregnated with a meaning that was not true to him. His critical changes in the Common Prayer are mainly illustrative of these attitudes. For "in Christ Jesus our Lord," he substitutes "by thy beloved Son." Instead of "everlasting joy and felicity, through Jesus Christ our Lord," he would say "the everlasting joy to which thy glorified Son hath led the way." "For thy mercy's sake in Jesus Christ our Lord," he transforms

¹ *Hours of Thought on Sacred Things*, first series.

to "of thy compassion, shown in the tender mercies of Jesus Christ." "We bless thee for . . . the redemption of the world by our Lord Jesus Christ," he cancelled in favor of "we bless thee for . . . sending thy Son to be the light of the world." "Everlasting joy and felicity, through Jesus Christ our Lord," he changed to "everlasting joy and felicity to which thy glorified Son hath led the way." For "through our Lord Jesus Christ" he wrote "nearer the spirit of thy Son." "Grant us every blessing in Christ Jesus our Lord" he would expunge in favor of "make us joint heirs with Christ as children of God." Where the text reads "we beseech thee, O God, to hear and to accept us as true disciples of thy Son, Jesus Christ our Lord," he would have petitions offered "with the submission of children, and the perfect trust of thy beloved Son." For the phrase "Our Saviour" he sometimes substituted "Jesus Christ," and sometimes "Forerunner." "Through him whom thou hast exalted to be unto us a Prince and Saviour," he changed to "As we look unto him who was tempted as we are, and yet without sin." These changes indicate with sufficient clearness the "unique position." It is not that of an outward potentate, nor that of an official Saviour, but that of the supreme prophet of the soul; of one endowed with eye clear to the Beatific Vision, and with power to magnetize unto its joy.

III. Interesting as are his attitudes as a theologian, there is a spirit behind them that interests us even more. This controversialist who stood so valiantly for his truth, yet believed in a unity of spirit, and strove to show the way to it. An absolutely free intellect was indeed indispensable to him, and he would have held dearer any loneliness and isolation with this, than any fellowship without it; but this allowed him, as he would religiously have

allowed it to any other, the differences that should have made fraternal worship impossible would have needed to be very radical indeed. Of course where there is united service there must be points of intellectual sympathy: no group of people can come together in the worship of God unless there be a common belief that there is a God; or in discipleship of Christ, unless in some sense they, in common, recognize him as their master. But the difference is incalculable between ultimates of belief such as these and requirements of doctrine such as the sects impose; and Dr. Martineau dreamed his dream—the foolishness of his day, but possibly the blessed reality of a wiser future—of a worship in approaching which these requirements shall not be required; when theological animosities shall no longer keep apart those whom a common love should otherwise unite. He also dreamed his dream of a Church deeply based upon the religious sentiment, toiling on from age to age, changing its doctrines as new light comes, yet without breach in the continuity of its life. Here are two distinct conceptions, though they express one spirit. The former deems it possible to find points of union amid existing diversities; the latter dreams of an organization of which doctrinal features shall not be dominant and obtrusive. No abatement of the profound research, no rest for the restless mind, no truce even to polemic strife. You need not make your zeal for truth the less because you magnify your love.

The former was borne in upon him, as it has been borne in upon so many others, by contemplating sectarian divisions in contrast with the common truth out of which they spring. Scattered through his various writings are many tentatives towards reconciliation, but one stands out conspicuously before all others, a remarkable paper entitled “A Way out of the Trinitarian Controversy,” first pub-

essence that underlies them; and the absolutely One is revealed as relatively Three."¹ If Trinitarian apologist has ever offered a more satisfactory account of his doctrine, we have not met it.

From this account of the doctrine it is easy to see that distinct predicates respecting the First Person should be difficult to form. He may be vaguely conceived like space without worlds, or like life without living beings; but of him little can be said. Accordingly, while multitudes of Trinitarians talk of the doings of the Father as familiarly as of those of the "elder Lord Shaftesbury," the Trinitarian creed deeply studied gives them no warrant for so doing. The creed indeed speaks of the First Person as "Maker of heaven and earth, and of all things visible and invisible;" but this does not distinguish him from the Second Person, of whom it is affirmed that "*by him all things were made.*" A harmony of these two statements is easily realized by remembering that the creative act is peculiarly the Son's; that only as acting through the Son is it referred to the Father. And accordant with the creed is the teaching. The fashioning of the world, the creation of man, the shaping of the long drama of history, the redemption, the final judgment, are not of the Father, but of the Son. Whatever is done is through the agency of the Son. "The one fundamental idea by which the two personalities are meant to be distinguished is simply this; that the first is God in his primeval essence,—infinite meaning without finite indications; the second is God speaking out in phenomena and fact, and leaving his sign, wherever anything comes up from the deep of things, or merges back again."²

The reason, then, why the First Person yields so few predicates is plain enough: "The moment anything arises,

¹ *Essays, Reviews, and Addresses*, vol. ii. p. 530.

² *Ibid.* p. 532.

it is the Son." Around him, therefore, as their natural centre cluster all events: all phenomena of nature, life, history, through which an impression of the Divine is borne in upon us. The firmament sheweth the handiwork and the heavens tell the glory of the *Son*; and since all distinctive tokens of the Divine are thus of him, the Father is but a "blank of infinite possibility,—the occult potency of all perfection, but the realized stage of none;" and though we may say he is "the abyss how deep," or "the heaven how high," he yet offers no peculiar power or grace by which the mind can lay hold upon him. He is necessary as a background to our thought, but presents no outline in the foreground. He is as the vault that holds the stars, yet were itself inscrutable and unguessed but for them.

This most fruitful exposition it is not needful to follow further. The way out of the Trinitarian Controversy, as he would show it, *is through the recognition of a common conception under different names.* The Trinitarian's Son is essentially the Unitarian's Father. The Unitarian's Father is anything but a colorless and metaphysical Absolute; he is the creating, sustaining, guiding power of the universe, its manifest wisdom, life, and love; and the Trinitarian's Son is just that. When the Unitarian says Father, the Trinitarian, understanding him from his own mind, supposes him to refer to that impalpable abstraction, the First Person of his Trinity, in whom the Unitarian, as such, has scarcely any interest at all. Not unnaturally, therefore, the Trinitarian conceives a coldness and lovelessness fundamental in the Unitarian faith, a misjudgment scarcely intelligible to the Unitarian. On the other hand, when the Trinitarian says Son, the Unitarian is almost sure to limit his view to the Jesus Christ of history, and he is quite aggrieved that a man should thus be lifted to a God. To the Trinitarian, however, the historic character is only the earthly apparition of a power and grace

that know no time limitations, but are coexistent with the life of God. "The 'Son' comes before his mind, not as an historical personage at all, but as God's eternal expression of himself,—the thought he puts forth in all his works and ways, manifested through all ages by nature and history; but concentrated with unique brilliancy in the character and existence, the holy life and redeeming work of Jesus." In short, it is the like power, the like wisdom, the like grace that under different names they both contemplate; the Father of the one is the other's Son; and on the basis of this recognition, the two may come together, not indeed throughout, but on the common "under-truth" of their faiths. Dr. Martineau concludes with a reflection which multitudes can but approve, but which few are likely soon to embrace: "Let the advocates of each compare them together from this point of view, with mind open, not to words only, but to the real thoughts they contain, with temper sensitive to sympathy rather than to divergency, and there is hope that we may yet all come into the unity of faith, and true knowledge of the Son of God."¹

Such is his attitude on this divisive problem, and in these profound and reconciling words we may see a prevailing temper of his mind in dealing with the beliefs of men. Living so much in relation with the "under-truth that feeds the roots of all our faiths," he found bases of agreement there scarce credible to less thorough minds. So while on critical grounds none were more exacting in their demands than he, he was yet haunted by the sense of an underlying unity of faith which it grieved his great heart that so few others should recognize. Indeed it may be doubtful if there was a Protestant communion that he could not have joined, if the prescribed conditions had been only the root convictions. He could have wor-

¹ *Essays, Reviews, and Addresses*, vol. ii. p. 538.

shipped with those whose doctrinal attitude was farthest from his own, and then labored to show them the better way, as he would have rejoiced also to be shown. In fact, while his theological affiliations were Unitarian, his religious affiliations were with the deep souls of Christendom; and it was an open secret that his religious affiliations counted with him for more than his theological.

This brings us to a second conception. "The under-truth that feeds the roots of all our faiths," he could commend to the attention of the great religious bodies, hoping it might charm them to a broader sympathy. Within his own religious fellowship, however, he could at least attempt to legislate in its behalf; and this he did. Doing it, however, he found that the sympathies of the great majority of his brethren were not with him; and for many years, on the practical application of the "under-truth," he and they were not of accordant mind. Thus it happened that while theologically the prophet of the more advanced Unitarianism, ecclesiastically, in his deep mind and heart, he was not Unitarian. This attitude, which to some has seemed peculiar, should at least be explained.

What shall we make basal in religious organization? Shall it be some rapture of the soul or some conception of the intellect? Shall it be worship or dogma? Suppose a group of people who may be able to say, "We love God" and "We believe in the Unity of the Divine Nature," — which shall they put forward as expressing their cardinal interest and invite men to co-operate with them in cultivating and extending, the love or the belief? Shall the basis of their organization be religious or shall it be theological? The practical difference, whether one or the other, is very great. If they organize on the belief in the Divine Unity, make dominant, that is, the fact that they are Unitarians, however tolerant may be

their professions, they make impossible the approach of any sincere soul that is not Unitarian; if on the love of God, they put forward a principle to which all aspiring souls may respond. Trinitarians are quite as likely as Unitarians to love God, and, agreeing to disagree, they can kneel one beside the other at a common altar. Here, however, in the far prevailing judgment of men, is an insuperable difficulty: they cannot agree to disagree. Unless they believe alike, they cannot pray together.

Dr. Martineau did not so hold; he deemed it possible, and held it wise, to organize on the love and not the dogma. Allowing that some measure of agreement is necessary in the religious grouping of men, the necessary extent of this he yet held to be greatly exaggerated; and he dreamed his dream of a church in which indeed the Unitarian shall have a place, but which shall be primarily and declaredly Christian rather than Unitarian. He never indeed overlooked the fact that intellectual sympathies will inevitably have much to do with the bringing of men together; that men will, to a wide extent, differentiate themselves on lines of belief; but this fact he held not to make necessary a theological dominance in a body organized for the nurture of religion.

The intensity of his feeling on this point is related to two or three matters of history to which he frequently refers. English Presbyterianism, into whose ministry he was ordained, would, as we have already seen, impose no doctrinal tests. Beginning with the severer type of doctrine of Baxter's time, it had taken new light as it had come, had advanced and meliorated and expanded, until at length it reached the confines of Unitarianism; or rather we might more accurately say, while yet prevailingly Trinitarian, Unitarianism had become quite common within its rank. Then indeed an effort was made to bring the organization to a declaredly Trinitarian basis; and at the

Salter's Hall Convention in London, in 1719, the debate was earnest. But these Presbyterians, however prevailingly they may have disliked Unitarianism, refused to part with their liberty; they would consent to no doctrinal test whatever. Here was to Dr. Martineau a model that he liked to contemplate—"a living church with changing creed,"—and one which he never wearied of commanding.

But now another incident. In the year 1825 the British and Foreign *Unitarian* Association was formed. Here was a contrast: the convention at Salter's Hall, though preponderantly Trinitarian, for the sake of fellowship of those of another mind, refused to declare itself so; the convention at Finsbury Hall declared the organization that it formed Unitarian. Which offered the more marked example of tenderness for intellectual conviction, the Trinitarians who would take no stand that should banish Unitarians from their fellowship, or the Unitarians who took a stand that made the fellowship of any but Unitarians impossible? It should be possible for the candid Unitarian to see how Dr. Martineau might see that more conspicuous example in the former. It ought to be said that the form in which the question came before these respective bodies was different, and that therefore there was not an exact parallelism in their conduct. At Salter's Hall the question was, Shall the minister coming to our rank be required to subscribe to the doctrine of the Trinity? and the answer, after long debate, was no. At Finsbury Hall they found themselves Unitarian and named themselves accordingly, and why should they not? Certainly no ethical objection is to be urged against their conduct, and most felt that the action was practically wise. But however unlike the circumstances of the two bodies, and however dissimilar the things they respectively did, it is difficult to disown the fact that

the Unitarians turned away from the large inclusiveness which Presbyterianism from first to last proclaimed and exemplified.

Yet another incident, of painful but illuminating suggestiveness, was soon to occur. In England, as in America, the largest liberty and the most catholic sympathy have been the profession and even the boast of Unitarians; their ability to maintain this noble claim with the Unitarian flag ever in the van, was brought to a proof that proved it wanting. In the time of Charles II., a benevolent woman, Lady Hewley, of Presbyterian affiliation, bequeathed certain funds for religious and charitable uses. These, placed in the care of those in religious sympathy with her, at length came into the hands of Unitarians. The question arose among the enemies of Unitarianism, whether Unitarians could be the lawful custodians of funds given by one who was not a Unitarian, and who never conceived their being administered in the interest of Unitarianism. But if these funds could be taken away from Unitarians, why not also the chapels which Presbyterian money had built, and which had come into Unitarian hands through the fact that their congregations had become Unitarian? In less than a decade after the organization of the Unitarian Association, the Unitarians were called to meet this twofold issue before a legal tribunal. The plea it needed to impress upon the court was that the Presbyterians were an undogmatic and purely Christian body which, unrestrained by creed, had through the slow modification of opinion come to the Unitarian attitude, and that the Unitarians, also an undogmatic and purely Christian body, were their natural successors and heirs; that one with Lady Hewley in the deep fellowship of the spirit, they only differed from her as, after an interval of two hundred years, it was inevitable that they should differ. But at once it was seen that the name Unitarian which

they had taken made impossible the claim that they were an undogmatic body. It said, by the clearest implication, that the large fellowship of the spirit which was the all-ruling feature of Lady Hewley's worship had been put by, and that, too, in the interest of a dogma that was none of Lady Hewley's. To meet the exigency, therefore, there was formed in a committee-room of the Association a new organization under the Presbyterian name, to make in court the contention impossible to itself.¹ This series of incidents,—the noble action of the Salter's Hall convention, the adoption of the Unitarian name, and with it a dogmatic standard, at Finsbury Hall, an act that brought the Unitarians into the sharpest contrast with the Presbyterians, the action to which the Association was driven in the Lady Hewley suit, together made a deep impression upon the mind of Dr. Martineau.²

The contention turns on the employment of a name; and some earnest spirit asks, Why not employ it? If you are Unitarian, why not call yourself such? Indeed, why not? Dr. Martineau not only concedes your right, but urges it upon you as a duty so to do. No man has more earnestly pressed the importance of distinctly formed and frankly declared religious conviction than he, and no man has taken to himself the Unitarian name by more fervid proclamation. But if an individual should do thus, why not a group of individuals to whom Unitarianism is

¹ The case was decided against the Unitarians. The funds were transferred to Trinitarian custody, and the chapels were lost. The latter, however, were restored to the Unitarians by act of Parliament in 1844.

² On this subject he has left a considerable record. See "Address, on Occasion of Laying the Foundation Stone of a New Church in Hope Street," *Essays, Reviews, and Addresses*, vol. iv.; also "The Unitarian Position," vol. ii., and "Church-Life? or Sect-Life?" and "New Affinities of Faith," in the same volume. In the *Theological Review*, April, 1866, he printed an article on "The Living Church through Changing Creeds," and at the National Conference held at Leeds, April, 1888, he gave an address, afterwards printed in pamphlet, on "Church Organization."

a common conviction? Again why not? If the cardinal and all-directing purpose be to persuade men of the Unity of the Divine Nature, why, take name accordingly. A Unitarian society is thus as legitimate as a temperance society, or an historical society. Like these it stands for a distinct and definite purpose that may be very wise, but to the subordination of all else. These illustrations may guide our thought to the point at issue, as Dr. Martineau conceives it. Is your church but as a temperance or an historical society? He answers no. "A man's '*Church*' must be the home of whatever he most deeply loves, trusts, admires, and reveres,—of whatever most divinely expresses the essential meaning of the Christian faith and life."¹ Does the doctrine of the Divine Unity embrace all this under its shelter? As one takes reckoning of whatever he most deeply loves, trusts, admires, and reveres, of whatever most divinely expresses to him the essential meaning of the Christian faith and life, how little of it does he find in association with this dogma! So far as the dogma is divisive,—and the limits of permissible fellowship under it are the narrowest,—in insisting that his ecclesiastical structure shall be built upon it, he turns from the home with which so many affections are associated, and elects an isolated hermitage. Instead of the spiritual and universal and eternal, he builds upon the speculative and the individual. The contrast is emphasized by a further distinction on which it is profitable to meditate: On the former a *church* may be builded; on the latter only at most and best, a *sect*. "It is the conscious sameness of spiritual relations," says Dr. Martineau, "that constitutes a *Church*; it is the temporary concurrence in theological opinion that embodies itself in a creed and makes a *Sect* in the proper sense." "The very life and soul of the former," he continues, "so far as we are con-

¹ *Essays, Reviews, and Addresses*, vol. ii. p. 376.

cerned, is in the feeling and proclamation of unity in spite of difference. The essence of the latter is in the accentuation of difference amid unity,—in the imitative acceptance of the very principle and mode of thought whence other sects arise." He adds, "We are bound, I must think, to hold our particular form of *personal opinion* on a very different tenure from the *spiritual affections* which bring successive generations to kneel in our churches; to treat the former as a life interest, the latter as a freehold in perpetuity; and to beware of fixing upon worshipping assemblies and an ecclesiastical body whose life runs on through centuries, the mutable types of thought special to our own time."¹ From this point of view we can surely understand him when he adds, "To a Unitarian *Society*,—just as to a Reform Society,—I would willingly belong, but of a 'Unitarian Church' I could never be a member."²

That utterance such as this should draw upon him some severities of criticism, especially from those who mistake sectarian zeal for Christian steadfastness, was doubtless inevitable;³ but the thoughtful Unitarian, out of his own experience, should at least understand him. Where is there such an one who does not realize that his spiritual affinities run wide of his theological relations? The books he turns to, not for theological instruction, but for religious nurture, which most arouse him, elevate him, comfort him, strengthen him, how prevailingly are they the production of other than Unitarians! The heroes of the faith whose example most enkindles, and of whose deeds of love and sacrifice he most likes to tell, wandering back from heaven as they went thither, he knows could only

¹ *Essays, Reviews, and Addresses*, vol. ii. pp. 372–373.

² *Ibid.* p. 374.

³ If any one wishes to see specimens of such criticism, let him turn to the *Christian Reformer* for 1859, and the files of the *Inquirer* for the same period.

disown the fellowship that implied acceptance of his dogma. He looks upon illustrious contemporaries, toiling with a devotion he can but reverence, and diffusing a life which he is sure is the light of men; and he knows by unmistakable tokens that in the deeps of the spirit he is one with them: —

“ One in the freedom of the truth,
One in the joy of paths untrod,
One in the soul’s perennial youth,
One in the larger thought of God; ”

yet the hand-clasp which this oneness should make spontaneous and glad is rendered impossible through a name he has assumed and a flag he carries. For while in a beautiful sense it is true that

“ Stone walls do not a prison make,”

and that spiritual sympathies may roam free whatever the restrictions of dogma; yet is it also true, that no other restrictions so isolate, no other separations so separate, as dogmatic ones. To men of shallow natures this situation may be satisfactory: they may live within a sectarian enclosure and yearn for no larger love; but to a susceptible and fervid nature like Dr. Martineau’s, it is scarce tolerable. Any such can feel with him when he writes, “ that I find myself in intellectual accordance with the Socini, or Blandrata, or Servetus in one cardinal doctrine,— and that a doctrine not distinctively Christian, but belonging also to Judaism, to Islam, and to simple Deism,— is as nothing compared with the intense response wrung from me by some of Luther’s readings of St. Paul, and by his favorite book, the ‘ *Theologia Germanica.* ’ ”¹ Such also can understand how, to be torn away from the great company of devout souls, in which Wesley and Keble and Pascal and St. Augustine are enrolled, and with whom his spirit

¹ *Essays, Reviews, and Addresses*, vol. ii. p. 376.

is most deeply affiliated, he should regard "an unnatural" and "an inadmissible fate." His attitude, if some had not apparently found it incomprehensible, we should say was the clearest possible. Be faithful to your intellect, he would say, — always that; seek the truth with all earnestness, and proclaim it with all fervor. But building a church, the central feature of which should be an altar, not a doctrine, make basal and prominent the truth that unites, not the speculation that divides. You hold to the Love of God and the Divine Unity; hold fast to the Divine Unity, but rear your church to the Love of God. Let the doctrine be your personal conviction; let the Love be your public confession. In the one you hold to a theory in which a few shall agree with you, in the other to a sentiment in which Christendom is at one with you. Others by dogmatic barriers keep you away from them, see to it that by no dogmatic barrier do you hold them away from you. They may not come at your invitation, none the less let yours be the open door and the proffered welcome. Bring yourself, not merely into mystic sympathy, but into open relation with all reverent and aspiring souls. Let there be one church however small and feeble, theological indeed in the privileges of its members, but religious in its aim, and in all the features of its organization. Thus has he pleaded with his brethren, shut out from the dominant churches by a Trinitarian orthodoxy, yet bent on establishing a Unitarian orthodoxy over against it. This language, it must be said, speaks true to the conscious purpose of few Unitarians: in England, as in America, they have proclaimed the largest liberty. Come with us, they have said, believing what you must, and no question shall be asked you; and they have sometimes been quite troubled in spirit that an invitation so cordial should be received so coldly. The Trinitarian might say, Your invitation has a generous sound, but I cannot ignore the fact that you

organize on a view of the Divine Nature the very opposite of mine. However you talk of the worship that unites, you have drawn with unmistakable distinctness the line that divides. Your temple door stands hospitably open, but over it is inscribed *Unitarian*. Dr. Martineau puts himself in the Trinitarian's place, and clearly sees that by that inscription the Unitarian makes his own pretension impossible; that by making the way of approach a dogma, he bars away from the large fellowship of the spirit; and this, vividly conscious of spiritual affinities and eager to place their claims before every other, he felt to be an unnecessary and a sad mistake.¹

The ecclesiastical ideal of Dr. Martineau, expressed in the happy title of one of his essays, was a "Living

¹ It is pleasant to find that others looking across the line of sectarian division from the opposite direction may reciprocate his feeling. Thus A. H. Craufurd, in his *Christian Instincts and Modern Doubt*, speaking of Dr. Martineau says: "I cannot help feeling painfully that a church which has no room in it for the devoutly Christian genius of Dr. Martineau is a national church only in a very defective way. It does indeed seem strange that we should exclude from our worship and our fellowship that saint and seer who has in our time been by far the best and noblest exponent of the essential verities of our Master's religion. To claim for ourselves that we are nearer to Jesus than he is would indeed be a thing most absurd and impudent. To put, or even seem to put, a stigma on the greatest religious teacher of our age is a thing from which we may well shrink. We grateful and devoted followers do indeed know well that 'the disciple is not above his master,' but immeasurably below him. All the present nominal leaders of our church taken collectively would not make one James Martineau. How, then, can we presume to banish from the fold of Christ this His greatest and most faithful servant and son? How can we hurl at him the harsh and unchristian anathemas of the Athanasian Creed? For my part I will freely own that, when I am supposed to be declaring that he shall 'without doubt perish everlastinglly' by reason of his Unitarian errors, I find myself instinctively exclaiming as I see him soaring upwards into the divine presence, 'He has outsoared the shadow of our night;' 'My Father, my Father! the chariot of Israel and the horsemen thereof.' It will indeed be well for us if only a small portion of his sacred spirit shall descend upon us. We do not even dare to hope, as Elisha hoped concerning Elijah, 'that a double portion' of his sublime spirit may descend upon us. When he goes his mantle is not likely to fall on any successor." (pp. 259-260.) This in some points may seem an exaggeratio; but the attitude is noble.

Church through Changing Creeds;" or, what means the same thing, a "Progressive Theology amid sameness of Spiritual Relations."¹ But this can obviously never be save where "spiritual relations" are the ever dominant ones. The weakness that has been the evil genius of Protestantism, which makes necessary a new church as the organ of a new religious conviction, must surely pursue it, while, recognizing free inquiry, we yet build upon dogmatic foundations. Continuity of life there can be none for the church that does not build upon the deeper love and diviner aspiration. The fathers may conceive that they are building for the sons, but the sons must excommunicate the fathers. The "changing creed," where creed is the fundamental fact, makes impossible the "living church." This consideration, brought before the vivid imagination of Dr. Martineau, has counted for much. Very early his stand was taken. In 1848, in an address on the occasion of the laying of the foundation stone of his new church in Liverpool, he spoke these eloquent words: "We *know* what we believe; we *love* what we believe; we plainly *tell* what we believe; I am a Unitarian; you, who meet here from week to week, are doubtless Unitarian too; but the society of worshippers, of which we are only the *living* members, and the Church erected here, of which we shall be but *transient* tenants, these are *not* to be defined as Unitarian. To stamp them with such a doctrinal name, would be to perform an act of posthumous expulsion against many noble dead whom it is an honour to revere; and perhaps to provoke against ourselves, from a future age, the retribution of a like excommunication. In refusing to commit our churches to a determinate system, we protest against the imputation of the least indifference to truth. We simply carry out, in affairs of religion, the rule which is followed in all wise

¹ *Essays, Reviews, and Addresses*, vol. ii. p. 372.

endowments for the advancement of knowledge. . . . Institutes of Science and halls of learning are created, not to sustain the theories of their day, however earnestly adopted by the first founders; but in the assurance that Nature and the human intellect will ever seek to converse together, and that a place that aids their meeting will be a welcome heritage to any age. . . . And why may not our Churches rise, not in blind expectation of perpetuity for the present types and classifications of theology, but in pure faith that God and the human soul will ever seek each other; and that, so long as Heavenly Mercy shall stoop, and earthly aspiration rise, a court of audience for trust and prayer cannot be obsolete."¹

The glance here is mainly backward; he is not willing to excommunicate the fathers. But there is also a forward look; true and vital as he may hold his beliefs, he would not fasten them upon the sons as a condition of entering on their churchly heritage. An academy dedicated to science, the ever progressive interpretation of nature, is ideal in its conception; but an academy reared in other times to perpetuate and diffuse the theory of phlogiston, or of cataclsms, or the corpuscular theory of light, all once believed and expounded by the best minds of the world, would wear to-day a singular look. So far as successful in its aim it could only perpetuate an anachronism,—as churches reared in the interest of dogma have surely done. This to Dr. Martineau is an intolerable thought. That truth may freely unfold, the problems of thought must be met by the unpledged mind. The Unitarian objection to creeds, he holds never to have been so successful on the intellectual side disproving their truthfulness, as on the moral side challenging their rightfulness. To his fellow-believers he says: "In clearing your conscience and uttering your truth to-day, respect the con-

¹ *Essays, Reviews, and Addresses*, vol. iv. pp. 439-440.

science and the truth of to-morrow. You are mortal; the Church is immortal; your own portion of it counts, and is to count, by centuries. In your personal action on your own time, use without stint the right, discharge without fear the duties, of an ingenuous Christian soul. But in providing for the Future, which belongs to other consciences and not to yours,—in speaking for the Church into which you were born and from which you will die,—remember that your concern with it is not discretionary, but fiduciary; beware of entailing upon it a permanent tribute to your own opinions; and see to it, that you close not against another age any door which you found open for your own.”¹

Such was his attitude, and such the difference, long continued and sometimes earnest, between him and his Unitarian brethren. They would establish a Unitarian Church; he pleaded for a Church of God and Christ. They would build upon a doctrine, he upon a reverence and a love. They would organize to fight down an error, he to build up a faith. They would take to themselves a dogmatic designation, he would have found a religious one, or at least one carrying no dogmatic suggestion. The regret on both sides was considerable: on theirs, that their theological leader could not be also in the broadest sense their ecclesiastical co-laborer; on his, that the close fellowship of his brethren was not quite compatible with the larger fellowship of his heart.

That the same religious societies, organized as Dr. Martineau would have organized them, would have done better religious work, any one has a right to believe or to disbelieve; but one thing is certain, that Unitarianism as a counter-orthodoxy, whether in England or America, has had no marked success. Its Unitarian proclamation has been rather a gauntlet it has thrown down, than an invita-

¹ *Essays, Reviews, and Addresses*, vol. ii. pp. 383-384.

tion it has put forth; it has been driven to much self-explanation; its tone has been critical, its temper cold. This may not have been because its emphasis was on the wrong interest,—the dogma from which it takes its name rather than the love that it should serve,—but many have thought so, and among them Dr. Martineau.

In recent years too, especially in England, Unitarianism has shown a marked tendency to secularization, the problems of society winning from the interest once given to the profounder problems of the faith, than which no tendency could have been more foreign to the spirit of Dr. Martineau. In this tendency, too, the Unitarian is not sharply distinguished from other bodies; it only conspicuously illustrates a spirit that is abroad, which Dr. Martineau, watchful of all phases of religious phenomena, viewed with a regret which only his profound trust could comfort. In a letter to the present writer, in answer to a question as to the outlook from the summit of his years, he replied: "You ask me in what light old age presents to me the world I am so soon to quit. Often do I wish that I could see it dressed in such a radiant sunshine of immediate promise as cheers the nonagenarian vigor of our dear friend, Dr. Furness.¹ But did I not 'live by faith,'—had I to 'live by sight' of the social and spiritual tendencies preponderating now, I should breathe my parting word in tune more with Jeremiah than with Isaiah. For our little Israel's participation in the future of English religious history, I have less and less hope every year. But all the Divine possibilities remain locked in our humanity, and sure, either here or there, to free themselves into realization. Resting in this, I can lay to sleep all impatient haste, and wait His time."

¹ This letter was written in 1892.

CHAPTER III

THE NEW TESTAMENT CRITIC

BEHIND belief is a reason for believing. What is the 'seat of authority,' or the ultimate support of religious belief? Keeping ourselves within Christian boundaries, and discarding mere eccentricities of opinion, we find three answers to this question.

First, there is that of the Roman Catholic. His ultimate authority is his Church. Its origin is divine: it is the earthly embodiment of a heavenly ideal; its head is the vicegerent of Christ and speaks in his name. The natural attitude before it, therefore, is one of reverent submission. To question is irreverence, to doubt is impiety.

The second is that of the evangelical Protestant. His appeal is to an infallible Bible. The Scriptures, Jewish and Protestant, are a message by which heaven makes known its will to man. Theories of inspiration have differed;—was it only an illumination of the intellect? or did the Holy Spirit subdue the mind of prophet and apostle to its thrall, and make them the amanuenses of its word? These questions suggest divergent theories on which contention has sometimes been earnest; but under both alike the doctrine of inerrancy has been maintained. The revelation has, indeed, been allowed to have been progressive, more primitive when the law was given by Moses, more fully unfolded when the prophets spoke; but in this progressive feature we have been shown a divine economy which adapts the lesson to the learner. By such consider-

ation, together with rules of interpretation which explain the obscure by the clear, the morally doubtful by the morally indubitable, which see in seeming discrepancies but surface denials of profounder harmonies, is the august thesis maintained. Here, says the apologist, is the oracle of Heaven's will. Here is wisdom without alloy of error, light and no darkness at all, beauty and no blemish anywhere. To one who holds the Bible thus there is no question of authority. Will he learn respecting God, his nature, his will? of man, his origin or destiny? of sin, perdition, redemption? the ethics that are unerring, the worship that will be accepted, the faith that will save?—why, he will open this book and learn.

These two forms of authority we distinguish as outward. They speak to man as from the skies, whose depths his unaided vision may not penetrate. Listen to the apologist of either, and the supreme and only assurance is in its word. Man only guesses till it instructs, and is ever a wanderer without its light.

The third answer is that of the philosopher, who finds the ultimate warrant of conviction, not without, but within. Grant truth offered from without, still, he will argue, it must be received within; and receiving implies, not passive acquiescence, but active embrace. Merely granting a teaching true, as the unlettered man may grant the formula of the asymptote, is surely not a receiving to which we can attach a religious value; but only that in which the teaching is met with responsive embrace. But this implies what? Simply that the mind shapes its judgment according to criteria of its own. It is not enough that a dictum be true; in order that I may receive it, it must be true to me. If dissonant with my intellect or conscience, however I may assent to it outwardly, I inwardly repudiate it; and it is rather luggage that I carry than light upon my path. As respects truth in general, so as respects

the distinction between truth in its human proclamation and its divine. Telling me *this* is divine truth, made known through inspiration, *that* is mere human truth, reached through investigation, is to little purpose unless there be that within me which marks the difference: some deep sense that discerns the peculiarities of the divine speech or the intonations of the divine voice. Such sense our philosopher will claim. The soul, he will say, not only proves all oracles but discriminates them as of earth or of heaven.

Thus the ultimate warrant of religious belief he finds, not without, but within. He does not, indeed, claim for all men the ability to find this warrant, but that it is within the range of human faculty. He finds it in the "summit minds," which, through the unity of the race, represent the unfolded possibilities of all. From the mountain crest they report the vision to those upon the slopes below. Herein is the element of just thought in the claim of outward authority. Human society is not an association of equals; everywhere is the relation of dependence, those of dimmer upon those of clearer vision. The parent must be authority to the child, the teacher to the pupil, the statesman to those that follow him. The fundamental truths of science, the great principles of social organization, met and dealt with in all the practical relations of life,—how many can render an ultimate account of them? Men may be found who claim to put by outward authority; yet their social ethics, their business rules, their political maxims, their literary judgments, their philosophical opinions, closely examined, confute them. These illustrations, however, hardly illustrate the authority claimed for Church and Bible. The child gives up the parent's guidance at last, and walks wisely in ways of his own selecting; the pupil outstrips his master; the statesman may be forsaken for another leader; the science we

learn from an Agassiz we may surrender with a Darwin, and the Social Physics of a Comte we may give up for the Sociology of a Spencer. In all these cases the mind acts freely, following by natural attraction what seems to it the clearer light. Not thus, however, are we permitted to treat Church or Bible, which, speaking from above reason, demands its surrender rather than seeks its persuasion.

The Catholic and Protestant, while most fiercely contending with each other, unite in common abhorrence of such a philosopher. He is rationalist, infidel, mere theist, or whatever other bad thing, according to the time and tenor of debate, it is most convenient to call him. He is apt, too, to intensify the dislike of both by holding either under the like adverse judgment. Whether on easier terms with the followers of Luther or of Hildebrand, whether for practical use he may prefer the Bible or the Hierarchy, he finds no better warrant in one than in the other for the tremendous claim of infallibility, and so of ultimate outward authority; and in the argument with which he exposes the pretensions of either, the other may see the indictment of his own. He has, not unlikely, a far kindlier feeling for either than either cherishes towards the other; both he may allow to be depositories of divine truth and to convey the monitions of the Divine Spirit; and here again either is displeased at seeing the other allowed to be the almoner of a grace of which it claims to be the sole dispenser. These attitudes may wear a very human look, but they are not without deep reason. Neither could allow the claim of the other without the destruction of itself. To an infallible authority any rival must be a pretender. It discredits its own title when it admits the legitimacy of another. In another aspect, too, the common objection to the philosopher may be seen to be well taken. On the assumption that there is an outward authority that is the ultimate support of religion, the

structures of Catholic and Protestant dogma are reared ; in this transfer of the seat of authority from without to within, a new departure is undertaken than which no other could be more revolutionary. Our philosopher may be one of ready sensibility and most generous appreciation ; to the noble work of the Catholic Church he may bear most willing testimony ; the great lessons of Holy Writ he may ponder with surrendered heart. His, however, is just a natural response to a truth or a divineness that has beamed upon him. He embraces it for no other reason than because it justifies itself to his interior nature. His theology will be no system of dogma supported by Scripture texts or the decrees of councils, but a body of convictions, won it may be through divine provocation, but with the soul for its central light.

Undoubtedly the predilection of most men is for an outward authority, a voice that speaks to them a decisive word. It is not strange, therefore, that, accustomed to its tone, they do not surrender it with glad alacrity, and that they look with a prevailing distrust upon a competing doctrine that implies a transition so momentous. An inward authority, that suggests to them mere personal opinion, personal idiosyncrasy, a hazy talk of intuitions, a vaporizing of ideals ; — where, they ask, is the all-persuading and unifying truth ? That a wide acceptance of an inward authority would involve difficulties is very probable, though it might prove with respect to this, as with so many other matters, that "the evils from which we suffer most are those that never come." It may be that man, by nature a religious being, would find his way to a proximate unanimity of thought ; that his worship, while in spirit more real, would be no more multifarious than now. In ethics there is no prevailing appeal to an outward standard, yet the Moral Philosophy of the world is classified on two or three lines of thought. Men who must

have an outward authority in religion are very apt to be intuitionists in their ethics, and while looking to the Bible for their faith, find in conscience their criterion of right; yet on a wide survey, with minor differences, nothing is clearer than their large ethical agreement. How should it be otherwise with religion under the like rule? But while a prevailing recognition of an inward authority would involve difficulties, the outward authorities present difficulties far more grave, because pertaining, not to their working, but to their inmost nature. Are they what they are claimed to be? They are fervidly proclaimed infallible; — are they so? The Protestant is reasonably sure of the absurdity of the Catholic pretension, but is his own more secure? That, reasoning *a priori*, we should find sounder presumption in favor of an infallible book than of an infallible church, it were hard to say; while, dealing with facts after the wont of men, it is doubtful if a more formidable bill of particulars can be offered against the Catholic pretension than the Protestant. Possibly, too, if Protestants were as eager to see their faith through Catholic eyes as they are to exhibit the Catholic faith through their own, they might see in one important point the logical superiority of the Catholic doctrine. The Catholic teaching that inspiration was not given once for all, but is ever continued to the Church, is of great practical significance. When the Catholic urges that, granted an infallible Scripture, we have yet no infallible guidance without an infallible interpretation, how can we confute him? When he further urges that through the help of the Holy Spirit the Church is able to supply this, though we may be sceptics as to the fact, how can we fail to see that its assertion gives a consistency to his scheme of doctrine which the Protestant is not allowed to boast? Infallible guidance! How do the warring sects of Protestantism bear out the Catholic contention of the impossibility of this!

I. Still, however, the Protestant doctrine demands to be dealt with on its own merits. The recoil from the Catholic claim of authority led the reformers to their tremendous emphasis of a counter-authority. An infallibility was appealed to, to counterpoise an infallibility. Here was no blending, as Dr. Martineau would say, of divine and undivine elements, which, in order to read the Bible wisely, we must learn to distinguish; in every feature it was divine, and so to be received without discrimination, as Luther would have had Carlstadt "swallow the Holy Ghost, feathers and all." Its various writings were but varieties of a common inspiration, a Chronicle as truly as a Psalm, a Proverb as a Beatitude. The consequence was a critical study of the Bible such as was never devoted to any other literature. It may be easy to "call spirits from the vasty deep," but who can forecast what they will do when we have called them? The spirit of critical inquiry thus invoked was destined to achieve results unlooked for and unwelcome. The view of the New Testament with which the reformers began was about that which the uncritical reader receives from its cursory reading. Here, said they, is a message of one who came from God,— Messiah, Logos, Second Adam,— who authenticated his divine commission by miracles; who dying rose again and went back to his native heaven. For the record of his wonderful words and deeds we are indebted to two biographers who were of a group of twelve immediate disciples, and yet two other biographers who were companions, one of an immediate disciple, the other of a great thirteenth disciple. Following these biographies, and written by one of these biographers, is an account of the formation of the early Church under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, together with its constitution, the conversion, labors, travels, sufferings, of the great thirteenth; next a series of twenty-one letters, one written by a brother of the Divine One, six by

immediate disciples, and fourteen by the thirteenth disciple, all conveying a varied exposition of the faith, and the practice consistent with it. Such was the picture, so easy, so natural. The intense study of the text, however, of necessity brought to light what was there: remarkable agreements indeed of the Gospels one with another, yet also remarkable differences between them,—differences which reverent faith might be willing to ignore, but which a reverent reason could not possibly reconcile; a gulf no arch could span between the first three Gospels and the fourth, inconsistencies in the Acts, anachronisms in the Epistles. One after another these manifold difficulties appeared, forcing the inevitable questions: Are these writings one and all of apostolic origin? Are Matthew and John, with measureless differences between them, both the work of immediate disciples? The claim is that they were written under the guidance of the Holy Spirit; can the Holy Spirit be held chargeable with manifold discrepancies? The sequel, were it not known, might easily be guessed: an exploration, intense in its eagerness, of whatever documents might yield a fact or a suggestion. There was a plunge into textual criticism; — granting the original manuscripts inspired, copyists may have committed errors, interpolations even may have crept in; a plunge into the earlier literature of the Christian age to wring from it its testimony; the severest analyses of the New Testament writings, and collation of part with part; the most rigid comparison of language, the most careful scrutiny of peculiarities of literary style. Dealing with such considerations, there appeared a line of critics, Reimarus, Lessing, Paulus, Bretschneider, De Wette, who were compelled to repudiate the accepted doctrine, met by an array of Orthodox apologists, eager to maintain the traditional faith, and yielding nothing that noble scholarship and dexterous reasoning and profound conviction could hold.

At length appeared the school of Tübingen under the lead of Strauss and Baur, which was destined to fix the vogue of nineteenth-century rationalism, and on which accordingly all Orthodox batteries were to concentrate their fire.

The peculiarities of this school are too widely diffused to need rehearsal; enough for us to know that Dr. Martineau early studied and embraced it. In his writings his affiliation with this school does not distinctly appear, though variously hinted, until his celebrated review of Renan¹ in 1863. It was then, however, a matter of not less than fifteen years' standing, as a letter² to the writer testifies. In this letter he remarks: "Baur's masterly handling of his historical materials had impressed me so much before my year's visit, with my family, to Germany in 1848-49, that I had hesitated whether to take up our abode [for study and education] at Tübingen or in Berlin."³ From this time to the publication of the *Seat of Authority* in 1890, the general features of the Tübingen criticism held the allegiance of his mind.

To this volume we now come. In dealing with the New Testament writings the first question is, Do they come from the sources they purport to come from? Are they

¹ *Essays, Reviews, and Addresses*, vol. iii.

² Dated June 12, 1897.

³ It may be fitting that I should say here that it was his sympathy with Tübingen that rallied the opposition of his fellow-sectaries to his appointment to the college professorship of which the story is told on an earlier page. On that page the color may have been laid somewhat too lightly. The course of the opposition amounted almost to a trial for heresy; and to his sensitive spirit was well-nigh unendurable. In case it accomplished its end he had serious thought of seeking a field of labor in America; for knowledge of which fact I am indebted to a letter from Mr. Martineau to Rev. William R. Alger, bearing date of April 3, 1857, which Mr. Alger kindly lets me use. There was among English Unitarians at that time a very prevalent and quite violent "Germanophobia," a rabies quite prevalent in America also, and which is now occasionally met. On the principle *similia similibus curantur*, it can usually be soothed by a treatment that provides a little more knowledge of German.

of apostolic origin? The familiar headings, "according to Matthew," "according to John," carry no affirmative weight; "*according to*" does not necessarily mean *by*; it may as easily mean, *Such is the tradition handed on to us in association with the name of Matthew, or with the name of John*; to many it might more easily mean this. To the Epistles, indeed, a name, as of Paul or Peter, is attached; but in settling the question of the authorship of an ancient writing an associated name can signify little against an incongruous internal evidence. Should there, for instance, be brought to light a brief biography of some ancient worthy, purporting to be the work of Plutarch, we should have not the slightest hesitation in repudiating its pretensions to Plutarchan authorship if its style was incongruous with Plutarch's; if it gave support to ideas the opposite of those we know to have been Plutarch's; if it contained allusions to events that have occurred since the time of Plutarch. Of course, in dealing with this kind of evidence there may be scope for differences of opinion: characteristics may not be so pronounced as to be at once decisive; but this order of criticism would be of itself objected to by no mind competent to appreciate its value. Dr. Martineau, applying it to the New Testament Epistles, arrives at the conclusion that but six of them, 1 Thessalonians, Galatians, Romans, 1 and 2 Corinthians, and Philippians, are of apostolic origin. "The other epistolary writings," says he, "which set themselves forth under an apostolic name, remain unattested till the fourth generation from the death of Christ, and in nearly all of them there are such evident traces of a post-apostolic time, so many thoughts unsuited to the personality of the reputed author, that the ordinary favourable presumption is broken down; and, however excellent the lesson which they contain, we must confess, as we receive them, that we listen to an unknown voice."¹

¹ *Seat of Authority*, pp. 180-181.

This seems destructive criticism: fifteen of the twenty-one Epistles denied apostolic authorship. Enough there are, scholars with laurelled brows, who take a different view from this; comparatively few would coincide with this judgment in its fulness; yet one need not look further than the encyclopædias in familiar use to find weighty reasons why the fifteen are severally rejected, together with names of men accounted wise who consider those reasons valid. The peculiarity of the attitude of Dr. Martineau and his school is that they hold in gross a negative view which many others hold distributively. Few will go as far as he; many will meet him at some points with critical sympathy; and in none of his judgments is he without the support of illustrious authority.

We come now to the Gospels. The interest here is, of course, intense; and a line of reasoning or a literary discovery that should put their authenticity beyond dispute would be greeted with a rapture that could be evoked by scarce any other.

For most obvious reasons the Gospels are commonly discussed under two divisions,—the first three, called the Synoptics, and the Fourth Gospel.

I. *Synoptics.* Of none of these have we autograph manuscripts, and the names associated with them are merely traditional. On the line of external criticism, the most that the Orthodox theologian can hope is to find definite traces of them at a date sufficiently early to make the tradition probable. Now the Apostles were men, not boys, and at the death of Jesus must have been close upon, if not beyond, maturity; and age must ere long dim their vision. To make the Orthodox contention secure, it has been held necessary to show beyond reasonable doubt the emergence of these Gospels out of the first century. This, however, has not been achieved. There is no reasoning that makes the

hypothesis more than speculatively tolerable; and there are no circumstances, the tradition itself excepted, not explainable on the reverse supposition.

Dr. Martineau begins his discussion of the authenticity of these Gospels by comparing the "vestiges" of their use in two periods of time. In the last quarter of the second century references to them are accompanied by *their names*, which "are absent from all prior citations of words now extant in them."¹ The significance of this fact he draws from a comparison of Irenæus and Justin Martyr. The former, writing probably between 180 and 193, quotes the Gospels by their names, and gives reasons why there should be four of them and no more.

Here all is plain. No one doubts that Irenæus knew the four Gospels that we use. Turn back now a generation to the writings of Justin Martyr. He makes numerous citations which carry our minds to equivalent passages in our Gospels. But observe that he never quotes them by number or by name, but refers to "Memoirs of the Apostles." Now, Orthodox apologists fervidly contend that the "Memoirs" used by Justin were the Gospels Irenæus knew, a contention which Dr. Martineau and his school find irreconcilable with the facts: First, the fact already referred to, that Justin gives no hints of the authors or the numbers of the Gospels, but quotes always as if from a "single anonymous production." Secondly, the fact that while his quotations easily suggest equivalent passages in our Gospels, they are scarce ever identical with them. Indeed, while his quotations are very many, only five are "exactly true to Matthew and Luke." It has been frequently urged that Justin quoted from memory, and, sure that he was right as to the substance, was indifferent to verbal accuracy; and support for this view is claimed from inaccuracies in his quotations from the Old

¹ *Seat of Authority*, p. 181.

Testament as well. Dr. Martineau, however, feels that this will not do, for the reason that "the same differences are constant through repeated quotations of the same passage," and that "they differ, both in frequency and character, from concomitant inaccuracies" in quoting the Old Testament.¹ Thirdly, and to many probably the most significant fact of all, Justin quotes from his "Mémoirs" matter which is not in our Gospels. "Comparing these phenomena," says Dr. Martineau, "with the citations of Irenæus, we seem to be in contact, at an earlier date, with the unfashioned materials of Christian tradition, ere yet they had set into their final form, . . . tradition called indeed 'apostolic,' but by the vagueness of that very phrase betraying its impersonal and unaccredited character." He further remarks that "historical memorials which are to depend for their authority on the personality of their writer cannot afford to wait for a century ere his name comes out of the silence."²

But does their internal character ratify this judgment? Do they not of themselves bear out the claim that they proceed at first and second hand from eyewitnesses and independent writers? To Dr. Martineau's close scrutiny they yield precisely the opposite conclusion. We all know how we should treat two or more writings conveying the same material in the like or in identical phrase; we should say that, granting one to be original, the others were taken from it; or that all the writers must have received from a common source. The contrary judgment, that all wrote independently, we should pronounce psychologically incredible. Yet we meet precisely this phenomenon in the study of these Gospels; "the same recitals repeated in either two, or all of them, with such resemblance in substance, in arrangement, and even in language, as totally to exclude the possibility of original

¹ *Seat of Authority*, p. 183.

² *Ibid.* pp. 183-184.

and separate authorship.”¹ Dr. Martineau makes a very suggestive comparison of these Gospels with the Fourth Gospel. The Fourth Gospel all agree is no compilation: it wears all the characteristics we should look for in the creation of an independent mind. It affords Dr. Martineau, therefore, a standard of judgment of what we may expect in an independent account of the ministry of Christ. Two-thirds of its matter he finds peculiar to itself; while the remaining third, though dealing with events reported by the synoptists, “presents them under aspects so new, that the identity is often difficult to trace, or is even open to doubt.”² Dividing these Gospels into one hundred and seventy-four sections, he finds fifty-eight of these common to them all; “twenty-six, besides, to Matthew and Mark; seventeen, to Mark and Luke; thirty-two, to Matthew and Luke.” Thus the unshared elements are but forty-one, of which thirty-one are in Luke, seven in Matthew, three in Mark.

This is a telling consideration to one who weighs it well. There is another, however, which to many may be more significant. The casual and uncritical reader of the Synoptics is likely to be little aware how small a portion of the story of the life of Jesus is told. From the Jordan to Calvary is a period of about four hundred and fifty days. Of these, the events of not more than thirty-five are narrated. A silence respecting whole months together, “now three, now two,” breaks the continuity of the sacred story. A record of only thirty-five days, or only one-thirteenth of the brief period, is furnished us by the synoptists. What can be the meaning of this fact?—three records made by independent narrators, yet twelve-thirteenths of the great ministry passed over in total silence! Dr. Martineau raises the question how this could possibly be. If these Gospels are in any sense the work of attendants of Jesus, how is it

¹ *Seat of Authority*, p. 184.

² *Ibid.* p. 184.

that all keep within the narrow circle of one-thirteenth of his ministry? How is it that none afford us a glimpse of any portion of the labor or the rest of the twelve-thirteenths? Why this fulness of detail respecting thirty-five days and this silence respecting four hundred and fifteen? The natural inference from this fact is hard to parry: we are mistaken in supposing these writings to be the record of eyewitnesses of the work of Jesus. "Even if," says Dr. Martineau, these writings "were independent selections from a mass of contemporary memorials, preserving fragments only of the life of Christ, they could not all alight upon materials lying within such narrow range; for the flying leaves, scattered by the winds of tradition, would be impartially dropped from the whole organism of that sacred history, and, when clustered by three disposing hands, could never turn out to be all from the same branch." He adds the reflection that the "vast amount of blank spaces in which they all have to acquiesce betrays a time when the sources of knowledge were irrevocably gone; and their large agreement in what remains, that they were only knitting up into tissues, slightly varied, the scanty materials which came almost alike to all."¹ Such are specimen considerations of his profound and eloquent argument. His conclusion is that these Gospels are "composed of mixed materials, aggregating themselves through three or four generations." As such they are, of course, anonymous writings; and the mighty claim for them as the records of eyewitnesses is gone. Are they, then, to be discarded? Not so; only an untenable theory respecting them is to be put by. Their native value is still very great, after all deduction of disputable theory respecting them. In their inmost kernel "we approach, no doubt, the central characteristics of the teaching and the life of Christ. But the evidence of this is wholly internal, and has nothing

¹ *Seat of Authority*, p. 185.

to authenticate it except our sense of the inimitable beauty, the inexhaustible depth, the penetrating truth, of the living words they preserve and the living form they present. Of our witnesses we know nothing, except that, in such cases, what they tell as reality, it was plainly beyond them to construct as fiction.”¹

2. *The Fourth Gospel.* Great as has been the interest in the “synoptic problem,” the controversy over the Fourth Gospel has been the more earnest. Without disparaging its companion Gospels, there is no denying the fact, the prevailing Christian consciousness being our witness, that the Fourth Gospel has, through its mystic heights and depths, a religious value beyond any of them; and multitudes there are who, brought to the necessity of choice, would, like Luther, surrender the Synoptics and hold fast to John. The more widely prevailing conception of the person of Jesus, and one of the leading doctrines of the Church are drawn from its page. Besides, in its literary structure it wears a character to which the New Testament critic attaches great significance. While even a cursory reading of the Synoptics bears in upon us the impression, which critical study makes wellnigh irresistible, that they are largely a recast of previously existing material, not so the Fourth Gospel. It is surely an organism, conceived and brought forth by one mind. It wears the indisputable features of independent authorship, a matter of supreme moment with those who would establish its apostolicity. From the urgency of so many considerations it would have been surprising indeed had not the Orthodox contention for its genuineness been both stubborn and fervid.

But the logic of facts, however obscured, can never be controverted; and while it is true that the Johannine issue as shaped to-day is not precisely as Baur left it, it is by no means as he found it; and where the Gospels are most

¹ *Seat of Authority*, pp. 188–189.

profoundly and dispassionately studied, the general features of his criticism were never more widely recognized.¹

How stands the external evidence of the genuineness of this Gospel? So far as quotations or references can bear testimony, it is only a question whether it was first used somewhat after or somewhat before the middle of the second century. Dr. Martineau examines a great number of citations of writers both orthodox and heretical, and adopts the later date. The earliest citation which he is willing to recognize as from our Gospel he finds in a fragment of Apollinaris about 175. The earliest citation from the Fourth Gospel together with its *author's name* he finds in a defence of Christianity by Theophilus, who could have written but little before the year 180. The John whom Theophilus mentions, however, is not designated as one of the Twelve; that designation is not met till we come to Irenæus;² and the fact that he used our Gospel his numerous citations place beyond doubt. Its use in the seventh decade of the century, and from thence a spreading familiarity with it, is thus reasonably plain. Stepping back from this date, however, he finds no satisfactory indication of acquaintance with it, rather facts that suggest the reverse conclusion. He finds that it was known by the Valentinians (about 180), but not by Valentinus (about 160); known by the Marcionites (about 170 to 180), not by Marcion (about 150). Such are his judgments after a critical examination of all known data; and the fact that this Gospel was not known by these masters and was known by their disciples is at least accordant with the judgment

¹ See essay on "The Fourth Gospel" by Emil Schürer, *Contemporary Review*, vol. lx.

² In estimating the testimony of Irenæus, Dr. Martineau is led to a discussion of the question whether the John of whom Irenæus tells on the authority of Polycarp is not John the Presbyter confounded with John the Apostle, both of whom, according to Eusebius, dwelt at Ephesus. For this discussion, which is extremely interesting, I have no space, and must be content with referring the reader to the *Seat of Authority*, pp. 192 seq.

that it came into use between their dates. The critical battle is hottest, however, over Justin Martyr. Dr. Martineau, examining his citations, comes to the conclusion that this Gospel was probably not known by him. He quotes one passage that has been much debated: "For Christ said, unless ye be born again, ye will not enter into the kingdom of heaven. But that it is impossible for those who have once been born to enter into the wombs of those who bare them, is plain to all." Of course this carries us to the earlier verses of the third chapter of John, which Dr. Martineau translates, "Jesus answered and said unto him, Verily, verily, I say unto thee, unless a man be born from *above* [a rendering to which the Revised Version gives a marginal support], he cannot see the kingdom of God." The points of Justin's departure from the Gospel are plain. But may they not be accounted for by the supposition that he indulges in memoriter quotation, in which, faithful to the sense, he is careless of the letter? So many have thought, and Justin's Old Testament quotations make it plain that verbal accuracy was not a consideration that weighed heavily upon him. But it happens that in the *Clementine Recognitions* Dr. Martineau finds the same passages quoted with these identical variations; and he concludes that "this concurrence of two independent writers in a set of variations on the same text must be due to some common cause;" and he asks, "What else can it be than the use by both of them of a source deviating from the fourth Gospel in these points?" He finds it impossible to doubt "that that source embodied an earlier tradition, on which the Johannine version afterwards refined."¹ This hypothesis doubtless harmonizes the conditions, and under the spell of Dr. Martineau's eloquent reasoning many may feel that Orthodox oppugnance to it must spring solely from interest in a rival one. Such may

¹ *Seat of Authority*, p. 202.

well fortify their candor by remembering that the reverse view, that Justin used our Gospel, is held, not to mention a host of others, by Ezra Abbott, by Schürer, and by Keim. The judgment of the last two is especially significant, since, while they allow that Justin used the Gospel, they deny that an Apostle wrote it.

The conclusion of Dr. Martineau, based on notices of the early use of the Gospel, therefore, is that it could not have originated earlier than the fifth decade of the second century. This judgment implies an allowance of a reasonable time for its distribution "from the place of its nativity to the literary centres of the church and of the Gnostic sects."¹

But turn now to the Gospel itself; — does its internal character ratify this judgment of its late origin? Have we not a reasonable guarantee of an eyewitness in the verisimilitude of its narratives? So Schleiermacher held, and so multitudes of the good and wise still hold. This consideration is undoubtedly very persuasive, but it is only to be surrendered to in the absence of irreconcilable facts. We can easily see how an American Defoe, placing himself by the side of Bunyan, might so delineate his career that the first impression even of careful readers would be that the work was the record of an eyewitness and companion. But did a more careful scrutiny detect words that have come into our language within the last century; did we find in it an allusion, however covert, to the Declaration of Independence, or the Transcendental Philosophy, — we should say that while verisimilitude is to be praised as art, it is quite possible that it may be a source of illusion.

An early tradition, that later times have not been willing to part with, referred the Fourth Gospel and the Apocalypse to the same author, — the Apostle John. If, however, the latter-day view, which Harnack received

¹ *Seat of Authority*, p. 208.

from a pupil and published with his own great support,¹ shall prevail, this is no longer a relevant consideration. This view regards the Apocalypse as a Christian recension of an originally Jewish document; and Dr. Martineau's analysis of it reveals elements which may be as early as A. D. 66, and other elements that cannot be of earlier date than A. D. 136.² This view Orthodox conservatism can hardly like; but that it relieves the Fourth Gospel of an incubus rather than takes from it a support may be fairly argued. For those who have been zealous to maintain the tradition have had to deal with the embarrassing question, how two writings in all respects so dissimilar could have been the product of the same mind. The contention has usually been that the Apocalypse was the earlier writing, and that the Apostle after its composition, through a mellowing of sentiment and growing familiarity with the Greek language and contact with Greek culture, achieved his preparation to write the Fourth Gospel. The reasonings, however, by which this thesis is supported are likely to bear in upon the mind the feeling that they are all but indefensible; while the search for analogies only succeeds in making their existence scarce credible. Leaving behind all other considerations, take account of the contrast of language and literary form. The Greek of the Fourth Gospel is of the best in the New Testament; that of the Apocalypse is simply barbarous; while, as respects the peculiarities of style by which the workings of a mind are shown, comparison of the two reveals only contrast. As to the date of the Apocalypse, the most orthodox criticism has rarely placed it earlier than about the middle of the seventh decade of the first century, a time when the son of

¹ For Harnack's account of this interesting incident, see *Seat of Authority*, p. 225.

² *Ibid.* p. 227.

Zebedee must have been well past the more vigorous period of life, and have entered into the stage when habits of mind are not easily modified. The supposition that between this date and that stadium in life to which tradition assigns the production of the Fourth Gospel he could have achieved the marvellous change which the later writing must imply, a change obliterating all trace of the mind that brought forth the earlier one, is little short of psychologically incredible. The conviction of Dr. Martineau, as that of many another profound scholar, is that "never will the same mind and hand produce two such books, till 'all things are possible to men' as well as 'to God.'"¹

Undoubtedly the apostolic origin of this Gospel is more easily defended when it stands alone than when it is associated with the earlier writing. But now, another consideration. Grant that the literary features of the Gospel make the supposition that it could have been written by the author of the Revelation incredible, will they allow us to think of it as the work of a Palestinian Jew? and we may make the consideration more significant by remembering that the son of Zebedee was not by vocation a scholar but a fisherman, "unlearned and ignorant," when he accepted his call to be an apostle. Again the literary aspects of the Gospel come before us. It is not to be pretended that the Greek of the Fourth Gospel is up to the standard of the classic age; yet it is good Greek, fluent, graceful, as of one long familiar with its use. Only the exigencies of a theory could ever lead to the thought of it as the late acquisition of one whose birthright was another tongue. So strongly has this consideration weighed with some, as Ewald and Bunsen, that, while believing the Apostle to have been substantially the author of the

¹ *Seat of Authority*, p. 218. This point is very fully discussed by J. J. Tayler in his book on the Fourth Gospel.

Gospel, they have conceived that he must have employed literary help from the more learned around him. The tradition that John wrote the Revelation, which is Hebrew turned into Greek, has, from its literary features, provoked no challenge, the composition being such as would naturally be expected of him. Were the Gospel represented as coming to us, not merely from some centre of Greek culture, but from one well known to represent that culture, no surprise would be excited; the composition would be held worthy such a source. As the case stands, while we are hardly competent to say that the Gospel could not have been written by such a Jew, we are in a position to require that whatever collateral testimony there may be shall favor this assumption. Unfortunately for it, however, the testimony favors the reverse assumption. When Dr. Martineau says, "No companion of Jesus could have placed the scene of the Baptist's testimony to Jesus in 'Bethany beyond Jordan,'¹—a place unknown to geography; or have invested Annas as well as Caiaphas with the prerogatives of high priest; or have represented that office as annual; or have so forgotten Elijah and Nahum as to make the Pharisees assert that 'out of Galilee ariseth no prophet,'"² possibly he states the case rather strongly. Grant, however, these errors in geography and history possible to one born and reared and long active in Palestine, it is surely more easy to think them of a stranger to its scene and life. Barely credible in a "companion of Jesus," they were quite credible in a companion, say, of Clement of Alexandria. But another consideration buttresses the foregoing. The attitude of the writer, as shown alike in the letter and the spirit of his teaching, is that of a foreigner, not a compatriot or friend. The manner of speaking of "the Jews,"

¹ The King James Translation reads "Bethabara;" but the Greek is "Bethany."

² *Seat of Authority*, p. 212.

"the Jews' passover," "the passover, a feast of the Jews," shows the disdainful appraiser of a life in which he could never have participated. As far as we are able to trace the Apostle John, he represents a Judaic Christianity; he is one of the founders of the Church of Jerusalem, and views with no friendly mind the apostolate of Paul, and his freer Gospel; yet the writer of the Fourth Gospel gives no hint that he is of the Jewish race, that he ever thrilled with a Judaic sympathy, that the "feasts of the Jews" were the feasts of his fathers, and within recent memory his own. Dr. Martineau very forcibly remarks: "No Israelite, sharing the memory of the λαὸς θεοῦ, could, like the evangelist, place himself superciliously outside his compatriots, . . . and reckon the Jews among the common ἔθνη of the world." He brings this spirit the more distinctly to view by placing it in contrast with that of Paul,—Paul in all the years of his apostolate pursued by the unrelenting malice of his countrymen; yet neither his "heart nor faith was ever so alienated from the traditions and inheritance of his people as we find the spirit of the fourth Gospel to be." On the contrary, "so far as he was an exile from them, he grieved at the separation; he looked back on them with regretful affection, and forward to reunion with yearning hope. The universal religion which he had gained was not opposed to theirs, but its proper consummation, if they would only take it all." He adds: "That, while the Gentile missionary speaks of his brethren in this tender voice, one of the elder apostles should set his face as flint against them, and treat their place in the world as the stronghold of all that is earthly and undivine, is hard to conceive; and the contrast suggests rather the suspicion that we are transported into the age of Marcion and the anti-Jewish Gnostics, whose Christianity was not a development but a defiance of the Israelite religion."¹

¹ *Seat of Authority*, pp. 212-213.

The argument, however, that is weighty beyond all others against the Johannine origin of this Gospel is drawn from a comparison of it with the Synoptics. Doubtless the far prevailing conviction is, that the Synoptics, whether written by their reputed authors or no, transmit to us the Palestinian tradition. But this being the case, such are the differences between them, it seems clearly impossible to maintain the like for the Fourth Gospel. The thesis wont to be put forth by reconcilers is, that the Fourth Gospel was written after the Synoptics and with intent to fill out their narrative. Where outside the brain of the apologist the suggestion of this is found, in what aspect of the narrative itself, it were difficult to say. We should say that the most obvious characteristics of this Gospel make this thesis utterly untenable. An actor in this world's affairs, surveying the records of others, may write to complete their incompleteness, to correct details that have been misreported, or to draw from events another meaning. But "in executing this purpose," says Dr. Martineau, "he will necessarily work upon their main program, and find room within its outline for filling in the forgotten details, and retouching the faded or mistaken colours. The story will act itself out on the same field and in the same period: only it will be enriched by new episodes, and gain some varieties of light." But when we come to the Fourth Gospel we find nothing of this. Its writer, "totally disregarding the organic scheme of his predecessors, constructs the history afresh; so that the sparse points of contact . . . are but tantalizing concurrences, that supply no links of consecution, and leave the new story completely outside the old."¹

The more salient features of this comparison need not here be presented in fulness of detail, so wide is the familiarity with them. Did we not know that what men see

¹ *Seat of Authority*, pp. 215-216.

depends very often upon the point from which they look, the fact that men can face the contrast between the Synoptics and John, and believe both to be authentic histories of Jesus, would seem strange enough. We know that the same events may convey very different impressions, that the same truth may be offered in most diverse aspects, and that outside the Providence of God we nowhere meet such bewilderments as in the phenomena of a great life. These facts may well teach us caution in our judgments upon the Gospel records, than in dealing with which the apparent is never less likely to be the measure of the true. But however such considerations may save us from the hasty and superficial judgment, they only blind or warp us if they prevent us from drawing from facts their natural inference; and that they are likely to do this, especially when they buttress a theory we would like to see prevailing, experience only makes too evident. To apply this reflection to the noble rank of scholars who to-day maintain the Johannine authorship of the Fourth Gospel may seem scarce respectful. The liability, however, to construe facts by predilections, to see, that is, according to the point from which we look, is one from which intellectual acquirements however great are not a sure protection, or Bacon and Agassiz would have another record.

In dealing with the Johannine problem let us change the point of view, and note what might then be — reasoning on a basis of probability — the Orthodox attitude towards it. Let us suppose the Christian Church built upon the Synoptic records alone, the Fourth Gospel, though written, lost to sight, buried in some ancient library, and now, in the closing years of the nineteenth century, like the Gospel of Peter, first brought to view. We can imagine the acclaim with which it would be put forth: Here is another Gospel, written by John, the disciple whom Jesus

loved; the original — it must be that, whence Justin Martyr drew those strange quotations, the fourth of Irenaeus, who held that there should be four, neither more nor fewer; it is surely the document of which we find so many traces in the Christian literature of the latter part of the second century, and which we have so long wanted to see; which the Marcionites and the Valentinians knew, which Apollinaris cited and Theophilus refers to by its name. It is nobly written, it is rich in the profoundest spiritual insights. More important than anything else, its portrait presents other features of the great Person, its narrative other details of the great story. Let the canon long closed be opened to receive it, that Christian faith and worship may be instructed from the record of our Lord in its completeness.

The interest of Christendom would be at once aroused, and the Gospel would speedily be translated into all Christian tongues. Its literary completeness would be at once apparent; its mystic heights and depths would be discerned; the sage would ponder it with delight and the saint with ecstasy; but the proposition to open the canon to give this new-found Gospel place beside the long familiar Three would certainly be a grave one, and, unless summarily and widely repudiated, would prompt to the most animated discussion. The great divines of the Church, Protestant and Catholic, swayed by reverence for the canon, and with as yet only a literary interest in this candidate for a place in it, would weigh with jealous mind all arguments favorable to its reception, and meet with forward interest every opposing consideration. The line of study, it is needless to say, would be that of comparison of this Gospel with those already recognized; and this could not fail to bring into view the vast differences between them. The intrinsic value of this document is indeed very great, some Lightfoot would argue, but not

on that ground alone can we allow it canonicity. Allowing that the three Gospels so long in use are still to be of the canon, it is clear that any fourth that shall stand beside them must in its more general features be in accord with them. Now here is an invincible difficulty in the way of admitting this Fourth Gospel to the companionship of the Three,—the difference between them; difference in aim; in the central Personality, in style of teaching, in detail of events;—the biography of the latter cannot possibly be cast in the mould of the former. The aim of the Three is simply narrative. While the critical may detect in the several writings the individuality of the writer, find Matthew, for instance, the more national in his interests, Luke the more universal, and Mark the least doctrinal, there is no mistaking the fact that their purpose is to set down in due order the details of Christ's ministry. The ruling feature of this Gospel on the other hand is argument; its distribution of material is to illustrate a thesis, not to exhibit a career. It is a philosophical disquisition, and though the writer treats of the Christ, it is from the feet of Plato. The great Personality—how different in the two? In the Three he is the Messiah of Jewish hope; there is the most studious care, especially in Matthew, to show in him the fulfilment of Old Testament prophecy. He comes through the gate of mortal birth; and whatever may be said of the discrepancies in the genealogies of Matthew and Luke, it is perfectly plain that they aim to connect him with the line of David. In this Gospel there is nothing of this at all. He is the Logos come out of heaven and become incarnate. Of ancient Scripture there is scarce the suggestion that he is the fulfilment; of the line of David it conveys no hint; of birth, of childhood, that he grew in years or in wisdom, there is nothing in the record to indicate. In short, with only this record before us we should conceive him without yesterdays, without

to-morrows, as befits the Eternal Word. And, consonant with this contrast, there is a difference in their early history. The Messiah comes to John for baptism, for thus it became him to fulfil all righteousness; but the Word, so far as the record shows, was not baptized. The Messiah is tempted of the devil; the Word should experience no temptation, and this Gospel shows none. The conventional usages of earth and the seductions of Satan,—what have they to do with this Radiance of God? The style of teaching is wholly different. In the Three the far prevailing method is the parable,—without a parable spake he not unto them. In this writing this style is wholly wanting. In its stead we find long discourses which it cannot be supposed were reported from the Teacher's lips, and which it is scarce possible to believe that memory could have treasured. A comparison of the miraculous in either brings us face to face with another contrast. In the Three the miracles most frequently met are cures of demoniacs;—from the prevalence and the vividness of the belief in demons in the Palestine of this period, this is but natural. In this John, however, there is not a single example of this miracle. How is it that it should make such impression upon Matthew and none upon a fellow-disciple? The last miracle of this Gospel is the stupendous miracle at the grave of Lazarus; yet this is known to the writer of this Gospel only. How could such an event fail to impress all who witnessed it and all who heard of it? Was it known to the writers of the Three?—how could they then have preserved silence respecting it? But the difficulty deepens. This miracle, as this Gospel tells us, was the impulse to the plotting against Jesus that led to his arrest and crucifixion; and it is past comprehension how the writers of the Three could severally tell the story of the crucifixion and know nothing of its immediate cause, or, knowing, suppress it in

their narrative.¹ In the distribution of events, too, we meet an irreconcilable difference. According to Matthew and Luke, the expulsion of the traffickers from the temple was at the close of the Teacher's ministry; according to this Gospel it was at the beginning. The scene of the ministry as offered by the two is unmistakably different. According to the Three the Teacher devotes his labors almost wholly to Galilee, going up to Jerusalem near their close to bear his testimony and receive his martyrdom. According to this Gospel he labors chiefly at Jerusalem, making only excursions into Galilee. As respects the period over which the ministry extended, we meet also a difference that it is impossible to harmonize. Turn over the narratives of the Three as you will, you can make out from them a ministry of but little more than a year. This writing extends it to nearly three years. Finally, a difference, in statement brief but in significance overpowering, in the date of the last supper of Jesus and his disciples. According to the Three this supper was the Jewish passover; according to this writing it could not have been the passover at all. The date of the passover was definitely fixed; it was always the 14th of the month Nisan, and any Jewish child could have given it. According to the Three the meal was taken on the evening of that day, and Jesus was crucified on the day following. But according to this writing the meal must have been taken on the evening of the 13th Nisan, for Jesus died on the passover day. Here is irreconcilable contradiction where mistake on the part of a disciple had been scarcely possible. These differences, none of them unimportant, taken together are of great significance; and they make the proposal to receive this writing into the canon utterly untenable. If the Three possess the elements requisite to canonicity, among which

¹ See Keim, *Jesus of Nazara*, vol. i. pp. 179-180.

must surely be a faithful record of our Lord's ministry, this writing, then, cannot do so; and to give it a place with them is to imperil all, through its dissonance with them. On the canon as it is, the Church is securely builded; in thrusting under it this writing we must imperil its foundations. By all of the sense of sacredness in which we hold the Three, and by all of conservative instinct we must resist this proposal. Is this a fancied issue? None the less it illustrates our thesis, that what men see often depends, not alone on the facts they contemplate, but also upon the direction in which they look. That under these circumstances such would be the Orthodox attitude towards the Johannine problem there cannot be a doubt. Orthodoxy, in this issue, would be anti-Johannine. They would be heretics who would receive the Gospel into the canon. We return to Dr. Martineau to say that the facts which under such circumstances would array Orthodoxy against this Gospel are a portion of the facts on which he bases his argument against its apostolic origin. In view of them he holds it impossible to maintain that the Synoptics and the Fourth Gospel both come out of the apostolic circle.

But are there any internal features of this Gospel that especially accord with the external evidence of its late origin? To Dr. Martineau the fact is all but indisputable. As respects the origin of the Logos doctrine, which the Proem states and the subsequent narrative is arranged to illustrate, there has been on the one side a more than willingness to find it the utterance of a Jewish thought, on the other a conviction unshadowed by a doubt that its root is in the Alexandrian type of Neo-Platonism. With the champions of the latter view is Dr. Martineau. With a brief statement of the doctrine, first, as presented by Philo, and, secondly, of the incarnation of the Logos in Jesus Christ as taught by Christian philosophers, he goes on to

say: "In this form it did not come upon the stage until the middle of the second century; when Christianity, released from its first enemy by the destruction of the Jewish State, turned round to face and to persuade its Pagan despisers, and searched the philosophic armoury for weapons of effective defence; and most of all when converts from heathenism, as Justin Martyr and Athenagoras, addressed themselves on behalf of their adopted faith to those whom they had left behind. From the apostolic age this conception was entirely absent: not a trace of it is to be found in the Pauline letters, which work their way to similar issues by other tracks of thought; and not till we listen to the Apologists in the time of the Antonines does this new language fall upon the ear. It was borrowed from the Greek γνῶσις, so fruitful of speculative systems in that age of peace and letters, and was compelled to take up into its meaning the Christian facts and beliefs. The fourth Gospel breathes the very air of that time: it weds together the ideal abstractions of the Gnostic philosophy, and the personal history of Jesus Christ; and could never have been written till both of them had appeared upon the scene. It is, indeed, itself a Gnosticism, only baptized and regenerate; no longer lingering aloft with the divine emanation in a fanciful sphere of æons and syzygies, but descending with it into a human life transcendent with holy light, and going home into immortality."¹

By another pathway of thought he comes to the like conclusion. Religious opinions, as we view them in history, wear often a transitory look, but viewed on the scale of a human life the most evanescent of them have a considerable endurance. The Christian doctrine of the Nature of Christ passed through various stages, yet it was more than three centuries before it reached a final statement. Three of these stages Dr. Martineau finds within the Gospel narrative.

¹ *Seat of Authority*, p. 237.

The frequent designation of Jesus in the Gospels is *Son of God*. When did he become such? Grant him in any sense an earthly nature, such as it was supposed that the Messiah would be, when did the higher nature take up its abode in him? This question, "never contemplated, indeed, by those who first used it [the designation] in its stereotyped Jewish sense," was "sure to be started as soon as it came with the surprise of freshness upon hearers who had to construe it for themselves."¹ The earliest answer Dr. Martineau finds to have been, *at the baptism*. In illustration of this view he goes behind the Synoptists, to the *Gospel according to the Hebrews*, which he holds to embody an earlier tradition. Here at the baptism of Jesus the voice from heaven speaks in the language of the Psalmist, "Thou art my Son; this day have I begotten thee." At the consummation of the rite the Spirit descends upon him, and he who before was but the son of David becomes the Son of God. Dr. Martineau also calls attention to the fact that this view was long held by the Ebionites, who through the second and third centuries stood fast by the faith of the first; and he holds what most readers will undoubtedly confess, that the first chapter of Mark, with whom "the beginning of the Gospel of Jesus Christ, the Son of God," is with the baptism, conveys the like impression; and he feels that nothing can be plainer than that "the genealogies which give the pedigree of Joseph, and are intended through him to link Jesus with the house of David, must have been drawn up under the influence of this belief as to the conditions that were to meet in Messiah,—an earthly lineage and a heavenly investiture."²

Here is a distinct type of doctrine, the sway of which we have warrant for believing was considerable.

But sooner or later the question must arise, was sure to arise as the new faith pushed out into wider fields, How

¹ *Seat of Authority*, p. 238.

² *Ibid.* p. 239.

can sonship be conferred? Filiation is not a gift; it holds by an immediate title. If it is not, it cannot *be*. Probably through the working of some such thought as this, the union of the divine nature with the Messiah's human nature was next conceived to have been at his birth. Hence appeared the stories of miraculous conception of which those in Matthew and Luke are probably the earlier. This is the second type of doctrine, and now the third: Birth brings upon the theatre of this world a nature that was not here before, but "can the divine be born?" Grant that at Messiah's birth a divine nature mingled with his human nature, was it generated then? Did it not come down from heaven, where it had a pre-existent life? Pre-existent! was it ever non-existent? Can we think of it otherwise than as expressing the life of God in the mystery of eternal generation? "It was inevitable, that, under the influence of this mode of thought, the sonship to God should yet retreat back another step beyond all temporal limits, and become pre-existent to the whole humanity of Jesus; so that nothing in him should be new to this world, except the corporeal frame and mortal conditions which were needful to his relations with men."¹ This is the doctrine of the Fourth Gospel.

Here are three types of doctrine, each opening into the wider ranges of speculation, and capable of an interest that is profound and a hold that is strong. Their several periods of ascendant interest it is impossible now to show; but that the first two ran their course and the third reached its blossom within the first century is to Dr. Martineau an incredible supposition. Yet if the Orthodox view be the true one, this course was run and this blossom attained within the active period of one man.

We need not follow this line of study further. For these insurmountable reasons, Dr. Martineau cannot allow the

¹ *Seat of Authority*, p. 241.

Gospels, in the structure in which we know them, to be the product of the apostolic age. Neither in the Synoptics nor in John do we find a disciple's record of the great ministry. The records that we read come to us from a later age, in the light of whose beliefs and hopes and sufferings and struggles they must be interpreted, and he thus interprets them. Of the greatest intrinsic value, they are thus none the less discredited as to the primary contention respecting them; and the claim for them as an ultimate outward authority is no longer tenable.

II. This wears to some a destructive look, but what is destroyed? Dr. Martineau deals a heavy blow at accepted theories, and shocks a reverence that subsists upon them. It is but fair, however, to remember that his too is a reverent spirit, and only just to believe that it is in the spirit of reverence that his blows are given.

Let the critic suspend his function and the philosopher speak for a moment. You believe in inspiration, you say; you are assured that God could not have been so indifferent to the spirits he has created as to leave them to grope in the dark, vouchsafing them no beam of his great light; and that through these New Testament records a beam of that light has been borne to them. It may surprise some earnest soul to be told that the above statements only fail to convey Dr. Martineau's mind as they fail in fulness. He too believes in inspiration, and that through these records a beam of the divine light has been imparted. But he also believes that it is through another beam cast on your own soul that you distinguish it; that it is only through the divine in you that the divine is apprehended by you. But here is a point on which you and he radically differ: you will have this record divine not only in its spirit, its prompting, its awakening light and its vitalizing power, but in its letter too; its cast of

thought, its detail of narrative, its moral reflections, its historical allusions. Paul's metaphor of the treasure in earthen vessels you cannot, in dealing with this problem, allow to give you guidance; you "want not the treasure only, but the casket too, to come from above, and be of the crystal of the sky." To Dr. Martineau, not only does the record fail to satisfy this want, but the want is intrinsically impossible of satisfaction. For "whatever higher inspiration visits our world must use our nature as its organ, must take the mould of our receptive capacity, and mingle with the existing life of thought and affection. How then can it both assume their form and escape their limitations? how flow into the currents of our minds without being diluted there? how dissolve itself in them without any taint from their impurity? You cannot receive the light on a refracting surface, and yet expect it to pursue its way still straight and colourless. And the soul of a man, especially of one fit to be among the prophets of the world, is not like a crystal, a dead medium of transmission, which once for all deflects what it receives, and has done with it; but a living agent, whose faculties seize on every influence that falls upon them, with action intenser as the appeal is more awakening."¹

Thus, then, we are brought to this: In the achievement of the higher work of the world God and man co-operate. In the complete result, however fair, divine and human elements are commingled. Grant with God the initiative, with man is the elaboration. It follows that the discrimination of the two, to him who will think justly, is a matter of paramount interest. But how may this be? Not without effort on our part; to be "carried blindfold into the Eternal Light" is not allowed us. But where are the tests by which we may mark the distinction? The answer is, Not without, but within, "in the methods of

¹ *Seat of Authority*, p. 289.

just thought, the instincts of pure conscience, and the aspirations of unclouded reason. These are the living powers which constitute our affinity with God, and render what to Him is eternally true and good, true and good to us as well; and their selecting touch alone can part asunder the entangled crowd of acts and things, and from their conflicting meanings single out for us the idea which is His, and the spirit which He loves."¹

Thus your claim for the New Testament record, which the critic finds such various and such weighty reason to set aside, the philosopher finds incongruous with just thought. It implies that you have received from God what it were impossible for God to give. Here, then, you say, is the end of Revealed Religion. Better so, in calm sincerity be it said, than that your claim should be valid. Men with nature and human experience before them, and their own unaided reason within, have found their way to the soul's Alpine summits where the air was free and a glory thrilled them; and when you sigh over the hardness of their lot, the reply may be, Better their lot than yours, with a revelation that enables you to dispense with the laborious discrimination of true from false, and right from wrong; and so far as the New Testament has been held to do this, it has only blessed mankind in spite of it. As the non-use of any faculty or power means its enfeeblement and decay at last, the revelation that should supersede the hard exercise of reason and conscience in the determination of ultimate truth were not God's blessing, but his curse; and while in this stricture upon the doctrine we go beyond its widely prevalent application, we do not go beyond legitimate inference. But is it so certain that Revealed Religion has no longer any tenure if the prevalent view of inspiration be untenable? One thing is certain, that Dr. Martineau thinks otherwise; no Orthodox

¹ *Seat of Authority*, p. 297.

divine stands more insistently for Revealed Religion than he. He is drawn much to the study of Natural Religion, but to Revealed Religion he gives the prior place; for without it, as he holds, Natural Religion were without a guiding light. His comparison of the two is full of suggestion: "Natural Religion is a human elaboration which sets more or fewer steps between ourselves and God. It is a method of *mediate* knowledge, carrying us, by successive stages of advance, out of the finite into the infinite: there are media without, as we pass the facts of the world in review before us, and move from the narrower through the wider order to the cause which embraces all: there are media within, as our own reason weaves up feeling and perception into its premisses, and so marshals its premisses as to conquer its conclusion." But what then? Clearly this: So far as "God *naturalizes* himself in order to be discerned, constructs a cosmos to be the mirror of his thought, covers it with greater and lesser circles of intersecting laws, executed by a delegated physiology from within, he is not *presented*, but *represented*."¹ Here, if you please, is his manifestation, but not himself; a witness of his wisdom and his power, but not his personality; and through the study of this is Natural Religion won. Revealed Religion, on the other hand, finds its possibility, not as God is "*represented*," but as he is "*presented*." Its knowledge is not *mediate*, but *immediate*, Spirit present with spirit, living God with living soul. And this is possible, not as man ascends into the Divine Presence, but as God comes with revealing light into the human. "Where," he tells us, "the Agent is Divine, and the recipient human, there can be nothing for the mind to do but let the light flow in, and by the lustre of its presence turn each common thought to sanctity: the disclosure must be *self-disclosure*; the evidence, *self-evidence*;

¹ *Seat of Authority*, p. 304.

the apprehension, as we say, *intuitive*; something given, and not found.”¹ This, as is more than once brought out in the preceding pages, is Dr. Martineau’s initial truth. Religion begins with it, and in its light runs its career. While the common phrase gives us Natural and Revealed Religion, Dr. Martineau, true to the order of his conceptions, would reverse the terms, and tell of Revealed Religion and Natural. Until the soul has apprehension of a God, the eye cannot discern his tokens.

Thus is Dr. Martineau a prophet of Revealed Religion, though it must be confessed that his utterances have not the familiar sound of those who have been held the special custodians of this. But let us see through his inferences the more special features of his thought. (1) The conditions of revelation being two, God and a human soul, it follows that between them can be no mediator. *Immediate* divine knowledge can never be at second hand. As many, therefore, as “know him at first hand, so many revealing acts have there been; and as many as know him only at second hand are strangers to revelation.” They may hold what has been given to another, but, “in passing through media to them,” it has lost its character as Revealed, and has become Natural Religion. “Take away the fresh Divine initiative, and the immediate apprehension which it gives cannot pass *laterally* from man to man: no one, in the absence of God’s living touch, can put us into communion with him, and make him known to us as his own spirit would. Nothing spiritual, nothing Divine, can be done by deputy; and the prophets are no vicars of God, to stand in His stead among alien souls, and kindle in them a flame unfed by the Light of lights.”² But (2) is there, then, no part which the prophet may bear in revelation? Grant that he alone is immediately enkindled, can he in no sense communicate the sacred fire? Yes, in a most

¹ *Seat of Authority*, p. 305.

² *Study of Religion*, pp. 307-308.

important sense he may do this. For the order of dependence of feebler upon mightier natures here finds illustration. Under the rule of Providence the higher is ever for the lower, and the prophet of God for the service of all. There is no mistaking the fact that when the prophet speaks a sense of the divine may be experienced where it was scarce known before. It is, however, only *awakened* where before it *slumbered*. The impulse "gives no new reality: it only interprets what is already there; flinging a warm breath on the inward oracles hid in invisible ink, it renders them articulate and dazzling as the hand-writing on the wall. There is no change in the object within sight; only the film is wiped away that concealed or confused what was close at hand. The divine Seer does not convey over to you *his* revelation, but qualifies you to receive your own." Dr. Martineau goes on to tell us that this "mutual relation is possible only through the common presence of God in the conscience of mankind;" that the fact "that the sacred fire can pass from soul to soul is the continuous witness that He lives in all;" and that "were not our humanity itself an Emmanuel, there could be no Christ to bear the name." "Take," says he, "this Divine ground away, . . . and no inspiration given to one can avail to animate another. He may indeed tell others what has been revealed to him, and they may take it on his word, and pass the report on; but this is not repeating his experience: it is believing testimony, not seeing God."¹

But the substance of revelation — what is that? Is it the history of the cosmos, the origin of man, the Israelites in the wilderness, the conquests of Joshua, the Levitical priesthood, the exploits of Samson, the deeds of Saul? Does it forecast the future; tell of a kingdom that shall pass away, of a deliverer that shall come? Does it

¹ *Seat of Authority*, pp. 308-309.

announce the end of the world, a final judgment, an ultimate salvation and reprobation? Do we read it literally in the texts of Judges and Isaiah and Ezekiel, in the genealogies of Matthew and Luke, in the colloquy of Mary and Elizabeth, in the rhapsody of Zacharias, in the arguments of Paul, in the visions of the Apocalypse? Such has been the teaching; but such is *not* the teaching of Dr. Martineau. "In virtue of its immediate or intuitive character," says he, "Revelation must always open our eyes to what really *is* or *ought to be*, not to what *has happened*, *is happening*, or *will happen*." He illustrates by reference to space and time, the contents of which are won through the senses, the memory, the understanding, while space and time themselves are intuitively given. He adds: "The immediate self-disclosure of God to the human spirit, similarly carries in it the consciousness of a present Infinite and Eternal, behind and above as well as within all the changes of the finite world. It brings us into contact with a Will beyond the visible order of the universe, of a Law other than the experienced consecution of phenomena, of a Spirit transcending all spirits, yet communing with them in pleadings silently understood. But it recites no history; it utters no Sibylline oracles; it paints no ultramundane scenes; it heralds neither woes nor triumphs of 'the latter days.'" He concludes with a judgment which to some may seem severe, but from which the consistency of his mind forbids him to flinch: "So foreign are such apocalyptic things from the essence of 'revelation,' that they exemplify the lowest aberrations of 'natural religion.'"¹

"The Bible, then, is no revelation, is it?" asks some offended spirit. "These rhythmic sentences, seeming so logical and fair, bring us to the abyss of infidelity at last." Undoubtedly the difference between your judgment of the

¹ *Seat of Authority*, p. 311.

Bible and his is very great, though your language hardly speaks true to him. He tells as fervidly as you of divine quickenings that thrilled the hearts of Hebrew seers, and through them awoke their people to a vivid consciousness of God; of one who out of communion with heaven spoke in tones that, reverberating across the abyss of eighteen centuries, are still the world's chief melody. You find its inspiration in the meaning of its texts, he in the fire of the prophet's soul. Hence follows the difference between you and him, as he would state it. While with him revelation implies the soul and God in the simplest and most normal relations, with you it is "apocalyptic" in its gift. No contrast could be clearer than this, or in the broad survey of religion more frequently presented. To great multitudes the apocalyptic concomitant seems indispensable. A revelation from God,—surely some portent must attend it. It cannot be the burden of a common soul,—some supernatural messenger must bring it. How shall we distinguish it, if its communication be attended by no marvel? To Dr. Martineau—and always there are those like him—the apocalyptic does not signify, or, so far as it does, offends rather than assures. While you must have in some sense the wind and the earthquake and the lightning, he is well content with the still small voice. His feeling, indeed, is stronger than this: he places "Apocalyptic Religion" and "Revealed" in contrast as mutually exclusive types: if revealed then not apocalyptic, if apocalyptic not revealed. For the soul only can receive revelation, and nothing apocalyptic can appeal to it. The apocalyptic can only be addressed to the senses or the imagination; and, while it may overwhelm as a wonder, it cannot penetrate as a light. Its place, if it have any, is within the embrace, not of Revealed, but of Natural Religion. But again the question, How in the absence of apocalyptic accessories can a revelation be known to be such? Dr.

Martineau's answer is that the Divine Word authenticates itself, and needs no apocalyptic witness to its origin.

This rich field we need not explore further. Dr. Martineau's attitude is plain, likewise his wide departure from prevailing standards. These Scriptures he would explore under the guidance of natural reason, while prevailingly they are read in apocalyptic light. He rejoices to receive the heavenly treasure they convey, and to that very end is eager to discriminate the terrestrial vessel that contains it. Prevailingly they are seen through a haze of marvel in which treasure and vessel are indiscriminately blended. It is enough for him to receive the spiritual illumination that they bring, and, from the inspiration they impart, to be assured of inspiration at their source. Prevailingly their inspiration is an *a priori* assumption, which, reasoned however it may be, the text according to its letter cannot satisfy. To him, inspiration is illumination of the spirit through immediate contact with God. Prevailingly it is miraculous dictation. As of the Christian records, so of their central figure. To him, he is a human friend and brother, who, living in the consciousness of God, became the oracle of his grace. Prevailingly he wears an apocalyptic halo, his beauty not a blossom of earth, but a marvel from the skies. In his treatment of the New Testament presentation of this person we now follow him.

III. The New Testament offers us three conceptions of Christ,—the simply Jewish, the Pauline, and the Johannine. They are of the Messiah, the Second Adam, and the Incarnate Logos. To all of these Dr. Martineau devotes a copious and fruitful page. The earlier, however, is the root of the other two, and a conclusion respecting it is by implication a conclusion as respects them. We shall, therefore, follow him only through his discussion of the Messianic claim.

Though Jesus Christ may be the same yesterday, to-day, and forever, his features have differed from age to age according to the eyes that have contemplated them. To the Jews with whom his ministry began it was inevitable that he should be looked upon in the light of the Messianic expectation. Grant that "Messiah was but the figure of an Israelitish dream," yet was he the master light of Israel's seeing, the comfort of his griefs, the fulfilment of his unextinguishable hope. A great one should come of the line of David, who should regenerate his people and rule the world. Measured by this expectation, Jesus was repudiated by the great mass of his countrymen; to them he did not fill out this august figure. By his few immediate followers, however, he was believed to be Messiah; and on their proclamation of this belief the Christian Church began its career. So much is certain; but now a question: What was the attitude of the mind of Jesus towards this hope? That, a growing boy, he received it from his parents, is most probable; that, entering upon manhood, it was a haunting assurance, we need not doubt; and that, when he began to preach, "The time is fulfilled, and the kingdom of God is at hand," his language reflected this great expectation, is reasonably certain. But thrilling to the vision of Messiah's kingdom, *did he conceive himself the Messiah?* This, too, is the all but universal conviction, both of believers who would magnify him and of doubters who would discredit him. It is preached throughout Christendom; a recent author, treating of Christ's knowledge of the Old Testament, pleasantly tells how his interest in its pages was enhanced by seeing in them glowing forecasts of himself. Beyond a doubt, too, his Messianic claim is on the surface of the Synoptic narratives. Dr. Martineau, however, treats it as made, not by Jesus for himself, but as foisted upon him by his followers; and devotes his learning and acumen to relieving Jesus from what he con-

ceives an unwarranted and so derogatory pretension. Dr. Martineau is not alone in this view; but his arguments are sufficiently novel to give them more than ordinary attention; and not a few even of those most friendly to his general scheme of thought have hesitated to embrace them.¹

Admittedly a Synoptic teaching, why doubt the record? To evangelical faith this, of course, is impossible. To one, however, to whom the laws of criticism apply to the New Testament, as to all other writings, a doubt may be supported by considerations that are not slight. The character of the books yields a tentative suggestion of great weight. They are not in their ruling purpose narrative, but argument. Their aim is, not to furnish a biography of Jesus, but to set forth this very thesis respecting him. Look, for instance, at the first of the three in the order of the canon. "It is," says Dr. Martineau, "compiled throughout in a dogmatic interest. . . . The position which it aims to establish, viz., that the life it relates is that of the future Messiah, is present everywhere: it supplies the principle of selection with which the writer passes through the traditions and records ready to his hand: he drops as irrelevant whatever does not help his thesis: he weaves together exclusively the incidents and sayings which admit of being turned to its support. . . . If here and there, in the intervals of the compiler's logical vigilance, words that transcend his theory or incidents that contradict it lie embedded in his story, the truth is betrayed by the only signs of which the case admits; and such rare instances, like the solitary organic form detected in rocks that never showed such traces before, may tell a story of the past significant out of all proportion to their size. It is only by reasoning from such internal marks, that we can ever hope to recover the simple outline of the truth."²

¹ See especially essay by J. Estlin Carpenter, *Unitarian Review*, vol. xxxvi.

² *Seat of Authority*, pp. 330-331.

This is unsparing criticism; and many, embracing it as a just account of these writings, would summarily reject them as without historic value. Not so Dr. Martineau. Criticism to him is not merely a surgeon's lance, but a rod of divination also; and he applies it to these writings to see what positive conclusion it will draw from them. Grant that the attitude and manifest purpose of the compilers should make us wary of their conclusion, does a scrutiny of their materials yield any facts that justify a different conclusion? While beyond a doubt these writings reflect the conviction of the age out of which they come, are they faithful to the age of which they treat, and especially to him in whom centres all their interest? Dr. Martineau holds otherwise; and as a newly discovered fossil in the rocks may rule the construction of wide ranges of scientific inference, so from certain "slight but speaking indications" he draws from the Synoptics a conclusion exactly the reverse of that which they were severally written to justify.

He draws his first critical inference from a study of the names by which Messiah is designated. These are three: the Son of David, the Son of Man, the Son of God. In the age that brought forth the Synoptic writings these were undoubtedly interchangeable terms; they meant one and all Messiah. But in the prior age when Jesus walked among men, were they so? Dr. Martineau finds unconscious testimony that they were not in an unequal use of them that could not have been accidental.¹

By his countrymen Jesus was spoken to and spoken of as the Son of David. "Is not this the Son of David?" "Thou Son of David, have mercy on us." "Hosanna to the Son of David." Their startled inquiry, their appeal for help, their wondering exclamation, employ always this designation. Of course it was appropriate to Messiah, as

¹ *Seat of Authority*, p. 333.

to any one of David's line. The point to notice is, that they knew him by no higher title. Put against this the title Son of God, and you vault from earth to heaven. Did we meet as coming from their lips, "Is not this the Son of God?" "Jesus, thou Son of God," "Hosanna to the Son of God," we should need no other evidence that this supreme title was current with them. Their non-use of it is the clearest possible negative testimony that it had no currency with them. Dr. Martineau holds the designation "Son of God" to have been given its Messianic meaning by the Christians themselves, as it is not used in any pre-Christian literature in this sense; while in the earliest of our Gospels, that of Mark, it is only so used "by the demons he cast out, and the Satan who tempted him,"¹ who through their supernatural and devilish nature were supposed to have special discernment of him as their divine and invincible antagonist. Indeed Dr. Martineau holds that the title "Son of God" was bestowed upon Jesus "in virtue, not of the Messianic office, but of the heavenly nature, discovered in his person: and was, therefore, first freely given to him by his disciples after his passage to immortal life."² He draws support for this conclusion from a distinction made by Paul, who speaks of Christ

¹ There are two apparent exceptions which he notes. One is the question of the High Priest, "Art thou the Christ, the Son of the Blessed? And Jesus said, I am." [Mark xiv. 61, 62.] Dr. Martineau finds it hard to reconcile this open avowal with repeated shrinking from and even prohibition of the claim; and made, according to the narrative, within the hearing of no friendly ear, he gravely doubts if dependence can be placed upon so exceptional a detail; and this especially when he remembers that "ere it could be set down as matter of history, it had become the equal wish of Jewish accusers and of Christian disciples to fasten upon the crucified the highest Messianic pretensions, the one as proof of imposture, the other as a warrant for their faith." The other seeming exception is the exclamation of the centurion at the Cross [Mark xv. 39], "Truly this man was the Son of God." Coming from a Roman, Dr. Martineau holds that this language can have no Messianic meaning, but only one compatible with a heathen's conception of divine things. *Seat of Authority*, pp. 333-334.

² *Ibid.* p. 334

as "of the seed of David according to the flesh; and declared to be the Son of God with power, according to the Spirit of holiness, by the resurrection from the dead."¹ This was in harmony with a ruling idea that "it was the spiritual constitution of beings more than human" which brought their nature "into antithesis with the animal life and affinity with the essence of God." Accordingly, until the exigencies of a theory required it, this august title could hardly have been applied to the Son of David here on earth; but only to his spiritual essence, free of incarnation and lifted into heaven.

Neither then in the title "Son of David," nor in the supreme title "Son of God," do we find evidence that Jesus was regarded by those around him as the Messiah; evidence that should be held assured in the face of more general and opposing considerations. We come next to the Son of Man. It is by this title that Jesus designates himself, and from its meaning as he uses it we must judge whether he claims the Messiahship or no. The phrase was not of his inventing: it was current in his time; the Scriptures that he read were full of it. Its meaning, too, far from being fixed, was extremely fluid. "Behold even the moon, and it shineth not; yea, the stars are not pure in his sight. How much less man, that is a worm? and the son of man, which is a worm?"² "What is man, that thou art mindful of him? and the son of man, that thou visitest him?"³ "Put not your trust in princes, nor in the son of man, in whom there is no help."⁴ In these passages and many others like them it is plainly the human species that is contemplated. The Scriptures say "son of man" where we say simply "man." There are, however, other passages that show another use. "Son of man, stand upon thy feet, and I will speak unto thee."⁵ "Then said he unto me,

¹ Rom. i. 3-4.

² Job xxv. 5-6.

³ Ps. viii. 4.

⁴ Ps. cxlii. 3.

⁵ Ezek. ii. 1.

Hast thou seen this, O son of man?"¹ "Understand, O son of man."² Here it is applied in the form of address to the individual, and is equivalent to our phrase, "O man;" though as this use of it is met in only one passage outside of Ezekiel, where it occurs eighty-nine times in the address of Jehovah to the prophet, Dr. Martineau conceives that it may have a tacit reference to the Seer's office. There is yet one other use of this title, met in one passage only: "I saw in the night visions, and, behold, one like the Son of man came with the clouds of heaven, and came to the Ancient of days, and they brought him near before him. And there was given him dominion, and glory, and a kingdom, that all people, nations, and languages, should serve him."³ This passage has attracted a good deal of attention, not alone for its striking imagery, but also for the suggestion of a person to whom this title peculiarly belongs; and not a few have been anxious to maintain that here is contemplated a personal Messiah. A little careful reading, however, should make it plain that we are not dealing here with a person but with a personification. As the Seer has conceived successive heathen nations under the figure of the lion, the bear, the leopard, and another "beast" to which he gives no name, so now he personifies humanity under the image of the Son of man.

Such were the uses of the phrase in the Old Testament. We come now to the New Testament. With the support of current usage Jesus could easily draw the title to himself; he could apply it to another; after the analogy of its address to the Seer in Ezekiel, or instructed by the mystic imagery of Daniel, he could apply it to the anticipated Messiah. Using it in any of these ways, he would have been intelligible to those about him; and examples from his sayings that to the unprepossessed reader would suggest two of these uses would not be difficult to find. But

¹ Ezek. viii. 15.

² Dan. viii. 17.

³ Dan. vii. 13-14.

now the question presses: Did he give the title a new use by drawing it to *himself* as *Messiah*? Are the two titles, as we meet them in the New Testament, of equivalent meaning? Where he says "Son of man," could we without violence to his meaning substitute "Messiah"? Such is the traditional view, which the Synoptic writings seem clearly to support, but which in their very text Dr. Martineau finds reason for referring to the prepossession of their compilers.

At the threshold of this study a question obtrudes itself: Did Jesus in his speech use language with a view to intelligent impression, or did he consciously use it in such manner as to mystify those who heard him? If we recoil from the latter supposition as unworthy of him, we seem driven to interpret his words in harmony with the former. We turn now to his earliest use of this title in our canon: "The foxes have holes, and the birds of the air have nests; but the Son of man hath not where to lay his head."¹ Is this equivalent to saying, The foxes have holes, and the birds of the air have nests; but I, *Messiah*, have not where to lay my head? In theological treatises it would not be difficult to find exposition to this tenor. Yet so far as the record shows, this utterance is responded to by no surprise, no challenge of incredulity, no exclamation of wonder, such as must surely have been in any group of Israelites of that period to whom it had been declared that the Messiah was among them. The Messiah, the great Deliverer of whom prophets told and for whom Israel longed,—can we imagine how the word would have passed from lip to lip, and countenances lowered with anger or glowed with exultation, according as they saw a blasphemous pretender or him who should fulfil their hope? The evangelist's silence as to any such effect of this language is unconscious testimony that it bore home no such meaning.

¹ Matt. viii. 20.

If, then, "Son of man" here means "Messiah," Jesus uses a phrase which has one meaning to his hearers of which he is certainly aware, and another to himself which he makes no effort to make plain.

As we read on, we meet the phrase in a series of passages, scattered through the larger portion of the active ministry. "But that ye may know that the Son of man hath power on earth to forgive sins."¹ "Ye shall not have gone over the cities of Israel, till the Son of man be come."² "The Son of man came eating and drinking."³ "For the Son of man is Lord even of the sabbath day."⁴ "He that soweth the good seed is the Son of man."⁵ "The Son of man shall send forth his angels."⁶ All these passages, notwithstanding the Messianic sense *we* find in them, apparently conveyed none to Jesus' hearers. There seems no reason to suppose that they attached other meaning to the phrase as it fell from his lips than when they read it in their Scriptures or heard it in the synagogue.

Of the fifteen months which, as Dr. Martineau reads, is the utmost scope which the Synoptics allow to the ministry of Jesus, the above citations are drawn from the record of more than fourteen. It must be an acute eye that can detect any growing explicitness as to the significance of this title; in them all alike Jesus uses it as if speaking to those familiar with it, and with no apparent effort to transform their meaning of it. Yet by comparison of texts the theory has been ingeniously worked out that Jesus made a progressive disclosure of his Messiahship. Dr. Martineau examines this, but cannot accept it. There is, indeed, in all these Gospels from first to last an intensification of the Messianic idea,—of that all readers are sensible. But the question may be asked whether this is due to progressive revelation on the part of the Master or growth in the mind

¹ Matt. ix. 6.

⁴ Matt. xii. 8.

² Matt. x. 23.

⁵ Matt. xiii. 37.

³ Matt. xi. 19.

⁶ Matt. xiii. 41.

of the disciples, and "retrospectively read back between the lines of his reported life."¹ In the consideration of this question Dr. Martineau is brought to Peter's confession in the region of Cæsarea Philippi.

The refutation of Dr. Martineau's thesis, most will agree, is here if anywhere; let us, therefore, read the passage through his eyes, not neglecting to use our own. Galilee and its triumphs have been left behind; Jerusalem with its new experiences and its undoubted perils is before. Dr. Martineau we may well believe not wrong when he conceives the disciples and the Master to be in different moods: they in the exultation of anticipated triumph, he in pensive meditation upon the coming struggle. In a pause upon the way he asks the judgment of others and of themselves respecting him. "Whom do men say that I, the Son of man, am?" They answer John the Baptist or one of the prophets. "But whom say ye that I am?" The answer is, "Thou art the Christ."² Dr. Martineau is not to be disputed when he says: "If the term, 'Son of Man,' was only a synonym for 'the Christ,' and Jesus had been habitually applying it to himself through the previous year or years, there is no room for his question addressed to them, and their answer was a mere tautology."³ It seems perfectly clear, if this is authentic language, that to within seventeen days of his death he drew this title to himself in no Messianic sense whatever. Further, if the question, "Whom say ye that I am?" is asked with a view to eliciting a confession of his Messiahship, it is hardly less clear that up to this time he had not been known, even in the inmost circle of his friends, as the Messiah at all. Thus the evangelists unconsciously make plain the fact that the Messiahship of Jesus, which from first to last is on the surface of their writing, up to this date had not been learned

¹ *Seat of Authority*, p. 347.
² *Seat of Authority*, p. 339.

³ Matt. xvi. 13-16.

in any walks with Jesus; and compel us to think of it as cast back from later years when theories were wrought out respecting him.

Another consideration presses: When the question narrows to "Whom say ye that I am?" and Peter answers, "Thou art the Christ," does Jesus accept the title? So evidently the evangelists would have us believe, but here again their unconscious testimony bears the other way. He meets the confession by peremptorily enjoining silence.¹ The common interpretation of this is: Yes, I am Messiah, but do not mention it. Why not mention it? Shall the ambassador of God withhold his credentials? If indeed the Messiah, what was there to do but mention it? "Was then the Messiahship a *private* prerogative, which could be clandestinely held? Was it not rather the ultimate national test which he was forced to offer for the judgment of Israel?"² The reasons that are wont to be assigned for silence, set over against the reasons that should have impelled proclamation, are incredible for their weakness; and it is easier to doubt the evangelist than to think such trifling of the Master. If all is not made plain, yet none the less light breaks upon us when we conceive the command not to report that he was Messiah a posthumous refashioning of a repudiation of the claim: "Silence! to not a creature are you to say such a thing again!"³ Does this seem a charge of literary dishonesty? I see rather the influence of prepossession, which in honest intellects has more than once played pranks as grave as this. But is the context consistent

¹ I do not forget the blessing of Simon Bar-jona and the gift of the keys. The fact, however, that this striking passage is found only in Matthew, that Mark and Luke while giving all other details of this interview yield no hint of anything like it, compels me to hold with those who doubt its genuineness.

² *Seat of Authority*, p. 352.

³ *Ibid.* p. 349.

with this view? "From that time forth began Jesus to show unto his disciples, how that he must go unto Jerusalem, and suffer many things of the elders and chief priests and scribes, and be killed, and be raised again the third day."¹ — *Killed and raised again the third day!* Unless we are dealing in these words with that to which criticism cannot apply, we have surely an order of events thrown back upon lips that could not possibly have told of them. But grant to Jesus a presage of suffering and death, what significance could its announcement have to the mind of Peter? Was any idea further from the Jewish mind than that of a slain Messiah? To Peter such a forecast on the part of his Master must mean the utter rejection of his confession. In their significance to his mind, the command that he tell no man the great truth of his Messiahship together with intelligence that he was about to die could only be hopeless contradictions; and the most hopeful reconciliation of the two passages seems clearly to be through Dr. Martineau's transformation of the first one. But when Peter is told of death, is he not told of resurrection too? If the former bears in upon him the thought of defeat, should not the latter mean to him a surpassing triumph? So clearly it would seem. He, however, reads with other eyes than Dr. Martineau's to whom this record, taken at its surface value, bears no insuperable difficulty. Peter's rebuke, "Be it far from thee, Lord: this shall not be unto thee,"² makes it perfectly plain that if anything was said about resurrection he did not hear it; that his mind is ruled by thought of defeat and ignominy alone. Here, too, we need to take account of the conduct of Jesus. Does he comfort by correcting his disciple, as so easy for him to do? Does he say, "Peter, you mistake; I told you of my death, indeed, but did I not speak of resurrection also? Would

¹ Matt. xvi. 21.

² Matt. xvi. 22.



you withhold me from a temporary darkness which shall be the prelude to such matchless light? restrain me from the contest which, because the hardest of all, shall prove me the supreme of conquerors"? His stern language rather is, "Get thee behind me, Satan: thou art an offence unto me."¹ Nothing seems plainer than that he takes the apostle's attitude, than that he forecasts the hard issue at Jerusalem and nothing beyond it. "If," asks Dr. Martineau, "Jesus knew and had just said that he should 'lay down his life that he might take it again,' if, having explained that this was the Divine gateway to the Messiahship, he was going to Jerusalem on purpose to pass through it, how is it possible that he should meet the apostle's suggestion as an alternative, and thrust it away as a temptation?" He adds: "It is only in the deep darkness of the soul, where nothing is clear but the nearest duty and its instant anguish, and the issue is shut out by the midnight between, that any Satan can slink in with pleas of ease and evasion."² The testimony, therefore, though unconscious seems irrefutable, that no resurrection forecast could have had place in this interview, that we here deal with a later faith woven into the structure of earlier memorials; and that Jesus and the apostle are alike contemplating a martyrdom unrelieved by vision of aught beyond it.

Of course this inference is irreconcilable with the Messianic claim; but is not the traditional view of this passage supported elsewhere in the sacred narrative? However unsatisfactory its impression when we study it alone, may we not draw confidence of its genuineness from later utterances of the Master? After the Transfiguration, did he not charge his disciples that they tell no man of this "until the Son of man *be risen from the dead*"?³

¹ Matt. xvi. 23.

² Matt. xvii. 9.

³ *Seat of Authority*, p. 350.

In forecast of his Passion does he not tell how the chief priests and scribes "shall condemn him to death, and shall deliver him to the Gentiles to mock, and to scourge, and to crucify him: and *the third day he shall rise again*"? ¹ At the close of the last meal with his disciples did he not comfort them with the assurance, "*After I am risen again, I will go before you into Galilee*"? ² So testifies the record surely; and if the assurance is to be held genuine because clearly "written in the book," faith may ask no more, and we may dismiss our difficulties with the passage we have reviewed as pertaining to its rhetoric only. But change the point of view. Allowing these assurances to have come from the lips of Jesus, did the after conduct of the disciples in any manner reflect them? What should have been their conduct? — What were ours, for instance, if in earnest talk with a friend about to die he should bear in upon us assurance, "I go away indeed, but on the third morning after I will return; perhaps in other form and lineament, and with other eyes than look upon you now, yet in my inmost reality the same"? Should we not comfort his lingering pain, and with a smile turn away to make ready for his welcome? Yet the ordeal finds the disciples totally unprepared. The assurance so often breathed yields them no support; of the promise to go before them into Galilee — a thing impossible to forget — they have no remembrance until an angel at the open sepulchre brings it back to them.³ Their conduct, in short, was precisely such as had been most natural had no such word of cheer been spoken to them. How explain this failure of the Master's word even to gain lodgment in the disciples' memory? Were resurrections such ordinary occurrences at Jerusalem that a promise of one might be crowded out of mind by the

¹ Matt. xx. 19.

² Matt. xxvi. 32.

³ See Matt. xxviii. 7, 8, 9, 10, 11. Compare John ii. 22.

press of other interests, like the letters or the invitations of a busy man? Could they think him dead and not remember? Could they sorrow for him and not recall? We are here dealing with a difficulty of which the standard theories of the New Testament provide no reconciliation. Dr. Martineau's statement may not be the final word; but he seems in accord with human nature and the laws of the human mind and the literary methods of the time when he says: "Every feature of the tragedy, as it occurred, took them by surprise; and not till they afterwards discovered that just these things 'the Christ *ought to suffer* and to enter into his glory,' did they feel sure that he must have known and voluntarily met it all, and have said enough to let them know it too, had they not been 'slow of heart to believe what the prophets had spoken.'"¹

The conclusion, then, drawn from unconscious testimony, is that the Messiahship of Jesus has anything but the sure support that is claimed for it; that his application to himself of the title "Son of man" does not necessarily imply it; that the Messianic claim, in short, though put forth by the evangelists, may be none of his. Nor for support of this judgment are we left to unconscious testimony alone. There are sayings attributed to Jesus that seem strained and unnatural if we suppose him conscious that he was the Messiah. Dr. Martineau dwells on the fact, which others besides him have discerned, that in his forecasts of the downfall of Jerusalem and of the convulsions of the world, events preclusive to the coming of the Son of man, not one of the evangelists makes him speak of the drama as "belonging to himself." Always he speaks in the third person of the Son of man.² "Then shall appear the sign of the Son of man in heaven."³ "So

¹ *Seat of Authority*, p. 351.

² Matt. xxiv. 30.

³ *Ibid.* p. 354.

shall also the coming of the Son of man be." ¹ "Ye know neither the day nor the hour wherein the Son of man cometh." ² "When the Son of man shall come in his glory, and all the holy angels with him." ³ Regarding these passages as forecasts of the Messiah, as one yet to appear, they would have been as to their form as appropriate to the lips of John or Peter as his own. To another peculiarity of Jesus' use of language Dr. Martineau calls attention: He always speaks of the *coming* of the Son of man; never of his *coming back*. If Jesus draws the title to himself as Messiah, and contemplates death as a far country through which he will travel ere entering upon his office,—the same personality that is with them now to be with them once more, his language is wholly inappropriate. He was here then; his *future coming* should be a *coming again* or a *returning*.

These considerations have critical weight, but there is clearly another of more vital significance to Dr. Martineau: His profound reverence for the person of Jesus is troubled at the thought of him as drawing to himself the fulfilment of that "Israelitish dream." The Messianic claim to his mind does not befit the lowly yet trusting and self-surrendered brother of his heart. Jesus of Nazareth is most dear to him; the Messiah of Jerusalem repels rather than draws him. Descent from heaven, miraculous powers, which so enrapture others, to him are harmful and grotesque accessories to the spirit of the Beatitudes and Calvary. To discredit the former is to relieve the latter of that which bedizens and dishonors it. This, indeed, is not woven into the structure of his argument, but it is clearly one of the under-considerations that most deeply move him.

It is a long way we have travelled, and the end is—what? Prevalent theories of inspiration have been discarded, the apostolic origin of the Gospels has been de-

¹ Matt. xxiv. 39.

² Matt. xxv. 13.

³ Matt. xxv. 31.

nied, the cardinal doctrine of the person of Jesus on which the Church is reared has been shown untenable. Some troubled spirit asks, What have we left? Dr. Martineau answers — God ; and with him everything essential. While, too, in his investigations he has been guided by the love of truth, and the desire before all things to proclaim it, any reader of him may see that it is in the cause of God and to promote His purer and more spiritual worship that he toils, yes, and destroys. In his view, and in that of multitudes besides him, miraculously given Scriptures and an apocalyptic Christ are not unqualified helps to spiritual religion ; rather they carry hindrances that are grave, and if ever they were of high service to this end, that day is passed. In the Scriptures taken in their simplicity, soul seeking in them what speaks to soul, there is bread of life ; while in the daily walk to have him of Nazareth for companion is to experience the light of God upon the path ; but that this measure of blessing may remain it seems imperatively demanded that infallibilities and apocalyptic Christologies should pass. The signs of the times, reflecting the trend and temper of the human mind, yield support to this judgment. The defence of these to-day is too labored to be persuasive, and, instead of strengthening faith, they extend and intensify scepticism. Do you say that without these the Church will crumble, that in the teachings of Martineau is the potency of this dark consequence? Then I differ. As I ponder these teachings the vision that haunts me is of a deeper conviction, a more vital piety, a more confident trust, a closer walk with God. But if crumble it must, then for truth's sake let it. Let the temple fall, and amid its ruins we will take comfort from the thought that the walls of the firmament still stand : and with the lights gone out and all voices silent, we will fix our gaze upon the sheltering and enfolding heaven.



BOOK III

THE PHILOSOPHER OF RELIGION

CHAPTER I

KNOWLEDGE

WE come now to Dr. Martineau's contribution to the philosophy of religion. In the forefront of all inquiries in this field is the question of knowledge: What can we know? What themes are within the range of human faculty? Dr. Martineau's thesis is a "Divine Mind and Will ruling the universe." The first question is not whether this thesis is true, but whether it is one with which the mind is competent to deal. Phenomena I am allowed to say I know. Through all my senses they are borne in upon me; I group them in their orders, I discover their relations, I detect their laws; but through them alone I do not come to a Divine Mind and Will. Here clearly is assumption of something other than phenomena, and which he must press beyond their confines to justify; and the question of our times is whether these confines do not fix the limit beyond which human intellect may not go. Time was when this question could have awakened no anxiety; when he who would investigate the higher problems of human interest approached them nothing doubting that in the human mind was capacity for dealing with them. The era of this happy confidence passed when men saw the significance of Kant's philosophy.

For from Kant we date the prevailing trend of modern agnosticism. I say Kant, not forgetting Hume, who has been held by some the master of those who do not know. In recent years his views have been the ward of men of science. Professor Huxley calls him the "protagonist of Agnosticism," from his pen a generous but candid praise. He was, however, too near to being the despair of thought to fix its vogue even in the domain of agnostic theory. Agnosticism, while denying us the certainty we call knowledge, may yet leave us the certitude we call faith, and in some measure must do so in order to establish an ascendancy with us. Hume conducts to scepticism, and leaves us but its hopeless blank.

It will help us to see these two agnosticisms together. Hume finds the origin of all our ideas in sensations. The organism receives impressions; the ideas of the mind are copies of these; and this view unfolded and applied is his doctrine. But there are ideas which we cannot refer to individual impressions. Yes, impressions occur in definite relations, and the mind takes ideas from these. They occur, for instance, in succession, a fact that passes into the mind as the idea of time; they occur simultaneously, and hence the idea of space. Time and space are the mental presentation of these two orders of impressions; and other meaning they have none with which the philosopher need concern himself. But there are other ideas which thinkers had supposed to come out of the mind itself, as identity and causality, and which we are able to trace to no impressions. For instance, identity. It seems to me the tree I look upon from my window is the object I saw standing there yesterday, and that the man who read Hume's Essays last week was the very man who is thinking about them this morning. The tree may have greener or browner leaves to-day, may have lost a number or put forth a few; yet it seems to me I use language the natural

and unforced meaning of which is true when I say it is the same tree. Likewise the thinker of this morning may be in some particulars other than the reader of a week ago; but the difference seems to me to lie on the surface of a fundamental identity. Every such consideration Hume meets with the comprehensive denial that any interior principle of things or of ourselves can be known. What we have in either case is a close resemblance of impressions, which, however close, are really different. The congeries of impressions received to-day is so like the congeries of impressions received yesterday that the mind conceives them the same. Identity, that is, is an illusion. So the relation of cause and effect which seems to rule the world. We see the sun shine and the ice melt, medicine given and pain relieved; and so ever a prior event and a sequent one, and regard the sequent event as contingent upon the prior, and as occurring through its agency. Here Hume breaks with us. Sequences of events may be plain enough, but causal law he will allow none. In the sequences that pass before us it is just the sequences that we see, not any bond between them. There is what we call antecedent, and there is what we call consequent; but that unity between them that makes them two aspects of a composite phenomenon he will not suffer us to affirm. Events, he would say, are conjoined, but how can we say they are united? The origin of the causal idea he thus explains: Certain impressions always occur in pairs and in the same order; and so from multiplied experience of these there results a subjective cohesiveness between them, which compels us, discerning one member of the pair, to look for the other one. The idea of cause means nothing more than a habit of the mind which results from long experience.

The issue of this we need no deep insight to discover. Identity denied me, I am with respect to my interior nature but a congeries of fleeting impressions; causality discred-

ited, I can pass, by no reasoning, from the appearances with which I deal to a reality out of which they spring. I am thus doubly doomed to ignorance, from a limitation of my faculties which will allow me to know nothing real and from the constitution of things which will allow nothing real to be known. A congeries of impressions is obviously incapable of a knowledge of realities; and, given whatever phenomena, if the causal clue be wanting, an angel's intelligence should find in them no meaning. Real knowledge implies a persistent Ego and an intelligible order; Hume yields us a congeries of phantasms and a universe of phantasmagoria. And the final result?—The sensible, yes, but no gleam of a supersensible; phenomena, but no abiding ground of them; the oscillating wave of appearance, but no changeless deep; stars rolling and burning, but no heaven that holds them; order and beauty, reverence and wonder, but—no soul, no God.

Kant proved Hume's doctrine and found it wanting. He found that the mind did not merely register impressions, but also contributed to impressions somewhat from itself. From myriad sources impressions are received; the mind construes them in the relations of space and time, which are moulds within it, not realities beyond it. Here is a most radical departure from Hume's doctrine. The latter teaches that space and time are learned by experience, the former that the mind brings them to experience out of its own nature as mind. In the perceptive act these are the mind's contribution. In the cognitive act the mind brings its contribution likewise. Outwardly there is offered us the accidental, the phenomenal; the mind furnishes the substantive, the noumenal. Attribute we cannot divorce from entity; yet entity is not offered to the senses, but is brought by the mind itself to what were phantasm without it. So of causality. All I perceive, indeed, is a prior event and a sequent one. Were I merely a registry of

impressions, the order of events here, antecedent and consequent, would be all that would impress me; and, though from repetition of this order the appearance of one might suggest the other, I should discern no closer relation between them. But a closer relation, the relation of cause and effect, I do discern; and, as I cannot receive this through the senses, the mind must contribute it. It must be a part of the *a priori* equipment with which I meet and construe the world.

Thus, then, the images and conceptions of my mind I may not refer to sensuous experience alone, for the mind has part in them. Experience furnishes the raw material of which they are formed; the mind fashions them. They are shapeless bullion as the mind receives them; it moulds them into coin, and stamps them with Cæsar's image and superscription. But, observe, with this result: *since they are formed within my mind I can affirm for them no outward validity.* Were the mind a camera, the image within it might be a faithful counterpart of the object before it; but since the mind is not a camera but a die, the features of the image are such as the mind has given it. Had I one *a priori* endowment more, or one less, the difference would be confessed in the structure of my world. The dog follows in the path of his master; he receives impressions as his master receives them. Yet that his world and his master's are very different worlds, is probable; and the difference should find explanation in the different moulds in which their worlds are respectively fashioned. All of which illustrates the Kantian doctrine that my world is only my world. It is his oft quoted dictum that "Mind makes Nature;" which is his way of saying that we project out from ourselves the sceneries we look upon. To this result we come: The impressions we receive from the outer world are fashioned by the mind into an ideal structure, which, because ideal, cannot be real.

But this is not all. Of the three departments of the mind, the perception, the understanding, the reason, there remains the last. The question is whether, through this, we may not reach the object of our quest. He studies it, but to the like negative result. The reason, as he conceives it, is as the sky over our heads, the seat of the unconditioned, to which the judgments of the understanding are ever pressing, and in which their unity is realized. We need not follow the steps of his analysis. He finds in the reason three ineradicable ideas, — of an Immortal Soul, an Infinite Universe, an extramundane God. Here they are, and because of them, the belief in realities answering to them is natural if not irresistible. But from idea to reality can we cut out a logical pathway? Kant says no ; and, one after another, he pulverizes every argument that maintains the contrary. With earlier philosophers these ideas had been an arch by which they crossed over to the country of their heart and hope. Kant blew up the arch. Thus the mind was entirely insulated. Its world was wholly within. Mountains towered, oceans heayed, suns glowed, God was, eternity hovered on the view, in idea and in idea only.

Such, as seen against Hume's, is Kant's agnosticism. The two philosophers are perhaps as far apart in their influence as in the fundamentals of their doctrine. While religion has recoiled from Hume as a speculative Mephistopheles, it has found in Kant an ally and a friend. On the *a priori* foundation which he laid but on which he could not build, others have builded, and felt their temple resting on the granite pillars of the world. Yet with respect to the great problem of knowledge they were in about like measure agnostic. The latter locks you up at home with *a priori* semblances; the former sends you abroad amid empiric phantoms, yourself a phantom. Kant will allow no converse with realities, though he finds in the mind

the ineradicable forms of them; Hume will grant no realities with which to converse. The former finds no highway; the latter dreams no whither. Hume is the spirit that denies; Kant is suggestive of baffled hope. To the seeker of Elysian Fields Kant says, This route is impossible; Hume offers conduct to an abyss yawning and black, which no bridge may span, no sail or wing may cross.

The foregoing sketch shows agnosticism in two aspects, that which will not let me know a world around me and that which denies me knowledge of a soul and God. Dr. Martineau pronounces judgment upon both. First, as logically first in order, he deals with the question whether the images of the mind must necessarily be thought dissonant with the objects and relations around us.

I. In his general philosophy Dr. Martineau sets out with Kant. The Kantian doctrine that the mind gains perception of an outer world through space and time, regarded as *a priori* forms, mended in some of its details, he makes his own by adoption. Time and space, whether objectively real or no, are subjective means by which the mind takes the world into itself. They give form to the otherwise formless impressions. Time arranges them in their sequences, space spreads them in their co-existences, and thus the orderly picture is furnished us. The categories of the understanding, too, while in some details he mends the Kantian exposition of them, his intellect, by its strongly marked *a priori* tendency, is prepared to welcome. No writer of modern times has looked more confidently within himself for the fashioning principles of philosophic judgment. Here, however, he diverges from his philosopher. As set over against the Kantian idealism, his attitude is that of unflinching realism. One concession to it he makes, if the admission of a fact so obvious can be called a concession: the outer world of our psychology "comes

to us as postulated, not as demonstrated."¹ The forms within the mind we can correctly study without respect to its postulates, whether they be true or no. These forms may be the mental presentations of objective realities or they may be subjective illusions, and "either supposition is compatible with assent to the psychology of the critical philosophy."² It seems to me the picture world within me has a counterpart in an actual world outside of me; yet, speaking with the fear of logic before my eyes, it need not be so. Very likely Orion hangs above me, a real object answering faithfully to my vision; but possibly "some god paints the image in the firmament of the soul;" and possibly, and this is the ideal theory, the mind is the demiurge of its own constellations. The presence in thought of these alternatives there is no denying; and if Kant's speculation proceeded on the assumption that neither of them can be logically removed, Dr. Martineau declares that the position would be "unassailable." To balance, however, between two unprovable and irrefutable hypotheses was not of Kant; rather he set forth the claims of one with an emphasis that meant the repudiation of the other. Because in the forming of experience the mind is a factor, his contention is that we can know only our ideas; nay, more, that between the object of my contemplation as something beyond me and the form of it as presented within me there is a hopeless contrariety. There seems to many students an arbitrariness in thus urging the claims of one alternative with scarcely a provisional recognition of the equally valid claims of the other. Accordingly Dr. Martineau, as the critic of Kant's agnosticism, brings forward the alternative hypothesis as at least entitled to a hearing. It is barely possible that things may be presented truly. The form within the mind may correspond with the object beyond it; — the supposition that it does

¹ *Study of Religion*, vol. i. p. 66.

² *Ibid.* p. 67.

so is at least worth trying. It is true that we cannot set the form within against the thing without, and so prove an agreement between them; but neither, in like manner, can we prove a disagreement. The theory of disagreement is an inference from an ingenious doctrine of the working of the human mind; the theory of agreement is supported by the general faith of the intellect, which Dr. Martineau sees no clear need to surrender. Nor does he find it difficult to convict Kant of inconsistency here; for the faith which his doctrine repudiates he yet acts upon. Kant always affirmed external realities, however he might fasten upon us the doom of ignorance respecting them. But what is the warrant of his belief in them? Why, the general faith of the intellect, or, as Dr. Martineau states it, "confidence in an intuitive necessity of thought."¹ When asked, however, to allow objective validity to their mental representation this faith is not sufficient. It will do for the things in themselves, of which, apart from the bald fact of their existence, he allows no knowledge; but for the validity of the images of them it will not do. They are fashioned within the mind according to forms or moulds of its own, so they can be in the likeness of nothing beyond them. The dilemma here to all except the most transcendental of transcendental philosophers is serious; for belief in the harmony of these representations with the things about us it is impossible to surrender. That is to say, we are compelled to believe it, *and yet it cannot be true*. And with the like reasoning Dr. Martineau deals with the root doctrine of the Kantian agnosticism, that of space and time. According to that doctrine these are inward forms, not outward realities; like griefs or joys they pertain to the mind, and with it pass away; were all minds to vanish, space and time would be no more. The whole external scene, therefore, is clothed in illusion. Dr.

¹ *Study of Religion*, vol. i. p. 69.

Martineau very pertinently asks, "If the 'forms' and 'categories' of the mind are good authority for 'never doubting' existences beyond it, why will they not serve as guarantee for the externality of Space and the continuity of Time irrespective of our senses?"¹ The things in themselves, transcendental objects of which no predicates can be named,— how is it that we believe in them? Through "an intuitive necessity of thought." Why do we deny the reality of space and time? On the ground that they are only an "intuitive necessity of thought." Dr. Martineau holds with respect to these parallel beliefs that by the like necessity of thought both should be justified or both discredited; in other words, that, through the faith by which Kant held to his realism, he should have enlarged its border, or that, through the scepticism by which he limited it, he should have gone forward to its repudiation.

We come to his most radical departure from his philosopher. While Kant holds space and time to be merely *a priori* forms of perception, and therefore, so far as seemingly objective to us, illusory, Dr. Martineau holds that the fact of their being subjective does not imply the impossibility of their being objective also; and so, while laying tribute to their subjectivity for the great service that it yields, he maintains that we may still hold fast to our natural trust in the "veracity of our faculties." This is departure from the critical philosophy in one of its most characteristic features. Time does not, like a pleasure or a grief, cease when we cease to be conscious of it; space spreads out its co-existences whether there are eyes that behold them or no. Professor Caird thinks it most absurd, on Kantian principles, to suppose the forms of consciousness to represent things as they are. Of course it is, for on Kantian principles what seems beyond me is thrown out from within me; and belief in its reality can only follow

¹ *Study of Religion*, vol. i. p. 69.

from illusion. Not thus with Dr. Martineau, to whom space, while as to its apprehension *a priori*, is yet empirically real: and the categories that organize the world within him are mental presentations of relations that prevail around him.

This criticism we will pursue no further. While accepting Kant's psychology in its more general features, we see on what line of cleavage he yet departs from him, and the position that he gains from which to repudiate his agnosticism. Kant finds no exit by which thought can go out into relation with the outer world; to Dr. Martineau a door is ever open. Kant draws his philosophy wholly from within: that fields blossom or stars burn is without significance to his speculation. Dr. Martineau goes out into the universe, seeking light as to its mystery in its laws and forces. Kant, because of the assumed dissonance of the world of consciousness with the realities of things, can have no dealing with the latter; Dr. Martineau, from their assumed harmony, construes the latter by principles drawn out of the former. The thesis that the senses show things as they are cannot indeed be proven; but the "*bona fides* of our intuitive witnesses" which the unphilosophical world accepts, he though a philosopher accepts also; and assured through this that he has access to "fellow beings and an external scene," he feels himself within reach of "other truth than the mere self-consistency of our ideas;" and that "our judgments may be tested by the agreement of their affirmed relation with the real one."¹

II. But allow that we have found our way out of the prison-house of idealism, and have come into the presence of objects "not made by our consciousness," still the problem of knowledge is not settled. Grant that the world we contemplate is not an illusion, can we affirm that we see it

¹ *Study of Religion*, vol. i. p. 75.

rightly? I cannot get past the fact that between the subject and the object of knowledge there must be "copartnership;" and that the aspect in which it will be presented to me will depend not alone on what it is, but also on what I am. Were I a dog, it would be a dog's world that I should know; were I an angel, an angel's world. As I am a man, my world must be a man's world, neither less nor more. The point of contention, of course, is as to the man's world. To the dog my account of the world, could he understand it, might seem very exaggerated; to the angel, very inadequate: yet within my human range may it not be true? The question, though very interesting, were hardly vital, were it not for the dual aspect in which my world comes before me. As I contemplate it, it is not merely a scene of fleeting appearances, but is construed in the relations of cause and effect, finite and infinite, that which appears and that which is. The spiritual factors here, however, encounter objection from a prevalent empiricism which is not lightly to be put by. Its objection is commonly put forth in the doctrine of the relativity of knowledge, in an examination of which Dr. Martineau meets it.

This doctrine is probably far less frequently doubted than the conclusion that is drawn from it. Its meaning, stated in its fulness, is that only as man comes into relation with the universe can he know it. As thus stated, it wears no bodeful look; yet it is seized upon by scientists like Huxley and theologians like Mansel as barring away from that higher knowledge which man has ever striven most zealously to win. After all your brave speculations, say they, it is only the relative you can know. Granted; but precisely what does this signify? To Dr. Martineau, instead of implying a doom of ignorance, the doctrine of relativity has seemed to set forth the very law by which knowledge is won. Gaining knowledge is establishing relations. Telling me, therefore, that I know only the rela-

tive is simply telling me that I do not know what I do not know. But we are told that the implication is that we cannot know the absolute; but what is that? The absolute is the unrelated. The doctrine, then, comes to this, that with that with which I cannot be related I cannot enter into relation. Further, if I could become related with it, then *ipso facto* it would become related with me; and then it would cease to be absolute. That I cannot be related with the unrelated is undoubtedly true; but what knowledge this truth shuts me away from it is not easy to see. To know the absolute would imply knowing without the condition of knowledge,—seeing without light, hearing where there is no sound, breathing and living and moving *in vacuo*,—the aim, not of sane, but of insane ambition. My vision of realities no doubt a deeper wisdom might improve; and under the scrutiny of

“the crowning race
Of those that eye to eye shall look
On knowledge,”

they may seem inadequate enough; yet they may be something other than ignorance hopeless and entire. The ancient Gaul, peering over the water, saw banks of fog for the most part; yet through their rifts gleamed now and then a crag which revealed to him England,—not, indeed, the England of the geographer and the geologist, but an England that did at least interrupt the vacancy of ocean; an England, too, of which his descendants were destined to know much, yet of which, after whatever conquests of knowledge, there should be ever a measureless residuum unknown.

This may seem a summary way of disposing of an objection so frequently met, and the courtesy of debate may require that we look a little further. Of the two forms of knowledge which the intuitionist claims, the empiricist is

willing to allow only one. When, therefore, against the apparent and phenomenal, the intuitionist places the real and the causal, he opposes the objection that we can know only the relative. The pertinence of this objection is the point to consider. Is the assumption of other than empirical knowledge, knowledge through the intellectual as through the perceptive faculties, made untenable by the law of relativity? Of course knowledge of the *thing in itself*—of nature in itself, soul in itself, God in himself—we may not claim; for the phrase is coined to denote that which, though in the “sphere of being,” is not in the “sphere of thought;” and of which, therefore, knowledge cannot be assumed without a manifest contradiction. But why may not the intellectual faculties do their work under the law of relativity, establishing relations in the realm of the supersensible, as the perceptive faculties in the realm of the sensible? This the intuitionist strenuously claims, surrendering without ceremony the pretence of knowing things out of relation; but maintaining, in Dr. Martineau’s language, that the “relativity of cognition imposes upon us no forfeiture of privilege, no humiliation of pride,” and that “there is not any conceivable form of apprehension from which it excludes us.” A little further we will quote him: “The intellectual relations into which different natures may enter with a given object may be more or fewer; and the remembrance of the paucity open to us and the numbers that may be out of reach, though within the range of richer capacities, is fitted to adapt our temper to our place: but to dispense with all intellectual relations in the act of intellection can be no object of ambition to any waking man: the very statement is like one of the senseless knots of some nightmare dream.”¹

Dr. Martineau points out what may often be forgotten, that the law of relativity must apply to all our faculties,

¹ *Study of Religion*, vol. i. p. 113.

not a part of them only; and that all must share in the limitations it implies. If because of it I must distrust my intellectual apprehensions, I should likewise be doubtful of my sensible perceptions. Eyes and ears are under the sovereignty of this law as really as the intuitions of the reason. The misgiving, therefore, with which, because of this law, I regard the latter should weaken my confidence in the former; and the confidence which, notwithstanding this law, I feel in the former should brace my assurance of the latter. The man of science believes in eyes and ears, notwithstanding relativity; why then so doubtful of our intellectual cognitions because of it? But does not philosophy deal with the ultimates of thought? Indeed it does; but how in doing so it necessarily departs from the law of relativity is not, from our present point of view, apparent. Contemplating the supersensible on the one side as the sensible on the other, man may receive according to his measure, which is precisely what the law of relativity allows. The philosopher indeed tells of infinite and eternal, as the man of science tells of the indestructibility of matter, the indestructibility of force, infinite time, space, power. Herbert Spencer declares both orders of conception inconceivable, and we may grant them so. This fact, however, does not prevent our establishing under one as under the other those ever widening relations which progressive knowledge implies. The truth is that to the mind as to the eye it is given to discern in miniature what may not be grasped in immensity. There is given me just a point of light, and I tell of Jupiter or Sirius. There is an image bounded by the periphery of my retina, but it bears in upon me the sweep of the Milky Way. So while I can receive space and time and power only according to the measure of my faculty, it is given me to perceive that the measure of my faculty is not the measure of them. Empirical observation alone can affirm what it can itself

embrace: space enough for the stars to float in, time enough for whatever record, power equal to what power is seen to accomplish; but such measured language expresses the mind of no man; and the empiricist, off his guard, will use the dialect of the *a priori* philosopher. Within him is a certitude that the space that enfolds the stars has no boundary beyond them, and that the stream of power that flows before him is no measure of the fountain. The analogy may be suggestive rather than exact; let it stand, then, for what it suggests, viz., that the measure of our receiving is not the measure of our apprehending. The cause that works its effects before me, meeting the causal principle within me, becomes the miniature of a universal causality. Without that principle, it were but a sensible appearance, limited, fleeting, isolated; meeting that principle, it is seen to be a manifestation of the ever-constant and universal.

Another form of the agnostic doctrine is presented in the Comtean dictum that all we know is phenomena. To which, in Dr. Martineau's philosophy, the obvious reply is that without *noumena* we cannot know *phenomena*. Were it laid down that we can know nothing *without* phenomena, the doctrine would be indubitable. Until appearances are offered I suspect no realities; until effects are seen I suspect no causes. The converse, also, with slight modification of language, can be maintained. Grant that the initial awakening is with effects, they are yet only fortuitous events till I discern a cause in relation with them; and appearances are without meaning till I see them on a background of reality. These correlates Dr. Martineau likens to the Siamese twins, always met together, and not to be separated without the destruction of both. In short, to know one thing we must needs know two things: knowing only phenomena, we know nothing. Till I see a background I discern no foreground; a dynamic

without a static, the finite without the infinite, matter without spirit, effect without cause,— of these how is conception possible? "Mental action is dualistic, not monistic." In his critique of Mansel, Dr. Martineau, treating of these correlates, says: "They come into existence before our thought together, and have their living meaning only *in pairs*; one of the two giving us the constant and ontological ground, the other the phenomenal manifestation. The attempt to think away the finite from the presence of the infinite, or *vice versa*, must inevitably fail; and of the two schemes to which the attempt gives rise, viz., that which says 'entities only can be known,' and that which says 'phenomena only can be known,' both are to be unhesitatingly rejected. Two other possibilities remain, viz., the Idealism which, treating all 'relation' as a subjective economy of ours, pronounces that we know *neither*; and the Realism which, taking relations in the mind as exponents of relations out, decides that we know *both*. It is on this last alone that, in our view, a sound philosophy can take its stand."¹

What, then, is the explanation of this doctrine so frequently and so dogmatically put forth: all we know is phenomena? This: Of the two elements of knowledge which we hold all knowing to imply, that of the variable and the constant, the phenomenal and that of which phenomena are, the former only, in the common meaning of the term, is learned; the latter is the prime condition of learning. The one I roam the fields of space and time to gather, the other I take with me as I go. Other distinctions are apparent enough. The latter from age to age is quantitatively the same; the former is infinitely cumulative. Of our gatherings from the fields of space and time we can definitely tell: we can classify them, analyze them, organize them, generalize them. Of soul, however, there are

¹ *Essays, Reviews, and Addresses*, vol. iii. pp. 135-136.

few predicates; substance defies analysis; the infinite we cannot classify. Here we deal with that which comes before us only in our meditations, and then as a presence that we apprehend, and not a form that we discern. And of these contrasts is born the habit of regarding knowledge as of that only which we can learn, accumulate, define, classify; which we can record in histories, build into sciences, utilize in our arts, weave into the multifarious web of our literatures. And here, of course, Dr. Martineau joins issue. Substance, he maintains, is not less really known because we cannot analyze it, nor the infinite because we cannot classify it. As truly as the sensible forms, these come before the mind; and are of all sensible knowledge the condition. Our fullest account of them may be brief, but they pervade our thought and interpenetrate our every conception. "The unity and simplicity and unchangeableness of a cognition do not identify it with ignorance. And since to the correlative of phenomena this permanence must from its very function belong, and otherwise it would itself become phenomenal and demand its own permanent behind, any disparagement of its intellectual claims on this ground forgets the very conditions of human knowledge."¹

In yet another form is agnostic doctrine brought us in the teachings of Herbert Spencer. Certain noumena he also recognizes, as Cause and Power. These are implied alike in our scientific and in our religious conceptions. They introduce us, however, not to a reality we can know, but to a reality impossible to be known. His ultimate truth, climbed to by whatever stairway of thought, is the Unknowable. From the borders of phenomena he looks out, not upon a blank, but upon a mystery. Over against the relative he meets an absolute the existence of which he must confess, but knowledge of which is impossible. If he simply

¹ *Study of Religion*, vol. i. p. 122.

meant that it cannot be fully known, known as we know the forms around us, or as the truths we inductively establish, he would be in accord with the seers and bards and prophets from Isaiah to Tennyson. This, however, is not his meaning. He would rather maintain that beyond knowing *that it is*, we have no possible knowledge of it. *That it is*, we may affirm with certainty; *what it is*, we have no faculty to tell.

Dr. Martineau raises the question whether this is a "tenable distinction." "Is it possible," he asks, "to have assurance of a real existence, which yet remains to the end an utter blank? Do we know the fact by a vacuum in thought, or by a thought itself? If the former, how can a subjective nothing tell us of an objective something? If the latter, how can there be a thought with nothing thinkable?"¹ And with all his carefulness of thought and all his skill of expression, Mr. Spencer does not save himself from inconsistency. This Unknowable he describes as a "Power." A Power?—if he knows it to be this, then it is not wholly unknowable. But of this Power he has the courage to shape affirmations. It is "eternal;" — if eternal, then not temporal. It is "omnipresent;" — then it is never absent. It is one; — then not many. It is the cause of all phenomena; — then not itself an effect. His language is not only that of affirmation, but also that of differentiation. Dr. Martineau finds this "list of predicates," though "scanty indeed when measured by the requisites of religion, too copious for the plea of nescience." And he adds, "Wherever I can *distinguish*, there I *know*; and do I not distinguish this 'absolute' from all that is related to it, and thus get it, as counter term, into relative apprehension? Is it not, among noumena, different from Space, from Time, from Substance? If I can say all these things about it, it is no longer competent to me

¹ *Study of Religion*, vol. i. p. 124.

to designate it as the absolutely Unknowable. To know that an object *is*, yet know nothing that it *has*, is impossible, because contradictory. This negative Ontology, therefore, which identifies 'the supreme reality' with total vacuity, and makes the infinite in Being, the zero in thought, cannot permanently poise itself in its precarious position : it must either repent of its concessions to realism [which it is too philosophical to do], and lapse into the Scientific commonplace 'all we know is phenomena ;' or else advance, with what caution and reserve it pleases, into ulterior conceptions of the invisible cause, sufficient to soften the total eclipse into the penumbra of a sacred mystery."¹

Thus, reviewing the several forms of agnostic doctrine, Dr. Martineau finds them wanting. The Idealism that insists that our conceptions, because formed within ourselves, are without objective validity, he finds postulated, not proven ; and he renounces it in the name of the "*bona fides* of our intuitive faculties." For agnostic pretensions derived from the doctrine of relativity he finds no warrant, since the establishing of relations is the method of attaining knowledge, not a checkmate to its quest. The doctrine that all we know is phenomena he finds suicidal ; while the doctrine of the Unknowable, which teaches that we may know there is a reality, yet know nothing about it, he finds self-contradictory.

Thus, agnosticism in all its forms failing to make good its pretensions, he comes confidently back to the free use of his faculties, the senses reaching into the world without and the moulding forms within. Through these, co-operating in his conceptions, he is given appearance, playing upon a deep of reality ; a stream of effects, a fountain of cause ; a world of shadows with a sun behind.

¹ *Study of Religion*, vol. i. pp. 124-125.

CHAPTER II

GOD AND COSMOS

THUS does Dr. Martineau assure himself of the competency of the human mind to attain knowledge that is not borne in through the senses, and which cannot be reached through inductions: knowledge of the substantive as against the accidental, of the real as against the phenomenal.

In doing thus, however, he acts the part of a bridge-builder who solidly constructs his abutment ere he throws his arch. His aim is to connect earth and heaven: to reach, that is, on lines of human reasoning, a full assurance of the reality of God. These lines are two,—a strictly intellectual and a moral; their postulates he finds in the reason and the conscience. It is the inferences from the moral consciousness which stir him most; and Professor Upton is undoubtedly right in regarding this, “with its progressive ethical ideal and its unconditional imperative, as the main source of that form of theism which vital religion always tends to assume as men become civilized and distinctly recognize the paramount authority of Conscience and the transcendent worth of moral character.”¹ Still, in no period in which man is capable of speculative inquiry, can the vast question whether it is possible to construe the universe in relation with an Intelligent Creator, be other than an entralling one; and no one has it ever more enthralled than Dr. Martineau. His contribu-

¹ *The Hibbert Lectures, 1893, p. 194.*

tion to it, too, is a unique page. Living in the nineteenth century, and not only learned in its philosophy, but steeped in its science, he has constructed an argument on this high theme, which prior to the middle of our century would have been hardly possible. Of all his multifarious writings, too, it is probably the crowning page. Though his thought ramifies widely, its salient features may be shown in our answers to two questions: (I.) Do we draw from the causal idea the conclusion that there is an Intelligent Cause? If so, (II.) Does the universe in its intellectual aspects ratify or discredit this conclusion?

I. *The Causal Idea.*

1. With cause as a fact we are on the easiest possible terms. When we bring it seriously before our thought, however, how many problems start up! In every manifestation of cause there are two terms, a prior and a sequent one. The latter may be any change within us or without, and is suggestive of little speculation. When we inquire, however, as to the agency that produces the change, we take hold on one of the crucial problems of philosophy; and a modern teacher hardly exaggerates when he claims that the attitude of one's mind towards this problem "shows whether he be idealist or materialist, positivist or transcendentalist, fatalist or believer in free will, theist or atheist."¹

There are two prevalent theories of the origin of the causal idea: one refers it to experience, the other to intuition. The former maintains that through the order of events we are led to it; the latter, that to the order of events we bring it. From these theories of the origin of the idea, there follow two theories of the nature of causality. To the experience philosopher, there is an antece-

¹ Francis Bowen, *Princeton Review*, January-June, 1879, p. 615.

dent followed by a consequent, and more than this he will not suffer us to affirm; to the intuitionist, there are an antecedent and consequent and a *link that binds them together*. The one sees a constant relation; the other sees this and also an indissoluble bond. These theories are respectively known as the theory of *phenomena* and of *force*. They have not the field entirely to themselves; but they alone require recognition in the discussion now before us.

The phenomenal doctrine — what is it? In its modern form it dates from Hume; and in his writings may still be found its strongest and most winning presentation. Up to his time the necessary connection between the terms of the causal relation was secure, and philosophers reasoned as common people talked. The antecedent did not merely go before, it was *efficient*; the consequent did not merely follow after, it was *effect*. The emphasis of necessity should be felt here. Not only *did* the consequent follow upon the antecedent, but it must. Water, brought into contact with heat, not only *will* be converted into steam, it *must* be. The tides do not merely follow the moon, they must do so. There was held to be not merely the uniformity which experience shows, but a necessity that compelled it. The two terms of the relation, indeed, were held to be but different phases of a composite phenomenon. Hume, however, dislocated them. He is moving, it should be borne in mind, upon lines of empirical thought, pressing Locke's sensationalism to the last conclusion. Nothing in the mind that was not first in the senses, was Locke's dictum. But, says Hume, the link between phenomena, in which the causal principle is supposed to be found, is not offered to the senses. I am sensible of the wind's blowing and the leaves' rustling; of the sun's shining and the snow's melting; but an intimate connection through which one term follows upon the other, I do not see. That events are conjoined, my experience

teaches me; but it does not teach me that they are united. But how explain, then, the practically universal conviction that they *are* united? Hume finds the explanation in a habit of thought, born of a uniform experience. In our experience thunder follows lightning; so after the flash we look for the thunder; or, hearing the thunder, we doubt not that it has lightened; and so in all relations in which we are accustomed to meet the like antecedent attended by the like consequent. There is implied here in Hume's reasoning, not a fact without, but an illusion within; a cohesiveness of ideas, not a link between phenomena. Whatever knowledge we have is wholly through experience; *a priori* element he allows none; and experience, while recording what is, has no oracle as to what must be. Better work has doubtless many times been done, but work has rarely been better done than this. In the development of thought it perhaps was needed, and Hume did it once for all. Even now, after a century's debate, few who read him, however braced by an antagonistic philosophy, can be insensible of the persuasiveness of his clear and subtle and dignified argument. Language can scarcely tell the antagonism he provoked. All our doing and all our thinking imply the union of the terms of the causal relation; and dissolving it was, in Hutcheson Stirling's figure, like "drawing the linchpin out of existence." Scepticism could achieve a no more paralyzing result than must follow a distrust of the necessary constancy of cause and effect; and no wonder men who cannot depart from the lines of experience still strive to reach through experience that necessary bond, which Hume's impervious logic shows that no experience can find. Literally and vividly accepted, Hume's doctrine should mean, not the end of philosophy only, but the collapse of science as well. And yet how near at hand was the very possible experience which should have in-

clined him to suspect [if, indeed, he ever doubted] that there was somewhat not embraced in his speculation. From his study where he meditated, suppose him to have gone to the kitchen where his cook was preparing his dinner, and there seen the familiar spectacle, a fire with water boiling over it; and suppose the cook, not an expert in empirical philosophy, to have spoken of the fire as *making* the water boil, emphasizing that necessity which the contents of every teakettle seems to confess under pressure of 212° Fahrenheit. "No," the philosopher should have said; "you use language without discrimination. What you can affirm is antecedent and consequent: a fire and water boiling over it. In affirming that the fire *makes* the water boil you imply a necessary bond between the two phenomena, which observation does not show; and which empirical doctrine, therefore, cannot allow." "But," we may suppose the cook to argue, "the water never boils save when there is a fire under it, and it always boils when I make a fire under it, if I keep it over the fire long enough." "Yes," the philosopher we may suppose to reply, "no doubt such is your uniform experience; and that, by the way, is the explanation of the idea of cause that so strongly possesses you. By long association in the mind the thought of boiling water has come to suggest that of heat as its essential condition; and so by a very natural illusion a link between the ideas is mistaken for a necessary bond between the phenomena." The cook had no doubt marvelled at the wonders of philosophy, and replenished the fire to keep the water boiling.

Comte, building on the basis of Hume's scepticism his structure of Positive Philosophy, extended the influence of his master, if he did not add to the significance of his teaching. Hume was no scientist; by the keenest of metaphysical arguments he discredited the grounds of metaphysics. Comte was no metaphysician, but was eminent

in science ; and he had both the strength and the weakness of an exclusively scientific mind. Facts he wanted, and he had the genius to gather them and to organize them. At the same time, speculation was peculiarly offensive to him. Hume's teachings voiced an antipathy he could not have uttered so persuasively, and he requited the service he found in them by making science their custodian. His comprehensive dictum was, "All we know is phenomena ;" and in the letter that he sends us, he allows no reading between the lines. "Every proposition which is not reducible, in the last resort, to a simple statement of fact, particular or general, must be without real and intelligible sense." Our knowledge he severely restricts to the observed contents of space and time, grouped in their relations of succession and resemblance. While others talk of cause and effect, he, with his master, knows only antecedent and consequent. All inquiry into causes he holds to be utterly futile. Of the word "cause," together with others of dynamic import, he would reform or discontinue the use ; and in his later writings the word "cause" is consistently avoided. Whatever is more than phenomena, in their sensible and ordered presentation, he refers to metaphysics, always with him a realm of spectres.

John Stuart Mill, the great Positivist's greater disciple, explains his master by telling us that it is "efficient, as distinguished from physical causes, that he rejects ;" that the causes he thus dogmatically repudiates are such as are "not themselves phenomena." "Like other people," he adds, "he admits the study of causes in every sense in which one physical fact can be the cause of another. But he has an objection to the *word* cause ; he will only consent to speak of Laws of Succession, and depriving himself of the use of a word which has a Positive meaning, he misses the meaning it expresses."¹ In thus explaining

¹ *Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte*, pp. 53-54.

and criticising his master he tells us of himself. The word "cause" he wishes to retain "for the purpose of distinctly designating . . . the *relations of succession* which *so far as we know* are unconditional."¹ On another page he tells us that when he speaks of the cause of a phenomenon he does not "mean a cause which is not itself a phenomenon."² He is shaping the canons of inductive research; and the causation which he expounds is, he tells us, without prejudice to the conception of efficient cause. Yet it would be plain, even if he did not tell us, that he considers the revived interest in this a remarkable illustration of what has been aptly called the "peculiar zest which the spirit of reaction against modern tendencies gives to ancient absurdities."³

That is to say, underneath the various dynamic changes he allows no dynamic constant. Heat he knows, and light, electricity, magnetism; but the presence in the universe of a power of which these are manifestations, he has no mind to perceive. As with him, so also with his school. They tell of an order of succession of which they have learned through observation, but nothing of a power which, since it is not revealed through observation, can only be discerned through a deeper faculty. The *nexus naturæ*, therefore, which the intuitionist philosophy always maintains, they do not find. In its place they affirm—and it is plain that they can affirm no more—an unconditional uniformity; unconditional, that is, as far as observation can show. Mr. Mill speaks in disapproving tones of the "many who do not believe . . . that there is nothing in causation but invariable, certain, and unconditional sequence."⁴ The language of necessity he does not like to use; enough for him that, the "sum of conditions" being prepared, an event will occur. According to this view the

¹ *Logic*, bk. iii. chap. v. p. 209. ² *Ibid.* p. 196. ³ *Ibid.* p. 209.

⁴ *Logic*, Harper & Brothers, 1870, p. 522.

antecedent is not, in the accepted meaning of the word, cause, but forerunner. It is prophetic, not mandatory; it declares what *is* to be, not what *must* be. The consequent is its faithful attendant, not its necessitated vassal. It is punctual, and so, according to all experience, calculable; and this is all that we can say. The sun, returning from his winter solstice, announces that summer *is coming*, it does not declare that summer *must come*. The moon gives intelligence that the tides are following her; but affirms no necessity that conditions them unalterably upon her movements. The exploding cannon thunders a warning of the speeding missile, but we may not refer to it an impelling force. This last illustration suggests one employed by a distinguished master of this school whom Dr. Martineau summons to judgment. Dr. Bain is displeased with the common language which tells us that a flying cannon-ball has "power to batter walls," regarding the word "power" a "pure expletive or pleonasm whose tendency is to create a mystical or fictitious agency." *Flying cannon-ball* followed by *battered wall* is enough for him.¹ Thus in the occurrence of events all we can affirm is a time order. Causation is reduced to a uniform succession, phenomenon following upon phenomenon. By such a track, if track it may be called, it is vain to think of reaching an Ultimate Cause; and with phenomenalism for our only light, a theistic interpretation of the world is impossible. By a thread, however fine, we may find our way out of whatever labyrinth at last; with no thread at all, we wander and go "no whither." This doctrine, indeed, leaves upon the mind the feeling that there is no *out* to which to find the way, that the universe we have been wont to think intelligible is but a Cretan maze of matter and its properties.

What is there, then, in this doctrine that wins it so considerable a favor? This: It is precisely the doctrine which

¹ *Study of Religion*, vol. i. p. 155.

the scientist can safely work by. The succession of phenomena, and the fact that they are always calculable, are all he needs to know; and beyond this, on scientific lines, it is futile to inquire. That atom acts on atom or body on body, we may believe; but he has no scientific need to ask or warrant for believing. There is also no denying the fact that considerations of ultimate cause have not gone well with scientific investigation; that, dominating the mind devoted to science, they have had a vitiating influence. The scientific thinker is, therefore, only to be commended for holding fast to the canons by which scientific work is done and taking cognizance of no others. In recent years, however, he not only has held fast to his own canons, but he has tried to make them canons for all thinkers. Hence his conflict with the metaphysician and the theologian. For, however the unconditional sequence of events may satisfy the demands of science, it really satisfies no mind: the august question of cause is too obtrusive to be put by. The empiricist, just a little off his guard, finds it difficult to be true to his empiricism, but in his use of language often betrays a haunting sense of that which his empiricism should make it impossible for him to say. Dr. Martineau has collected numerous examples of this,—expressions natural enough in themselves, but absurdly contradictory of the empirical standards of the minds that coined them.¹ Given a theory which does violence to a natural faith of the intellect, and pen or lips will rarely fail of its betrayal.

There is another consideration that gives this doctrine favor. It is the aim of the thinker to find a working principle of thought which he may safely use in dealing with all possible problems, he, of course, being the judge as to what problems are possible. The proof of a path is not alone its easy entrance, but also the jungle into which it leads. There are those to whom the speculations of meta-

¹ *Study of Religion*, vol. i. pp. 153-154. Also *Seat of Authority*, pp. 23-24.

physics are but a jungle, and who therefore put up at the entrance of the paths leading into them, *No passage here*. That is to say, they withhold an interpretation that may seem suitable for a particular order of phenomena by reason of the mazes into which it may conduct them. When Mill's *Logic* first appeared, his friend, W. B. Carpenter, calling attention to a passage in which he defines the "cause of a phenomenon to be the antecedent, or the concurrence of antecedents, upon which it is invariably and unconditionally consequent,"¹ pointed out that "when this assemblage of antecedents is analyzed, it is uniformly found resolvable into two categories, which may be distinguished as the *dynamical* and the *material*; the former supplying the *force* or *power* to which the change must be attributed, whilst the latter affords the *conditions* under which that power is exerted." Mr. Mill replied that the distinction was "one of metaphysics, not of logic."² Certainly he had easy warrant for holding his logic apart from metaphysics; any careful thinker would do that. Knowing a little of Mr. Mill, however, we can see how the *force* of the eminent scientist may at once have suggested to him the jungle, the intellectual perils of which had led Comte to expurgate the very word from his vocabulary. We may prefer to see one plunge into the jungle, doubting not that he may find his way through at last. Yet to Mill and his school the jungle has that impenetrable look that forbids the plunge; and beyond question they can tell of many a brave intellect that has been hopelessly entangled there. Two men were once somewhat warmly discussing a problem of thought, when one reminded the other of the dubious consequences to which his doctrine would lead him. "Consequences!" replied the friend; "talk to me of consequences! I will go to hell for the consistency of my intellect!" The calm

¹ *Logic*, Harper & Brothers, 1870, bk. iii. chap. v. p. 204.

² *Nature and Man*, p. 350.

rejoinder was, "When I find my thought leading me in that direction, I will revise my premises." On thought's battle-field many a warrior, fearless and true, shall be found in like manner prudent. The jungle we now come to, and, taking counsel of our courage rather than our prudence, we will dare the plunge.

What, however, we call the jungle may not be such to all: the metaphysics, to a Comte or Mill so hopeless, to a Martineau may look garden-like and clear. All the experience on which the empiricist builds, the intuitionist may also have; but he combines it with data peculiarly his own, without which philosophy were an impossibility, an absurdity to him. The eye that sees antecedent and consequent he holds to be not the eye that sees cause; and when he finds cause the issue of an empirical argument it wears to him an alien look. It is apt, too, to suggest to him a native and *a priori* conviction, which the sturdiest empiricism may find it hard to suppress, and which has stolen into the argument to the enrichment of its conclusion and the confusion of its logic. Or, if not this, he is sure to find it cut down to an empirical significance; and he is likely to approve the stalwart consistency of a Comte, who rejects a name when the conception for which it stands is not provided for in the cardinal postulates of doctrine, and to be critical of those who, like Mill, retain the name while they eviscerate its meaning. The cause of which the empiricist tells, "invariable antecedence," "sum of conditions," and whatever else, is no cause at all to him, only the outward and sensible method by which the cause accomplishes its work. His cause is not a condition, but an agent; not a means, but a power that uses means. But this, while its manifestations may be plain to the senses, can in itself only be known through intuitive discernment.

We here come to a view of causation with which every

modern discussion of it must settle before proceeding far, that of Kant. Hume, as we have seen in the previous chapter, found in antecedent and consequent only a pair of uniformly related experiences; the causal link between them he did not find; and in this, as an empiricist, he was true to the canon of his thought. In the supposed argument with his cook we may think the cook to have the better side; yet, speaking strictly from experience, the philosopher is right: all the senses take note of is fire and boiling water. And now Kant: The events that pass before us, whether in nature or in human life, we learn only from experience; through the senses they enter into us. But, entering into us through the senses, the mind meets them with certain elements of knowledge which it contributes out of its own nature as mind; and of these elements the idea of cause is one. In the act of giving our experiences intelligible construction it brings this to them. The idea is not before the mind until the experiences are offered; but it comes at their summons. Every event must have a cause; so says, not experience, which were incapable of an affirmation so sweeping, but the mind uttering its own oracle. With this dictum an inwrought principle of its constitution, it meets and organizes our otherwise fugitive and chaotic experiences. This view Dr. Martineau reflects when he speaks of causality as the "noumenal interpretation of empirical existence." Between him and Kant, however, there is this important difference to which, though pointed out in the preceding chapter, we can but once more recur: While Kant, according to the genius of his system, holds the causal principle only subjectively, regarding the causal *nexus* as necessary to the intelligibleness of our conceptions, but refusing to go out beyond them, Dr. Martineau finds it a subjective counterpart of what is objectively true. While Kant finds our conceptions moulded by the causal

category, and so, while necessarily true to *us*, not necessarily true to *things*, Dr. Martineau finds in the causal category a discernment of a *nexus* between the events which are the data of our conceptions. The former says, Our intelligible world is organized by causal relations; the latter, The world is intelligible, first, because a causal principle rules it, and, secondly, because in man is an eye that discerns that principle. Without the latter the scene I look upon, however related part with part, were unintelligible because incoherent to *me*; without the former I should have within me only a fictitious impression of a relation that does not prevail without me. As Dr. Martineau expounds the doctrine, it gives to events an orderly relation which the senses lay hold upon; but it links them by a causal tie which the mind perceives intuitively. Its distinguishing feature is the mental discernment of a dynamic equal to whatever change. It does not tell where the real seat of change may be; that must be sought through observation; but having found it, the dynamic bond between it and the phenomenon that is conditioned upon it is avouched to us *a priori*.

Thus do the *phenomenal* and the *dynamic* theories of causation stand before us. The one relies wholly upon empirical observation; the other makes no quarrel with observation, but rests ultimately on a dictum which the mind puts forth *a priori*. The one identifies cause with invariable antecedence; the other maintains a constant dynamic. On which side is the weightier reason comparison only can show. Here we come more directly on the trail of Dr. Martineau's thought.

Dr. Martineau opens his presentation of the dynamic theory by calling attention to the *necessity* which, in all minds not preoccupied by a countervailing theory, causality seems to involve. "The blow of the steam-hammer which welds two masses of iron, the combustion of the

furnace which runs the metal out of the ore, the rush of the torrent which buries a homestead in gravel, the gale which drives the ship upon the rocks, the summer warmth which decks the earth with foliage and flowers," he declares to be "hardly reducible, even in the imagination of an empirical philosopher, to mere pioneers of the phenomena they announce."¹ In the antecedent he reads decree, not prophecy; it is Olympian, not Delphian in its tone. The consequent he maintains to be, not a "new item of fact," but implicated with the antecedent as one side of a composite phenomenon. He brings the attitude of his mind into strong relief by a series of questions. He asks, "Which order then gives the more reasonable account of our mode of thinking—that for us causation owes its 'necessity' to customary succession? or, that in itself it owes its customary succession to its necessity? In other words, Is our belief in causation identical with our belief in *Law*? or with our belief in *Power*? or, to vary the expression once more, does it mean belief in the uniformity of nature? or in the derivative origin of phenomena?"² This latter alternative we may cling to as the most characteristic, and say that in Dr. Martineau's philosophy cause implies the "derivative origin of phenomena." Here blend two conceptions which it is important that we discriminate. We may think of phenomenon as '*derived*' from phenomenon, or we may think of the source whence the phenomenal as such is '*derived*.' The latter is, of course, the ultimate of inquiry, in which alone religion is interested. But here is a point of which it is well to take cognizance: while through the former inquiry we seek a key to the latter, it is not until we answer the latter that we reach more than a provisional answer to the former. A Laplace, looking into the starry heavens in inquiry as to their origin, may find scientific

¹ *Study of Religion*, vol. i. p. 146.

² *Ibid.* p. 147.

satisfaction in the conception of a fire-mist, through the interaction of whose forces those glowing orbs rolled into being. But the final answer is not gained until there is answer to the further question, how "out of the bosom of eternal rest" originated the infinite movement which fire-mist transformed into stars illustrates. This particular phenomenon I may proximately explain by reference to another; but the phenomenal *as such* I can only derive "from that which is other than phenomena." Other than phenomena, however, "is presentable in thought only under the form of Being or of Power, of which the latter alone can do what is wanted."¹ So, then, the physical event that passes before my observation I must refer at last to an ultra-physical agency. In these terms we state in advance the conclusion to which we hope to come.

Let us extend our comparison of the empirical and the metaphysical doctrines a little further. Mr. Mill maintains a uniform succession of events, and with this leaves the problem of causality. Dr. Martineau sees this as clearly as he, but looks beyond it. The cause he seeks is not found until a principle is reached which is not merely the occasion of phenomena, but their producing agency; and this principle can be only a force or power. Customary succession, uniformity of nature, law,—these afford him no ultimate account of anything. They show him a method, but of efficiency they tell no tale. Law, which in common speech many are wont to endow with such potentialities, attracts no masses, combines no molecules, darts no sunbeams, hurls no lightning, sends no rain, is ultimate account of no movement of matter, no function of life, no activity of mind. Rightly conceived, it shows only the *how* of things, not at all the *why*; its significance is fully stated when we say, Thus works the dynamic of the world, and not otherwise; or, everything

¹ *Study of Religion*, vol. i. p. 149.

according to law, but nothing *by* it.¹ And this qualification, which clears the way for a dynamic of which law only declares the method, leaves to our inductive inquirers all they want. Science, dealing only with phenomena, reaches its ultimate aim with the determination of their law of succession, and whether the determining principle is held to be the properties of matter, or the investigator may make his own the ecstatic cry of Kepler, "I think thy thoughts after thee, O God," it is neither more assured nor less so. The angel which Kepler conceived so to guide the movement of the planet that its radius vector should describe equal areas in equal times was nothing to science; but the law these terms enunciate was of measureless significance. It is an unfaltering constancy upon which science builds, and with this assured the man of science works his problems, leaving it to others to settle whether there be any agency in events beyond the power of crucibles and microscopes to find.

But another consideration. The uniformity of nature we learn only by experience. But what we learn by experience, by further experience we may unlearn; and the cautious scientist is likely to accompany his forecasts with the proviso, "no undiscovered fact disturbing my calculations," or, "the constitution of things remaining as it is." So, if the causal principle were indeed nothing more than invariable antecedence, then were it, as Mr. Mill teaches, empirically learned, with need of the ever amended statement which advancing knowledge is likely to bring to all our empiricisms. But herein is the very point at issue. Dr. Martineau's causal principle, though seen through uniformity, is an efficiency. The uniformities of nature are not without significance in the study of causality: we read

¹ "Laws of order are not yet causes; and if we know anything of causes, we know more than Laws." From essay, "Is there an Axiom of Causality? Essays, Reviews, and Addresses, vol. iii. p. 574.

off from them a lesson of method; we infer from them, not merely an agency, but a steadfast agency behind them. But suppose the uniformities all away, and in place of order, disorder wherever we turn; suppose events fortuitous, abnormal, or with no antecedent in sight, should we conceive them as occurring without power? Men have believed in marvels enough,—charm, magic, miracle; the sick healed by a touch, the dead called from the grave, heroes without human mothers, saviours virgin-born; but have they ever believed the more stupendous miracle, an event without producing agency? An event that passes before me may often enough seem unaccountable, but it is only so because I do not see the source of an agency that I am sure is there. I may conceive it occult, magical, supernatural, and thus render a mistaken account of it; but will it ever occur to me, or can sophistry ever persuade me, that no producing power is there? This consideration Dr. Martineau presses with great vigor and clearness. "What we learn from experience, from experience we may unlearn; and if B, which we had regarded as the effect of A, surprises us by dispensing with this antecedent, we shall have no difficulty in looking out for another to which it may be credited. But, however long we might be baffled in our search, would it ever occur to us that the event was not only without *this* cause, but without *any*? that the originating power which was not *here*, was *nowhere*? On the contrary, the very eagerness of curiosity which ensues on our surprise is but the pressure of the axiom of causation, reasserting the *derivative origin of all phenomena*: we know the missing *power* to be somewhere; but where is it then? Nay, more: were phenomena released, not only from this order or that order, but from all perceptible order, and turned from a regiment into a rabble, did they defy prediction, and startle us every instant like a flash of lightning or a shoot-

ing star, they would none the less be to us the expression of some power. . . . Belief which would thus cleave to us alike in a chaos as in a kosmos, can be no induction from the observed uniformity of nature, but must be an *a priori* law of thought brought by us to the interpretation of the world.”¹

His doctrine concisely summarized, is this: To the study of nature causality is brought; through the study of nature uniformity is found.

In the foregoing pages the language of necessity has been frequent; the fact is that it is utterly unavoidable in any intelligent discussion of causation; and this for the reason that to the unsophisticated intellect necessity clings undivorcibly to the idea of cause, a fact with yet further implications which we need to notice. Every effect, we say, must have a cause. The emphatic word here is *must*, implying necessity unvarying and absolute. This empiricists have striven hard to educe from their doctrines; but however ingenious in construction, the argument which is consistently empirical cannot proclaim necessity. Through experience we may affirm the results of experience, and a rule of probability that is derived from its oft repetition; but beyond this—what? Mr. Mill tells us that “Whatever has been found true in innumerable instances, and never found to be false after due examination in any, we are safe in acting upon as universal provisionally, until an undoubted exception appears; provided the nature of the case be such that a real exception could scarcely have escaped our notice;”² and this seems to offer us the canon of inductive inquiry in the fulness of its scope and with its obvious limitation. But whatever else it may provide, the necessity we are contemplating is clearly not within its provisions. A *provisional* necessity, indeed, were a bewil-

¹ *Study of Religion*, vol. i. pp. 148–149.

² *Logic*, Harper & Brothers, 1870, bk. iii. chap. xxi. p. 342.

dering thought. The truth is that the causal apprehension far outruns any knowledge of causes given by experience. Events I may meet on the right hand and on the left of which no cause is discernible. From any morning's walk I may bring home a score of observations of events which I cannot set in order of causal relation. Do I, therefore, believe the events uncaused? Not so. Though I see no cause I know there must be one,—*must*,—affirming a necessity which the widest dealing with empirical logic cannot eradicate from within me. Where experience has no word, or where, indeed, its oracles are discredited, this *must* yet dominates my mind. Is it said that from familiarity with the causal relation I acquire a habit of mind which I carry to experiences in which I do not find that relation, and mentally supply an undetermined antecedent, assured through my experience that an antecedent must be there,—interpret, that is, the chaos in which occasionally I wander by the rules of the cosmos in which I habitually move? Then is it necessary to show that such account is true not merely of *my* mind, educated in this century of science, but that it is true also of the human mind in its origin and history? Did that apprehension dawn with the discovery of the relation of antecedent and consequent, and was its growth attained through repeated observation of this relation? The contrary would seem to be true. The primitive man lived practically in a world of phantasmagoria. The orderly sequences of events, so plain to us, he had no eye to see; but against the supposition that he was without the causal apprehension his very superstitions bear witness. The nereids with which he peopled the sea, the naiads he found in the fountains and streams, the genii of forests and mountains, the demons that rode on the storm, the smiling divinities of health and plenty, the fiends of famine and of pestilence, all tell of a causal sense which meant behind events the presence of an executing power.

The doctrine of the scientific school is but a latter-day disputer of a race-old conviction. The conclusion is relentless that the belief in efficiency behind effect is not merely a well-reasoned judgment, but comes from the mind out of its *a priori* store. Here we find explanation of the necessity we link with the causal idea: the mind cannot conceive the limitation of its own principles; therefore the causal principle it must hold to be unconditional and universal. Hence to what it learns empirically it applies this principle as a constructive rule, doubting it no more than it doubts the mathematics which it draws from the same source, and applies with absolute confidence in their truth. Every event must have a cause,—no space, no time, no eternity, can negative this broad affirmation.

Thus the phenomenism of the scientific school, Dr. Martineau, speaking for the causal sense, refuses to indorse. While the former maintain only a succession of events, the latter is obliged to maintain also the derivative origin of phenomena. Phenomena, however, can only be *derived* from a power that is other than phenomenal; a dynamic constant, behind all change yet immanent in it.

Manifest in all change, yet its unchanging source, immanent in nature, yet a "Force behind Nature"! I quote the language of an eminent scientist,¹ whose illustration, too long to appropriate, I yet may paraphrase. We enter some vast factory and study its heaving and bewildering machinery. This machine, which we first study, is plainly connected with another, on whose movement its movement is conditioned. But the second machine we soon discover to have a like relation with a third, the third with a fourth; and, having found the clue, we may follow from one machine to another throughout an apartment, and there at length find a belt which seems to connect all these machines with something out of sight, seeking which we find our-

¹ W. B. Carpenter, *Nature and Man*, p. 350.

selves in another apartment devoted to different machines all connected in like manner. So through apartment after apartment we find movement conditioned upon movement, one machine through a hundred intermediaries responsive to another; and there is a conceivable order of mind to which this language should convey the explanation; indeed the phenomenism we have reviewed has in these machines a not unfitting illustration. To us, however, further investigation is permissible, and passing down beneath the factory, we find a wheel to whose swift revolutions all this complex movement is due, and this driven by a cataract foaming and thundering there. The movement within the factory is thus explained by a force outside of it and yet immanent within it. In like manner to the intuitionist the fact that explains the complex movement of nature is a force beyond it or behind it, yet immanent in it. Without the sensible the supersensible were not offered to our thought; as without the supersensible the sensible were incoherent and unintelligible. For the understanding of each and the hope of ulterior problems we grasp them as correlates. The factory and the cataract outside of it, nature and the force behind it, would be the one incomprehensible, the other never dreamed of, but for the relation in which we meet them. Having thus met them, however, we may, if our minds so incline us, turn to the machinery of the factory to study its adjustments,—nature in her countless phenomena,—with light shed from a knowledge of the source of its mighty energy; or we may follow up the stream,—the force behind nature,—to the headland whence it flows. It is the latter enterprise that now invites us.

2. But before we come to the consideration of the "force behind nature" it may be well to bestow a closer scrutiny upon force in nature. A few years ago we had knowledge, as we supposed, of *forces*. Mechanical force we knew,

gravitation, heat, light, electricity, magnetism,—we were on easy terms with all of them. Their look was familiar; with their habits we were well acquainted; and though they surprised us now and then with some undiscovered virtue, and though we could not tell whence they came nor whither they went, yet from their honest appearance and regular behavior, we could not doubt that such as they appeared to be, in very truth they were. At length, about the middle of the century, an eye, turned upon them, saw, as it were, a little behind them; and lo, an astonishing discovery! Where we had supposed was plain and obvious dealing with us was really an endless masquerade. These forces which seemed so honest were really of the nature of faeries, constantly putting off their own and putting on one another's graces; and all so deftly done that though carried on, not in any green-room, but on the very proscenium of nature, the most searching eyes, from Aristotle to Sir Humphry Davy, did not detect the secret. The discovery was made that the chemical action that paints my portrait is in other dress the familiar agent through whose smiling presence I may use my eyes; that the electricity that flames and startles, clothed in different attributes, is the servant that cooks my food, and that the unerring pilot that in all weathers tells the sailor what his bearings are, is in other guise my errand boy, not like the nimble Puck, promising to "put a girdle round about the earth in forty minutes," but stipulating to run round it at the speed of eight times in one minute. This discovery, in which was the potency of revolution, came too late for Comte, and was young science when Mill was mature philosopher.

Illustrations of this truth are on every hand. Every one knows that hammered iron becomes hot,—every-day illustration of mechanical action converted into heat. The same thing is seen again when a man by threshing his hands succeeds in warming them, or an Indian, by rubbing

dry sticks together [if he ever does], produces fire. The sailor tells us that by the churning of the sea in a storm the water becomes warmer, and Professor Tyndall accepts his testimony. Illustration takes wider range. The energy of falling water, transformed into electricity, lights the streets and homes and shops of Buffalo, does service by the smelting of iron at her forges, and drives the complex machinery of her industry. Here at the beginning is the energy of a falling mass; it is converted into heat, into electricity, into light, into mechanical energy, whence it comes forth heat again. Every noisome sink-drain, every swamp from which malaria rises, every decaying vegetable or putrefying animal, tells of chemical action which is heat lost to its identity. Of light transformed into chemical action every photograph bears witness. Magnetism is convertible into electricity, electricity into magnetism. Further, an exact mathematical equivalence prevails here, so that the dynamic value expressed in foot-pounds of one mode of energy may be written down in degrees centigrade of another, and in amperes of another.

Strange this ceaseless process of transformation, which yields us "fairy tales of science" in comparison with which the most poetic folk-lore is dullest prose! But are we dealing with distinct forces? The conclusion of science rather is that these are not several forces, but only modes of Force. They are manifestations, not essences; phenomena, not dynamic permanents. Plurality is abolished; we have no longer forces, but Force. *The dynamic of the world is one!*

But Force,¹—we come now to the supreme question,—what, in its ultimate essence, is it? We know its manifes-

¹ I am aware that the term preferred in these days is "Energy." Having taken "Force," however, from Dr. Carpenter's illustration, I have thought it best to hold on to it. Further, it is the word Dr. Martineau uses throughout his discussion.

tations; in its inmost nature, is it like any of these? This is one of Dr. Martineau's questions. With the dynamic permanent before his mind he asks: "Which of its phases represent it most truly? Does it resemble a universal elasticity, like steam; or a universal quivering, like light; or a universal conscious mind, like thought in man? or must we say that probably it is like none of these, and that all its phases *misrepresent* it?"¹ This seems a reasonable question; but bringing it to these manifestations severally, however you may press it, they return no answer. But though severally they are thus uncommunicative, perhaps through some grouping of them we may attain a clue to the answer that we seek. These modes of Force Dr. Martineau finds it possible to arrange in a scale of higher and lower. He says: "It is impossible, on looking at the faces of these assembled forces, to assign the same rank to all, or miss the traits of graduated dignity which make them rather a hierarchy than a committee. The delicate precision with which chemical affinity picks its selecting way among the atoms, is in advance upon the indiscriminate grasp of gravitation at them all. The architecture of a crystal cannot vie with that of a tree. The sentiency of the mollusk is at an immeasurable distance from the thought which produces the *Mécanique Céleste*. Hence, in the company of powers that conduct the business of nature, a certain order of lower and higher establishes itself, which, without settling every point of precedence, at least marks a few steps of ascent, from the mechanical at the bottom to the mental at the top. All equally real, all equally old, they are differenced by the work they have to do."²

The dignity may be obvious; but here, as in human life, dignity may be climbed to or descended from. Could

¹ *Seat of Authority*, p. 22.

² *Essays, Reviews, and Addresses*, vol. iv. pp. 236-237.

we scientifically bridge the gulf between chemical and vital, between vital and mental phenomena, we should embrace in ascending and descending scale all zones of terrestrial existence within the correlations of the one dynamic,— the working idea of Evolution, which we tentatively embrace. Could we now find the order by which these correlations succeed one another, we might come through this to the manifestation that is initial to all the rest, and see in that at least a suggestion of the reality that it manifests. Did this order proceed ever from mechanical action up, then in mechanical action we should see that nearer resemblance; if from mind down, then that nearer resemblance would be in mind. Unfortunately for any hope in this direction, however, the order of succession can be made out in either direction; and if from mind at the top we may trace the correlations to mechanical action at the bottom, so may we trace them also in the reverse direction. Hence there may be two schools of thought, to one of which, mind, and to the other, mechanical action, is the phenomenon through which the causal agency is earliest manifest. The one may argue up from mechanical action and the other down from mind; and we are as yet in no position to adjudicate between them.

There is, however, yet another aspect of the problem which calls for notice. We have treated the correlations as up the scale or down; given the initial movement at either end of the scale, are all forms of energy then pledged to follow from it? Yes, *if the conditions of all are provided*, a truth that carries an interesting implication. If we arrange our scale with physical force at the bottom, and above it the chemical, the vital, the mental, it requires no deep insight to perceive that while each lower may make shift without the higher, each higher implies the lower. For instance, while there can be no chemical change without heat, heat may have a vast range of

phenomena without the conditions of chemical change. In a world of one substance, as gold, in which, of course, chemical change were impossible, heat might play its part with only one order of function less than now. So, while life may not be where there is no chemical change, chemical change may have vast range where there is no life; given the inorganic realm alone, it will never promote itself into the higher one. This is said in remembrance of the many claims of a way found open from the simply chemical to the vital, claims always brought to confusion by the finding that the "living thing was on the wrong side to begin with." Finally, while thought may imply life as its condition, life may have a vast career without any relation with thought; and research and speculation have utterly failed to show or guess how the former can blossom into the latter. It seems clearly impossible, therefore, to work the evolution from the base up without a series of gifts the need of which is the paralysis of evolution. Begin at the top, however, and with mind all below it is given by implication. Grant the presence of thought and will, and be sure "they will appropriate vital power; as life, once in possession, will ply the alembics and the test-tubes of its organic laboratory; and chemical affinity is no sooner on the field than it plays its game among the cohesions of simple gravitation." To the claim, therefore, often put forth, that given one type of Force we have with it all others, the answer is that that depends on *which* one; a conclusion to which Dr. Martineau gives utterance when he says, "If all force is to be conceived as One, its type must be looked for in the highest and all-comprehending term; and Mind must be conceived as there, and as divesting itself of some specialty at each step of its descent to a lower stratum of law, till represented at the base under the guise of simple Dynamics."¹

¹ *Essays, Reviews, and Addresses*, vol. iv. p. 600. Also same vol. pp. 237-239.

Thus much, at last, we come to as mere observers of the phenomena of Force: Of these, mind is the all-comprehending phenomenon. This indeed is something, but let us take care not to magnify it unduly. Still we are dealing only with phenomena; the Power they represent comes as yet with no distinctness before our vision. Though the supremacy of mind may be suggested, observation finds for it no verification. Still it is the phenomena of the unitary Power that we have before us, not its ultimate nature. Its manifestations are plain, but its essence is still illusive. This is as it should be; for in our study we have been using only the observing and classifying faculty, to which, as already shown, the reality of Force is not revealed. Where its reality is given, there, if anywhere, should its nature be made plain; and here we turn from outward observation to the testimony of the interior man.

In seeking within myself for light upon the ultimate nature of Force, my first study must be of Force as it is given me to exercise it. Suppose for a moment my only apprehension of Force to be drawn from my exercise of it, what account of it should I render? My various activities — my work, study, play — we will suppose the same as now. An observer without community of nature with me would see in them no more than I see in the conduct of the bee or the beaver; and we can easily conceive him to arrive at some such theory of them as I of the doings of the animals or insects I may study. But however *he* might explain them, *I* should know them to issue from my will. So far as other than automatic or zoölogical, this would inevitably be my account of them. Force I should know, and know only, through the execution of my will. Will-directed force, will-causality, — no other would be conceivable by me. This supposition, however, while serving well enough for a tentative illustration, is

inherently impossible. Of my own force, unantagonized by force other than mine, I can know nothing. Were I simply passive, the force that on every hand assails me would simply stream through me;—I should be like the sponge in the endless wash of the sea. So, were I active, if my activities encountered no resistance, then they would be like sunbeams shot out into a perfectly transparent atmosphere; and I should be unconscious of effort because acting through an unresisting medium. As through simple passivity I could not know of aught around me, so through unchallenged activity I could not know myself. That is to say, through resistance to my will is consciousness of it awakened. The causal power within me is counteracted by a causal power beyond me; and to know either I must have experience of their antagonism. Now, since I could have no apprehension of causality in the universe but for causality at home, it is evident that from myself as a centre I carry it abroad. From my own experience as an agent I gain my conception of an agency everywhere. But cause at my own centre is Will; will-causality is all the causality I know. The ultimate significance of cause beyond me, found within me or not found, is *will*. *Force, as an ultimate essence, then, is Will.* In the antagonism of self and not-self there is simply will opposed to will;—will within, expressed in activities of body and brain; will without, expressed in the order of the world; will within, flowing out in contest with the elements, in the subduing of nature, in the creation of arts, in the building of civilization; will without, guiding planets, flashing sunbeams, immanent in chemical combinations and in vital functions. Cause in the sense of efficient simply must mean this to us.

The form of argument here, however, is that of analogy, and there is another, which, if to the ordinary mind not more persuasive, to the logician may be more satisfactory.

The moulding principles of our knowledge, causality with the rest, come, as we have seen, from the mind at the call of experience. Even the correlations of physical forces are to empirical observation only successions of phenomena; the unitary Force they represent is not manifest to the eyes, and is only intuitively discerned. But cause, as it is given us to know it, is of the will; in the very mould, therefore, where our experiences are formed the volitional stamp is set upon them. Ordinarily we may not think this; when we contemplate an event, we refer it to a cause unqualified by any epithet. But when we reflect on the ultimate nature of cause, we find will implicated in the very idea. To the relation of events this is brought by the mind, and because of the mind we must think it, and what we *must* think we must believe true. To Dr. Martineau the reasoning from analogy may be persuasive, but in these terms we come nearer to his characteristic thought. On a point of so much significance, though in a passage of considerable length, it is better that he speak for himself. In his crushing rejoinder to Professor Tyndall he says: "To witness phenomena, and let them lie and dispose themselves in the mere order of time, space, and resemblance, is to us impossible. By the very make of our understanding we refer them to a *Power* which issues them: and no sooner is perception startled by their appearance than the intellect completes the act by wonder at their source. This 'power,' however, being a postulate intuitively applied to phenomena, and not an observed function found in them, does not vary as they vary, but mentally repeats itself as the needed prefix to every order of them: and though it may thus migrate, now into this group, now into that, it is the dwelling alone that changes, and that which is immanent is ever the same. You can vary nothing in the total fact, except the collocations of material conditions; out of

which, as each new adjustment emerges, the persistent Power elicits a different result. Instead of first detecting many forces in nature and afterwards running them up into identity, the mind imports one into many collocations: never allowing it to take different names, except for a moment, in order to study its action, now here, now there. If this be true, if causality be not seen, but thought, if the thought it carries belongs to a rule of the understanding itself, that every phenomenon is the expression of power, two consequences follow: the plurality of forces disappears: and, to find the true interpretation of the One which remains, we must look not without but within; not on the phenomena presented, but on the rational relations into which they are received. Power *is* that which *we mean by it*; nor have we any other way of determining its nature than by resort to our own self-knowledge. The problem passes from the jurisdiction of natural science to that of intellectual philosophy."¹ He then, after much the same fashion as that employed in the preceding pages, finds his way to the conclusion that the universe is pervaded by a Will.

The One Force so variously manifest is Will. Elusive when studied in its outward manifestations, it reveals its identity to the eye wisely directed to interior self-scrutiny. Is this anthropomorphism? Such it has been the fashion to call it; and in its character as such, scientific thinkers like Tyndall and Huxley have seen the last reproach of the faith of Martineau. Yet Professor Tyndall finds in matter the "promise and potency of all terrestrial life," which looks much like Martineau's anthropomorphism taken in reverse; and whether with better reason on its side it need not take long to see. What is matter? Between the Epicureans, who wanted nothing more than its ultimate atoms to build a universe, and Bishop Berkeley,

¹ *Essays, Reviews, and Addresses*, vol. iv. pp. 240-241.

who denied its reality, the accounts of it are how many and how divergent! Certainly, if spiritualism is a creed of perplexities, materialism, as judged by its history, is not less such. The existence of matter what warrant of it have we? The last word we can say of it is that it is an affection of our minds. Is spiritualism to be held untrustworthy because it is reasoned from ourselves, and materialism, resting ultimately upon the like reasoning, to be received with unquestioning faith? With certainty may I affirm that matter is such and such because I must think it, and must the conception of mind, born of an analogous necessity, be repudiated as baseless? Is the former so brave a philosophy? Is the latter so feeble a puerility? "The existence of a Universal Will," says Dr. Martineau, "and the existence of Matter stand on exactly the same basis,—of certainty if you trust, of uncertainty if you distrust, the *principia* of your own reason."¹ And with respect to anthropomorphism in its larger features, we may appropriate from his titanic wrestle with Professor Tyndall this weighty deliverance: "If I am to see a ruling Power in the world, is it folly to prefer a man-like to a brute-like power, a seeing to a blind? The similitude to man means no more and goes no further than the supremacy of intellectual insight and moral ends over every inferior alternative: and how it can be contemptible and childish to derive everything from the highest known order of power rather than the lowest, and to converse with Nature as embodied Thought instead of taking it as a dynamic engine, it is difficult to understand. Is it absurd to suppose mind transcending the human? or, if we do so, to make our own Reason the analogical base for intellect of wider sweep? How is it possible to look along any line of light traced by past research, and, estimating the contents which it reveals, and leaves still unrevealed, to

¹ *Essays, Reviews, and Addresses*, vol. iv. p. 247.

remember that along all radii to which we may turn, a similar infinitude presents itself to any faculty that seeks it, and yet to conceive that this mass of truth to be known has only our weak intelligence to know it? And if two natures know the same thing, can they be other than like?"¹

Thus through a long pathway of thought he reaches his conclusion; and with it the great postulate of theistic faith is gained. The world expresses an Infinite Will; its laws are decrees; in deciphering its hieroglyphic we follow up a Divine Intelligence on lines by which it issued forth. The dictum of the French *savant*, "The heavens declare the glory of Herschel and Laplace," yields to the refrain of the Psalmist which it travesties; and philosophy, grown jubilant, breaks into rhapsody.

"Thou visitest the earth and waterest it:
 Thou greatly enrichest it,
 The river of God is full of water:
 Thou providest them corn, when thou hast prepared the earth:
 Thou waterest the furrows abundantly,
 Thou settlest the ridges thereof.
 Thou makest it soft with showers,
 Thou blessest the springing thereof,
 Thou crownest the year with thy goodness,
 And thy paths drop fatness."

3. It hardly needs to be said that Dr. Martineau means by Will what we mean by it, the executive function of Intelligence. In heaven as in earth, it discriminates and determines. There comes before our minds the blind impulse which Schopenhauer called Will. To Dr. Martineau a blind impulse, acting but not discriminating, were Fatalism, not Will. Causing implies willing, but "aimless force, force that cannot define its own path, but may fly off in any radius without prejudice to its identity, misses

¹ *Essays, Reviews, and Addresses*, vol. iv. pp. 247-248.

the essence of causality."¹ That essence, as the will declares it, is in having an aim, and choosing a pathway, and declining "all radii but one." The objection to the argument from Design, that designing means choosing and choosing implies limitation, has no favor in his eyes. To select always from ever present alternatives is of the Infinite Will, and is involved in an infinite prerogative. Power to do is not infinite unless there go with it the power not to do. In the denial of choice Omnipotence is denied.

A question of method here arises. Where do we find the types of Divine volition? The rain nourishes the corn, but spreads devastation through the river's overflow; water slakes my thirst, but it may also drown me; I could not live without the sunshine, yet it may generate a miasma that shall cut short my life; the conditions that make the harvest bountiful bring forth the pests that destroy it; and where nature is most affluent in smiles man is most exposed to the fever's breath, the wild beast's ravage, and the serpent's fang. These contrasts, contemplated with reference to the Supreme Will, have yielded conclusions how diverse! Scepticism has found in them justification of its doubt; simple faith has explained them by the alternation of his moods, the kindlier experience telling of his grace, the harsher of his wrath. There is yet another, which we may perhaps call the stoic temper, which finds utterance in the words of the prophet Isaiah: "I am the Lord, and there is none else. I form the light, and create darkness: I make peace, and create evil: I the Lord do these things."

Our personal vicissitudes are so engrossing to ourselves that it is often hard for us to think of them as not a matter of immediate concern in the legislation of the universe; and it is sometimes felt to be a cold philosophy that refuses to see the direct agency of Heaven in the exigencies of our travel, or the issues of our pathology; yet such negative

¹ *Study of Religion*, vol. i. p. 244.

conclusion is essential in Dr. Martineau's philosophy, which finds the types of Divine volition not in the details of experience, but in the ruling forces of the world. In his own language, "Every law represents *one* thought and is the explicit unfolding of one comprehensive and standing volition."¹ The single volition, that is, is represented by one law with all it carries. When the decree went forth, Let there be light; it was not stipulated that it should not dazzle my eyes, or be unattended by other inconvenience to me and to other sublunary creatures. In light we have a "single genus of power," a "dynamic constant," that holds its course and works its effects in apparent indifference to particular grievances that may be laid to its charge. So in the appointment that the rains fall, the convenience of my journey is not taken into consideration. Heat seems appointed to its tasks without respect to the myriad seemingly unfriendly contingencies that hang upon its action; chemical action holds on its way regardless of the pestilence it may generate; electricity I must handle circumspectly, or while serving me it may kill me. A law with its full budget of consequences, changeless and passionless,—this is what the volition seems to signify. In its origin a decree of Will, it is left to be one of the fixed and ever calculable habits of nature. And despite all our incidental inconveniences and even suffering, how much better so! The problem of wisdom and goodness in the universe belongs to later pages; but we may here wander from our path so far as to remark that through this invariableness the discipline of man and the possibility of his knowledge of the universe are provided. But something more than this is wanted, something this fixity, if carried up through all the zones of our moral and spiritual nature, would render it impossible to believe; and Dr. Martineau finds a way to it. In his critique of

¹ *Study of Religion*, vol. i. p. 222.

Professor Tyndall is a remarkable passage in which he asks: "Does anything forbid us to conceive similarly of the cosmical development; that it started from the freedom of indefinite possibilities and the ubiquity of universal consciousness; that, as intellectual exclusions narrowed the field, and traced the definite lines of admitted movement, the tension of purpose, less needed on these, left them as habits of the universe, and operated for higher and ever higher ends not yet provided for; that the more mechanical, therefore, a natural law may be, the further is it from its source; and that the inorganic and unconscious portion of the world, instead of being the potentiality of the organic and the conscious, is rather its residual precipitate, formed as the Indwelling Mind of all concentrates an intenser aim on the upper margin of the ordered whole, and especially on the inner life of natures that can resemble him?"¹ The purpose of this passage is to exhibit a very possible relation of volitions left to be the laws of matter with higher and more elastic operations of the Divine Will. This is a thought never far from the mind of Dr. Martineau. Whatever constraints the Divine Mind may impose upon nature, higher up, where he deals with conscience and the soul, the constraint relaxes. With whatever confidence we may calculate, we still may pray. While science, from the divineness that pervades its field, may well be devout, it does not follow that devotion, at its altitude, should be scientific. Rather here is a place where the free spirit of man meets the free spirit of God.

Like other speculators of like tendencies of mind, Dr. Martineau braces his intuitionism by a survey of Nature, gathering up the accordant notes she offers him. Of themselves alone they might not satisfy him; bringing to their study, however, an *a priori* warrant for his faith, they serve most admirably as illustration. The notes of purpose in

¹ *Essays, Reviews, and Addresses*, vol. iv. pp. 249-250.

nature, reasoning on the basis of human analogy, are neither few nor insignificant. "If they are apparent in the structure of a cottage," he asks, "are they absent from the hut of the beaver and the nest of the wasp? Does the granary of the farmer provide for the future any better than the storehouse of the squirrel? Is there more skill in a pair of spectacles, than in a pair of eyes?—in a guitar, than in the vocal chords of a Malibran or a Stanley?—in the hunter's snare, than in the spider's web?—in the lover's serenade, than in the nightingale's song?—in the oars of a boat, than in the fin of a fish?"¹ That here is adaptation to ends which squirrel and bee and beaver could not have foreseen, is plain. Originality is ours; it is not theirs. We can plan and build for the future: of foresight and intention they cannot do so. To us is reason; to them is instinct. Through the possession of reason we are fitted for our province, and are left in charge of it; they, a part of nature, are directed by its Indwelling Spirit. Through our reason we purpose and perform; through their instinct works the Reason of Reason.

One result of this doctrine of causation is evident: the old distinction between First Cause and second causes disappears. Save as man in the exercise of his free will is a second cause, there is no cause in the universe but God. Material causes, so called, are only material conditions, physical forces but physical means, man's free will but the unnecessitated agent of a Power that is over all, and in all, and through all. The universe is enchanted by an Infinite Will, through which suns blaze and civilizations blossom; and whose purposes unfold in the issues of history.

II. *The Intellectual Aspects of the Universe*

The consideration incidentally touched upon in the closing paragraph of the above statement must now be

¹ *Study of Religion*, vol. i. p. 247.

more explicitly dealt with. Does the universe ratify the result reached by the study of the causal intuition? In its processes, widely surveyed, do we trace the presence of Mind? With these questions the argument from Design or Final Causes is before us. The argument stands not where it stood in the times of Paley and Bridgewater Treatises; though they mistake who suppose that these writings have lost their persuasiveness; and they more gravely mistake who suppose the interest in this argument is materially less than a century ago. The philosophy of Evolution, indeed, presented the universe in another aspect; and some of the writings of its earlier expounders, as the *Lay Sermons*, the *Belfast Address*, and the *First Principles*, were certainly disquieting to the teleologist. If mechanism could do so much, what need of God? The net result as seen in the mind of to-day, however, is probably not less faith, but more caution. We turn to the universe not with less confidence that Design is there, but with the sense of the need of a deeper insight and a broader outlook. This is well; for we were acquiring a facility for tracing Design which was bringing the argument into disrepute through a cumbersome mass of puerilities. The illustration of Paley, a watch picked up on a heath, dignified and masterful as he used it, imitated by feebler minds, brought into literature a multitude of supposed Designs, which might often be looked upon as ingenious parody were it not for their evident sincerity; and there was appositeness as well as humor in the remark of Hegel that "though wine be useful to man, neither religion nor science is profited by supposing the cork-tree to exist for the sake of the corks which are cut from its bark to serve as stoppers for wine-bottles."¹

There are two ways in which the marks of intelligence in nature may be used in theistic arguments. The one is

¹ Quoted from Schurman's *Belief in God*.

as proof: Here is Design, it is argued, therefore there must be a Designer. Alike in a watch and in a world, intelligent adaptation implies intelligence. The orderly arrangement of words that results in an *In Memoriam* or a *Sordello* is no chance affair; the orderly detail of nature that brings forth an eye or an ear no more such. This is the Paleyan argument, though of date far earlier than Paley.

The second use of it is as illustration. Having the conviction that there is a God, the believer may see in the order of the universe the tokens of His wisdom. Knowing God already, he looks abroad and says, These are His ways. With his faith the aspect of the universe is accordant. What he carries to it, that he finds.

Now the former of these, the Design argument proper, has had illustrious recognition. Socrates used it in his way, Plato also, and Cicero; Kant treated it with respect; Mill coldly confessed its validity. Yet there have never been wanting those who could not feel its persuasiveness; who, though willing enough to confess the universe the handiwork of God, have yet felt the human mind unequal to the divination of its meaning: have found its scope too vast, or its symbolism too mysterious. Thus Descartes, who, as he believed, proved to absolute certainty the being of God, would have nothing to do with Final Causes. "We must not be so presumptuous," says he, "as to think God has taken us into his counsels." Also, while for this reason many earnest theists have been unwilling to use the argument, there have been theists not less earnest who have doubted its absolute validity. For instance, Dr. F. H. Hedge, while allowing to it "great theological value," could not find in it that complete demonstration which its prophets claim for it.¹ "The truth of an hypothesis," says he, "which seems to solve a given problem is not estab-

¹ See "Critique of Proofs of the Being of God" in *Ways of the Spirit*.

lished by that solution, unless the solution is complete;" and he adds, "If it fails to satisfy that condition, it is simply the best hypothesis, nothing more." To this rigorous requirement he finds the argument unequal. With whatever array of facts it may be justified, still he holds that the opposite contention has not been logically invalidated; that still it may be maintained that the necessities of existence are such, rather than that thus a Divine Intelligence appointed. Of the two hypotheses the latter may seem the more reasonable, but that does not make the former untenable. The argument may comfort belief; but, in effect he asks, did it ever win a Comte or a Laplace from unbelief? Further he points out the significant circumstance that the great expounders of the argument have gone to Nature "not to ascertain an unknown fact, but to justify an assumed one." Believers when they sought her, they were simply better assured believers after their interview with her. Had they gone to this interview with minds blank to the idea of God, he is very doubtful if they would have returned from it with the radiant faith they have illustrated. In this we should certainly agree with him. The Deity we find in Nature we first meet within ourselves; and the Hebrew prophet had surely not admonished, Lift up your eyes on high, and behold who hath created these things, had he not known, had he not heard, had it not been told him from the beginning. Dr. Hedge further says that Paley and the Bridgewater writers "have brought to view the exquisite adaptations of Nature, and, *on the supposition of a God for its author*, have abundantly illustrated the wondrous skill of the Creator." It was, then, the second or illustrative use of Design that he would recognize. Though it may not suffice to establish the existence of God, it may show the wisdom of God, if already known. With this view Dr. Martineau is in clear accord. He betrays, indeed, an interest in the Paleyan

doctrine which his American contemporary does not reflect; but in the structure of his brilliant argument it is God that shows him Nature, not Nature that shows him God. His inquiry is to "ascertain whether the world answers, in its constitution, to our *intuitive interpretation* of it as the manifestation of *intellectual purpose.*"¹ So plain is this relation of thought in his argument that it is simply astonishing that his doctrine should ever have been mistaken for the Paleyan. Like most other profound students of Natural Theology during the last century, he has given very evident attention to Paley's writings: yet the attitude of the two minds is entirely different. While Paley would say to the atheist, See these marks of Design; either discredit them or, for consistency's sake, be an atheist no more, Dr. Martineau would say, See these marks of Design; how beautifully they ratify the intuition of an Intelligent Cause. For the security of the primary postulate of his faith Dr. Martineau does not need Final Causes; like Descartes, he could have maintained it, as he achieved it, by philosophic insight alone. The form, however, which it takes in his speculation, that of Intelligent Will, makes its justification by Nature especially desirable; and the two placed over against each other, Will as philosophically found and Will as traced in the processes of Nature, together make a course of doctrine both weighty and impressive.

The line of contention of the advocate of Final Causes is Intelligence versus Automatism. Are the adaptations we meet in nature the happy hit of unintelligent forces, or did an Intelligence direct them? Or, more accordant with Dr. Martineau's attitude, an Intelligent Being granted, do we find in nature the tokens of His action?

What are the tokens of intelligent action? Dr. Martineau specifies three: *selection, combination, gradation.*

¹ *Study of Religion*, vol. i. p. 258.

Through these, intelligence, as we know it, ever executes its tasks. Of many possibles it selects one; various selections it brings together into a harmonious whole; and throughout the structure it subordinates minor ends to larger ones. These features are ever met in the works of men, as a watch, a house, a railway, a book, a statue, a picture, a school, a creed, a government. For instance, a book. Of many possible lines of thought or groupings of fact the author selects a few; these few, through successive chapters, he brings into harmonious relation; and throughout the whole he is ruled by a law of gradation by which minor matters open the way to those of larger importance. From works of human intelligence these marks are never absent; and meeting them in nature, it is reasonable to say, Either Intelligence has been here, or unintelligent forces have blindly simulated its methods.

In the presence of these alternatives, one of course may embrace either, but which he will embrace will depend, so teaches Andrew Seth,¹ on whether the philosophical or the strictly scientific spirit rules him. Science can hardly be teleological; but philosophy, however variously it may conceive, cannot permanently give up, teleology. The aim of philosophy is to rationalize the universe; and, outside the crudest materialism, that is not likely to be conceived as having a rationale which is not in some sense the offspring of Reason and ruled to its ends. The significance of this consideration is so prevailing that, however an occasional philosopher may decline teleological judgment, philosophy, true to the principle of its life, will yet dare it. The difference between Dr. Martineau and the schools now in the ascendant is not one of teleology and no teleology, but turns on the question where the warrant of teleological judgment may be found. They find it in what they conceive to be the great end of Crea-

¹ *Man's Place in the Cosmos*, pp. 56-58.

tion; he sees it here, and also in many a detail by which that end is being furthered. Let us follow him in his illustrations.

1. *Selection.* Do we find this in nature? We know how man dealing with the products of nature may select: how a florist, finding a rose of peculiar tint, by a process of selection may propagate and improve it; how the poultry fancier will in like manner improve his brood, and how the experimenter upon domestic animals may produce sheep of finer wool, and cows of richer milk, and horses of fleeter foot. We know also what naturalist, after contemplating this kind of selection, turned to nature with the question whether she also selected; and how, in answer to his question, she flashed upon him, with all its measureless implications, the great law of Natural Selection. There is, then, selection in nature; and the denial of it would require that our latter-day natural history be rewritten. It is divined from the intelligent action of man; shall we say it is of nature's automatic action merely, or shall we refer it to an Intelligence that, using nature as its instrument, directs the choice?

Illustrations of this law any student can easily supply for himself. There is one, however, on which Dr. Martineau especially dwells; which through the ingenuity of his presentation has gained considerable attention. It is drawn from a study of the anterior limbs of vertebrate animals. In skeletons we find in them a unity of plan, and a like relation of this part to the whole; and yet what possibilities! "The changes," says he, "that might be rung upon them by extension or contraction of size, by altered proportions of their members, by readjustment of weight, by shifting their leverage, by modifying their muscular apparatus, are endlessly in excess of all actual types."¹ Now what has limited the number of these

¹ *Study of Religion*, vol. i. pp. 259-260.

actual types? We cannot think of them as "accidental variations;" on the contrary, all agree that the limits of variation have strict "reference to the medium in which the creature is to live; reducing it to the pectoral fin of the fish and the paddle of the seal; or extending it into the wing of the bird, itself elongated by the primary feathers which grow from the fingers; and in terrestrial animals terminating it with the hoof or toe for progression, the claw for battle, the hand for prehensile use."¹

How shall we explain this adaptation of the organ to the conditions of the creature's existence? Why in its form is it so strictly relative to the creature's environment? There are those who answer that it is the environment itself which equips the creature for life within it. Now environment can undoubtedly do many things, but are there not limits to its achievements? However fishes may leap into the air, the fin shows no tendency to become a wing; and though semi-aquatic birds are much in water, they show no tendency to take on the structure of its finny inhabitants. "Except in mythologic tales," says Dr. Martineau, "no fisherman, like Glaucus of Anthedon, can betake himself to his own element and become a marine inhabitant indistinguishable from the fish, even though he has an immortality to do it in. Nor could any air that blows help the arms that beat it to grow into wings; whatever force was called into action by incipient attempts to fly would work in opposition to such direction of development and sweep away its first beginnings." His reason for this conclusion seems plain: "*The waters and the atmosphere can never set up instruments of resistance to themselves.*"² However, then, the environment may be a foster nurse to develop an organ incipiently provided, its absolute provision is not within its possibilities. For this, then, we must turn from the environment to the organism. Dr. Martineau dwells

¹ *Study of Religion*, p. 260.

² *Ibid.*

at length upon two views of the genesis of this: one the pre-formation theory of the earlier physiologists who held that the organism was potential in the egg or germ, so that in its production there was only needed the course of development. That is to say, the structure is in its every part pre-formed in the embryo, which unfolds according to a "directing and organizing idea" or "vital design," a view which, of course, only pushes the *selection* back to the source of that "vital design." The other view is that of *epigenesis*, and is far in the ascendant in our time. The embryos of man and of many of the animals below him are at an early stage indistinguishable one from another. The theory is that the distinguishing features which appear later are not *developed* but *added on*. According to the former view, the whole precedes the parts; according to the latter, the parts precede the whole. Now it is held by some that this latter view is inimical to the Design argument. Dr. Martineau, however, conceives the reverse. "For," says he, "if we want to conceive of development within a purely physical circle of processes, with a minimum of temptation to enquire beyond, surely the gradual increase of a given form in all its dimensions at once leaves us less to ask, than the successive aggregation of heterogeneous organs of which no hint had before been given."¹ Also so valiant an advocate of Design as Janet would, in the interest of his doctrine, adopt this view in preference to the earlier one.² Surely a ship is none the less a work of Design because not pre-formed in the

¹ *Study of Religion*, vol. i. p. 261.

² "Given," says he, "an organism in miniature, I could easily comprehend that the growth and enlargement should take place by purely mechanical laws. But what I do not comprehend is that a juxtaposition or addition of parts, which only represents external relations between the elements, should be found, little by little, to have produced a work which I would call a work of art if a Vaucauson had made it, but which is much more complicated and delicate than one of Vaucauson's automata." *Final Causes*, p. 139.

timber, but brought together part by part. With one of these theories as with the other the hypothesis of Design will work equally well; and to a Huxley or a Haeckel we may say that finding out how a thing is done is not the same as proving that God did not do it.¹

Thus there is selection in nature; and such seems its meaning. But (2) is there *combination* also? The student of Darwin is familiar with correlation of growth, a truth recognized by Cuvier a half-century before Darwin, and made his guiding light in his wonderful reconstructions of extinct animals from fossil remains. Every part so implies another part that, given any bone, a "person who possesses an accurate knowledge of the laws of organic economy may reconstruct the whole animal." Here within the organism, correlation is, of course, but another word for combination; but combination, in Dr. Martineau's use of the word, has a much wider application. Here is combination of part with part; there is also combination of "organic change" with a "special direction of muscular activity." At approach of winter the frog, the snake, the tortoise, seek a fitting place for their winter's sleep; at the approach of the birth season the smelt in the lake seeks the brook; the salmon ascends the river; the bird builds its nest; the caterpillar weaves its web; — the stirring of the reproductive impulse, which none will pretend that these creatures understand, is synchronized by these acts of preparation. A woman approaching maternity gets ready a cradle; and her action we say is intelligent. Can we then say that the like action

¹ In the above sentence I detect myself borrowing from Miss Cobbe. The passage is so apposite that I cannot err in quoting it entire: "It is a singular fact that, whenever we find out how anything is done, our first conclusion seems to be that God did not do it. No matter how wonderful, how beautiful, how infinitely complex and delicate has been the machinery that has worked, perhaps for centuries, perhaps for millions of ages, to bring about some beneficent result,—if we catch a glimpse of the wheels its divine character disappears. The machinery did it all. It would be altogether superfluous to look further." *Darwinism in Morals*, p. 5.

on the part of these lower creatures is merely automatic? We grant these creatures without intelligence; but is intelligence wholly unrelated with their conduct? It must be so, or the intelligence of nature, which is the intelligence of a Mind that ordains nature, must work through them and direct them.

There is another combination of organism with nature, and of this illustration is endless. Seasonal for the child's need is the flow of its mother's milk, and in the art of appropriating it the child needs no instruction; and the human babe, as Dr. Martineau remarks, is here on terms of exact equality with the young of other mammalia whether of the earth or the sea. But more suggestive than this is the provision of far lower creatures for their offspring. Every spring the caterpillar weaves its web upon our apple trees, never upon our beeches or maples, guided by a foresight surely not its own to the tree whose leaves will yield food for its young. The burying beetle seeks the carcass of some small animal, as a frog or a mouse, with the aid of its fellows covers it with sand, and then deposits its larvæ within it; which thus find right about them their appropriate aliment. The case of the pompoles is perhaps more striking. When mature, the insect lives on flowers. Its larvæ, however, are carnivorous; and so the mother places in the nest where her eggs are deposited the body of a spider or caterpillar, thus providing for her young a food suited to them, but which she could not eat. Not less suggestive is the phenomenon of migration. That other creatures should like to change their abode with the season, to man seems natural enough; but in the manner of their doing so there is food for reflection. Dr. Martineau quotes the example of shoals of turtles that "regularly swim from the bay of Honduras to the Cayman islands, near Jamaica,—a favorable spot for laying their eggs,—and make this distance of four hundred and

fifty miles with such precision, that in thick weather ships can sail under the guidance of their rustling in the water.”¹ Then there is the flight of birds through hundreds of miles of trackless space, yet ruled by an accuracy which the calculations of the mariner cannot surpass. “We can imagine readily enough,” says Dr. Martineau, “how changes of temperature might awaken in these birds a desire to secure perpetual summer by keeping a second country house not deserted by the sun; but by what mysterious sympathy between their nature and the latitudes and longitudes of the earth their lines of flight are directed, by what magnetic needle within them they trace their unerring path, by what secret chronometry they hit upon the date of passage and keep the appointment with their old habitat, is inexplicable except as part of the intellectual combinations of the world.”²

There is another combination on which Dr. Martineau lingers with very evident interest: it is that provided for in the complete absence of one of the related elements. A hearing-trumpet invented by one totally deaf, or a microscope by one totally blind, would not be thought of as produced without intelligence; rather they would be referred to an intelligence that was preternatural. But the ear is an instrument for hearing, in complexity and delicacy infinitely beyond any of man’s devising, and the eye an instrument for seeing, compared with which our microscope or telescope is but clumsy apprentice work. Yet both are formed in entire insulation from the medium in which they are to act: the ear where are no aerial vibrations, the eye where is no light. When, however, they emerge into the “element” in relation with which they are to perform their office, this wondrous adaptation! Certainly the philosopher may be entitled to respectful consideration who sees here something akin to a pre-established harmony. Now

¹ *Study of Religion*, vol. i. p. 293.

² *Ibid.* p. 294.

there are those who will argue that though the ear and the eye are formed in insulation from their element, they are yet formed within the matrix of a being who has them in perfect adjustment with that element. Be it so: we are given a point in their genealogy, but are told nothing of their genesis. Here the evolutionist brings forward his explanation: Light forms the eye, sound forms the ear; and hence the harmony. Given a clot of protoplasm, light acting upon it will call forth an incipient eye and sound waves an incipient ear; and from this beginning, which is next to nothing, Natural Selection will carry on the process to completion. Again be it so; yet myriad objects are beaten upon by these twofold vibrations, and no nerve of sight or of hearing appears in them. That thus they may be formed within the protoplasm, they must be potentially there. Ability to awaken on the one side implies ability to be awakened on the other. In the protoplasm must be eye and ear of earlier date; and the fact that light and sound perform a part in their development is not in the slightest degree dissonant with our thesis. Again it is legitimate to urge that finding out how a thing is done is not the same as proving that God did not do it.

3. We come next to *gradation*. In nature do we find this? Indeed we do. Without entering into the study of the vegetable or animal economy, which we could not pursue without recognizing a system of means and ends, which to many a thinker has borne sufficing testimony, we may draw our illustrations from the larger features of the evolutionary story. Saying nothing of the earlier chapters, a molten and a frozen world, which, if we took note of nothing else, we might leave to the rule of undesigning forces, we come to life, and it is difficult not to see in the prior processes a preparation for this. Allow that there were only elements before; now they have found an end in an organism which they support. All the myr-

ial forms of vegetable growth are simply the chemicals of nature organized; and in the organization is the first stage in the upward gradation manifest.

The chemical, then, for the vital; but the vital is not the final. Beyond merely organized is conscious existence. The vegetable has clearly a *raison d'être* in the support of the animal.

But beyond conscious life is self-conscious; we reach another and a higher stage when we come to man. With him, too, terrestrial being culminates; and for him, in some sense, all below him. On this point language needs to be guarded. It is not pretended that the lower forms of existence have no end save the service of man, that the world is ordered in contemplation of him alone; and the satire of Montaigne, who supposes a gosling to reason: "All the parts of the universe regard me; the earth serves me for walking; the sun to give me light; the stars to inspire me with their influence; . . . there is nothing this vault so favorably regards as me; I am the darling of nature," deals fairly with such pretension. Yet it is true, and surely no Darwinian should dispute it, that in the hierarchy of terrestrial being man stands at the summit, and hence, in the providence of nature, all below him must be for him.

These are the cardinal stages of gradation. Probably few feel that it ends here; indeed his vision must be strangely defective who does not see the tokens of its continuance. It well may be that it does not contemplate a transition to another and higher form of terrestrial being; but the perfection of the highest that now is, the progressive realization of the idea of a divine humanity,—perfection of the social organism, the achievement of that kingdom of man which is the kingdom of God.

Compared with the amplitude of our resources these illustrations seem meagre. However, the method of in-

telligent action is shown through them; and the easily gathered volume of the like illustrations could only show it more fully, not more clearly. To show this method, too, is of great practical importance. The causal argument, though never so fair, would fail to persuade multitudes of minds could some Cuvier or Agassiz declare: Useless to appeal to Nature; in her processes is no selection, no combination, no gradation; so far as can be seen she works without method and to no end. Dr. Martineau, indeed, would not be discomfited; he could still require us to accept the causal argument on its logical validity, maintaining, like Descartes, that the methods of God are too deep, and his purposes too vast, for human comprehension. But these features, met so widely in organic nature, he can but regard as ratifying the judgment he has reached independently of them. A weakness of the old Paleyan doctrine was its want of metaphysic; it is the peculiar strength of Dr. Martineau's that for his metaphysic he finds objective verification. The argument from the causal intuition may be good, and the marks of Intelligence may be plain; but both together and in harmony are better than either.

But though the central principle of Dr. Martineau's doctrine is safe without Design, he thinks enough of Design, not only to illustrate it, but to defend it against latter-day objections. These objections are various, but they may be grouped under two considerations, drawn respectively from the aspect in which they present the Divine Nature, and certain troublesome features of the outward universe.

i. *The aspect of the Divine nature.* (1) It is charged that the Design argument is—again that word of terror—*anthropomorphic*. It assumes the action of God after the methods of our own: it makes God man; and against this what fervid protestations! There is an element of

truth in this: I can form no judgment of anything save from myself; and the conception of any nature must be outlined from my own. Try any other conception of the Ultimate Principle than that of mind, and see if we escape this necessity. "There are," says Dr. Martineau, "but three forms under which it is possible to think of the ultimate or immanent principle of the Universe,— Mind, Life, Matter: given the first, it is intellectually thought out: the second, it blindly grows: the third, it mechanically shuffles into equilibrium."¹ The question presses, How much more liable am I to a vitiating twist from my own nature in dealing with one of these conceptions than with another? It is because I am a thinking being that I am led to think of the Ultimate Principle as thinking; but so it is because I am a living being that I think of it as living; and only because I am a material being that I can think of it as material. "Man is equally your point of departure, whether you discern in the cosmos an intellectual, a physiological or a mechanical system: and the only question is whether you construe it by his highest characteristics, or by the middle attributes which he shares with other organisms; or by the lowest, that are absent from no physical things."² He might have added that if, because its conception is formed from ourselves, the basal principle of theology must be given up, science for the same reason should be judged untenable; and a Huxley, decrying Design on this ground, is eaten up by his own logic. Theological conceptions, like all others, should be judged by their inherent strength, and not be discredited in advance by the fact that it is a human mind that forms them.

(2) But again, it is held that this mode of action, essential though it be to the human mind, when affirmed of

¹ *Study of Religion*, vol. i. p. 316.

² *Ibid.*

God, contradicts his attributes. He is the universal source, we say; he is infinite; he is eternal; he is absolute. But as universal source, there can be no power beyond him; as infinite, all is embraced in him; as eternal, the conditions of time do not apply to him; as absolute, he is out of all relation. Designing, on the other hand, implies selecting and contriving, which is transitive action and implies a datum objective to the selector or contriver. But a "datum objective to God" implies that all is not embraced in him, and therefore that he is not infinite; as a designer, he enters into relations, so he cannot be absolute. Design seems to imply a dualism,—God and a datum which is the theatre of his activity; while these attributes call for one Essence to which, since in itself all, nothing can be objective; and what seems its datum can be only its phenomenon.

Whether we are dealing here with the supreme problem of philosophy or with a metaphysical conundrum, there may be difference of opinion. On both sides, however, the dilemma has been taken seriously. On one side pantheism is felt to annihilate teleology; on the other teleology is saved by making reservations from pantheism. A profound and learned writer remarks in a recent book: "Christian theology, and Jewish also, have been as pantheistic as reverent reason and devout common sense would permit them to be."¹ This we may accept as true, and still be confronted by the question, What limits to pantheism do reverent reason and devout common sense prescribe? For answer to this question, we may quote a few compressed sentences from Dr. Martineau: "There are two ways of taking these wonder-working words: the Infinite, the Absolute, the All-acting, may be construed monistically, as embracing and absorbing the finite, the relative, the passive; or dualistically, as antithetic to them

¹ Thomas B. Hill, *Postulates of Theology and Ethics*, p. 61.

and implying them as their opposing foci. It is in the latter form alone . . . that they are given to our thought: the infinite which we cognize as the background of a finite is all *except the thing*: the absolute is the sphere of the relation we contemplate, *so far forth as exempt from it*: and the universal causality is apprehended by us only as that which is other than our own, and planted out in the non-ego, without displacing our personal activity. In all these cases, our thought holds on to a definite locus whence its survey is taken of *all else*: it sails in its little skiff and looks forth on the illimitable sea and the great circles of the sky, and finds two things alone with one another, the universe and itself: the metaphysicians who, in their impatience of distinction, insist on taking the sea on board the boat, swamp not only it but the thought it holds, and leave an infinitude which, as it can look into no eye and whisper into no ear, they contradict in the very act of affirming. Now, when kept true to their antithetic meaning, these terms no longer lend themselves to the easy magic of negation. If we have causality as well as God, there is room for saying, this sin is ours, that rebuke is his. If for him, as Omniscient subject, there are *objects of knowledge* that have been, are, and will be, they must be present to his mind in their distinctions, their connexions, their consequences: and that which in us is memory and foresight, and apprehension of rational relations, must have some intellectual equivalent in him. If, besides himself, there exist, in a sphere left free, living persons for his Love, there are innumerable definite and variable lines of selective movement on which that love may go forth; nor need we scruple to think of it as carrying shadows as well as lights, and as hid in eclipse from our unfaithfulness, though ready to warm us again when we emerge. An infinite of which these attributes must be denied would only be inferior to a finite being of whom they

might be affirmed; and where the boundary between the human and the Divine so gradually fades, an intellectual, moral, and affectional fulness of conception will secure more truth than the most spacious metaphysical void, where names alone can float without a meaning or a home.”¹ This weighty judgment let him answer who is able.

(3) But objection takes another form. It is urged that Design not merely abridges the infinitude of God, but otherwise carries a denial of his perfection. Designing implies discriminating and contriving; the laborious processes of intelligence, not spontaneity of action. Spinoza held that working for an end was confession of need; Mill contended that the use of means implied a want of power: the engineer, whether constructing a railway or a universe, confesses the difficulties of his task by the expedients he employs. How much worthier of God is the thought of the world as unpremeditated and simply unfolding from him.

This has a specious sound; but reverent reason and devout common sense have reply: As the heavens are higher than the earth, so are his ways higher than our ways, and his thoughts than our thoughts; and this truth must rule our conception of the Divine activity. It cannot imply, however, that his ways are not ways, in some sense congruous with our sense, nor that his thoughts are not thoughts. Though infinitely beyond ours, ours may be a means by which we may analogically conceive them. Grant our conception inadequate, yet not for that reason need we think it untrue. But change the point of view, and bestow a closer look upon this Being who thinks not, wills not, but ever acts from his own centre, not freely but as he must,—is such a being so far exalted above one who designs and executes? Is

¹ *Study of Religion*, vol. i. pp. 320-321.

the being of whom this universe is the only possible universe more august than a being to whom it is only one of infinite possibilities? Is the absolutely perfect being one who can do no other than he does? Strange inversion of the natural order of estimate, this placing of the non-intelligent above the intelligent, the necessitated above the free,— adding to the glory of God by discrowning him! If this inversion of natural estimate be necessary in order that we may not be anthropomorphic, let us be content with anthropomorphism.

The objection that Design is irreconcilable with acknowledged attributes of God is thus variously answered. It is not pretended that all is plain; we have before us a transcendent problem, in dealing with which only he who thinks little shall be sensible of no difficulties. But this seems clear, that the conception of a God of whom Design is predicable leads into difficulties far less grave than any competing one. There is one structure of the argument from Design in which the implied Designer is not so easy to receive, that built upon the conception of a God outside of and apart from the universe. The doctrine itself we should probably find it easier to surrender than to embrace its Deistical implication. But while this objection may be valid as against the teachings of the earlier Paleyans, it has no relevancy in a consideration of Dr. Martineau. Edward Caird speaks of Dr. Martineau as in accord with Jacobi when he affirms that “a God immanent in the world is no God at all,”¹ which is a complete inversion of Dr. Martineau’s clearest teaching. “Why not *inside?*” he asks. “What hinders a ubiquitous indwelling power from consciously taking such lines of direction, such modes and proportions of activity, as may realize a system of pre-conceived ends?”² He quotes from Aristotle: “Plant

¹ *The Evolution of Religion*, vol. ii. p. 8. I find that Professor Caird withdrew this statement in the second edition of his work.

² *Study of Religion*, vol. i. p. 328.

the ship-builder's skill within the timber itself, and you have the mode in which Nature produces." "Theism" he declares to be "in no way committed to the doctrine of a God external to the world," but "at liberty to regard all the cosmical forces as varieties of method assumed by his conscious causality, and the whole of Nature as the evolution of his thought."¹ His presence is the consecration of the universe; and as reverently as Wordsworth might he tell of One

"Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns."

Of this view there is something yet to be said. Enough for the present to show that the Deistical conception of an "absentee God" is wholly foreign to his thought.

2. *Troublesome features of the outward universe.* These Dr. Martineau considers in elaborate detail. Alphonso, King of Castile, wished he had been present at the Creation that he might have given good advice; critics of Design seem often in a like attitude of mind. *If* there was a Creator, to their minds he bungled badly. Select specimens of Nature, they say, may suggest Intelligence; but phenomena in a wide survey bear in upon us the reverse conclusion.

Even the more general features of the earth invite their criticism. They are displeased with the polar regions; of what use those icy realms? They are dissatisfied with the equator; to what end its blasting heats? They are critical of deserts and mountain systems; why Mohave and Sahara? why Alps and Himalaya? In what aspect of these phenomena is Intelligence manifest? To take the critic's attitude and give specific answers might often be difficult. Both polar and equatorial regions are unsuitable for human habitation, and deserts and mountains are barriers to the intercourse of men. Still in the

¹ *Study of Religion*, vol. i. p. 328.

vast economy of the earth they may have their place. Could we warm the poles, cool the equator, grade the mountains, and make the desert blossom, should we surely work improvement? Had we been present at the Creation with these suggestions, should we certainly have given good advice? Is it not possible that the Creator might have successfully maintained that a world upon his plan were preferable; that in a law-ruled system, such as he had in view, poles and tropics and mountain and desert were quite indispensable? The critics, too, of the solar system, who want a full moon all the time, and find the nights of Saturn much too long, and space too sparsely populated with stars, and the sun wastefully casting his heat where are no worlds to warm, and ether undulating where are no eyes to see, might perhaps be met with the like consideration. Could they, present at the Creation, have seen the scope of the Creator's purpose, perhaps they would have felt no need to revise his plan.

But pass to organic nature. Are there no facts encountered here irreconcilable with our thesis? The Intelligence we maintain will do nothing without purpose; how account, then, for rudimentary organs which have clearly no use in the animal economy? The opponents of Design have made much of these, too much by far. We grant the dictionary a work of intelligence; how explain the silent letters in such multitudes of words? You say there was a time when they were not silent, that it was only as language changed and developed that they became so. The silent letter, then, is charged with the history of the word, showing its origin in some foreign or some ancient tongue. Rudimentary organs may well be as these silent letters, witnesses of an earlier stage in the unfolding life of the organism. Spelling reformers would have us drop all silent letters; and critics of Design would hold the Intelli-

gence of nature to an analogous procedure; cancel, that is, an organ when it ceases to be of use to the organism. But thus one of the records of its history would be destroyed, and how in this procedure the clearer intelligence would be manifest it is difficult to see. When Dr. Martineau tells us that "Nature, far from being utilitarian only, is ideal too; and in setting up each single life takes but one step of a long history, and pursues an old type into new and modified exemplifications,"¹ he describes a method of action seemingly not dissonant with, but clearly accordant with, Intelligence. On the supposition of Intelligence, wherefore should it be otherwise?

But we are told not only of useless organs, but of very imperfect ones. The bee in the use of its one weapon may kill itself: its sting is so constructed that in endeavoring to withdraw it from a body into which he has thrust it he may tear it from his own. Some one suggests that a war vessel whose guns could not be fired without the shattering of its hull would hardly win our admiration for the intelligence of its construction; and the case of the bee may be analogous. However, all things for their use; and Dr. Martineau shows very plainly that however the bee may lose its sting in the more solid flesh of men and animals, it does not follow that it does so in plunging it into the bodies of other bees with which its chief warfares are conducted. No one disparages his fist because it cannot serve the purposes of a sledge-hammer, nor his head because for a certain peculiar use a he-goat's were the better; and the war vessel that should shatter its prow in an effort to ride down Gibraltar would witness, not the non-intelligence of its builder, but of its commander. Though it fail in manifold misapplications, it is enough to show the intelligent construction of an organ that it serves its intended uses.

Further than this we have no space to illustrate. Two

¹ *Study of Religion*, vol. i. p. 335.

other considerations, often pressed by critics of Design, (1) excessive birth-rate, so marked in all lower organisms and rarely absent from the higher, involving (2) a corresponding death-rate with the cutting off of such multitudes of all species ere the fulfilment of their promise, have been pressed with much earnestness by thinkers unfriendly to teleology. These Dr. Martineau reviews cogently and triumphantly; but we must be content to refer the reader to his illuminating page.¹

No teleologist pretends that organic nature opposes no difficulty to his theory, that turn where he may all is luminous with purpose. On the contrary, he is like one standing under a clouded sky, to whom only a rift here and there makes manifest a light beyond. The marks of intelligence that he finds give full assurance that Intelligence is there; and where he cannot see a meaning he is assured that it is because its scope is too vast or the hieroglyph too intricate. Of the much light he seeks there is but little he can gain; but a little is how much when a little of God! So he turns from his assurance that the world of his philosophy and the world of his experience are in harmony.

¹ *Study of Religion*, vol. i. pp. 346-357.

CHAPTER III

GOD AND CONSCIENCE

THUS far Dr. Martineau studies the theistic problem in the light of the intellectual categories only. His question is the race-old question as to the origin of things. He seizes upon the idea of cause, and in this finds his clue to the great argument. Cause is only possible through the exercise of force; force is only interpretable in terms of will; will is the executive function of intelligence. Thus by a purely metaphysical argument he shows that the system of things has no rational explanation that does not imply a Divine Intelligence. Having done this, however, he casts his glance abroad, and the Intelligence his philosophy demands is manifest in the structure of the world.

Thus he establishes the first part of his great thesis, "a Divine Mind and Will ruling the Universe." This conclusion, however, we might reach were we well developed Calibans only, beings of a high order of intelligence but without moral sensibility. There is, however, in man a moral sensibility, which makes him something widely different from a well-developed Caliban; and this sensibility Dr. Martineau accords an independent hearing in the settlement of the theistic problem. Through this he reaches a justification of the second part of his thesis, "a Divine Mind and Will *holding Moral relations with mankind*." That is to say, he finds not only a Supreme Mind in the universe, but a Supreme Righteousness. His method of procedure in the second stadium of his argument is the

same as in the first: as in the earlier investigation he first sought the significance of the causal idea, and then its ratification in the universe, so in the later he unfolds the testimony of the moral consciousness, and then asks if the constitution of nature and the experience of man are accordant with it. This order of study we will make our own.

I. *The Moral Intuition*

In the presentation of his ethical doctrines Dr. Martineau compares two criteria of judgment. They are Prudence and Conscience. Prudence, as he shows, is our regulative principle in deciding upon the utilities of conduct; Conscience, our light and guide in settling between conflicting motives. The former appoints for our *welfare*; the latter for our *character*. Prudence decides: This course were wiser, more useful, more expedient, than that. It is the monitor of merchant, teacher, statesman, of minister, moralist, and philanthropist, in the choice of means for the realization of desired ends. Conscience decides: This course were higher, worthier, nobler than that. It is a goad to the duty our indolence might shirk, our stay when a seductive evil hovers near us. The contrast between them may be more clearly seen through illustration. Shall I buy a piece of land? This question I answer rightly enough by reference to my circumstances, my tastes, my future aims. Shall I pay my debts, right a wrong, speak the truth, be just, charitable, humane? Here I am called to another judgment. I clearly see that honesty is higher than dishonesty, that righting the wrong is nobler than leaving it unrighted, that truthfulness is worthier than untruthfulness, and charity than uncharitableness, and humanity than cruelty. Seeing this higher, too, I recognize myself as bound to it. Within me is a voice that says, "Thus do, thus do." This voice has not

the tone of Prudence. Though I could see that the lower deed would enhance my welfare, and involve no forfeit of esteem, still were there that solemn admonition. It is not the Categorical Imperative, as commonly stated: "Act as if the maxim of thy will were to become, by thy adopting it, a universal law of nature;" it is more solemn, more imperative than this. It bears in upon me the sense of an Eternal Rectitude, my allegiance to which I am summoned then and there to witness.

Moreover, in the consequences that follow upon disobedience of this admonition there is pertinent suggestion. In purchasing the land it is possible that I may act unwisely, but at worst my error brings me only regret, my self-accusation is only that I was improvident or a fool; and through the misadventure my Prudence may gain a sharper eye. When, however, in the presence of a higher part I have chosen a lower, the feeling is far other. Then it is shame, guilt, remorse, a feeling appropriate to conscious offence against a majesty that has rightful command of me. Further, the terms in which I judge myself when, self-sophistication put by, I review my conduct with judicial mind, are accordant only with this order of feeling. Do I see that mine has been an act of treachery, that I have been unfaithful to a trust, abused a confidence, betrayed a friend? I cannot say that I was mistaken; I can *but* say I was base. However forgiveness may be profered me, and however sympathy may bring palliatives to my smart, the sense of ignominy persistently and defiantly abides. Even time, which heals so many wounds, is not gentle with us here, but stamps a record where we would invoke oblivion. The improvidences of youth we look back upon complacently enough; the memories of even graver blunders and mistakes may bring a smile upon our lips, and in the circle of our friends we may lightly tell the tale of them. But if there lie in memory a shameful deed; if

at any time we have been dishonest, false, selfish, vile, cruel, tyrannical; in proportion as our nature is unperfected, it comes back to us with a sense of degradation. In all such cases it is not my judgment I disparage, but myself I condemn. Our feeling and our language alike imply the distinction which Dr. Martineau is wont to make so impressive, that in the "issues" of conduct we are wise or foolish; in its "springs" we do righteously or sin. Again, the reaction of our conduct upon ourselves ratifies the solemn distinction. In the triumphs of our Prudence we win success and good reputation, in its defeats we experience discomfiture and chagrin; but in the one case there is no exaltation, in the other no humiliation of our nature; and how often through the tuition of our blunders we learn the way to our nobler successes. In our obedience and disobedience, however, it is wholly otherwise. While we obey, choosing in every alternative the higher, albeit the harder part, new strength accrues to us; our way is one of dignity and composure; however we may be frowned upon without, there is approval within; and we gain a nobler poise from the very cross we bear. But, on the other hand, is there anything that so overturns and demoralizes and destroys as disobedience? Not only does it entail a sense of shame and guilt, which in earlier stages may be remedial, but the tension of the upward wing is relaxed; the resisting power of the will is enfeebled; ideals are dimmed. Human experience is illustrated in the fortunes of the soul of Plato's speculation, which, victorious in its struggles with the lower passions and desires, was rewarded with strains of music low and soft and ravishing, floating down from the spheres, its preincarnate abode; and growing ever distincter and more ravishing as the soul went on from victory to victory, until, its earthly conquests ended, it reascended to its spherical home. Suffering itself, however, to be defeated, the spherical music was denied it, the

memory of its home became less distinct, and it sunk down into lower and lower incarnations, lost to its beauty and its joy. This varied experience, too, we should take care to remember, is in the largest sense human. Were it peculiar to a race or nation, were it the flower of culture or the blossom of civilization, our view of it would be entirely different. It may be narrower or broader in its range as life has fewer or more relations; but as the loftiest natures are never above it, so the lowliest, provided they are distinctly human, are never below it. In the natural order of things this sense of nobler and baser, with its implied moral allegiance, develops as man develops, penetrates his being more profoundly, and takes hold upon him more entrallingly the higher he rises. Accordingly, our chief moral revulsion is not experienced when we contemplate the barbarisms of mining camps or the brawls of city alleys, but that *corruptio optimi pessima* presented us in a drunken Webster, a treacherous Bacon, a licentious Goethe; the height from which they have plunged witnessing the clearer light that they have disowned.

Whence comes this inward voice? There pertains to the nature of man no profounder truth; and a just account of it must be of weighty significance both to morals and to faith. The answers to our question are various and plausible. It may be useful for us to examine them one by one, casting out such as are found untenable. By thus reducing the number of hypotheses, we may at length come to one which, all competitors discredited and itself not incongruous with the facts of experience, may claim our acceptance. This is the method of Dr. Martineau in his wonderful chapter on *God in Humanity*,¹ which we shall somewhat irregularly follow; also in his exposition of the same theme in the great *Study of Religion*.²

¹ *Seat of Authority in Religion*, chap. ii.

² Vol. ii. pp. 1-39.

1. While, to discriminate its function, we have placed Conscience in contrast with Prudence, we are brought now to remember that there are those who hold that these twain are one, and that that one is Prudence. Conscience, that is, they explain as a reflection of Prudence. Man ever acts, as they maintain, with reference to ends; which must always be in some form his pleasure, happiness, welfare. This fact they hold no more patent in the quest of money or fame than in the discharge of duty or the pursuit of character or holiness. The inward monition which we have described, they explain as a reaching after a nobler pleasure, or, what comes to the same thing, a desire for exemption from a bitterer pain. This is Bentham's doctrine. "Nature," he tells us, "has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne."¹ John Stuart Mill also tells us that "happiness is the sole end of human action, and the promotion of it the test by which to judge all human conduct;" also that "those who desire virtue for its own sake, desire it either because the consciousness of it is a pleasure, or because the consciousness of being without it is a pain, or for both reasons united."² This Hedonism might almost persuade, and very likely has persuaded many, by the vigor of its proclamation. Considering its high sources, however, it

¹ Quoted by Dr. Martineau, *Seat of Authority*, p. 58.

² *Ibid.* Over against this doctrine there is temptation to place the dictum of John Henry Newman: "All virtue and goodness tend to make men powerful in this world; but they who aim at the power have not the virtue. Again, virtue is its own reward, and brings with it the truest and highest pleasure; but they who cultivate it for the pleasure's sake are selfish, not religious, and will never gain the pleasure, because they can never have the virtue."

is simply astonishing that it should be put forth so unqualifiedly. Grant that considerations of pleasure and pain have much to do with our conduct; it is psychologically absurd to say that they rule us in the instinctive period of life, ere a distinction of ends has dawned upon us. During this period we simply act from inner incentives, with no perception whatever of the consequences to which they urge us. Doubtless the infant finds pleasure in its activities, as the kitten in its frolic and the colt in its gambol; but this is simply because to act from an interior impulse gives pleasure, and not at all because pleasure is the aim of its action. Thus, in the beginning of life our sovereign is within, and he admits no rival and takes no counsel. When we come to the self-conscious stage, does he abdicate his throne? Because a perception of ends is now possible to us, do the "springs" of conduct cease from their initiatives? Not so to the observant mind of Dr. Martineau; rather, they treat the wisdom that has now come as a servant to execute their behests. "Pleasure is, in fact," says he, "the *fruit*, and not the *germ*, of the several types of natural activity: it is simply the satisfaction of reaching their various ends, and, but for their existence first, could never itself arise afterwards."¹ Elsewhere, meeting the same issue, he writes: "Neither in human consciousness, nor in the phenomena of animal life, is there the slightest ground for assigning priority to the self-seeking desires, and treating all extra-regarding affections as derivative from them. Instead of admitting that pleasure sets up all our springs of action, I affirm that the springs of action set up all our pleasures."² But when, beyond the instinctive period, we begin to forecast and select our way, then considerations of pleasure and pain have an extensive sway with us. So far, however, as ruled

¹ *Seat of Authority*, p. 58.

² *Study of Religion*, vol. ii. pp. 12-13.

by them, we simply act from Prudence, such as we might manifest were we simply wise, all sense of moral distinction being denied us. Here Dr. Martineau holds to be the limit beyond which the "governance" declared by Bentham to be universal "can never be carried;" and he declares that unless character is "without any higher region where self-regards can breathe no more, the sceptre of pleasure meets here the frontier of its sway, and carries no prerogative into the proper territory of *duty*."¹ For this reason this branch of the utilitarian argument he dismisses as utterly untenable. Consciousness pronounces against it with an emphasis that cannot be discarded. The voice that speaks through it is sovereign, not ministerial, in its tone; it comes from the Sinai within the breast, not with admonition, This were inexpedient and that were wise, but with solemn command, Thou shalt not and Thou shalt. There is, however, another application of utilitarian doctrine, which demands a word. It is that associated with the name of Paley. It has an eye to consequences, but those consequences are heaven and hell. Without the emphasis of these, so Paley argues, pledging to holiness its reward and to sin its penalty, this inward voice would speak with no authority. Though the doctrine is Paleyan, it is also very modern, and is proclaimed from many a pulpit. Arguing from the analogy of human government, it is maintained that the Righteousness of the universe is without authority unless there is provided for disobedience a penal retribution. What significance would attach to law without a prison, or to the moral law without hell? This Dr. Martineau finds a thoroughgoing misapprehension of authority, "dispensing with its essence, and insisting on its appendages." "Are we, then," he asks, "to say, that if there were no pains of hell, and joys of heaven, there would be no duty binding

¹ *Seat of Authority*, p. 59.

upon men? and that, while the call and the compunctions of conscience remain, duty can cease to be?" His contention rather is that "it is the external sufferings, wherever placed in time, which it rests with us, in simple prudence or imprudence, to meet or to decline; and it is the internal appeal for preference, and remorse for rejection, which it may be in our power, but is never in our right, to tamper with by likings of our own. Whatever impressiveness there is in the prospective retribution belongs to it, not as a sentient expectation, but as a moral award. Strip it of its ethical significance, and reduce it to a naked affection of the sensitive nature; turn it from an emblem of justice to an arbitrary, though calculable, physical experience,—and all its solemnity is gone."¹

Thus the utilitarian explanation of moral authority fails. Utilitarianism speaks in terms of pleasure and pain, of wisdom and foolishness, of advantage and disadvantage; this voice speaks in terms of right and wrong: it uses the great words "ought," "duty," "obligation;" and, strive as we may, we cannot deduce the latter from the former. Though the problem has been attempted by some of the best intellects of the world, no safe passage has ever yet been opened from the *prudential* to the *ought*. Even Mill, whose splendid essay on *Utilitarianism* is the most persuasive exposition of this doctrine, repudiated it utterly in his memorable outburst: "I will call no being good, who is not what I mean when I apply that epithet to my fellow-creatures; and, if such a being can sentence me to hell for not so calling him, to hell I will go."² Certainly it is wise to do right, and he plays the fool who does wrong; but this is because the constitution of things is such that our better destiny is involved with our obedience.

¹ *Seat of Authority*, pp. 60-61.

² *Examination of Hamilton*, vol. ii. p. 131.

2. But grant that in utility we cannot find the source of this authority, may we not find it in ourselves?

"Our little lives are held in equipoise
By opposite attractions and desires,
The struggle of the instinct that enjoys,
And the far nobler instinct that aspires."

That is, there is within us a higher and a lower; and may it not be that through the higher as rightful lawgiver to the lower the moral rule is given? This consideration is often and variously met; and in one sense we hold it true, and Dr. Martineau so holds it. It is within us and at our supreme height that this voice is heard, and it is within us that we heed it or otherwise. "But," argues Dr. Martineau, "though the authority of the higher incentive is *self-known*, it cannot be *self-created*; for, while it is in me, it is above me. Its tones thrill through my chamber where I sit alone: but it was not my voice that uttered them: they came to me, but not from me. . . . I resist the claims of the right; I wrestle with them; I am beaten by them: or, I surrender to them; I follow them; I triumph with them: and how, then, can you say that they are but the shadow of myself? The authority which I set up I am able also to take down; yet, do what I may, I cannot discharge my compunctions, and shut the door on them as on troublesome creditors who have nothing to show against me, and depend upon my will for any claim they have. No act of repeal on my part avails to release me from the obligations which turn up within my consciousness; nor, by any edict of clemency to my own moral bankruptcy, can I say to myself, 'I forgive thee all that debt.'"¹ There is, however, a difficulty that lurks in this conception of higher and lower which exacts a word. Though the conception is true enough as denoting the contrast between the lower passions and

¹ *Seat of Authority*, p. 63.

the higher reason, it will not bear a moment's investigation when it conveys the suggestion of source and recipient of the moral rule. What is it within me that can receive such a rule? Only the person that I am, whose functions are my reason and my will: this may, indeed, receive such rule and then apply it to the control of my passions and the regulation of my desires. But above this, what is there within me by which this august rule can be declared? No fact can be plainer than that the recipient agency is here the highest within me. For this supreme gift, then, I am driven to look beyond and above me.

3. This view of the source of moral authority might be easily tested in other fields; the tests, however, would only still further discredit it, and we may as well dismiss it here. But there is a third explanation that has been pressed with great earnestness. We are not insulated beings; our life is in society; each is one of many, a part of all. May it not be, then, that this sense of obligation comes out of society: the whole dominating the individual, humanity in lordship over man? To poetic temperaments this view has often great weight; and to scientific minds, also, that can hazard a speculation where they cannot build an induction. It is variously reflected in all ethics of Positivist tendency, and is fundamental in that strange Religion of Humanity in which Comte would substitute for the worship of God a worship of man.

It is true that our moral sentiments, in the main, do not appear save in social relations. This, however, may mean no more than that, like other things, they must have their conditions; that mother love, for instance, could not be without motherhood, nor human sympathy save in contact with a human need that invokes it. That these conditions are the source of moral authority by no means follows. But come directly to the question: What

do we mean when we say this sense of obligation comes from society? Do we indeed mean that the whole dominates the individual? How, then, is the "whole" to be conceived by us? Is it an "aggregate of separate persons, taken one by one, without any consciousness of moral distinctions, and combined simply for the greater strength of associated will?" Then, as Dr. Martineau maintains, the dominance of the "whole over the part" is the "relation of force to weakness, which has nothing whatever to do with the relation of right to wrong." "Magnitude of scale carries no moral quality." "Such as the natures are, separately taken, such will be their collective sum."¹ A million rats might bring us to serious extremities; but their numbers would not promote them in our esteem, only increase our disgust. With Swift, conceive our fellow-men as *yahoos*, and their aggregate, however vast, could not break the force of the Brobdingnagian judgment which pronounced them the "most pernicious race of odious little vermin that nature ever suffered to crawl upon the face of the earth;" and any superior nature, however coerced by their numbers, could stand to them in no relation in which they could be to it a source of moral authority. The dark view of the great satirist may not be ours, and human nature may be noble in our eyes; still the argument holds, that in its mass, simply as mass, however large, it sustains no relation to me whence it can speak to me in that oracular tone. Its vast constraint may impose on me a *must*, but how can it impose an *ought*? It speaks to me of its interests and its welfare; but morally it speaks to no purpose unless to a Duty that is already within me. Shall I sacrifice for society,—toil, suffer, die? Yes, indeed; but my doing so is only enforced and perfunctory, it has absolutely no moral quality, unless the command to do so is met and ratified by an anteced-

¹ *Seat of Authority*, p. 67.

dent obligation in my breast. Through law or institution or custom does it say *ought* to me? Then it simply speaks out of a common sentiment to the like sentiment in me. In any sense implying moral authority as original in itself, it cannot speak to me that august word. Congruous with this truth and illustrative of it, is our feeling in contemplating some great ordeal where chief priests and rabbis are all on one side, and one buffeted yet truth-sustained son of man on the other. Transport ourselves into the Diet of Worms, and to whom shall we look for the purer moral light? Not to the emperor and the vast concourse of princes and nobles and church dignitaries, but to the one defiant hero there.

There is, however, another way of treating the relation with society,—one that takes account, not of mass, but of duration; and which affirms, in effect, that the spontaneous response to her rules which society cannot at once command she can secure through the drill of generations. I, who sum up in myself some thousands of years of hereditary dealing with her, have her utilities organized as moral prepossessions within me. Thou shalt not lie; thou shalt not steal; thou shalt not kill; be just; be temperate; be humane;—the moral response I make to these commands I am bidden to account for by the many centuries of her tuition. To this Dr. Martineau replies that “the highest capital of human wishes, paid up through all the ages, . . . can make nothing just that was not just before. At best, it can only enforce obligations already there,—obligations which it cannot cancel, and did not create.”¹ This is a brief and summary dealing with a doctrine of which the vogue is wide. Its clearness, however, makes exposition superfluous, and from its inherent strength it needs to be buttressed by no argument. While admitting, therefore, that through the tuition of

¹ *Seat of Authority*, p. 67.

generations man may acquire a more steady obedience, we must deny that in that tuition originated the righteousness he obeys. It well may be that through the evolutionary process the right becomes clearer and more dominating; but this is almost the same as saying that by it that process is directed, which implies that in its source it is extra-evolutionary.

But grant that Conscience is something other than a "Right by Social Vote," and that it does not come from society as an hereditary reflection of its prudence, may we not yet regard it as a certain standard of feeling that descends from those of loftier nature to those below them? A saint in a neighborhood may redeem its life; a nation is something other for a Pericles or a Washington; Socrates and Marcus Aurelius are suns in whose fostering warmth we thrive: by such there is created a moral atmosphere, from breathing which we more truly live. Conscience, may we not then say, is the result of consciences? By others' strength we are strong; by others' ideals we form our own. The standard of courage,—how often is it but the chieftain's example, short of which it is ignominy to fall! Consecration,—why not settle with it at once as the devotion of Paul and Savonarola glorified? To the vast majority, if not to all, the significance to moral standards of commanding example is measureless. Why not say, then, that the canons of moral judgment are the happy hits of a few exalted natures, whence they have descended as a grace to those below them? This view has to many minds a persuasive look; and with it before him Dr. Martineau remarks that if we take society to mean the "common council of responsible men, then it is most true that the moral authority which we acknowledge is brought to an intense focus in our minds by the reflected lights of theirs; and we should but dimly own it, did they not own it too." "But," he asks, "how is it that they thus work

upon us, and mould us to a new docility? Is it that they are principals in command, and we subordinates in service, that, accepting their will as sovereign, we are content to do their bidding? No: their function in this matter is, not to fill the post of authority, but to join us on the steps of submission below it; to confess their fellow-feeling with us, and accept their partnership under the same law. Instead of being our masters, they are but bondsmen, with us, of a higher righteousness, which opens its oracles and seeks its organs in us all.”¹

Thus all these hypotheses, critically examined, fail to render a satisfactory account of this haunting sense of obligation. It is not born of the consideration of pleasure and pain, whether present or prospective; it does not come out of ourselves; it does not come from society, either through the weight of its present authority, or its organized and hereditary discipline; and while our nobler fellow-men, through their submission to it, may help our own, it is as they help in the attainment of any virtue or any grace in which they surpass us. At whatever height they may stand above us, it speaks to them as to us, and they bow to it as we bow. These hypotheses we may now dismiss as not entitled to further hearing.

4. There is another hypothesis, which suppose we try. Suppose we assume that the authority which seems so real is so in very fact; that the voice which speaks as from above is indeed that of one who is rightful lawgiver to us; why, then we seem to give this authority a perfectly natural explanation, albeit the one that all the others have been put forward to supplant. It is such account as the needle, if endowed with consciousness, might give of the attraction that holds it: unseen, yet felt, and through the feeling, its objective validity certified. Obligation means a due; ought signifies relation; authority implies

¹ *Seat of Authority*, pp. 67–68.

not merely one who is sensible of its imperative, but also one who issues its decree. In other words, the moral consciousness implies a dualism, a sense of right within responding to a Righteousness without, of which our hypothesis renders an intelligible account. But suppose for a moment this hypothesis not to be true; that the inward sense responds to no outward reality; that this is an atheistic world in which man stands supreme. Then there is one term of a dual relation without the other one: a voice where no voice speaks; a sense of duty where there is no due; an allegiance inwardly required, but no sovereign to whom to render it; in a word, all the peculiar sentiments appropriate to one standing in the presence of a God, and yet no God. The inevitable result of this, so far as accepted, must be a sense of the utter untrustworthiness of our deeper faculties. They then demand an obedience where there is none to obey; and report to us as from beyond the stars a voice which is but the muttering of opinion around us or the whispering of fancy within us. If there be anything that more than anything else makes necessary the belief in God, it is the moral sense within us; and if there be any delusion that surpasses every other, it is that of which this sense makes us the victim if God be no reality. Let that supposition stand, and man may still be the "glory," but he is also the "jest and riddle of the world."

A distrust of our deeper faculties, however, can never be of long continuance. However they may be bewildered for a time, we cannot sophisticate ourselves into a permanent doubt of them. The universe that enters into us through them is the only one that we can receive, and before this trust in them the atheistic hypothesis vanishes. The dual relation is not between Conscience and a blank, but between Conscience and a reality. The duty within me implies One who demands of me his due. The righteous

ness that thrills me is the inward oracle of a Righteousness that presses upon me. The ought I feel is of sovereign command. The voice of Conscience is the voice of God. This, in other statement, is the mind of Dr. Martineau. As through Perception we are shown "another than ourselves," so, he reasons, through Conscience there is revealed to us a "higher than ourselves;" and to the report of either he attaches a like validity. He is not surer of a world around him than of a Righteousness above him. Our confidence in either rests ultimately, indeed, upon faith in our faculties; but this granted, he holds the inference in the one case as in the other to be necessary and resistless. To the impressions borne in upon us, whether through Perception or Conscience, there must be an objective counterpart: the sense of Duty, like the sense of touch or sight, implies a "dual relation;" it "cannot belong to a soul *in vacuo*, but must be for ever a disconsolate and wandering illusion, till it rests with Him to whom the allegiance is due."¹

Thus through the Moral Sense or Conscience we reach the conception of a Divine Righteousness. We pause in our course for a moment to ask what righteousness the righteousness of God implies. We must dare to be anthropomorphic yet again, and say that what it implies in God must be divined from what it is found to imply in man. In any system of religious thought a parallelism between Divine and human righteousness must appear. Thus under Jewish legalism, man's righteousness was in the keeping of the Law, its tithes and its offerings, its new moons and Sabbath days; God's righteousness, on the other hand, was seen in the appointment of this Law, in his smile upon obedience, his frown upon disobedience. In the systems of Christian doctrine, too,

¹ *Study of Religion*, vol. ii. p. 27.

associated with the names of St. Augustine and Calvin, we meet the like parallelism again. The righteousness of man consisted in the acceptance of certain conditions of salvation; that of God in providing these conditions and in reprobation of such as did not embrace them. These systems, however, were founded on a supposed revelation, in surrender to which the moral sense was given little hearing; rather, attempts on its part to interpret the moral universe by its own light were treated as superfluous and questionable enterprise. Whenever the moral sense makes this attempt, however, something other than a parallelism is reached; there is divined a relation as of wavelet and Deep, of ray and Sun. The righteousness of man, the conduct, that is, which the moral sense in its noblest exercise requires, becomes the analogical base from which we rise to our conception of the righteousness of God. The integrity which I demand, the justice for which I plead, the benevolence which I know should rule my life, I must find in him or I am hopelessly bewildered. Nay, in the last account, I see that they must be of him, his light shed abroad in me. To our limited vision, though justice and judgment are the habitation of his throne, clouds and darkness must be round about him. Many of his appointments I cannot understand. But when, turning within my moral consciousness, I find that while faithful to that I could not inflict a needless hurt upon any creature, then I am simply sure that his righteousness must be one with his goodness, and that the darker phases of existence, rightly understood, do not contradict his benevolence.

II. *The Moral Aspects of the Universe*

A grave problem, however, is yet before us. The faith so confidently affirmed above must now be brought to

proof in the broad field of experience. We found our deduction from the causal intuition ratified by Nature; do we find like ratification for our deduction from the moral intuition? Nature reflects an Intelligence; does it also reflect a Righteousness? Is the Being whose voice I recognize in Conscience identical with the Being to whom I refer the structure and order of the world? Shall I say the God of Nature is one and the God of Conscience another? To state this as a thesis and then attempt to defend it would lead into bewilderments of thought that would be ludicrous if they were not so grave. But to adopt the opposite thesis, and maintain that they are only different aspects of one; that the All-Wise is the All-Righteous and the All-Righteous the All-Wise, involves difficulties more familiar, but hardly less grave.

For when we affirm that the Author of Nature is righteous, we meet the solemn challenge that comes from the experience of evil, from which no sentient nature is granted immunity. How can the All-Righteous decree or suffer evil? How can we reconcile this manifold pain with a Divine Perfection? We recall the terrible indictment of John Stuart Mill: "Nature impales men, breaks them as if on a wheel, casts them to be devoured by wild beasts, burns them to death, crushes them with stones like the first Christian martyr, starves them with hunger, freezes them with cold, poisons them with the quick or slow venom of her exhalations, and has hundreds of other hideous deaths in reserve, such as the ingenious cruelty of a Nabis or a Domitian never surpassed,"¹ and what answer can we make? Though in the case of man we may construct a defence of this, taking account of his needful punishment and discipline and education, how of the lower animals which deserve no punishment, and can profit by no discipline, and which Nature yet makes the prey of

¹ *Three Essays on Religion*, p. 29.

other animals, afflicts with disease, crushes, freezes, burns, drowns, starves? Did we wish to maintain the sovereignty of an evil deity, what a bill of particulars would be possible! Pleasant pictures of Nature we often indulge: her sunshine, her breezes, her grass, her flowers; the bird's carol, the lamb's frolic, the colt's gambol, the sweet domesticities of the nest and the lair. But there are also the pestilence, the blizzard, the inundation, the earthquake, the tiger's claws, the vulture's beak, the snake's venom. The difficulties of this problem are manifold and grave. "With the critic," says Dr. Martineau, "who arraigns the creative skill and thinks the solar system or the human eye a bungling piece of work, it is easy to be simply amused without disturbance: but whoever asks us about the problem of evil, and especially of sin, touches a chord of secret sorrow, and subdues us to a grave anxiety." He adds the concession which the strength of his theistic feeling makes the more significant, that "in various ways the phenomena of life are disappointing to our ideal of a moral administration of its affairs."¹ It is undeniable, too, that the studies of recent years, especially on evolutionary lines, have deepened the gravity of this theme. The struggle for life, which is only another name for the struggle for food, and which is a basal truth in Darwinian doctrine, presents to us organic nature as a scene of ceaseless and pitiless foray. On the ethical side the darkness may be somewhat lightened by the *struggle for the life of others*, of which Henry Drummond discourses so eloquently,² showing an altruism against the otherwise unrelieved egoism of nature. There all the same is the struggle, not less insistent or attended with less suffering because altruistic. The truth casts a look of cruelty upon Nature which even her summer exuberance and beauty cannot

¹ *Study of Religion*, vol. ii. pp. 53-54.

² *The Ascent of Man*, chap. ii.

hide, and prepares not a few to embrace the solemn judgment of Professor Huxley, that "cosmic nature is no school of virtue, but the headquarters of the enemy of ethical nature;"¹ and that the "ethical progress of society depends, not on imitating the cosmic process, . . . but in combating it."²

However, though the difficulties of this problem are very great, it may not be absolutely necessary that we surrender our faith before them; at any rate, it is fair to investigate them before we do so. The sufferings of the lower animals our human sensibilities may exaggerate; and seeing them in their true proportions will so far lighten our problem. There may be pain that is quite indispensable to the welfare of sentient natures, and which, therefore, we must write down, not as bane, but as blessing. There may be pain incident upon a system of things which in its largeness our reason pronounces good, and which, therefore, for that system's sake we would have the world endure. It might be instructive sometimes, when disparaging the world because of its evil, to select some special evil, in thought banish it from the world, working as we do so all the myriad transformations its banishment should imply, and then calmly contemplate the result. Possibly it might look surpassingly fair to us; but the probabilities the rather are that the world thus made over we would not accept in exchange for the world we know; that the system of things that makes provision for that evil would be fairer to our eyes than the system of things that would not suffer it. We recall the dream of Theodorus as the imagination of Leibnitz has constructed it. The oracle has made known to Sextus Tarquinius that, following his heady will, for the wrongs he shall do he shall be driven forth in poverty and exile. Theodorus, a

¹ Romanæ Lecture, *Collected Essays*, vol. ix. p. 75.

² *Ibid.* p. 83.

priest of the temple, asks of Jupiter that he explain to him the hard fate of Sextus: why a different will, which should conduct him through other paths to a different issue, has not been given him. In a vision he is taken in hand by Minerva, who shows him the plan of several possible worlds. In one is Sextus rich and happy and honored, yet, as he surveys it, it does not suit him. He is shown another in which is Sextus great and powerful, yet he turns from it dissatisfied. Finally he is shown one that fills him with delight; and is then told that it is the plan of the very world in which he lives, which cannot be without its Sextus.

Of these three considerations the latter shall engage us first. In some form or other we have our Sextus, and we are not pleased with him; yet our ideal world must contain him; for it cannot be ideal without the conditions that imply him. Of the Divine Perfection we demand a world without evil: Sextus it should not suffer. To Omnipotence, we say, this should be possible; infinite resource should be equal to conditions that imply no pain. Suppose we grant it. Still we may urge that to Omnipotence this and at the same time that which is incompatible with it is not possible. We must not ask contradictions, even of God. The fact that he does not at the same time provide for his creatures mutually exclusive conditions does not discredit his goodness. We may see this better by illustration. The one aspect of the universe that we are most wont to celebrate is its order; but with this is implicated a very large portion of the evils of which we seek explanation. Without these evils how, then, that order? Take in hand a familiar case: Of the fluidity of water we never hear complaint; without this how should it serve its multifarious uses? Of the service of the sun's heat in occasioning chemical changes, whence the world's bloom and fruitage, we surely think well; and of gravitation which

holds the mountain in its place and the heavens at their poise we need the poet properly to tell. Yet you complain of malaria: because of your chill and your fever, God, you conceive, must be feeble or unkind. But in the production of this poison these several laws are joint agents. *Because* water is fluid, gravitation conducts it ever from the hilltops to the valleys, and holds it there; and the sun's rays falling upon it work the chemical change whence malaria comes. *If* water were not fluid, *if* gravitation would not conduct it to the valleys or would suffer it to flow to the hilltops, *if* the sun's rays would work no chemical change, why, then there would be no malaria; and these laws must be suspended in their operation, that living creatures may enjoy this happy exemption. And this supposed case may illustrate universal nature. The flood, the drouth, the hail, the frost, the lightning, the avalanche, the tornado, are all incident upon laws we would not ask to have annulled, without which, indeed, this system of things could not be. But you plead that if only they were so regulated that there should be no flood where there is anything to drown, or drouth where men have sown or where cattle graze, or frost where there is anything to suffer chill, if the lightning could be forbidden to smite anything but the unfeeling rocks, and the tempest be held back till the commerce is safely harbored, and the avalanche be diverted from its course in consideration of the thoughtless bear that is climbing before it, what incalculable loss and suffering would be spared. Be it so; but thus, in place of the order you celebrate, you would introduce a reign of miracle. Suffering might thus indeed be spared, but the constancy of nature would be gone. Let it be presumed that we might have the constancy or might have the miracle; yet, since they are mutually exclusive, we cannot stipulate for both. Possibly you may think the reign of mir-

acle would be better; but were it left to the suffrage of mankind the vote would undoubtedly be for the order. In this multifarious evil is our Sextus, to whom a law-governed and orderly world must give place.

The alternative presented us in thought, then, is a world whose more general features we approve, with Sextus, or a world without Sextus whose more general features we do not approve. It is not, however, in this large way that most men wrestle with the problem: it is not with evil but with evils that they struggle, the special pains they experience or see. Here, however, on a smaller field it is still an alternative of better condition with Sextus or poorer without him. We have mentioned pains that seem clearly necessary to welfare, and these come now before us. They are such as are experienced from hunger, thirst, heat, cold, fatigue. They have a monitory office, and the greater evil would surely be, not in experiencing them, but in not being able to experience them. Consider for a moment hunger and thirst. They express the demand of the organism for food and drink, without which it would perish; and the longer they are denied the more insistent is this demand. Of this the critics of the moral legislation of the universe have complained, but what would they have? In a matter so exigent as this, would they leave the animal or even man to the rule of wisdom or sagacity to select nourishment and determine the times for taking it, uninstructed by any sense of want? Dr. Martineau well asks, "If each creature had to study its own case, and, like an outside physician, prescribe its diet and its meals . . . how long would it be before it slipped into some fatal forgetfulness, like a patient kept alive by art, and blundering among his medicines?"¹ The sufferings of heat and cold, too, are in like manner monitory. Each tells the creature that its conditions are not suited to itself

¹ *Study of Religion*, vol. ii. p. 76.

and urges that it change them. Imagine a creature to which tropic heats and polar frosts were indifferent and so left to choose its latitudes without sensible realization of any contrast between them! The sufferings of fatigue, also, rightly claim a word in their behalf. Were the animal only a machine, it might run on and on, until at length, entirely spent, it could run no longer. Being, however, not a machine, but an organism, there comes at last the realization that its force is getting spent, which is also an admonition that it pause till its vigor be renewed. In like manner, too, we must treat the pain that attends physical injury or disease. It tells of something wrong with the organism, and asks relief. A particle of dust impinges upon the eye, and how keen is the suffering! The suffering is Nature's way of telling of the presence in the eye of that which would soon destroy it. However we may dislike our pain, surely our human wisdom would elect that where our injury is, there an ache may be. From what multitudinous forms of peril do we snatch ourselves at the beneficent prompting of our pain! A work on physiology recounts an instance of a man who, his lower limbs being partially paralyzed, was ordered to hold them in tepid water. Feeling no sense of warmth, he plunged them into boiling water. He never had the use of feet thereafter. The pain that normally attends a scald was not present to save him.

Here, again, we give our vote for a world with Sextus. There are other forms of evil, however, with which it is not so easy to deal. Dr. Martineau instances the *pains of decline*; and these, after careful dealing with them, he seems to turn from with mind not wholly satisfied. In them there is no discipline for any future, no provision for the welfare of the organism. They are attendant upon a slow and irremediable degeneracy, a declining sun which yields at last only twilight, which soon fades into night.

In man this decline is more marked than in other animals, as it is also more prolonged; but no animal is exempt from it. Age dims the eyes of the lion, takes its suppleness from the limbs of the tiger, its strength from the eagle's wing. With its approach the wolf and the panther become incapable of the hunt, and at length, unless reprieved by the merciful ferocity of other animals, they lie down in some lonely spot and whine and starve. We mark its encroachment upon our domestic animals, and, from sympathy for their sufferings, first, perhaps, administering some gentle anaesthetic, discharge them from further service.

It is useless to attempt to minimize this evil, or to explain its purpose. It can hardly be said to have a purpose; rather it foreshadows the fulfilment of purpose, so far as the organism is concerned. We may see, however, what the absence of it would mean, what, by asking reprieve from it, we by implication ask in place of it; and this may have for us a profitable suggestion. To all higher organisms the hill of life slopes gradually up; from the summit, would we have no sloping down on the other side? The full maturity of powers once gained, and further continuance implying the first stages of decline, would we have the organism vanish? Would we have it written in the constitution of animal or man, On the day when thou reachest the fulness of thy powers, thou shalt surely die? Whoever will follow out this alternative in practical application will be quite as sensible of the happiness and usefulness it would curtail as of the misery it would shorten. The horse should drop under his rider; the deer should be snatched from her fawn, the lioness from her whelps, the robin from her nestlings, that the downhill of life might not be trodden. The father and mother should be taken from their children when resource was fullest and need was greatest, the scholar forbidden to

gather up the results of his labors, the statesman to apply his experience, the philanthropist to bestow his blessing. Who can fail to see the paralyzing shadow such a change would hang over self-conscious existence? The period of maturity would be the dreaded period; the disciplines that hasten the unfolding of human powers would be renounced for the indolence that defers it. The growing strength of youth, which we watch with such pleasure now, would be to us as the prophecies of the hectic flush and the hastening pulse. But the question may be pressed, Why not the prolongation of years and at the same time exemption from decrepitude and decay? Why not till threescore and ten a continually expended, yet unwasted strength, and then a departure provided through some happy euthanasia? Again asking contradictions: for age, the vision and the enterprise of youth; for the runner, panting near the goal, the unspent vigor of the start. "With what face," asks Dr. Martineau, "can any creature ask that, *living* being so pleasant, *unliving* should be so no less? That it feels the cold on going out does but prove how warm its house has been. You cannot have opposites giving you the same experience: if it be sweet to behold the light, sweet it cannot be to lose it: if to thirst be a distress, to drink will be relief. The uneasiness of death is the necessary correlative to the happiness of life."¹

Another form of evil by which many minds are troubled is met in the law of prey. Large classes of animals subsist on other animals; man hunts for his larder;— alas, for his sport as well! Nor can we say that under this law there is always a sacrifice of the lower to the higher. The bird eats the worm, it is true; but the crocodile carries off the calf, and the tiger devours the man. The spectacle of one creature taking the life of another is

¹ *Study of Religion*, vol. ii. p. 83.

abhorrent to our sensibilities; and, from the frequency of this, "we are tempted," says Dr. Martineau, "to say that the sweet face of nature is hypocritical, and that the calm loveliness of the woods and ravines does but hide innumerable torture-halls and battle-fields." He adds: "From such impressions I own that I cannot always entirely free myself."¹

However, our human sentiments may here, as so often in other relations, mislead us. All that begins in time must end in time; the born must die; and with death itself we are ceasing to quarrel. Death of itself is beneficent; and of the many modes of death, that by violence is among the easiest. Among the lower animals it is probable that the victim scarce suffers at all. The testimony of men who have been nigh to the victim's experience, that of the explorer Livingstone, for instance, once in the jaws of a lion, makes this judgment all but certain. As creatures of this world, the animals must leave it, and by the law of prey Nature makes provision for their easiest exit. "Sharp and quick extinction may shock the observer by its startling contrasts: but, to the sufferer, the surprise is an economy of pain. To imaginative creatures it might be otherwise: they might torture themselves with life-long dread of the last struggle: and such ideal diffusion of possible calamity it is, that makes the human measure of pain so different from the merely sentient. But where there is no anticipation, and the unsuspecting victim strolls at ease, or keeps merrily on the wing, up to the moment of its fate, the sensibility is spared to the uttermost. I believe that, in our shrinking from this law, we illegitimately import into our conception of the case elements, which are indeed inseparable from any analogous human experience, but which have no entrance into the history of the lower terrestrial races."²

¹ *Study of Religion*, vol. ii. p. 88.

² *Ibid.* p. 89.

If we look at this mode of death from a practical and utilitarian point of view, its wisdom is certainly approved. But for it the world would be scarce habitable by the higher races. The animal left to decay where it died, the atmosphere would become tainted, the streams polluted, to such extent that only the lower forms of life would be possible. In some Southern States the buzzard is protected by law because of the health it preserves by devouring the carrion that would be pestilential. All animals and birds of prey perform the like office by making carrion to a large extent impossible. "Nature, in her predatory tribes," says Dr. Martineau, "has appointed a sanitary commission, and in her carrion-feeders a burial-board, far more effective than those which watch over our villages and cities;" and he adds a suggestion which gentle sensibilities may recoil from, that "one of the great difficulties in our crowded civilization is due to the fact, that there is nobody to eat us."¹

Thus far we have contemplated mainly the lower animals. We now turn to man. As an animal, he suffers as other animals suffer; as other than animal he has sufferings peculiarly his own. As related to the sensitive organism merely, his sufferings from like misfortune may not be greater than those of the more highly developed animals about him. Hunger and thirst and fatigue we may fancy very similar experience to him and to the horse; a wounded soldier may not suffer intenser pain than a wounded deer; and the murrain that destroys the cattle, though less prolonged, may be for its period as hard to bear as the consumption that afflicts man. But in addition to the sufferings of his sensitive organism he experiences a suffering through the action of his higher faculties of which language cannot adequately tell. A being who can carry the thought of contingency must have the dread of

¹ *Study of Religion*, vol. ii. p. 90.

vicissitude; in that he is able to forecast, it is impossible that he should not apprehend. The horse takes the food of to-day without concern for to-morrow; to man is the shivering dread of old age and penury. The dog is satisfied with the health that is; man is concerned for the illness that may be. The bird which the fowler has missed flies to another tree-top, and pours out its song; man, from experience of danger, may live in an enervating dread of perils that he does not see. The wounded deer takes suffering as it comes; the wounded soldier contemplates the family for whom he can no longer toil, looks forward to to-morrow as the dread continuance of the suffering of to-day, or to a prolongation of life in weakness and decrepitude. Nor is forecast the only mental gift by which man suffers; memory is enjoyed by him on the like hard tenure. With ills that have been, the animal is wholly done; man perpetuates in himself the pains of neglect and failure, of injuries received and wrongs committed. These are grave considerations; and Dr. Martineau is clearly right when he tells us that "all sorrow is certainly loss that refuses to go away into the past: all anxiety, privation that will not wait for the future: and we should be spared both, did we forget everything and anticipate nothing."¹ But again, what would we have? To be without Sextus would we away with the fair conditions that make him necessary, give up our memory to be spared our regrets, our vision to escape our dreads? Lives there a man who would abdicate his higher faculties and go down to the beast, that like the beast he might enjoy the comfort of to-day without a sigh and without anxiety? take the ill he must, provided only it be unattended by dark prospects and gloomy apprehensions? "Would you quit your many-chambered mind, and shut yourself up in a single cell, and draw down its

¹ *Study of Religion*, vol. ii. p. 92.

blinds, that you may suspect no storms and see no lightning, and know nothing till you are struck?" No: reason still holding her throne, you could not do thus. The dog has probably no evil memories and no anxious apprehensions, but can you fix the terms on which you would exchange your manhood for his doghood? Besides, as Dr. Martineau takes pains to point out: "This is less than half the tale: the ideal suffering which is added to our nature is balanced and over-balanced by an ideal happiness of which it alone is made susceptible. The capacity of thought takes up into it all the elements of our experience, and gives them a boundless spiritual extension: and if, in this enlargement, there is any change of their proportions, it is that the ideal forms rather soften the shadows and glorify the lights: so that the inner life is sweeter than the outer, and supplies the truest balm for the wounds of the actual."¹ Though memory writes some pages we could wish unwritten, yet how ample a volume is her happier record; and though the future holds our dreads, yet what brave achievements, what realized ideals, what radiant hopes are there! In the one direction we look back to the morning, in the other "lieth our Italy."

But man is a *moral* being, and has experience of suffering known only through his moral sensibility. We recall from Dr. Martineau's analysis of the "springs of conduct," the *primary passions*,² which he shows to be simply an equipment with which to meet a manifold affront and injury and peril, also a *compassionate affection* which sends us to mitigate the sufferings around us. We are given, that is, a constitution which presupposes a dealing with suffering; which we are commissioned, not passively to accept, but to combat and meliorate as we can. The eyes do not more clearly imply the light and the lungs the

¹ *Study of Religion*, vol. ii. pp. 92-93.

² *Types of Ethical Theory*, vol. ii. pp. 130 seq.

air than does the moral constitution an evil with which it is to wrestle. Without the evil it would scarce have a *raison d'être*. In the wrestle, too, not only are our chief moral duties performed, but our higher crowns are won. The school in which our patience is disciplined must be that of self-denial and suffering; our heroism must be gained on a battlefield; our nobler sympathy, through a dealing with need and pain. The evil "holds a place therefore among the data of the moral life, and is essential to this highest term in the ideal of humanity." Dr. Martineau quotes from Rothe the impressive saying: "In this world all Good, even the fairest and noblest,—as Love,—rests upon a 'dark ground,' which it has to consume with pain and convert into pure spirit."

In one aspect this wears an ungentle look, but what then? Our sufferings as moral beings, personal and sympathetic, are very great; but who would put off his moral constitution to escape them: part with sympathy that he may be sensible of no sorrow, part with courage that he may meet no peril, part with endurance that he may bear no cross? The higher faculties are none of them without their cost; to have them is necessarily to experience whatever trial and heart-ache they imply. But who will say that in bestowing gifts so great, though involving suffering so considerable, the Creator of our being either blundered or was unkind?

From evil incident to a moral nature we pass to moral evil. Of the consequences of this, the sufferings it entails, no extended exhibition need be made. Great, indeed, is the complaint of such suffering, the blight which follows vice, the woes of treachery, malice, cruelty, tyranny; and from none is the complaint more dolorous than from those most critical of the moral legislation of the universe. But what would they have as the consequence of these orders of conduct? Admitting them to be wrong, as of course they do, would they have happiness follow them?

Would they have Peter deny his Master and shed no tears afterwards? Judas betray him and spend his thirty pieces with untroubled conscience? Would they have devious paths lead to the same issue as straight ones,—the way of obedience the way of peace, the way of disobedience the way of peace no less: philanthropist and extortioner, saint and profligate, holy woman and harlot, travel by opposite roads to a like felicity: under a common heaven a common smile for all? Under such a rule as this,—woe, only woe to the world! However hard the penalty may look in a particular case, the most persuasive argument the optimist can offer for his faith is drawn from the suffering which inevitably follows wrong. If the law of the Lord is perfect, evil must follow infraction of it. Out of the light must be into the darkness; out of the warmth must be into the cold. The sufferings for sin of which the complaints are so fervid, bear unmistakable testimony that the core of things is true. "All is well," says an American preacher, "for if there is anything that is not well, it is well that it is not well." It is well that falsity and hate are not well; that malice and envy and cruelty are not well. What hope for the world or what trust in God if they were well?

But granting it not inconsistent with the benevolence of God that penalty should be linked with transgression, there is yet the further question: "How does it consist with the *holiness* of God to admit so much *unholiness* in human life?"¹ This is Dr. Martineau's question, and in dealing with it he remarks first on the contrast between the attitude here taken, and that which is common when the course of nature is under consideration. The moral censors of nature are wont to dwell upon her apparent fatalism: her storm and flood and pestilence know no relenting. Here the complaint rather is the excessive scope of contingency.

¹ *Study of Religion*, vol. ii. p. 100.

Why was not man so made that he could only choose to be good? The necessity of nature,— how dark a fact! The freedom of man,— how bodeful its consequences!

In both cases most true; but as we found reason for the steadfastness of nature, there may be justification of the freedom of man. Provisionally there is this to observe, that could man choose only the good, he were incapable of moral choice at all. His truthfulness and kindness were as unmoral as the sunshine and the blossoms. In the necessity of nature, as we have seen, there is provision for her stability; in the freedom of man is provision for his morality; and to this Dr. Martineau feels that the very righteousness of God must lead him. "A universe," says he, "which no sin could invade, neither could any character inhabit: and, in insisting that every access be shut against moral evil, we ask the holiness of God to cancel its own conditions, and take away the alternatives which reveal and reproduce it. It is because *He is Holy* and cannot be content with an unmoral world where all the perfection is given and none is earned, that he refuses to render guilt impossible and inward harmony mechanical: were he only benevolent, it would suffice to fill his creation with the joy of sentient existence; but, being righteous too, he would have in his presence beings nearer to himself, determining themselves by free preference to the life which he approves: and preference there cannot be, unless the double path is open. To set up therefore an absolute barrier against the admission of wrong, is to arrest the system of things at the mere natural order, and detain life at the stage of a human menagerie, instead of letting it culminate in a moral society."¹

This is a pregnant passage, but its meaning cannot be obscure. The lady perhaps affirmed too much when she said, "Take away my total depravity and you take away

¹ *Study of Religion*, vol. ii. pp. 101-102.

everything." She could, however, most justly have said : Take away my capacity for sin, and my capacity for holiness were gone. In thus saving me you would discrown me; in thus releasing me from the liability of hell you would make heaven impossible. It does not enter into the conception of man how God could call into being a *moral* nature that should not be free. But with the freedom there must be freedom to sin; the consequences we deplore, it must be possible to incur. A freedom to choose only one thing is determinism wrongly spelled. But again and finally, what would you? Become a thing to avoid the liabilities of a person? To escape consequences which in the exercise of freedom you need not elect, give up the august prerogative of a child of God? In the face of this alternative most of us would surely decide to endure Sextus for a yet longer period.

Thus it may be shown that a multifarious evil may not be incompatible with an infinite Goodness. It may be implicated with a legislation which, with all the smarts it brings, we would not change. Given a law-ruled world tenanted by sensitive organisms, and the conditions of suffering are provided. Given a nature endowed with the high prerogative of moral freedom, and sin must be possible. The suffering and the sin are linked with these conditions, and if we would not change these conditions, it hardly becomes us as rational beings to impeach the Universal Throne because of the consequences that result from them. Indeed, the only consistent complainer is the pessimist, who, since he conceives all sentient existence evil, would cancel it entirely. But the pessimist, however acute his reasoning and however sincere his proclamation, the suffering multitude do not take seriously. They conceive him a melancholy jester. Human nature repudiates his creed ; and the deed that should witness its consistent acceptance is held to be the supreme

proof that reason is dethroned. And where is pessimism found? Not in the cottages of the poor: the laborer, returning weary at night to his scarce comfortable home and scanty meal, will rarely hold even a passing dalliance with this creed of despair; not in the chamber of the suffering: here, where pain racks the body, how often the soul makes its own the promise, "When thou passest through the waters, I will be with thee; and through the rivers, they shall not overflow thee;" you may not look for it in the wife whose husband has dishonored her, nor in the mother whose son has brought anguish to her heart. It is beyond peradventure true that where, according to earth's common judgment, a faith in the Divine Goodness is most needed, there it is most surely found. Strange fact! This dark doctrine is met scarce anywhere but in books, a product of the minds of the Schopenhauers and the Hartmanns, men of lettered ease, who, amid surroundings of comfort, evolve a theory of a universe without relation with a personal God, and then wail out its threnody.

But ceasing to contemplate the evil of the world, let us turn briefly to the good, which, in considering the Divine Perfection, is held to count for something. To the happiness of the lower creatures, to the happiness and higher welfare of man, is the administration of the world favorable? To these ends rather than to their opposites is it really ordered? Consider for a moment the lower animals. Their range is narrow: physical happiness with a brief enjoyment of their young [if not too low for this], and the company of their kind [if they are gregarious]; and is not this range, barring vicissitude which we have noticed, secured to them? As for physical happiness,—the normal exercise of every function brings that. It is impossible to observe the cattle grazing on the hillsides, or the birds skimming through the air, or the fishes dart-

ing through the water, and not feel that they are happy. Their happiness, too, from the limitation of their nature, is unalloyed by anxiety. The deer that escaped the hunter yesterday browses in unconcern to-day, and the bird, forgetting experience of hunger, feeds as on crumbs dropped from the eternal tables. For most part in the life of the creature there is happiness till the time of its taking off has come, and then how soon all is over! Even the sufferings of that taking off it is probable that our human sympathies greatly exaggerate. Dr. Martineau asks what harm were done if nature prescribed some anæsthetic to her victims. A modern writer, teaching that God is ever kind to the victim of the inevitable, maintains that he has provided a "universal anæsthetic," that in the clutch of death there is no pain.

As regards the gregarious life of animals, it is possible to exaggerate the tranquillity; and probably Dr. Martineau does so when he tells us that "the herbivorous families have no victims, and but for their enemies would live at peace with all." If they carry on no foreign wars, it is certain that they have their internal strifes which are often quite as serious. Yet their enjoyment of one another's society is very real, and in a state of nature it is seldom denied them. The enjoyment of their young, too, is given to all creatures capable of it. However ferocious the nature, in the lair of the tigress and the nest of the eagle there is peace.

Look next to man. To his happiness and welfare is the order of the world favorable? True, he has intenser and more varied suffering than the animal; but this follows upon provision for intenser and more varied joy. Unlike the animal he dreads, but unlike the animal he hopes. The greater difficulties and the greater perils are his portion; but likewise the consciousness of victory, which they can never know. For his keener suffer-

ing, too, there are compensatory privileges: beauty, art, song, delight in nature, sympathy of friends. How many, smitten with infirmity from which the beast could only suffer, have found a solace in some wisely directed activity of intellect. I have known a man whose somewhat unique story is beautifully illustrative. His life was active, but his interests ran wide of his calling into the nobler literature. Early he became blind; but he had stored his mind with the richer poetry which was his resource when other resource was denied him. To the help he found in this he once bore unconscious testimony. He must have his eyes operated upon; and after the operation he was lying in great pain. "It looked very dark to me," said he, "*but I struck into Browning's Saul, and it was all right.*" Other infirmity came upon him; he became helpless. Yet with his great companions he lived in light. He must sit apart; but at will he could have the solace of Shelley's music, or Browning's song, or Emerson's starry wisdom. As the years deepened, he set about the preparation of a book, good in itself to have, but simply precious as a memento of the heroism out of which it came. Meeting him, too, was like going out into a June morning. The bruised turned to him for comfort, the doubting for renewal of their faith. Of course all have not the measure of his resource; but neither have many the measure of his misfortune. In any aspect his story is that of a man, and so tells of human possibilities; and probably there are few who, according to their need, might not find a like support if they would in like manner appropriate the means which the grace of God has made accessible. Concede what we must to the ills that flesh is heir to; still human experience sufficiently testifies that the legislation of the world is friendly to human happiness.

But man's higher welfare,—does nature also favor this? Man is a moral being; does nature favor morality? Of

two men with conditions otherwise equal, suppose one industrious and the other lazy; on which will nature smile? Or one temperate and the other drunken; which will she approve? Or one clean and the other licentious; which will be on the best terms with her? Few would deny that so far as man is industrious, temperate, and chaste, he has nature on his side.

Mr. Froude tells us that "the tower of Siloam fell, not for any sins of the eighteen who were crushed by it, but through bad mortar probably." Nature has such preference for the honest structure that she pulls down whatever we dishonestly build upon her. All sham and pretence she brings to judgment at last. Lay your bridge on honest piers if you would have nature hold it up; build your ship of honest timber if you would have her float it to the haven. The lesson of integrity,—by smile and frown she enforces that. The books and homilies on this subject are only weaker repetitions of her lesson.

The discipline, too, through which the nobler manhood is attained,—it is undeniable that she provides this through much of the very evil of which we complain. We want the hero's heart, but are aggrieved at the battle that proves it; we want patience, but are critical of the suffering that evokes it; we want sympathy, but not the kind of world in which it is possible. Strange we do not oftener see that our complaints of nature are based on the fact that she refuses to favor the indolence we like but disapprove, rather than the high service we shrink from but revere. For its cogent and eloquent presentation of this truth we will appropriate the following passage from Dr. Martineau: "For many men, the school of action fairly serves to purify and invigorate their will, though they ride through life on the crest of the world's wave and never sink into the hollows. But, though some can do without it, and others do nothing with it, yet it is true that, for the

greatest and best, you must seek among those who have abounded in hardships and been passed through the fire. Ease and prosperity may supply a sufficient school for the respectable *commoners* in character: but without suffering is no man *ennobled*. Every highest form of excellence, personal, relative, spiritual, rises from this dark ground, and emerges into its freedom by the conquests of some severe necessity. In what Elysium could you find the sweet patience and silent self-control of which every nurse can testify? or the fortitude in right, which the rack cannot crush or the dungeon wear out? or the courage of the prophet, to fling his divine word before the wrath of princes and the mocking of the people? I know it is said, that these would be superfluous virtues there, their worth being wholly relative to the evils which they minimize. But is this true? Is the soul which has never been subdued to patience, braced to fortitude, fired with heroic enthusiasm, as harmonious, as strong, as large and free, as that which has been schooled in martyrdom? No, the least part of these conquests is in their immediate mastery of the besetting ill: they add a cubit to the moral stature: they clear the vision: they refine the thought: they animate the will: so that there is not a duty, however simple, that does not win from them a fresh grace, or a mood, however common, to which they do not give a richer tone.”¹ Indeed, without the trials of which we tell so plaintively, noble character were at best only a nascent possibility. Nature is a stern schoolmaster, but what other can educate so well?

But grant that nature educates; the being whom she thus favors does she otherwise favor? Are the wise, the brave, the just, the gentle, especially cared for in her legislation? Certainly, for just and unjust alike are heat and cold and storm and pestilence; and what do we read in

¹ *Study of Religion*, vol. ii. pp. 94-95.

history if not of the rebuffs of the wise, the exile of the patriot, the stake of the martyr?

Growth in excellence is not escape from vicissitude; nor is there pledge to any excellence that in the inevitable conflicts it shall conquer without struggle. It is often said that the rule of the world is to superior force, a proposition which Dr. Martineau declares to be true of all possible worlds, like the statement, the warmer you are the less cold you will be. "By the weakest," says he, "we mean that which goes to the wall: by the strongest, that which prevails." On the same page he adds: "Alter the world as you will, . . . still that which prevails will be the strongest, and all things will go by might."¹ Might, however, is various in kind, and we hardly know what this judgment means until kinds of might are scrutinized. We cannot say the superior force is always *physical*, for then, in the encounter with man, the bear or the buffalo would always be invincible. Nor can we say it is physical in co-operation with *mental*, for then to a preponderance of these there should always be victory; whereas with the odds, as we reckon, in their favor, how often and ignominious has been their failure. For there is another force called *moral* force, which springs from the conscious service of right or truth, and this, especially when supported by religious faith, may make weakness invincible. "Providence is on the side of the heaviest battalions," said Napoleon; yet even he did not neglect to appeal to his soldiers with whatever sentiment should enkindle them. There were as brave men in the armies of Charles I. as in those of Cromwell, and the weight of material advantage was on their side; but they lacked the deeper inspiration that made the Ironsides invincible. That Spain with the best army in Europe would crush the Netherland revolt must have seemed probable enough to those who could

¹ *Study of Religion*, vol. ii. p. 111.

not reckon on the faith, inspiring what devotion and daring, of William of Orange and his followers. When an American woman in Italy plunged between two duellists who were stabbing at each other, and awed them into desistance, where was the superior force? When at Worms a solitary monk flung defiance to a Church and an Empire, where was it?

It is not pretended that the true or the right, become an entralling sentiment, meets no reverses. Often, indeed, it seems defeated, as in the case of the Huguenots or the Waldenses. But wait. The battle of French Protestantism was not fought out when the Edict of Nantes was revoked, nor when the last refugee fled before the brutalities of the Dragonade. Which at this day does the world approve,—Bossuet, applauding the most cruel trampling upon Protestant liberties, or Martineau, throwing himself into the breach in defence of Catholic rights? Dr. Martineau's own judgment should be given place here: "Can anyone name a good cause which,—not locally, but in the world at large,—has perished and had no resurrection? Intervals of suspended animation there may be: but the final mortality of the 'better part' I must utterly disbelieve. When we say of the baffled reformer, 'he was born *before his time*,' we confess our assurance that his time must come, and betray the fact that, for us at least, it has already come."¹

Further illustration of this theme may not be needful. That there are yet grave considerations we know; that our reasoning can yield more than a tentative satisfaction we have no confidence to suppose; to deal adequately with the problem, we are probably some millenniums too soon.

Our light is not yet clear; but if unequal to the needs of sight, it may satisfy the needs of faith. Dr. Martineau's laborious contention is that the order of the world does

¹ *Study of Religion*, vol. ii. p. 122.

not in its moral features contradict the oracle in the breast ;
so much assured, we may hold in confidence the conviction
that the God who imposes a righteous law upon us
does all things in righteousness, though perhaps only to
those who

“watch, like God, the rolling hours
With larger, other eyes than ours,”

can the truth ever be clearly manifest.

CHAPTER IV

HIS CRITICISM OF PANTHEISM

BUT however satisfactory the conclusions we have reached, there is a problem yet before us the consideration of which will ratify them or nullify them according to the issue of our study of it. We deal now with the more general conception of the Divine Nature. There are three forms which this has taken, and yet takes:—

1. The first, met now only in the lower ranges of intelligence, was once the ascendant doctrine through one of the fairest sections of the world. It affirmed a God wholly transcending the universe, which he had created at a definite time and given over to the governance of second causes. This God was infinite, eternal, omnipotent, all-wise, but "absentee." He so appointed the cosmic mechanism that it might run on without friction, but he himself dwelt afar. His Providence was here; the light of nature made it plain. It was, however, a grace given once for all, not one that was immediately and personally exercised.

This, of course, was Deism,—the doctrine that in the England and France of the eighteenth century held the high places of thought. With this Dr. Martineau's teaching, though the system as a whole no one would repudiate more earnestly than he, is not wholly dissonant. He also teaches the Divine Transcendency; while the Infinite Cause and the Infinite Righteousness he so eloquently proclaims were earnestly taught by the deists likewise. Their cause, however, had accomplished the grand effect, the cosmos we look out upon, and ever since had rested from causal

labors; which is the inversion of Dr. Martineau's teaching. Their Righteousness was a legacy of a departed Deity, not an ever-flowing and insistent oracle: a difference that places him and them at opposite poles of thought.

2. Over against the conception of Divine Transcendency is that of Divine Immanence, which, pushed to its extreme, is Pantheism. As the former, deistically interpreted, makes God wholly extra-mundane, so the latter, pantheistically conceived, makes him wholly intra-mundane. The God of Pantheism is an enchanting Presence within the universe, extending throughout its extent, Life of its life, Soul of its soul. He is the only reality; matter and mind are but phenomena of him. This is one form of the doctrine, and there is another. The word Pantheism, while naming the conception of all things *in* God, also names a conception that maintains that all things *are* God. While, according to the one, God is the *soul* of things, according to the other, he is the *sum* of things. Professor Howison ingeniously marks the distinction by varying the emphatic syllable of the word, — *Pan-theism* and *Pan-theism*, using the former to designate the thesis that all is God, and the latter, the reverse contention that God is all. Pantheism of the former type, however, seems atheism with less objectionable name. While, too, this type of Pantheism is strictly *atheistic*, the other is as strictly *acosmic*. The former loses God in the universe; the latter loses the universe in God.

Before stating the third conception of the Divine Nature, it may be well to inquire how, in strength and weakness, Pantheism may compare with Deism. The Pantheism we shall hold before us will be the spiritual type.

It is clear that Pantheism may yield a sense of the Divine Presence that Deism from its very nature could not give. Deism was not the creed of feeble intellects; and that it yielded intellectual satisfactions is plain enough.

Its failure, however, to minister to the deeper needs of the spirit was most signal. From its contact the altar fires died down to the flickering, and a chill crept upon the souls of men. Devotion asks a God, not listening from the skies, but present at its altar ; and is well pleased to think of him as inbreathing the prayer it offers. The characteristic longing of devotion, not to be reconciled to, but to commune with and be swallowed up in God, is met, as Deism could not meet it, by that conception of Divine Immanence on which Pantheism builds. Our more reverent meditations, in proportion as they are rapturous and exalted, though we may not be pantheists, are likely to be pantheistic. Theodore Parker was not a pantheist; yet, speaking out of the fervors of his heart, how often did he pantheize!¹ Many hold that Emerson was not a pantheist, yet what comforting quotations the pantheist may gather from his page! The great mystics are continually putting forth sayings which, interpreted from the intellect and not the spirit, should tell us of one Essence or Substance by which this glowing universe and we ourselves are pervaded, the Reality and Unity of all. Thus Eckhart says: "The words *I am* none can truly speak but God alone. He has the substance of all creatures in Himself." "He is a Being that has all Being in himself." "All things are in God, and all things are God." To like tenor we may quote from William Law: "Everything that is in being, is either God, or nature, or creature ; and everything that is not God is only a manifestation of God." Let us hear also Emerson: "From within or from behind, a light shines through us upon things and makes us aware that we are nothing, but the light is all. A man is the façade of a temple wherein all wisdom and all good abide." "Ineffable is the union

¹ I find that *pantheize* is not a dictionary word. It was, however, used by Dr. F. H. Hedge, once my teacher, and from whose lips I caught it. It is also to be found in his writings. See *Ways of the Spirit*, p. 254.

of man and God in every act of the soul. The simplest person who in his integrity worships God, becomes God: yet for ever and ever the influx of this better and universal self is new and unsearchable." The same feeling again throbs in the sweet lines of Madame Guyon,—

"I love the Lord—but with no love of mine,
For I have none to give;
I love the Lord—but with a love divine,
For by thy love I live.
I am as nothing, and rejoice to be
Emptied and lost, and swallowed up in Thee."

To like tenor might we illustrate indefinitely. The mystic may be given wide range as to his faith or his philosophy: he may be Protestant or Catholic; he may be Jew, Mohammedan, Brahman; but he can hardly be Deist. The like contrast of influence, too, we mark in the higher literature. Poetry, for instance,—in what other age or country was it so soulless and mechanical as in the England of deistic ascendancy? Good intellect and good taste we find in it, but how rarely the higher joy! From Pope and Johnson we gather marble and millinery blossoms; from Spenser and Wordsworth the flowers of Hesperides. To the former something is wanting,—a dulness is in the vision, a frost in the air,—the meaning of which the philosophic student of letters will not look far to find. To the latter this something is given in rich measure. The subtle appropriations of the spirit we may not clearly understand, but we are sensible of them; and, to a nature so sensitive as the poet's, we can easily see that, whether the universe shall seem a mechanism or a theophany, may make inestimable difference. Goethe voiced not himself alone, but the poet of whatever time whose genius calls him to the loftier themes, when he wrote,—

"No! such a God my worship may not win,
Who lets the world about his finger spin
A thing extern; my God must dwell within."

This various illustration shows that whatever satisfaction deistical conceptions may furnish the intellect, the mystic and poetic sensibilities they do not favor. The intenser fervor and the loftier meditation and the more rapturous vision are not of their inspiring.

But on the intellectual side Deism will not bear the closest scrutiny. It teaches that God—a potter, a carpenter—created the universe at a definite time. Grant that since that time God and the universe have been two facts; prior to that time there must have been an eternity in which God was all. But how out of his all-inclusive unity did he establish a duality? How out of himself, without abridgment of himself, could he furnish that which should be antithetic to himself? Is he indeed infinite? How, then, can the universe be outside of him? Is it contained in him? Then it is manifestation of him: its power his power, its life his life; with which conclusion Deism is no more. But other queries: From eternity God was sole Essence; was he, then, self-conscious? It is commonly held that self-consciousness is only possible in the presence of another than self, admitting which, we seem driven to the conclusion that this lonely occupant of eternity, since unable to say of another nature, *It is*, could not say of himself, *I am*. But he was conceived as Intelligence and Will. The intelligence, then, must have been self-centred, since there was nothing beyond self on which to direct it; and for the like reason the will must have been potential, not active. We are given, then, a God throughout an eternity, self-contemplative and inert; a conception that may provoke our wonder but hardly kindle our raptures. But come to the creative act. Following a determination of his will, he evolves out of himself a cosmos. To what end? Did he need it for his perfection? Then why for an eternity did he do without it? Was he without need? Why, then, the

stupendous superfluity? Turning from the creation to the government of the world, the deistic attitude is not less unsatisfactory. The God of Deism being an "absentee" God, the government of the world is devolved upon second causes. These are the great forces of nature, appointed to their several provinces and working to an appointed end, yet entirely insulated from the First Cause. While there is scope here for the conception of occasional Divine visitations in order to adjust some disturbed relations or to inaugurate some new departure, the general impression is that of mechanism, and that only. The second causes take the place of the First Cause; we deal with his agents, not with God. All goes so well without him that if he were to go to sleep what would it signify? Whatever we may say of its need or its beauty, worship will be without ardor when God is superfluous. To embrace atheism in place of belief in such a God implies no sad transition. The second causes may no doubt challenge our wonder, but they yield not the satisfactions of an Immanent Will with which we immediately deal.

But has the deistic view no features that commend it? Yes, it has two, the worth of which appears in the mere statement of them. First, it gives to the supreme object of religious feeling a distinctness of conception, which to the average mind is very satisfying. Indeed, it is easy to see that the doctrine is the natural and prevailing one with those who toil and pray, but do not meditate. Secondly, though suggestive of an "elder Lord Shaftesbury," the God of Deism is always a person. But from Pantheism, as set over against Deism, are there no deductions to be made? Indeed, there are. While there are individual minds that can find in it all content, to the great majority its conception of God is nebulous and vague. A spirit diffused through the universe is easily blended with, and so lost in, the forces of the universe, and

thus personality is lost. On the spiritual side it has shortcomings also. While in its warmer presentation Pantheism is capable of the inspirations we have referred to it, there is another presentation of it, which in its general influence is quite otherwise. When the devout soul communes with a mystic Presence,—the life, soul, love of all,—then the wilderness becomes a garden and the poorest flowers are passion-flowers. But when the mystic Presence yields to the philosophical One Substance, contemplation seems rather to take hold upon an Alpine crest, dazzling in the light it may be, yet on whose icy surface only the pale and struggling edelweiss can blossom. At a later stage of our discussion we shall come to other and more significant deductions.

3. While one of these conceptions maintains the Transcendency and the other the Immanence of the Divine Nature, there is a third that combines the two. God transcends the universe, it says, yet is immanent in it; is immanent in it, yet transcends it; is above all, yet in all; the soul of the world, yet infinitely more. This is Dr. Martineau's Theism. We say Dr. Martineau's; for while he maintains the common theistic attitude, which proclaims a personal God in immediate relation with the universe and with man, the Transcendency which he holds somewhat resolutely is not common to all theists. Its special significance in his thought we shall see.

Theism as defined above is the successor of Deism; in what aspect is it the preferable faith? It comes into the field as the foe of Pantheism; what fairer view has it to offer?

For the far-off God of Deism it gives us a God ever nigh. Deism gave God a heaven to dwell in; Theism finds the earth consecrated by his Presence. This change brings relief from a difficulty not slight. The conception of a God infinite, yet not present in the uni-

verse; infinite, yet an "elder Lord Shaftesbury" sitting in state beyond the stars, is inherently untenable. Accordingly it is a view that representative deists were ever slipping away from. Thus Thomas Morgan, often ranked with the deists and in certain aspects of his doctrine no doubt belonging with them, held as atheists those who denied God's immediate influence in the world. Toland, too, one of the chief figures among the deists, coined the very word "Pantheism," in order to set forth his own attitude of mind as one who believed in a God who was the "Mind and Soul of the universe." Sir Isaac Newton also was a deist; yet he speaks of a God as omnipresent, "*non per virtutem solam, sed etiam per substantiam.*" Such lapses from the cardinal deistic doctrine are not uncommon in the deistic writers; and they illustrate, we may dare to say, not Theism gained, but Deism not firmly held. The embarrassment involved here is escaped when the transition to Theism is accomplished, and heaven and earth alike are made God's dwelling-place and temple. The transition brings a spiritual satisfaction likewise. Dr. Martineau remarks that "if anything, in the Natural Religion of the last century, could lay strong hold of the devout imagination, it was the idea of the *Omnipresence* of God."¹ The reason for his specifying the last century is plain enough: the prevailing conditions of thought were then such as to make it by contrast especially impressive; it was like a gleam of sunshine through arctic night. He also remarks that "were the experiences of early life laid open, during its years of growing fervour and self-discipline, it would probably be found that, both in the orisons of the closet and in the encounter with temptation, the attempt to realize this thought played a great part and wielded the chief power." Yet a little further on he says: "Hence it is that, except in an apathetic age, or

¹ *Study of Religion*, vol. ii. p. 161.

among persons of level temperament, the Deistical conception fails to satisfy, and scarcely passes into a religion: once flung into awakening vicissitudes or more impassioned natures, it breaks its bounds and seeks a nearer God."¹ He might have added, only that it was the pantheistic view that he had before his mind, that all the mystic raptures that Pantheism enkindles have their condition in Theism. The mystic and poetic utterances we have quoted as of pantheistic inspiration might as easily have flown from an exuberance of theistic joy. Theism enchanteth the universe: it gives to the hills a Presence that consecrates them, and to the stars that glorifies them. It is the faith of Paul when he tells of one who is above all, and through all, and in you all; and of David when he sings, If I ascend up into heaven, thou art there: if I make my bed in hell, behold, thou art there.

Thus, through its doctrine of Divine Immanence, does Theism surpass Deism in the satisfactions that it yields. But the Transcendency which Dr. Martineau maintains so earnestly — what gain from that? Before answering we should see more definitely what transcendency means. He takes pains to tell us that the terms "transcendent" and "immanent," as applied to the Divine Nature, should not be used, as they often are, as equivalent to *external* and *internal*, "as if the contrast in question had reference only to *position here or there*."² While Immanence means the Divine Presence in every part of the universe, Transcendency implies "transcending the universe in every way, as infinite, as eternal, as source, as perfection." It tells us that the sum of things, however vast, cannot be commensurate with his infinity; that, grant the universe his theophany, God is not to be measured by his manifestation. However we may see him in it, he yet was before it, and could it perish, he would survive it. The signifi-

¹ *Study of Religion*, vol. ii. p. 162.

² *Ibid.* p. 141.

cance of this consideration to the theistic problem we may now discern. Theism, in maintaining the Divine Immanence, may be on undeniable ground, but there is a line of danger towards which it is ever pressing. Starting with a theistic assumption of the presence of God in the universe, one may at length identify him with its interior life, and then see him unfolding in its evolution. With this the brink of Pantheism has been dared. While not affirming the logical necessity of this, experience shows its liability where Immanence is held and Transcendency disowned. Where, however, Transcendency is held to, this result is obviously impossible: however the universe may manifest God, it cannot enfold him; though pervading it with his spirit, he cannot be submerged in it as to his personality; though the ultimate explanation of all worlds, all worlds do not explain him.

God in all and above all, source of all and more than all,—such is the larger aspect of Dr. Martineau's Theism. In all as Will, working through the multifarious dynamic of the world, soul of its order and pledge of its constancy; above all, like the star in sweet and immediate influence, not less here because poised afar; like the sun to whose effluent rays, poured down from the deeps of heaven, we refer the bloom and beauty of the world. In all,—the strength of the hills his strength, the life of the world his life, the glory of the heavens his glory; yet above all, and out of that infinite reserve a grace which sun and star may not reflect, but which a free and communing spirit may receive; and to such, an assurance of a Wisdom that cannot err, a Justice that cannot fail, and a Goodness that cannot be unkind: a smile to gladden, a refuge to which to flee, a breast on which to lean.

With Pantheism we must now come to closer quarters. Between it and Theism the battle rages. Of the field of contention let us seek a broader survey.

By reason of its Protean aspects, Pantheism is difficult to define save in the broadest terms. The Malebranche type is far indeed from that of Spinoza, and neither will do for the Hegelian. Through all its variables, however, there is this constant: an Essence or Principle which is the source of all things, is present in all things, and unifies all things. In star and flower, in soul and clod, it is identical. Mind and matter are its manifestations: the world of mountain and sea and city and civilization, the universe of planet and sun and star, are simply fleeting aspects of this Principle. They come and go; this comes not, goes not, but eternally abides.

“The One remains, the many change and pass.”

It is real; to them, save in it, there is no reality. It is their ground; they its phenomena. Coleridge, though with mind intent upon a special aspect of the doctrine, gave it a summary as cogent as it is striking,—

“God — World = God.
The World — God = 0.”

In God alone, that is, all reality; in the world apart from God only appearance, which, he withdrawn, would vanish.

Of course in a monism such as this our ordinary distinctions are lost. Creator and creation are one. Cause and effect, save in the relations of phenomena, are one. God and nature are one. God and man are one. The consciousness that asserts an Ego antithetic to God blossoms of him. His nature is an infinite Deep, and I a bubble of its wave. Further yet illustration may be pressed. Do I pray? Not exactly; the One yearns towards itself through me. Do I love? For convenience of speech we may be allowed to say so; but speaking with philosophical severity, the One the rather loves itself in me. One Principle, one Reality, — all details of

conduct should draw their meaning from this One; a conclusion nowhere better stated than in Emerson's *Brakma*,—

“They reckon ill who leave me out;
When me they fly, I am the wings;
I am the doubter and the doubt,
And I the hymn the Brahmin sings.”

This to many wears a bewildering look, but that to certain temperaments it yields a mystic satisfaction there is evidence enough. In Hunt's volume on Pantheism are some lines of great impressiveness, drawn from a Persian poet, which may be quoted in evidence,—

“I looked above and in all spaces saw but One;
I looked below and in all billows saw but One;

I looked into its heart, it was a sea of worlds;
A space of dreams all full, and in the dreams but One.

Earth, air and fire and water in Thy fear dissolve;
Ere they ascend to Thee, they trembling blend in One.

All life in heaven and earth, all pulsing hearts should throb
In prayer, lest they impede the One.

Nought but a sparkle of Thy glory is the sun;
And yet Thy light and mine both centre in the One.

Though at Thy feet the circling heaven is only dust,
Yet is it one, and one my being is with Thine.

The heavens shall dust become, and dust be heaven again,
Yet shall the One remain and one my life with Thine.”

However, the mystics are not a numerous clan, and in their intellectual temperament they are somewhat exceptional. Hence it is that a region that to their view may be radiant with the flowers of Paradise may wear to other eyes a Sahara look. To most minds the significance of the One must be read off from its predicates. The All in All—does it live, does it think, does it will, does it

love? Is the One It or He? Is the universe the result of free activity of the One? May we refer its order to intelligence of the One, working on lines of preference? Do its laws in any sense express volitions of the One? Within this All in All is the thought of other entity permissible? Am I really I? or am I a phantom with a delusive sense of personal identity and foolishly dreaming of immortality? Between me and the One are there personal relations? Has the language of affection, obligation, dependence, surrender, as interpreted with reference to the One, a natural and unforced meaning? These are vital questions; and though the hierophant of modern Pantheism bans them with the dictum *omnis determinatio est negatio*, the insatiable mind will yet press them; and on their answer depends our faith, our ethics, and our civilization. Fortunately for us some of these questions can be answered by implication as we proceed.

It may be well to indicate the measure of concession we will make to the claims of Pantheism. We are not pantheists, we will say; where, then, shall we fix a limit to the Divine inclusiveness? We will go out into the universe to make reply. Allow his presence here; that he dwells in the planets and bends the curve of their parabolas, that of him the sunlight glows, that we trace him in the complex order of a fructifying and unfolding world; still may not the universe be in some sense a dwelling which he inhabits, or a datum on which he acts? Surely, you say, somewhat here is other than he; if nothing else, at any rate the matter of which the sensible universe is composed. Well, what is matter? We have all smiled at Dr. Johnson's refutation of Berkeley's doctrine that matter has no substantive existence: stamping his foot upon a rock, the great Doctor exclaimed, "*I refute him thus.*" Yet it is undeniably true that his attitude of mind is a persistent one: even in these better instructed days, the non-reality

of matter, if the wisdom of philosophy, is the foolishness of common sense. Impatient of speculation, you will go to science, you say, which if it conduct through less ethereal realms, will at least give definite answers to your questions. Go then to science; take this question to some physicist and learn that the answer is wholly beyond him. While, however, he cannot tell you what matter is, he may tell you some strange things about it. A block of granite has a very substantial look; listen while he tells you that, solid as it seems, its ultimate atoms are not in contact, but stand off from one another as really as the planets of the solar system do. Listen further while he tells you that these atoms are not at rest, but, like motes in a sunbeam, are in perpetual dance. Beyond these statements he will give no hint as to the ultimate nature of these atoms, but only elaborate upon their behavior; show, in other words, under given conditions, what force they manifest. If now, suspecting that the ultimate nature of force may throw light upon your question, you ask him what this is, in his capacity as physicist he is dumb. You must appeal your question from physics to metaphysics if you will get even the hint of an answer. Now Dr. Martineau, as we have seen, resolving all forces into modes of Force, and drawing the ultimate nature of this from the human consciousness, declares it to be Will. Force must be interpretable in terms of will, or it can have no meaning to man. But Force is not more clearly manifest in the movement of a planet than of an atom of hydrogen; and the query will obtrude itself whether this atom is anything but force, a monad of force; in other words, if what we call matter is other than a mental correlate by means of which the conception of Force is made possible. Grant that this is not a demonstrable conclusion, yet undoubtedly it is the prevailing conviction of those on whose judgment we most rely. The inference is clear: Regarding Force as the ex-

pression of Will, and Will as a function of Mind, the seemingly material universe is really crystallized Intelligence. This is Dr. Martineau's conclusion: "The whole external universe, then (external, I mean, to self-conscious beings), we unreservedly surrender to the Indwelling Will, of which it is the organized expression."¹

The outward universe we thus surrender to the pantheist. With him we hold it to be not real in itself, but to have its reality in God. But how of human personality? Shall we concede this also? Shall we submerge man in God? This brings us to the battle-line of Theism and Pantheism. However the theist may conceive God and man related, he never loses the latter in the former. He is ever ready to say, God is in me, but he cannot bring himself to say, His Being comprehends me. As a consistent theist I may well maintain that God loves me, but I cannot allow that he loves himself in what by courtesy is called me. Grant all the infinite disparity between me and God, still I must insist that we are two and not one. I am not a wavelet of his deep, nor a ray of his sun. He is not conscious in my consciousness, nor is my meditation his soliloquy, nor my prayer his rhapsody. I am I, as he is he; real as he is real, person as he is person. Self-consciousness is a dyke against which the pantheistic flood beats only to be broken. While man holds fast to this, a few may find Pantheism an interesting speculation, but it will never be a vital faith to many.

Here, though all along we have reflected him, we come more distinctly on the trail of Dr. Martineau's thought. It is remembered how he reaches his doctrine of causation: through experience of cause within himself he gains discernment of a cause beyond himself. But cause within himself is will; will causality, therefore, is all the causality he knows. Two wills he thus finds in the universe, his own

¹ *Study of Religion*, vol. ii. p. 166.

and another. The other holds the universe in sway, its exercise limited only at the confines of human personality.

But why this limitation? Why not surrender this trifling demesne, and so have one will, one cause in the universe? The answer is, (1) The human consciousness, as above illustrated, puts forth unceasing protest against the surrender. Save as we do violence to this, the surrender cannot be. Consciousness permits me ever to say *I am I*, but never, though speaking into the ear of God, *I am Thou*. (2) In merging the human personality the Divine is sacrificed; for the former is the basis of our belief in the latter. If the former is an illusion, the latter is wholly untenable. Instead of a personal God we may then perhaps affirm an impersonal Somewhat, a thought, as it were, where no thinker is, a spring of power to which there is no conscious direction of its flow; and this impersonality is held before us as the more philosophical and the sublimer conception of a God. This indeed is the conclusion, if not the postulate, of all Pantheisms; and we are bound to remember also that it is the vogue of thought with many not reckoned in the schools of pantheists. Thus Herbert Spencer, turned preacher for the nonce, and fervidly reproving the "impieties of the pious," speaks of a choice between "personality and something higher."¹ This something higher, to be sure, he tells us is inconceivable; but this is not reason for disbelieving its existence, "rather the reverse." In faith he comes little short of the standard of him who said, "*Credo quia impossibile est.*" The answer, reflecting Dr. Martineau and reason alike, is that the teaching implies an inherent contradiction. Higher than personality is lower; beyond it is regression from its height. From the equator we may travel northward, gaining ever higher and higher latitudes; but if ever the pole is reached, pressing on from thence will be descending to lower lati-

¹ *First Principles*, p. 109.

tudes, not gaining higher. So when we study gradations of being, we may pass through every zone from inorganic to conscious and intelligent, and thence climb through all ranges of intelligence, till at thought's impassable height we can only name the infinite. But the infinite is an infinite what? Unconsciousness? Impersonality? The terms suggest, not thought's upward flight, but her downward plunge. An intelligence and personality beyond my conception my theistic attitude implies. When I speak of an infinite God, this is involved in my meaning. But a non-intelligence that is higher than intelligence, an impersonality that transcends personality, discards an attribute ideally supreme with stipulation that a nature without it shall vault up to heights transcending the ideal. Such is our conclusion when we contemplate in itself this impersonal First Principle. When we contemplate it in relation with man, we are even more impressed with its failure to answer to our conception of what should be highest. The personal God of Theism, however the conception of him may suggest difficulties, may at any rate take cognizance of our needs and be a very present help in time of trouble; this impersonal Somewhat, however it may unify a cosmos, can decree no justice, is capable of no love, can extend no help, can hear no prayer. (3) The consequence to man of a full acceptance of this doctrine would be a surrender of freedom and moral accountability; the deprivation, too, of any proper object of reverence and praise. Is it objected that we should judge a doctrine by its inherent strength and not by its consequences? The answer is that the inherent strength of a doctrine is often determined by its consequences, by the consideration whether it is true to the nature of man and the great needs of life; and there is no juster ground for the repudiation of a doctrine than the fact that from its contact the religious instincts are clouded or the moral consciousness bewildered. Some may chal-

lenge this judgment as applied to Pantheism by reference to the saintly pantheists whom previous pages have noticed. Grant all that may be claimed for them, it is yet simply true that in a wide survey Pantheism has rarely justified itself as in the best sense friendly either to piety or to morals.

The question, Why withhold the demesne of human personality from the rule of the Divine Will? may in reverse form be asked respecting the Divine Will itself: Why does it arrest itself at the demesne of human personality? In answer, the questioner may be shown that did the Higher Will usurp the province now held by the human, knowledge of itself would be impossible. In that unity there could be no apprehension. Self and other than self must stand over against each other, that either may be known. Make real the identity of which Pantheism tells, and the result would be a blank to human consciousness. This consideration is developed by Dr. Martineau in a passage which we will quote in full: "The very same principle which establishes a *Unity* of all external causality makes it anti-thetic to the internal, and establishes a *Duality* between our own and that which is other than ours: so that, were not our personal power known to us as *one*, the cosmical power would not be guaranteed to us as *the other*. Here, therefore, at the boundary of the proper Ego, the absorbing claim of the supreme will arrests itself, and recognizes a ground on which it does not mean to step. Did it still press on and annex this field also, it would simply abolish the very base of its own recognizable existence, and, in making itself all in all, would vanish totally from view. It is precisely by *not being unitary* that causation is accessible to thought at all; and if our own will does not exercise it, we are excluded from even the search for it elsewhere. By *self* we mean the will internal: by 'God,' we mean the will external: by *cause* we mean either: and

as the two former come into our knowledge as terms of a relation under the category of the latter, it is impossible for either extreme to lapse into the other. It would be a parricidal doctrine of causality that should thus lay violent hands on the conditions of its own existence.”¹ Indeed it would seem such; and when we shift the argument about and reason from the necessary self-assertion of the nature, the conclusion is even more emphatic. The unity we maintain we confute in that *we* maintain it. The saint at the gate of Paradise who, in answer to the challenge from within, had been chastened to the reply, “It is Thou, dear Lord,” illustrated by his self-abnegation the selfhood he verbally disowned. Do I say, I am a pantheist? Then, *ipso facto*, I deny Pantheism; for in the very assertion of the Ego I imply all else as objective to me. Here, quoting Dr. Martineau again, “we touch the ultimate and irremovable ground of all certainty; whence alone we look forth and discover either the *πᾶν* or the *θεός*: and to negative this position on behalf of what it shows us would be like the fanaticism of a fire-worshipper who should put out his eyes to glorify the light.”²

But is there not implied here an abridgment of the Divine infinitude? If man exercises a causal prerogative, then there seems to be a realm from which the Divine Agency is excluded. This consideration has drawn a good deal of attention, and it has been urged alike by pantheists, from their jealousy for the Divine Immanence, and by necessarians, who would discredit human freedom. If there is with man a causal initiative, the Divine Will does not rule within its domain; and though it may bend the curves of history, the details of the record must be left to man’s free origination. The theistic doctrine sets a limit to the Divine Power, in the face of which who can longer maintain that it is infinite?

¹ *Study of Religion*, vol. ii. pp. 166–167.

² *Ibid.* p. 167.

Theists have recognized this difficulty, and have wrestled with it often with deep longing for clearer light. But before we seek the significance of the theist's reservation from the Divine Power, let us see if the pantheist really maintains its infinity. This impersonal First Principle—is the exercise of all power allowed it? On the contrary, power of choice, "preferential power" as Dr. Martineau would say, pantheism always denies. Its God can do no other than he does; all in the fields of space and time is an evolution of him, and follows from a necessity of his nature. This preferential power the theist maintains; and draws light from the preference of God in dealing with this phase of the theistic problem. Here once more we will turn to Dr. Martineau's page: "Is there any reconciliation of these contradictory aspects of personality? There is none, if you assume that infinite Will can never abstain from appropriating all its causality, or divest itself of a portion, in order to fit up another and resembling nature. But surely one who assumes this has already committed the fault which he charges, and discovered something to which his 'rigorous infinitude' is incompetent! If we drop this assumption, then our allowance of independence is itself the result of our dependence: it is *conceded* to us by the author of our being, and, though entrusted for awhile with a certain free play of causality, is referable in the ultimate resort to the Supreme cause: it is included in what he *has caused*, though excepted from what he *is causing*. It takes therefore nothing from his infinitude, but what he himself renounces; and what is thus relinquished is potentially retained. The self-abnegation of infinity is but a form of self-assertion, and the only form in which it can reveal itself. Whether by setting up other minds with a range of command over alternatives, or by instituting a universe under law without alternative, the Infinite Cause foregoes something of his absolute freedom; in

the one case admitting partners of his liberty; in the other, establishing for himself a sphere of necessity: and in the latter case, the more comprehensive the sphere, the vaster is the renunciation: and if it extends to the All, so as to leave no margin of transcendency, the limitation reaches its maximum, no possibility but one being anywhere left open. If therefore there be any force in this objection, the Pantheist who brings it is himself exposed to it in a superlative degree. What greater contradiction can there be than to say, in one and the same breath, that a being is infinite and omnipotent, yet cannot put forth preferential power? And if we are jealous of his infinitude, which shall we be more afraid to grant,—that he lends to a derivative being a little preferential power; or that he is forever incapable of exercising it himself?"¹

But the Causal Will immanent in the universe,—is he not man's cause too? We were not always here,—was not our origin from him? Is he not implicated with our lives,—our heart-throbs and our soul-throbs, is he aloof from them? He is our cause indeed. A pervasive presence within us, too, it is our joy to think him; and with just discrimination to draw

"the mystic line,
Severing rightly his from thine,
Which is human, which divine,"

we may confess most difficult. But while we claim him as cause we cannot deny that we are causes; and that while "there is one Will in nature there are two that meet in man."

The suggestion that lurks here seems at first rather startling: my will meeting his will; my impotence holding a province against his omnipotence! Rather should we say, his will granting autonomy to mine; for some wise purpose appointing to me a principality within his universal kingdom.

What that purpose is should be seen in the different

¹ *Study of Religion*, vol. ii. pp. 182-183.

nature, and so the entirely other relation with the Divine which that autonomy makes possible. Did the Divine Will occupy the field of our will, we should conform to it as winds and seas and stars now do, but we could not proffer it our surrender. We should involuntarily yield to it, but we should not voluntarily obey it. Resignation, aspiration, free affection, the crowning graces of the human, by that ever determining Divine Will would be made impossible. We should be another species of automata, exercising no causality, and so knowing none. The recognition of the Divine Will would be made impossible by its constancy and pervasiveness. The feeling is irresistibly borne in upon us that in calling man into existence God intended that there should be one being in the universe that might render him a free obedience; and that to this end he placed him over against himself outside the scope of his immanent volition. Is it objected that in this view God favors the lower ranges of being with his immediate guidance, but takes his Holy Presence from the higher? gives to planets no choice but to obey him, and leaves man to the possibility of sin? That possibility is essential to man's distinguishing glory. Because the Higher Will does not rule through our struggle a victor's crown may be won by us. Besides, as Dr. Martineau urges, this absence is in only one aspect, and to the end that, in another, he may bestow his Presence. Absent is he as a constraint, but present as a personal sympathy and affection. While through his Immanence he deals with all else, from the sphere of his Transcendence he bends to man. It is *our* aspirations that go upward, our *prayers* that we pray; it is we *ourselves* that are tempted and strive for the higher joy. Yet in all our aspiring and wrestling we are not apart from him. Withdrawn from us as a law, he meets us as a friend to reinforce our courage, to comfort our griefs, and to woo us upward.

CHAPTER V

FREEDOM AND IMMORTALITY

I. *Freedom*

THERE are many arguments against Free Will; for it there is one. With Calvin and Edwards we may maintain its incompatibility with Divine Decrees; with Hartley and Priestley we may surrender it before the Law of Association; with Comte and the positivists we may find no place for it in the sequences of phenomenal causation; with Spinoza and the pantheists we may conceive man but a mode of a universal Substance, and what he mis-calls his freedom to be ruled by its necessity. All these doctrines may be so presented as to make the affirmation of Free Will look quite foolish. On the other hand the apostle of freedom has one argument which he deems conclusive, and which three words can state: *Consciousness declares it.* Here in consciousness, where we gain a first-hand acquaintance with the will, and receive its testimony respecting itself, its freedom is unmistakably avouched to us. "If bound," it says, "I know nothing of the gyves." That we exercise a preferential part, determine upon this as against that, in the presence of alternatives choose, rather than are constrained to, one of them, accepting the testimony of consciousness, we can but say we know. Accordingly, while the advocate of Free Will contents himself with maintaining the necessary trustworthiness of consciousness, and with showing how the experiences of life may be harmonized with its oracle, the

determinist puts forth the arguments of his school, and then undertakes to discredit consciousness. Discrediting consciousness, however, is serious business; for, being our witness to many things besides freedom, on the principle, *falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus*, doubting its testimony as to freedom involves us in a paralyzing scepticism. Further, it is perfectly plain that the doctrine of Necessity, however cogently argued, cannot, since it is out of accord with consciousness, carry the full force of a practical conviction. In the toil, study, play of life, in its right doing and its wrong doing, we have the certitude that we act, not as we must, but as we will; and by no inference from any theory of the universe can the significance of this certitude be destroyed.

The controversy being thus one of theory *versus* consciousness, there pertains to it this further aspect: The oracles of consciousness are to be asserted rather than argued; the theories by which we will confute them are to be argued rather than asserted. The former are self-evident until discredited; the latter, in that they are arrayed against consciousness, are discredited until proven to the overthrow of consciousness. Were I, giving account of myself, to say *I am well*, and another to contradict me, *No, you are not well*, I might think him trifling with me; or, if a physician, I might suspect him to see in my eyes, or in my breathing, or in the expression of my countenance, some incipient ill. Beyond the general assertion, however, that I feel well, I obviously could not go; and it would be for him to show the latent disease my feelings up to date have not allowed me to suspect. Were one calling himself a prophet to appear, proclaiming a universal bad health, and teaching that the general feeling of good health is an illusion, very likely he would win converts; indeed, the Invalidinarians might speedily become a numerous sect among us. Probably, however,

there would be doubting ones who would query how the conditions and feeling peculiar to good health can coexist with an ever-present and all-pervading invalidism; and who would be so unreasonable as not to call the doctor till their consciousness of health had been shown to be delusive? So where the universal consciousness of freedom is challenged, the burden of proof, or rather of disproof, is on the determinist side. It is in full recognition of this feature of the discussion that Dr. Martineau bears his part in it. The consciousness that affirms freedom he holds should be trusted until its veracity has been successfully impugned; which he has no suspicion that it ever has been, and clearly doubts if it ever can be. Accordingly, in his wonderful discussion of this problem he assumes Free Will, and devotes his great thought and learning to shattering antagonistic doctrines. If any one thinks he has an unanswered argument against Free Will, if he will turn to this discussion¹ he may probably find himself mistaken. Not that Dr. Martineau's attitude is wholly defensive: he has made many a sally into the enemy's camp with no end of destruction of the machinery of argumentative war; but his general method is to expose the weakness of necessarian doctrines rather than to buttress the alternative one. He holds that until the latter is discredited, it must stand; that no mere plausibility of theory can be allowed to prevail against a clearly authenticated fact of consciousness.

But the question is asked, What signifies the endless controversy over this insoluble problem? So far as we can see, like wisdom is found on either side; and whether with freedom or necessity, virtue and depravity seem to prosper. If we were to judge its significance thus, by the personal and average worth of those who take sides upon it, we might indeed be tempted to call truce to the strife;

¹ *Study of Religion*, vol. ii. pp. 184 seq.

though still it would be gravely doubted whether character could indefinitely prosper on a doctrine that gives the lie to the clearest dictum of the interior nature. The bearings of the discussion, however, run wide of the question of personal character: the outlook upon the universe, the mental construction which it yields to libertarian and necessarian, is entirely different. Grant to each the like certificate of good morals, we must yet discriminate between the worlds they live in. While to the latter freedom is a conclusion he cannot draw out of his postulates, to the former it is a datum which his postulates imply. While the one subordinates the inner life to a rule of necessity which he finds abroad, the other carries abroad a freedom found at home and interprets the world in its light. Of the preceding pages, there are few indeed that would not need to be rewritten to make them the consistent utterance of a necessarian. Let alone his Ethics, of which freedom is a constitutive principle, he must be a superficial reader who does not see that Dr. Martineau's firm conviction of freedom signifies greatly even in the domain of Critical Theology. It is not too much to say, indeed it is clearly obvious, that prior to his conversion from the determinism which he early held, he could not have written the *Seat of Authority in Religion*, could all the learned data have been given him. To the apostle of freedom the Bible cannot yield the same meaning as to the apostle of necessity, and Christ must be a different teacher. The great themes of Christian doctrine, in any thorough treatment of them, will surely reflect the thinker's attitude on this vexed problem. When we set aside the testimony of consciousness, man becomes another being, and his record has another meaning. In wrestling with this problem, therefore, the theologian is settling with a consideration, and that a very important one, by which his judgments must

be influenced. So when we come to the vast considerations of the Philosophy of Religion, the significance of our attitude on this problem can hardly be exaggerated. Few are the pages of Dr. Martineau's great *Study of Religion* that would not need to be transformed to make them even tolerable in the eyes of a necessarian; and with the complete triumph of necessarian doctrine, his type of Theism, which is that of Paul and of Jesus, should disappear. In relation to the supreme question of philosophy note its bearing. In his study of Causation we have seen that, like Schopenhauer, Dr. Martineau comes to the conception of Will as the ultimate source of the universe. His Will, however, is not, like Schopenhauer's, a blind and restless impulse, but the executive function of an Intelligence. In other words, it is not only Will, but free Will. But it is only through will in man that we arrive at the conception of Will beyond him; and if we must conclude that man's will, though coalescing with an intelligent principle, is necessitated and not free, how shall we escape the same conclusion respecting the Divine Will? If intelligence carries freedom in heaven, then on earth; if it is under necessity on earth, then, for aught we can reason to the contrary, so also in heaven. God wills not as he will, but as he must; and rules by appointments he cannot help but make. The logic of necessity, therefore, by this path leads to Fatalism; and Dr. Martineau, in vindicating freedom, fights a battle for the supreme doctrine of religious faith. On this point Dr. Martineau should himself be heard. Speaking of a phase of the necessarian argument, he says: "If it holds of mind as well as matter, and is co-extensive with causality itself, it applies no less to God than to us; and all that has begun to be in his eternal life, the thoughts and acts that have written themselves out in the history of the universe, have been without alternative, the sole possibility of things.

He could neither have withheld creation, nor created anything else. If in its immensity his nature is exempt from external constraint, it is because it swallows up and embraces all necessity within itself: he does not prefer, he does not choose, he does not divide and judge; he thinks what must be thought, he does what must be done, and perceives neither better nor worse that might be. Pessimism and optimism are alike a vain jangle: the world had to be what it is, and stands in no degrees of comparison: there is no margin of the possible beyond the actual: they are identical. I never like to press the consequences of a doctrine from which I dissent, knowing well the happy ingenuity with which its dangerous tendencies are evaded by men's better affections: but, without some regard to them, it cannot be estimated as a logical whole: and if here a conclusion is legitimately drawn from the necessarian premises which he does not desire to admit, it is but a fair invitation to him to carry a fresh scrutiny to his first principles. He usually resents the imputation of *fatalism*: and with some reason, so long as the question is detained on the field of human life: for the fatalist imagines it to make no difference whether he bestirs himself or not: the necessarian, that it is just this that does make the difference, only that with the end the means also are no less ordained, and that God will not act *for* him but *through* him. But when the doctrine is carried into the Divine nature, does it leave anything there that is distinguishable from *Fate*? How can we call *that* a *Mind*, from which the alternatives, the problems, the comparisons, of thought are absent? and how, *that* a character which has no choice, and cannot help being and doing precisely what it is and does? Goodness cannot exist except under possibility of evil, or love except under conditions of preference, or perfection except as the superlative and crown of a better and a worse: and from

an infinitude embracing nothing but necessities such predicates must be withheld.”¹

There is another theme in the consideration of which our attitude on the problem of the will has great significance. We recall the fine saying of Novalis: “ Philosophy can bake no bread; but she can procure for us God, Freedom, and Immortality.” It may not have occurred to all that the middle conception here is a key to the other two. We have seen how freedom is related to the theistic doctrine, but how to immortality? Undoubtedly there is a type of determinism with which the belief in immortality is not untenable, as, for instance, that of Edwards and the earlier Calvinists, who held the will of the natural man to be enslaved by sin, though the function of a nature constitutionally immortal. When we affirm, however, a constitutional necessity, we embrace a philosophy with which belief in immortality does not easily coalesce. For an immortal nature, as it is easy to see, must be an entity, not an appearance merely; that is to say, a self-subsistent nature. A necessitated nature, on the contrary, must be a dependent one: it has its reality in another nature of which it is a manifestation. Try the issue with reference to modern Naturalism, which, whether on its more strictly Positive or on its Evolutionary side, has shown freedom little favor. Is man but a flower of nature? The comfortless but unanswerable answer is, No flower is immortal. Does he come in any sense through the determination of Nature's law, her latest and fairest phenomenon? We can only repeat the last conclusion and say, There is no immortal phenomenon. What comes by law, by law may go; that which is integrated may be resolved. Unless there be that in man which is not the product of nature and which law does not rule, it is useless to talk of immortality. Or try the

¹ *Study of Religion*, vol. ii. pp. 232-233.

issue with reference to Pantheism. Though the forms of this are Protean, there is one cardinal conception from which it cannot depart: all reality is in God, and the universe and man are submerged in him. Of course the freedom which would be an invincible dyke against this submergence is not here; for there is no proper personality, only a mode of the One Essence.

Thus, one defending the doctrine of freedom may well have in view a basal principle which must rule his criticism of theology, his judgments of history, his construction of ethical theory, his religious philosophy, his view of human destiny; and all depends on whether the simple dictum within us shall be received or no. Though there are many incidental arguments in favor of freedom, and though the consequences to which we argue on determinist lines in their ugly aspects remonstrate against determinism, we come for ultimate settlement to consciousness at last.

II. *Immortality*

Dr. Martineau settles with the problem of freedom before he approaches that of immortality. He carries, however, the result of that settlement over to the consideration of the latter problem: it is a free nature of which he maintains the immortality. With his usual thoroughness, however, he reviews the salient doctrines by which in these latter days immortality is often held to be discredited: in a discussion of the "physiological aspects" of death he shows the utter irrelevancy of the objections of modern Naturalism; and in a like discussion of the "metaphysical aspect" of death he shows against Schleiermacher and his school how groundless is the pantheistic doctrine of absorption. He then turns upon the inner nature itself, and asks if the vaticinations of the intellect

and conscience favor belief in immortality; and here we will take up his argument.

1. *The Intellect.* In these days when Natural History is so assertive an interest, the lower animal, long neglected, is often brought forward to challenge man's claim to the exclusive possession of the faculties commonly regarded as peculiarly human. Man reasons; but the horse is detected in conduct so suggestive of reason that it seems almost an intellectual perversity not to allow it to him; — incipient reason, indeed, but reason. The fleeing criminal is hardly more fertile in devices to escape the constable than the fox or deer to outwit the hunter; shrewd observers have little doubt of the cogitations of the elephant; as an example of maternal affection, see the hen gathering her chickens under her wings; while one contemplating the special friend and companion of man, his steadfastness and fidelity, may often be willing to make his own the saying of Dio Lewis: "The best part of man is the dog that is in him." Thus, in observing the features in which the conduct of brute natures resembles our own, very interesting parallelisms may be made out, quite satisfying to those who, from apparent similarity of nature, are disposed to give both a like place in their philosophy; and so implicate both in the same destiny.

These parallelisms we will pause neither to discredit nor to explain. Let them be admitted to whatever extent there may be warrant for admitting them; still it may be maintained that between brute and man there is a difference that is fundamental and not to be ignored. This difference, following Dr. Martineau, we may dare to state thus: While what we call the inward life of the animal is for the outward life, with man the relation is the reverse: the outward life is for the inward. With the former the physical life is the all-predominant consideration; with the latter the psychical and moral. To the animal are the pro-

pensions through which it seeks food and propagates its kind, the passions that resist injury and flee from danger, the brief period of maternal affection, all for the individual's safety and the support and the perpetuation of the race. When we turn, too, to the more curious instincts, shown in the civic habits of the ant and the bee, the architecture of the bird and the beaver, the web-weaving of the caterpillar and the spider, we find it the same, the wisdom of the universe working through them and directing them to the conditions of their existence; just as it works through the plant, directing its root to shoot downward and its stock to shoot upward, and its leaves to spread out into the air. So always whatever light is given to the animal it is for the guidance of its purely animal existence. To adopt with man, however, the like order of preference we feel to be a departure from the rule appointed to him, and thus unnatural and dishonoring. While we may adopt as our working maxim, *mens sana in corpore sano*, we forgive and even applaud the disregard of it which fidelity to the higher claims of the higher nature may ask of us. The true relation of the physical is that of subordination to the spiritual; it is designed to be the instrument of its progress, the servant of its work. Robert Browning states our thesis well:—

“To man propose this test—
Thy body at its best,
How far can it project thy soul on its lone way?”

The recognition of this relation is implied in our characteristic judgments. While we look very tolerantly on the rigors through which the higher faculties are honored, the enfeeblement of the intellect in any degree through physical excess is revolting in our eyes. The truth is more clearly seen in extreme illustrations. We might not be willing to commend the austerities of St. Jerome; but

they are beautiful to contemplate beside the gluttonies of Charles V.; and every healthy nature would say, Better locusts and wild honey with John the Baptist than to participate in the orgies of the "hog Vitellius;" and at all degrees between, it is plain where the emphasis of our truer appreciation lies. On the other hand the scholar whose severe application has brought dimness to his eyes; the philosopher the vigils of whose thought are traced in a stooping form and a sallow countenance, we gently disapprove and deeply admire. Bodily strength and grace we need not esteem lightly; bringing the physical to its fairer and more robust development may be honoring the Creator of it; and the Greeks, in that they sought it, were wiser than the Christian anchorites in that they despised it; yet to gain a sage we would gladly sacrifice an athlete.

This difference, so markedly shown in the contrast between the animal, subject to no change save in the way of animal improvement and deterioration, and man, advanced through all the measureless ranges of psychical progress, is implicated in yet another contrast of great significance. The outfit of the animal seems an ideal provision for the purely terrestrial sphere appointed to it; that of man, if the terrestrial sphere be all that is appointed for him, seems clearly a vast over-provision. The scope of the animal's life, the range, that is, of its possible interest, is the immediate and present. Its space is here; — around it bends the circle of the horizon, but it is incurious as to what lies beyond; under it is the earth, but it looks down in no inquiry; over it hang the heavens, but it looks up in no wonder. Its time is now; — behind it is a past that invites to no retrospect; before it is a future that beckons with no vision. In this we see an ideal fitness. Allowing that to the animals this is the only world, it is enough that they fit into it as it comes.

When we come to man, however, if we still grant this

life to be all, this ideal has apparently no recognition. We deal here indeed with incommensurable terms; and Dr. Martineau asks, "How can we compare capacity of reason with decades of years?" Yet a proportion he recognizes, and all recognize, between the endowment of a nature and its persistency and range of achievement. You do not give to the pleasure boat the outfit of a ship to the Indies, nor to an ephemeron that lives but a day the equipment of a being of threescore and ten. Yet if the terrestrial period be all there is for man, something like this disproportion, only far more marked, is forced upon us. Few there are who, the fact of immortality being granted, would see any incongruity between the powers of man and the career thus appointed him. If this life, then, be all, we have before us the bewildering thought of a being equipped for eternity and doomed to perish in threescore and ten.

The outfit of man as a purely terrestrial being — what should it be? What more could he stipulate than that he be treated as other animals are treated? which, of course, would mean that he be provided with other faculties than theirs as his special and human needs were to be other. The full range of this claim few might venture to specify off-hand; but it would seem to imply, beyond the range of other animals, the ability to draw food from the earth; to provide clothing for his protection, and arms for his defence, and medicine for his ills, and surgery for his hurts; to find out fire and iron and the manifold uses of the forge; to pile wood and stone into dwellings; to expand the footpath into the highway; to grade the hill, and clear the forest, and drain the swamp; to find out what servants he may have in wind and heat and water; to construct an alphabet and organize a language; to found a home, and build up a social and civic structure. All this taken together is very much indeed; but allow it all

embraced in our stipulation, and add to it whatever else a human being with only a terrestrial outlook may require, and what approximation will it make to the sum total of endowment that man possesses? Take from him all not embraced in this provision, and would he be the being that he is? The obvious answer is that the scope of his powers is immeasurably beyond all this; that man's capacities cut down to these proportions, the features that are his distinguishing glory, were gone. Here is contemplated only the near and the practical, while the human range embraces the far and ideal.

Dr. Martineau remarks in his characteristic way that while other creatures live in Time, Time lives in man alone; and the same also he finds true as respects Space. His thought is not recondite; it is a truth all recognize that to man alone is a past with its glories and its shames, a future with its dreads and its hopes, a field of vision stretching around him in ever-widening horizon. To one, however, at all conversant with the Critical Philosophy, the truth is capable of being borne home more profoundly and impressively. However we may define Space and Time, it is simply true that what we may dare to call their laws are laws of the human mind. On the perception of these laws the mazy structure of our mathematics is reared; and our celestial calculations are made by a science wholly *a priori* in its origin. We draw it from within ourselves and apply it to the computations of the moons of Jupiter and the measurement of the orbit of Saturn, with no doubt whatever that if accuracy rules our processes truth will be the issue of them. That is to say, two infinities meet in man, and he runs backward and forward on the one, and out on all radii of the other, drawing ever out of himself a knowledge of their laws. This is an impressive truth,—man not naturalized, but freeborn into these infinities. And what shall we say to the further

truth that at will he leaps out of both, and roams free in a supersensible and metaphysic world?

This endowment of a purely terrestrial nature, destined for the brief period of threescore and ten, seems an immeasurable over-endowment. If our scope is thus indeed restricted, the question as to this over-endowment is a most bewildering one. Grant that we need yesterday for its experience and to-morrow for its foresight; yet, with relations thus restricted to our own period, what need have we of these immeasurable reaches beyond it? What need of the record of Pharaonic dynasties, or of the story told by the monuments of Thebes and Karnak? For the practical guidance of to-day are we helped in any measure by what we have learned of the Aryan migrations or the wars of the Pelasgi? Is our political economy furthered by what we may know of the trade of Tyre, or our statesmanship instructed by our knowledge of the decrees of Sennacherib? What need of research into geological antiquities? Or, changing the direction of our glance, what need of millennial forecasts? — Of what advantage is it to know when the pole star will stand in our zenith, or when the sun will reach the Constellation of Hercules? With relations in space so restricted, what need of an ever-expanding horizon? What need of the stellar infinitude and the astronomer's free life in it? Further, while engaged in practical estimates we may ask what need of the Analytical Geometry and the Differential Calculus? What need of knowledge of the ultimate elements of matter, or of the chemistry of light, or of the revelations of the microscope and spectroscope, the correlation of forces, the derivative origin of species, the specific gravity of Jupiter, the periodicities of Uranus? What need to add to all these the domain which philosophy opens to our contemplation? What need of the mystic realm of Beethoven's music, and Goethe's drama, and Dante's poetry?

Of endowment equal to the achievement of these things, and the impulse to achieve them, for a being thus restricted, what need? Why in the case of man this incalculable departure from the manifest ideal met in all the lower kingdoms of animal existence? Making our estimate on the strictly utilitarian basis, stipulating for man, according to his nature, such equipment only as other terrestrial natures have, there is no need. The provision for his brief earthly life far surpasses the earthly requirement. Even though we make our own the saying of Coleridge, "We construct our earthly charts from celestial observations," still our contention is unshaken. Still may it be successfully shown that for the purely earthly guidance the nearer luminaries are sufficient for our needs. In the days of Athens' glory Plato's thought was of small consequence in the Agora, and the archons had little use for Aeschylus. The vast structure of the Roman Empire shows nothing more plainly than how the common needs may be supplied, power established and preserved, civilization built up and extended, without the higher intellectual endowments. Its characteristic great man was the soldier, not the sage; the lawgiver, not the philosopher; the architect, not the scientist; the engineer, not the poet. Indeed, considering the period of its duration and the extent of its sway, its conquests in the higher realms of intellect were singularly slight. It produced not a poet, not a philosopher, of the first class; and were the volume of its literary creation suddenly to be blotted from existence, with here and there a regret for Seneca, a grief for Cicero, a sigh for Horace, a tear for Virgil, and a lament for Tacitus, the world would go on with no sense of irreparable loss. Good work here surely, but none of those vast achievements which date epochs in our intellectual advance. Of Rome it was peculiarly true that her kingdom was of this world; and if it were whispered to us

that henceforth we must get on without the higher energies of intellect we might take comfort from the example of her success. Yet the common judgment is right in seeing the more representative man in him of wider and higher intellectual relations: in Aristotle, not Alexander; in Plato, not Pericles; in Dante, not Cosimo de' Medici; in Goethe, not Frederick; in Montesquieu, not Louis XIV.; in Milton, not Cromwell; in Newton, not William III.; in Wordsworth, not Wellington; in Emerson, not Grant. There is the philosopher, Kant, and there beside him is his servant, Lampe. Into the vast speculations of the former the latter may not enter; yet in the philosopher the valet may see his own possibilities, not transcended, but illustrated. The philosopher with all his greatness has only the common human faculties; and so exhibits in himself what, though undeveloped, is yet nascent in us all.

Now the perplexity we encounter here draws all its significance from the supposition that to man as to all other terrestrial natures there is a terrestrial life only. Reverse, then, the supposition; allow that the here is but a prelude to a there, that "we have vaster relations than our immediate surroundings," and the perplexity vanishes. The disproportion we have contemplated between outfit and scope of existence yields to a sense of the fairest proportion. This transient tenant of the world, that finds his range too narrow, is really a destined citizen of the universe, awaiting his fuller "enfranchisement." In the "excursions" he makes, he feels "the outskirts of a problem that is to engage larger meditations and maturer powers;" and the "Science that transcends the demands of one life" he is permitted to feel to be the "propylæum of another."¹

This contrast of outfit, with only the light of Natural

¹ *Study of Religion*, vol. ii. p. 351.

History in which to study it, enfolds perplexities which only deepen as we meditate upon them. Of him who allows no light but that of Natural History we have a right to ask its explanation. Why is the ideal of nature as shown in the endowment of the lower animals so markedly departed from in the case of man? As their endowment is measured off to them according to terrestrial needs, why not his also, if only a terrestrial nature has been given him? Nor is this question here raised for the first time, nor was Dr. Martineau the first to raise it. Early in the century Lord Erskine wrote: "When I reflect that God has given to inferior animals no instincts nor faculties that are not immediately subservient to the ends and purposes of their beings, I cannot but conclude that the reason and faculties of man were bestowed upon the same principle, and are connected with his superior nature." From this conclusion he draws the same inference as Dr. Martineau. "When I find him," he goes on, "endowed with powers to carry, as it were, the line and rule to the most distant worlds, I consider it as conclusive evidence of a future and more exalted distinction, because I cannot think that the Creator of the universe would depart from all the analogies of the lower creation in the formation of the highest creature by gifting him with a capacity not only utterly useless but destructive of his contentment and happiness, if his existence were to terminate in the grave." Where this inference is repudiated it is difficult to see what possible explanation can be given of this break in the analogy, in passing from the lower orders of existence to the higher. The inference granted, however, the analogy is obviously unbroken. Man has his larger endowment as a provision for the ampler range yet before him.

The consideration of the scope of man's powers counts for much with Dr. Martineau. There is another consider-

ation, however, which, as conveyed in his impressive language, probably counts with his readers for not less: it is of man's power as a *creator*. In the possession of this he feels man to be "above the measure of his present lot." "The reflective mind of man, it has been said, alone is the mirror of nature; but more than this, it is a retaining mirror, whereon the images, once left, remain, and shine in the dark; and, most of all, it is a redisposing, a beautifying, a quickening mirror, that drops the matter and keeps the meaning of things, freshens their colours, deepens their expression, and so shifts their scenery as to shape a drama from a chronicle. Well may the poet be called by the half-sacred name of *Vates*; for the ideal transformation of the actual is as divine a miracle as the turning of dust into dew-drops; and the moulding of language into an instrument for this end, that its rhythm and its fire may sweep through the ages, still waking up wrath and love and pity wherever it alights, is a marvel surpassed only by our blindness to it."¹ If valued for nothing else, this language might well be treasured as a wonderful account of an unaccountable wonder.

There are two orders of creation that endure. One is illustrated in the coral reef, in the bridge, the aqueduct, the highway, the structure of a language, society, or government; in a church, a university, in all of which many co-operate, and a succeeding generation may carry forward what a previous one begins. "Such monuments record the power of the social spirit, and measure for us the greatness of nations." The other order is altogether personal, the embodied conception of one mind, its very genius excluding all participation. We meet it in the transcendent achievements of art and song and letters: in the dome of St. Peter's, in the Campanile at Florence, in the wonderful delineations of Raphael, Angelico, Da

¹ *Study of Religion*, vol. ii. pp. 352-353.

Vinci, in the sonatas of Beethoven and the Messiah of Handel, in the Iliad, the Agamemnon, the Divina Commedia, Job, Faust, Hamlet, Saul. These are publications of the solitary soul. To add to them is to outrage them; to mend them is to destroy them. Their reality is in the unity of the one mind that brought them forth. From age to age they experiment upon individual souls, leaving upon them the priceless impress of wisdom, holiness, beauty. They are stars in our intellectual firmament; and no orb in all the galaxy above us more truly witnesses a creative mind than they.

It is such creations that Dr. Martineau is contemplating in the passage above quoted. Whither may they lead our contemplation? I cast my eyes upon my bookshelves where my chief treasures are, not costly and yet priceless. There is Plato, and beside him Goethe, and beside him Pascal, and Dante is close by, and Kant and Hume and Berkeley just a little further away. There, too, are Shakespeare and Milton and Browning and Emerson; and before me is an open volume wherein I read, "Lo, I am with you alway." These words seem spoken to me; and from all these great ones I turn with the sense of personal interview. Their page when most impersonal is as a letter they have written me. This sense of personal relation with the great artist or the great poet or the great teacher is certainly the common one. But the two terms of the relation,—what and where are they? The second is indubitably here; "is the first of them nothing and nowhere? and is the homage it wrings from me paid to a blank? or to a dead book only,—to blotted paper, or coloured canvass, or an orchestral score? Heart-worship, like God, is not of the dead, but of the living; and that, in the thought-glance with which we look up to a Homer, a Dante, a Shakespeare, there should be no reciprocity possible,—

that in reverencing the prophets, we do but decorate their tombs,—that the touch which wakes such fires within us should be that of a quenched torch, would expel their chief meaning from the noblest relations subsisting among human minds. A great creative personality may be lonely and neglected in his day; and only when the reflection which he leaves of himself travels down the ages, does he select and gather together his natural associates and lovers: and shall he never hear the chorus of that great company, or know of that life which began for him when life had ended?"¹

Through another and related aspect we come to another and related consideration. In our philosophizing it is not our wont to think of an effect as more enduring than its cause, when the real and ultimate cause has been found. Phenomena pass, but not their originating spring. You hold audience with Emerson? Oh no, there is no Emerson. There was an Emerson once, a phantom, that is, to which we gave the name, which flitted here and there across our path, and left this *imperishable record*. His visions, his heart-beats, he built into this enduring memorial and—*vanished!* The creation abides; the *creator is no more!* Here are his phenomena; he—where? The stream flows on—its *fountain long since gone!* The light abides; the *sun extinguished!* The suggestion seems almost to carry its own refutation. Not only does it bewilder our sense of what is inherently fitting, but it inverts one of the primary conceptions on which our philosophy is founded. "Can a word that is immortal come from a speaker that is ephemeral?"

Yet another consideration puts in a persuasive plea. Though mind as we know it is related with a physical organism, and therefore, when that organism perishes, ceases from that mode of activity with which we are

¹ *Study of Religion*, vol. ii. pp. 353-354.

acquainted, who can say that with the decay of the organism its possibilities have been surely realized? Very especially in the case of great men is the significance of this question borne in upon us. The great things they achieve — are they more than hints of greater achievements that were possible, were opportunity given them? The intellect that brought forth the *Divina Commedia* — who can feel that its capacities were exhausted with this consummate production? What lament of great minds is more common than that they have not time to make real the ideals which mental faculty alone, and apart from physical decay, should make so possible to them? But for this limitation, what conquests in science might Agassiz have made! What songs might Tennyson have sung! With this consideration in mind Dr. Martineau remarks that the fact that one sees "what he must relinquish, and resigns it with regret, shows that he could conquer it, if he had a chance; and it is precisely at the end of life, that, from the vantage-ground of a lofty elevation and a large survey, he most intently turns to the horizon and best discerns the outline of the promised land on which his eyes are about to close." This he follows with the impressive statement: "I do not know that there is anything in nature (unless indeed it be the reputed blotting-out of suns in the stellar heavens) which can be compared in wastefulness with the extinction of great minds: their gathered resources, their matured skill, their luminous insight, their unfailing tact, are not like instincts that can be handed down; they are absolutely personal and inalienable; grand conditions of future power, unavailable for the race, and perfect for the ulterior growth of the individual. If that growth is not to be, the most brilliant genius bursts and vanishes as a firework in the night. A mind of balanced and finished faculties is a production at once of infinite delicacy and of most

enduring constitution; lodged in a fast perishing organism, it is like a perfect set of astronomical instruments, misplaced in an observatory shaken by earthquakes or caving in with decay.”¹

Here again we need to remember that great and small, as applied to minds, have reference to range of development, not difference of constitution. Were the great fundamentally other than the small, endowed, that is, with capacities of which in the less favored there are no germs, then immortality might be conceived, as some have conceived it, as the exclusive privilege of the great. But it is not so: the great are only the most representative; in them we see in fairer proportions what is true of all. However modestly I may estimate myself, I yet may say that there was not a faculty in the august intellect of Plato that is not also in mine. The fact that he can speak to me and I can understand him, that I can explore his depths and scale his heights, shows that however in power he may surpass me he is not fundamentally unlike me. It is not likely that I shall ever write a *Lycidas*; but I cannot doubt that I am at least a “mute, inglorious Milton.” The claim, then, that we put forward for the great is true for all. We argue not the immortality of sages, but of the soul.

So much do we find in the prophecies of the intellect.

2. *The Conscience.* After God, conscience is the most solemn word. It is the oracle of the moral law within; in listening to it we hear a judgment from the Universal Throne. Its decisions are ever respecting the motives of conduct, This is worthier, that less worthy; and with the decision an obligation is laid upon us. With the ever possible obedience, we are in harmony with the Power that asks it; with the ever possible disobedience, we are at variance with that Power. Now the issue. With

¹ *Study of Religion*, vol. ii. p. 356.

the freedom to obey or not to obey, we are put upon a trial that depends upon ourselves. "The alternatives of a trust have a sequel in the alternatives of a reckoning. So that wherever Conscience is, there we stand only in the forecourt of existence; and a Moral world cannot be final, unless it be everlasting."¹ This pregnant sentence may be pondered long.

But, admitting that alternative consequences must ever follow these alternatives of conduct, it is yet often doubted whether it is necessary to look to another world for them. Here and now, it is argued, men may reap as they sow; blessing for their blessing, evil for their sin. In illustration of this, appeal is often made to the peace of the unsullied conscience, and to the twinges of guilt and shame that attend unfaithfulness. In the presence of these, it is maintained that there is no need to ask a future in which a harvest appropriate to the sowing shall be gathered.

This view is not Dr. Martineau's; and by way of controverting it he calls attention to the workings of conscience in two very significant aspects: —

Ideal justice, — what does that stipulate? In a specific case, — what blessing should follow upon this virtue, what bane should be the issue of that transgression, it would be impossible for man to give more than a proximate judgment. We applaud the brave and the self-denying; we condemn the drunkard and the liar. But the deeper considerations, — motive, temptation, organized predilection, without reference to which just praise or blame cannot be awarded, can be duly estimated only by the mind of God. But while we may be unable in the specific case to make the absolutely just award, we all recognize a principle by which just awards are made, and which requires that the "greater excellence should have the ampler recognition, and the deeper guilt should have the most to bear."² In

¹ *Study of Religion*, vol. ii. p. 361.

² *Ibid.* p. 363.

our earthly relations this principle rules our judgments. In our courts the lighter sentence is for the first offence, and penalties become severer as transgressions are repeated. On the other hand we smile upon the toiler after higher excellence in his earlier successes, applaud his yet nobler achievement; but withhold from him his crown till some distinguished triumph has been won. This rule may not be always consistently followed, yet it is our rule; and we are sure that neither in heaven nor among men can there be justice apart from it.

Now this rule, however recognized in outward judgment, in inward experience is practically inverted. The young man, encountering temptation, may be conscious of moral elation in his earlier victories; but as he goes on,

“Still treading each temptation down,
And battling for a brighter crown,”

as by repetition of victories he rises, and his vision of duty becomes larger and his insight into its meaning clearer and deeper, his triumphs cease to elate him; the height that is won is forgotten in contemplation of the height that is above him. While to others he may seem so far from earth, he is only conscious that heaven is so distant; and so, though few may deserve better, few are less conscious of desert than he. Hence it is that at the moral summits of humanity we hear a Channing complaining of the hardness of his heart, a Wesley bewailing his unbelief, a Luther lamenting his want of steadfastness, and Paul crying, “Oh wretched man that I am!” Looking in the other direction, we find it correspondingly the same. In the punishments of conscience there is ever the sharper pang for the earlier sin; and suffering is ever less as transgression is repeated. So he may suffer least whose guilt is greatest; and the sinning soul may indurate itself beyond the scorchings of retribution.

For these reasons it seems impossible to admit that "our Moral nature runs through its own cycle, and fulfils its own idea, in our experience here. It announces a righteous rule which again and again it brings to mind and will not suffer to be forgotten, but of which it does not secure the execution. It is a prophecy, carrying its own credentials in an incipient foretaste of the end, but holding its realization in reserve; and if Death gives final discharge alike to the sinner and the saint, we are warranted in saying that Conscience has told more lies than it has ever called to their account."¹

Thus he finds the Intellect and Conscience, both pleading for immortality, the one for the exercise of its powers, the other for the realization of its justice, and he admits their plea. The fact that these may not be here, is to him sufficient warrant that there must be a there.

Here we leave him. The faith which Positivism must disown, and Pantheism cannot encourage, and Evolution can barely allow, supported by Dr. Martineau's philosophy, may be strong and buoyant. A dogma he does not offer us; the warrant of a science he does not claim. Through his intense believing, however, and his lofty thinking, he bears in upon us a certitude that is clear and strong and sufficing. It must be a stubborn scepticism that, emerging from the deeps of this great *Study*, cannot say with the Emperor Marcus, "What springs from earth dissolves to earth again, and heaven-born things fly to their native seat."

¹ *Study of Religion*, vol. ii. p. 365.

INDEX

A.

Abbott, Ezra, 239.
Aberdeen, University of, 119.
Academy, The, 141.
Acosmism and atheism, 402.
Act of Uniformity, The, 42.
Addison, Joseph, 126.
Address to James Martineau, eighty-third birthday, 118-120; reply to, 120-122.
Admetos, 18.
Aeschylos, 125, 437.
Affection, Compassionate, 388.
Agamemnon, — Aeschylos, 441.
Agassiz, Louis, 128, 224, 245, 348, 443.
Agnosticism, Club to combat, 97-99;
Kant's and Hume's, compared, 280-
285.
Akenside, Mark, 139.
Alderson, Dr., 9, 10.
Alexander, 438.
Alger, William, R., 78 n., 88; letter to,
from Dr. Martineau, 98 n., 229 n.
"All we know is phenomena," 294,
304.
Alphonso of Castile, 354.
Altruism in Nature, 377.
Amsterdam, University of, 119.
Ancient Egypt under the Pharaohs, J.
Kenrick, 24.
Andover Theological School, 119, 162.
Andrews, St., University of, 118.
Angelico, Fra, 440.
Angelo, Michael, 138.
Animal, The, outfit of an ideal provision
for a terrestrial sphere, 433.
Annas, 242.
Anomalies *vs.* Customs of Heaven, 172.
Anthedon, 341.
Anthropomorphism, 348.
Antoninus, The, 251.

Antoninus, Marcus Aurelius, 371, 447.
Apocalypse, The, 239; authorship of,
240-241.
Apollinaris, 237, 246.
Apollo, 18.
Apostles, The, 39, 178, 231.
Aquinas, Thomas, 155-156.
Argyll, Duke of, 98 n.
Arianism, 21, 163-164, 165, 196.
Aristides, 16.
Aristotle, 27, 76, 80, 93, 123, 128, 320,
353-354, 438.
Armstrong, Rev. James, 38.
Armstrong, Rev. R. A., 92.
Arnold, Sir Edwin, 119.
Arnold, Thomas, 14, 79.
Aryans, 436.
Assembly's Catechism, 36.
"Asses of Parnassus," 127.
Association, Law of, 423.
Athanasius, St., 66.
Atheism and acosmism, 402.
Athenagoras, 251.
Atkinson, Henry George, 84-85, 86.
Atonement, The, 71, 173-174.
Augustine, St., 214, 375.
Austin, 10.
Authority in Religion, 54; Catholic view
of, 221; Protestant view of, 221-222;
philosophic view of, 222-225; internal
and external, 225-226.
Automatism *vs.* Intelligence, 338.
Axiom of Causality, 99, 314 n.

B.

Bacon, Francis, 76, 127, 139, 245, 362.
Bain, Alexander, 93, 98 n., 124, 306.
Balfour, Arthur J., 122.
Bank of England, 134.
Baptist, John the, 135.

Barbauld, Anna Lætitia, 8 n., 9.
 Barnes, Thomas, 21.
Battle of the Churches, The, 82.
 Baur, Ferdinand Christian, 229, 236.
 Baxter, Richard, 36, 37, 45, 208.
Beatiitudes, Mount of, 140.
 Beecher, Henry Ward, 142, 150.
 Beethoven, Ludwig van, 436, 441.
 Belfast, 166.
Belfast Address, The, John Tyndall, 335.
 Belsham, Thomas, 162.
 Bentham, Jeremy, 51, 110, 124, 363.
 Bentley, Richard, 79.
 Bergerac, 2.
 Berkeley, Bishop, 328, 413, 441.
 "Besetting God," The, 150.
 Bethany, 242.
 Bible, The, 168, 178, 260.
 "Bible and the Child," The, 179.
 "Bible, The: What it is and What it is not," 169.
 Birth-rate, Excessive, 357.
 Blandrata, Giorgio, 214.
 Boeckh, August, 26.
 "Bona Fides of our intuitive witnesses," 289.
 Bossuet, Bishop, 130.
 Boswell, James, 79.
 Bounty, Royal, 45, 46, 47, 48.
 Bowen, Francis, 300.
 Bradley, G. G., 119.
 Bretschneider, Karl Gottlieb, 228.
Bridgewater Treatises, The, 335, 337.
 Bristol, Bishop of, 98.
 British and Foreign Unitarian Association, The, 209, 210, 211.
 British Museum, The, 36 n.
 Broddingnag, 369.
 Brooks, Phillips, 120.
 Brougham, Lord, 7.
 Browne, Sir Thomas, 10.
 Browning, Robert, 98 n., 119, 141, 432, 441.
 Bunsen, Baron, 241.
 Bunyan, John, 239.
 Butler, Joseph, 92, 125.
 Byron, Lord, 141.

C.

Cæsar, Julius, 283.
Cæsarea Philippi, Declaration at, 271-274.

Caiaphas, 242.
 Caird, Prof. Edward, 288, 353.
 Cairn Gorm Mountains, 136.
 Calculus, The, 43, 436.
 Caliban, 358.
 Calvary, 234.
 Calvin, John, 375, 423.
 Calvinism, 190.
 Calvinists, 429.
 Campanile, at Florence, 440.
 Canon, Genuineness of, 117.
 Canute, 10.
 Capel, Thomas J., 54.
 Cappe, Catharine, 29-30.
 Cappe, Newcome, 29 n.
 Carlstadt, A. R. Bodenstein, 227.
 Carlyle, Thomas, 83, 124, 141.
 Carpenter, J. Estlin, 15, 92, 264 n.
 Carpenter, Lant, 13-19, 35, 78.
 Carpenter, Mary, 15.
 Carpenter, W. B., 15, 98, 99, 125, 308, 318 n.
 Cartesians, 108.
 Categorical Imperative, The, 141, 360.
 Categories, The, Kant's inferences from them criticised, 288.
 Catholic, The, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49.
 Catholic Church, The, 52, 225.
 Catholic Emancipation, 17.
 Catiline, 179.
 Causal Idea, The, 300.
 Causation, Two theories of, 300-301; phenomenal theory of, 301 *seq.*; dynamical theory of, 311 *seq.*; Hume's view of, 281, 301-303; Comte's, 303-304; Mill's, 304-305; Kant's, 310-311; Martineau's, 311 *seq.*; reduced to uniform succession, 306; empirical and metaphysical doctrines of, compared, 313.
 Cayman Islands, 344.
Cerebral Psychology, Bain, 95.
 Channing, W. E., 82, 142, 147, 150, 165, 166, 446.
 Chapman, Mrs. Maria W., 10, 11.
 Charles I., 398.
 Charles II., 44, 210.
 Charles V., 433.
 Chillingworth, William, 6, 36.
 Christ Church, Liverpool, 58.
 "Christ's Treatment of Guilt," 156 n., 193.
 "Christ the Divine Word," 150.
Christian Examiner, The, 78.

Christian Instincts and Modern Doubt,
A. H. Craufurd, 216 n.
"Christian Peace," 150.
Christian Reformer, The, 51, 78, 202,
213 n.
Christian Teacher, The, 57.
"Christian View of Moral Evil," 174.
"Christianity without Priest and without Ritual," 176.
Church and State, 79.
Church of England, 20; *Sacerdotalism* in, 178.
Church of England, 82.
Church vs Sect, 212.
Cicero, 104, 143, 437.
Civil War in America, 89.
Clarendon Press, 107.
Clarke, Samuel, 109.
Clement of Alexandria, 242.
Clementine Recognitions, 238.
Clifford, Prof. W. K., 98, 99.
Cobbe, Frances Power, 94, 160, 161,
343 n.
Coleridge, S. T., 124, 411, 437.
Collins, Anthony, 110.
Columbia Theological School, 162.
Columbus, Christopher, 10.
Combination in Nature, 343 seq.
Commodus, 15.
Common Prayer, 198.
Comte, Auguste, 84, 88, 108, 113, 124,
125, 224, 303-304, 308, 309, 368,
423.
Congregationalism, 38.
Conscience, its function, 359-362; not a reflection of Prudence, 363; its oracle not from the higher nature in man, 367-368; not a reflection of social sentiment, 368-372; the voice of God, 372-374; a forecast of immortality, 444 seq.
Contemporary Review, 237 n.
Corinthians, Epistles to, 230.
Correlation of growth, 343.
Cosin, Bishop, 10.
Cotman, John S., 10.
Craufurd, A. H., 216 n.
Creed of Christendom, The, W. R. Greg,
82, 180, 184.
Crome, John, 10.
Cromwell, Oliver, 308, 438.
Crosby and Nichols, 88.
Cudworth, Ralph, 109.
Cuvier, Georges, 343, 348.

D.

Daily News, London, 5 n., 7, 82 n.
Dante Alighieri, 144, 436, 438, 441.
Darbshire, F., 104.
Darbshire, S. D., 104.
Darwin, Charles, 125, 126, 224, 343.
Darwinism in Morals, F. P. Cobbe,
343 n.
David, Son of, 74, 247, 265.
Davy, Sir Humphry, 320.
De Wette, Wilhelm M. L., 228.
Death, the transition of, 192.
Declaration of Independence, The, 239.
Deism, cardinal features of, 401-402;
maintained Divine Transcendency,
401; its God always a person, 406;
criticised, 405-406.
Democritus, 85.
Demosthenes, 27, 129.
Deontology, Bentham, 51.
Derby, 18, 19.
Derbyshire, 9 n.
"Derivative origin of phenomena," 312.
Descartes, René, 123, 336, 338, 348.
Design, objections to the argument
from, 331, 335-354.
Development of organs, two theories of,
342.
Dewey, Rev. Orville, 150.
Dickens, Charles, 94.
Diderot, Denis, 111.
Dieppe, 2.
"Discipline of Darkness," The, 150.
Discourse on Matters Pertaining to Religion, Theodore Parker, 186.
Divina Commedia, Dante, 441, 443.
Domitian, 376.
Dragonade, The, 1, 2, 399.
Drummond, Henry, 377.
Drummond, James, 22.
Dublin, Mr. Martineau's call and settlement there, 35-37; his life there, 44; moral issue that severed him from his congregation, 44-49; losses from his congregation, 163.
Dublin University, 43; honors Dr. Martineau, 100.

E.

Early Messianic Ideas, 95.
Ebionites, The, 252.
Ecclesiastical organization, basis of, 207
seq.

Eckhart, Johannes, 150, 403.
 Edict of Nantes, 1; Revocation of, 1, 2, 399.
 Edinburgh University, honors Dr. Martineau, 100; 119.
 Edwards, Jonathan, 9, 110, 423.
 Efficient and Effect, 301.
Egypt of Herodotus, John Kenrick, 24.
 Eichhorn, Johann Gottfried, 33.
Elegantia Latinae, Edward Valpy, 12.
Elegy, Thomas Gray, 145.
 Emerson, R. W., 52, 83, 126, 128, 134, 160, 171, 403, 438, 442.
Endeavors after the Christian Life, 7-8; first series published, 78; second series, 79; 95, 107, 143, 145, 148-149, 150, 172.
 Epicurean Morality, 179.
 Epicureans, The, 328.
 Epistles, The, 167, 228; genuine, 230.
 Erpingham, Sir Thomas, 10.
 Erskine, Lord, 439.
Essays, Reviews, and Addresses, 51; their publication, 118; 180, 183, 184, 187, 197, 202, 203-204, 206, 212, 213-214, 217, 218, 219, 314 n., 322, 328, 329, 330, 333.
Essays, Theological and Philosophical, 95.
Essays, Hume's, 280.
 Essex Hall, Convention at, 209, 211.
 Eucharist, The, 51.
Europe since the Reformation, 82.
 Eusebius, 237 n.
 Everlasting Gospel, The, not the Primitive, 180.
Evidence, J. A. Froude, 99.
Evolution of Religion, The, Prof. Edward Caird, 353.
 Evolution, Philosophy of, 96, 132.
 Ewald, Heinrich Georg August von, 241.
Examination of Hamilton, J. S. Mill, 366.
 Ezekiel, The Book of, 260; the Seer in, 268.

F.

"Faith the deliverance from Fear," 158.
 Fall, Doctrine of, reviewed, 174-175.
 Faraday, Michael, 126.
 Fatalism, Necessity implies it, 427-428.
 Father Taylor, 138.
Faust, Goethe, 441.

Filiation, not a gift, 253.
 Final Causes, 336 seq.
Final Causes, Paul A. R. Janet, 342 n.
Finito and the Infinite in Human Nature, The, 199.
First Principles, Herbert Spencer, 95, 335.
Five Points of Christian Faith, 78, 178.
 Florence, Campanile at, 440.
 Force, behind Nature, 318; in Nature, 319, Unity of, 321; ultimate nature of, not revealed to the senses, 321-325; resolved into Will, 325-326.
 Forces, Correlation of, 319-321.
 Forgiveness, 192.
Foundations of Belief, Arthur J. Balfour, 122.
 Fourth Gospel, The, 231; compared with the Synoptics, 234; date and origin of, 236-253.
 France, her losses from the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, 1.
 Frederick the Great, 438.
 "Free learning," 20 n.
 Free Will, 423 seq.
 Freedom, involves liability to sin, 391; how related to immortality, 429.
 Froude, J. A., 99, 396.
 Fuller, Andrew, 64 n.
 Furness, W. H., 220.
 Future Punishment, 192-195.

G.

Gainsborough, Thomas, 10.
 Galahad, Sir, 76.
 Galatians, Epistle to the, 230.
 Galilee, 242, 249, 275.
 Garfield, James A., 34.
 George I., 44.
 George, Henry, 139.
 Giles, Rev. Henry, 57, 64.
 Gladstone, W. E., 50, 97.
 Glasgow, University of, 13, 119.
 Glaucus of Anthedon, 341.
 Gnosticism, 251.
God in History, 187.
 Goethe, 133, 362, 404, 436, 438, 441.
 Gordon, Rev. Alexander, 20 n., 92.
Gospel according to the Hebrews, 252.
Gospel of Peter, The, 122.
 Gospels, The, 55, 167, 232, 233; agreements and disagreements of, 228; significance of their headings, 230.

Gradation in Nature, 346-348.
 Greek Grammar, Matthiae, 26.
 Grant, U. S., 438.
 Greenwood, Grace, 135.
 Greg, W. R., 180, 184.
 Grote, George, 96, 124.
 Grundy, Rev. John, 50, 51.
 Guyon, Madame, 404.

H.

Haeckel, Ernest, 343.
 Hall, Bishop, 10.
 Hamilton, Sir William, 88, 93, 124, 125, 132.
Hamlet, Shakespeare, 441.
 Handel, George Frederick, 441.
 Harnack, Dr. Adolf, 239.
 Harrison, Frederic, 98, 99.
 Hartley, David, 110, 181, 423.
 Hartmann, Eduard von, 393.
 Harvard University 99, 119.
 Haworth, F., 104.
 Hedge, F. H., 120, 133, 336, 337, 403 n.
 Hedonism, 363.
 Hegel, G.W. F., 80, 81, 335, 411.
 Herod, 179.
 Herschel, Sir John, 330.
 Hewley, Lady, 210, 211.
Hibbert Lectures, Charles B. Upton, 299.
 Hierarchy, The, 224.
 Higginson, Rev. Edward, 19.
 Higginson, Helen, 36.
 Hildebrand, 224.
 Hill, Rev. Thomas B., 350.
 Holmes, O. W., 120.
Holy Livin an Holy Dying, Jeremy Taylor, 78.
Home Prayers, 118.
 Homer, 76, 139, 441.
 Honduras, Bay of, 344.
 Honors to Dr. Martineau, 99-106.
 Hope Street Church, 81, 145.
 Hopkins, Mark, 34.
 Horace, 437.
 Houghton, Lord, 10.
Hours of Thought on Sacred Things, 44, 95, 107, 143, 145, 150.
 Howison, Prof. George H., 402.
 Huguenots, The, 1-2, 5, 399.
 Humanitarianism, 164, 196.
 Humboldt, Wilhelm von, 25.
 Hume, David, 123; agnosticism of, 280-282; his agnosticism compared with

Kant's, 284-285; 301, 302, 303, 310, 441.
 Hungary, Unitarians of, 103-106.
 Hunt, John, 412.
 Hutton, Rev. Joseph, 37-39.
 Hutton, R. H., 80, 192-193.
 Huxley, Thomas, 98, 99, 280, 290, 328, 343, 349, 378.
Hymns for the Christian Church and Home, 74.
Hymns of Praise and Prayer, 95.

I.

Iliad, The, 441.
 Immanence, Divine, 402, 407-410, 422.
 Immortality, Freedom essential to, 430; testimony of the intellect to, 431 seq.; testimony of conscience to, 444 seq.
In Memoriam, Tennyson, 125.
Inquirer, The, London, 213 n.
 Inspiration, spiritual, not mechanical, 166-170; full significance of, not sure to be seen by him who brings it, 180; nature and scope of, 185-188.
 Intellect in man and the lower animals, 431 seq.
 Irenaeus, 232, 237 n.
 Isaiah, 5, 220, 260, 331.
 Islam, 214.
 Israelites, The, 259.

J.

Jacob, 137.
 Jacobi, Karl Heinrich Friedrich, 353.
 Jamaica, 344.
 Janet, Paul A. R., 342.
 Jena, University of, 119.
 Jeremiah, 220.
 Jerome, St., 432.
 Jerrold, Douglas, 139.
 Jerusalem, 74; Church of, 243; 249, 274, 276, 277.
Jesus of Nasara, Dr. Theodor Keim, 249.
 Jews, The, 243, 404.
 Job, 441.
 John the Apostle, 239, 240, 243, 245.
 John the Baptist, 135, 271, 433.
 John the Presbyter, 237 n.
 Johns Hopkins University, 119.
 Johnson, Dr. Samuel, 79, 141, 404; refutes Berkeley, 413.
 Jones, Jeremiah, 33.

Jordan, The, 242.
 Josuba, 259.
 Jouffroy, Theodore-Simon, 139.
 Jowett, Prof. Benjamin, 118, 119.
 Judaism, 214.
 Judas, 191.
 Judges, Book of, 260.

K.

Kant, Emanuel, 76, 81, 125, 279; source of prevailing agnosticism, 280; tests Hume's doctrine, 282; finds an *a priori* element in all knowledge, 283; his agnosticism *vs.* Hume's, 284-285; his doctrine of causation, 309-311; Dr. Martineau sets out with, 283 *seq.*; de-parts from, 310-311; 336, 438, 441.
 Keble John, 214.
 Keim, Dr. Theodor, 239.
 Kempis, Thomas à, 150.
 Kenrick, John, 22 n., 24, 27, 28, 30, 31, 32, 104.
 Kepler, Johann, 314.
 King, Rev. Thomas Starr, 88.
 Knight Prof. William, 118.
 Knowles, James, 98.
 Knox, John, 36.

L.

Lachmann, Karl, K. F. W., 26.
 Lampe, 438.
 Laplace, Pierre Simon, 113, 312, 330, 337.
 Lardner, Nathaniel, 163 n.
 Law, the function of, 313.
 Law, William, 403.
Laws of Man's Nature and Development, The, G. H. Atkinson and Harriet Martineau, 85.
 "Laws of Succession," Comte's substitute for Cause, 304.
Lay Sermons, Huxley, 335.
 Lazarus, his resurrection narrated only in the Fourth Gospel, 248.
 Lecky, W. E. H., 119.
 Leeds, Address at, 211 n.
 Legge, Thomas, 9.
 Leibnitz, Gottfried Wilhelm, 378.
 Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim, 88, 124, 228.
Letter and Spirit, 82.
 Lewis, Dio, 431.
 Lewis, Mrs. Leyson, daughter of Dr. Martineau, 36.

Leyden, University at, 100, 119.
Life and Correspondence of Thomas Arnold, 79.

Lightfoot, John, 246.
 Lindsey, Theophilus, 163 n.
 Little Portland Street Chapel, its earlier type of doctrine, 93; calls Dr. Martineau and J. J. Tayler to a joint pastorate, 93-94; its outward features, 94; 145, 160.

Liverpool Controversy, The, 57 *seq.*, 162, 168, 172, 178.

Living Church through Changing Creeds, The, 211 n., 217.

Livingstone, David, 385.
 Locke, John, 76, 110, 301.
 Lockyer, J. Norman, 125.

Logic, Mill's, 308.
 Logos, Johannine, 227, 247-248; of the Alexandrine type of doctrine, 250-259; weda Gnostic philosophy with the human history of Jesus Christ, 251; 262.

London, Bishop of, 27.
 Longfellow, H. W., 8, 144, 367.
 Longfellow, Samuel, 214.
 Louis XIV., 1, 438.
 Lowell, J. R., 120.
 Lowell Institute, 88.
 Lubbock, Sir John, 98.
 Luke, Gospel of, 232, 234, 253, 260.
 Lunatic Asylum, York, 30.
 Luther, Martin, 141, 214, 224, 227, 446.
Lycidas, Milton, 444.
 Lyell, Sir Charles, 94, 126.

M.

Macaulay, T. B., 125.
 McNeile, Rev. H., 169 n.
 Malebranche, Nicolas, 411.
 Malibran, Maria Felicia, 334.
 Man, his outfit for more than his terrestrial sphere, 434-439; as a creator, 440.
 Manchester New College, history of, 20; its several designations, 20 n.; its cardinal purpose, 21; types of doctrine which it has reflected, 21-22; 23, 25, 26, 166.
 Manning, Archbishop, 98.
Man's Place in the Cosmos, A. Seth, 339.
 Mansel, H. L., 88, 93, 124, 290.

Marcion, 237, 243.
 Marcionites, knew the Fourth Gospel, 237; 246.
 Mark, Gospel of, 234, 247.
 Martineau, Basil, son of James Martineau, 52.
 Martineau, David, son of Gaston Martineau, 2.
 Martineau, David, son of the above David, 2.
 Martineau, Edith, daughter of James Martineau, 52.
 Martineau, Elie, of Bergerac, 2.
 Martineau, Elizabeth, sister of James Martineau, 3.
 Martineau, Ellen, sister of James Martineau, 3, 6.
 Martineau, Gaston, son of Elie Martineau, and founder of the English line, 2.
 Martineau, Harriet, sister of James Martineau, 3, 5 n., 11, 14 n., 82-87.
 Martineau, Helen, daughter of James Martineau, 36.
 Martineau, Henry, brother of James Martineau, 3.
 Martineau, Herbert, son of James Martineau, 52.
 Martineau, Isabella, daughter of James Martineau, 36.
 Martineau, James : ancestry, 1-3; birth, 3; early home, 4-11; at school in Norwich, 8-12; in Lant Carpenter's school at Bristol, 13-18; studies civil engineering at Derby, 18; decides to become a minister, 19 ; at college, 19-34; "admitted to preach," 35 ; teaches in school at Bristol, 35; called as co-pastor to the Eustace Street Presbyterian Church in Dublin, 35 ; marriage, 36; ordination, 36-42; combines preaching with teaching, 43 ; prepares a hymn-book, 43 ; becomes sole pastor of his church, 44; makes an issue with his congregation, on the *Regium Bonum*, 44; becomes co-pastor of the Paradise Street Chapel in Liverpool, 50; begins work as a reviewer, 51; becomes sole pastor, 51; publishes the *Rationale of Religious Inquiry*, 52; bears a part in the Liverpool Controversy, 57-71; publishes a second hymn-book, 74 ; a writer of hymns, 75 ; becomes Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy and Political Economy in Manchester New College, 75-76; unconscious divergence from English Sensationalism, 77; his apostasy shown him by John Stuart Mill, 77 ; publishes first series of *Endeavors after the Christian Life*, 78; continues critical labors, 79; publishes second series of *Endeavors*, 79; goes to Germany for rest and study, 80-81; his conversion from an empirical to a spiritual philosophy, 80-81; essay on *Mesmeric Atheism*, 82; difficulty with his sister Harriet, 82-87; two collections of his essays, *Miscellanies* and *Studies of Christianity*, brought out in Boston, 88 ; invited to London to become resident professor in Manchester New College, 89 ; resigns his pastoral charge at Liverpool, 89; farewell sermon, 89-91; contest over his appointment to the College, 91-92; his work in the College, 92-93; takes with J. J. Tayler the pulpit charge of Little Portland Street Chapel, 93; on the death of Mr. Tayler conducts the pulpit service alone, 94; becomes Principal of Manchester New College, 94; publication of *Essays, Theological and Philosophical*, 95; two series of *Hours of Thought on Sacred Things*, 95; volume on Spinoza, 95; publishes a third hymn-book, 95; rejoinder to Prof. Tyndall, 95-96; candidate for the chair of Logic and Mental Philosophy in University College, 96; opposed and defeated by George Grote, 96-97; becomes a member of a Metaphysical Club, 97-99; Academic honors, 99-100; other testimonials, 100-103; death of his wife, 102; severs his connection with Manchester New College, 102-106; publishes *Types of Ethical Theory*, 107; publishes *Study of Religion*, 111; publishes *Seat of Authority in Religion*, 117; collects and publishes four volumes of *Essays, Reviews, and Addresses*, 118; publishes *Home Prayers*, 118; address from the scholars and thinkers of Europe and America on his eighty-third birthday, 118-120; his reply, 120-122; critically reviews the *Gospel of Peter* and Balfour's *Foundations of Belief*, 122;

death, 4; analysis of his intellect, 123-134; personal features, 135-141.

Martineau, Mary Ellen, daughter of James Martineau, 52.

Martineau, Philip Meadows, son of David Martineau, 2d, 2.

Martineau, Rachel, sister of James Martineau, 3, 6.

Martineau, Robert, brother of James Martineau, 3.

Martineau, Russell, son of James Martineau, 36.

Martineau, Thomas, father of James Martineau, 3, 6.

Martineau, Thomas, brother of James Martineau, 3.

Martyr, Justin, his use of our Gospels, 232-233; comparison of one of his citations with corresponding passage in the Fourth Gospel, 238.

Matthew, Gospel of, 234, 260.

Matthiae's Greek Grammar, 26.

Maurice, F. D., 98.

Mécanique Céleste, Laplace, 322.

Medici, Cosimo de', 438.

Melanchthon, Philip, 188.

"Memoirs of the Apostles," 232.

Memoirs of Catharine Cappa, by herself, 29.

Memoir of the Late Charles Well-beloved, John Kenrick, 29 n.

Mesmeric Atheism, 82 seq.

Messiah, God's and man's, 73-74; comparison of, in Synoptics and in John, 247-248; conditions that were to meet in him, 252; that Jesus was Messiah a Synoptic teaching, 263; indications that Jesus did not claim the Messiahship himself, 264-277.

Messiah, Handel, 441.

Metaphysical Club, its origin and work, 97-98.

Mill, James, 51, 110, 181.

Mill, J. S., detects Mr. Martineau's defection from the Necessarian philosophy, 77; 88, 93, 123, 124, 125, 128, 165, 181, 304-305, 308, 309, 313, 314, 316, 320; admits the validity of the argument from Design, 336; dislikes the argument, 352; his happiness theory, 363; 366, 376.

Miller, Mrs. Fenwick, 5 n.

Milton, John, 438, 441, 444.

Miracle and Law, 379-381.

Miscellanies, edited by Thomas Starr King, 88.

Modern Materialism: its Attitude towards Theology, 96.

Montaigne, Michel de, his ideal of education, 17; 126, 347.

Montesquieu Baron de 438.

Monthly Repository, The, 51.

Moral Evil, Christian view of, 174-176, 389 seq.

Morgan, Thomas, 408.

Moses, 154, 179, 221.

Müller, Max, 24, 119, 126.

Mystics, The, their tendency towards pantheism, 403-404.

N.

Nabis, 376.

Nahum the prophet, 242.

Nantes, Edict of, 1, 2, 399.

Nathan der Weise, Leasing, 8.

National Review, The, 88, 94.

Natural Religion, J. R. Seeley, criticism of, 113 seq.

Nature, R. W. Emerson, 52.

Nature and God, 95, 183.

Necessity, philosophical doctrine of, early held by Dr. Martineau, 77; he was converted from, 80-81; illustrated and criticised, 424-430.

Neo-Platonism, the Alexandrian type of, reflected in the Proem of the Fourth Gospel, 250-251.

Newman, F. W., 82, 180.

Newman, J. H., 42, 124, 363 n.

Newton, Sir Isaac, 408, 438.

Nineteenth Century, 98, 122.

Nisan, the month of, 249.

Norwich, early home of the Martineans, 2, 3; outward features of, 8-10.

Novalis, F. von Hardenberg, 76, 429.

O.

Octagon Chapel, Norwich, 9 n.

Old and New, The, 117.

One, The, 412.

Opie, Amelia, 9, 10.

Organs, rudimentary, 355-356; imperfect, 356.

Ould, Rev. Fielding, 58 seq.

Outer and Inner Temple, The, 73.

Oxford University, honors Dr. Martineau, 100, 119.

P.

Pain, of hunger and thirst, 381 : of heat and cold, 381-382; of decline, 382-384; of apprehension and memory, 387 *seq.*

Paley, Bishop, 92 his illustration of design, 335-336; his argument compared with Dr. Martineau's, 338; his doctrine of future rewards and punishments, 365.

Pantheism, compared with Deism, 402-405; compared with Theism, 407-410; definition of, 411; concession to, 413-415; reservation from, 415-419; final objection to, 418-421; considered with reference to immortality, 430.

Paradise Street Chapel, 80.

Pardon, Divine, 192.

Parker, Theodore, 124, 126, 127, 129, 179; criticised by Dr. Martineau, 183, 186, 187; not a pantheist, 403.

Parr, Dr. Samuel, 12.

Pascal, Blaise, 125, 214, 441.

Paul, St., 214, 243, 260, 371, 427, 446.

Paulus, Heinrich E. G., 228.

Pericles, 371, 438.

Personal Influence on Present Theology, 88.

Pessimism, repugnant to human nature, 392-393.

Peter, his declaration at Philippi, 271 *seq.*

Peter, Gospel of, 122.

Peterborough, Bishop of, 98.

Pfleiderer, Otto, 119.

Pharisees, The, 242.

Phases of Faith, F. W. Newman, 82; criticised, 106.

Philippians, Epistle to the, 230.

Philo Judaeus, 250.

Philosophical Christianity in France, 79.

Pierre, Marie, 2.

Plato, 76, 80, 93, 108, 123, 125, 126, 128, 131, 138, 139, 141, 180, 195, 197, 336, 437, 438, 441.

Plutarch, 230.

Polycarp, 237 n.

Pope, Alexander, 404.

Positive Philosophy, The, 303.

Presbyterianism, English, doctrine of Dr. Martineau's early home, 6; his doctrine when ordained, 36, 164; its spirit compared with that of English Unitarianism, 209-211.

Prescott, W. H., 125.

Prey, the law of, 384-386.

Price, Dr. Richard, 109.

Priestley, Joseph, 20, 110, 162, 163 n., 423.

Proctor, Richard, 126.

Prospective Review, 79, 86, 88.

Prudence, its function in morals, 359 *seq.*

R.

Ranke, Leopold von, 81.

Rankin, Elizabeth, 3.

Raphael, 440.

Rationale of Religious Inquiry, The, publication of, 52; 53; analysis of, 54-57; 107, 166, 167.

Regium Donum, The, 44 *seq.*, 50.

Reimarus, Hermann Samuel, 228.

Relativity of Knowledge, Frederic Harrison, 99.

Religion, Revealed and Natural, compared, 257-259.

Religion, Revealed and Apocalyptic, compared, 261-262.

Renan, Ernest, 119, 124, 197, 229.

"Right by Social Vote," 371.

Roman Catholic, The, 221, 224.

Romans, Epistle to the, 230, 267.

Rothe, Richard, 389.

Rudimentary Organs, 355.

S.

St. Andrews, University of, 118, 119.

St. Peter's, 440.

Salter's Hall, convention at, 209.

Samson, 259.

San Greal, The, 76.

Saul, 259.

Saul, Robert Browning, 395, 441.

Savonarola, Girolamo, 371.

Sayers, Dr. Frank, 8.

Schaff, Dr. Philip, 120.

"Scheme of Vicarious Redemption," The, 173.

Schleiermacher, F. E. D., 88, 124, 130, 239, 430.

Schopenhauer, Arthur, 132, 141, 427.

Schüller, Emil, 237 n., 239.

Schurman, Dr. J. G., 184-185 n., 335.

Science, Nescience, and Faith, 95, 132 n.

Scott, Sir Walter, 8.

Seat of Authority in Religion, 95, 117,

118, 162, 169, 187, 198, 230, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 238, 239, 242, 243, 244, 245, 251, 252, 253, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 264, 265, 266 n., 271, 272, 274, 276, 322, 364, 365, 366, 367, 369, 370, 372, 426.

Seeley, J. R., criticism of, 113 seq.

Seer in Ezekiel, The, 268.

Selection in Nature, 340 seq.

Seneca, 140, 437.

Sennacherib, 436.

Servetus, Michael, 214.

Sextus Tarquinius, 378 seq.

Seth, Andrew, 339.

Shaftesbury, Earl of, 109.

Shakespeare, John, 15.

Shakespeare, William, 15, 132, 441.

Sin, Dr. Martineau's treatment of, 190-192; punishment for, 192-195.

Skeats, Herbert S., 45 n.

Socini, The, 214.

Socrates, 76, 128; uses the argument from Design, 336; 371.

Solomon, his ethics Epicurean, 179.

Son of David, Jesus so designated by his countrymen, 265.

Son of God, 265; when Jesus became such, 252-253; use of the designation, 266.

Son of Man, 265; significance of the designation, 267 seq.; Second Coming of, 276-277.

Sophocles, 125.

Sordello, Browning, 336.

Space, its laws the laws of the human mind, 435.

Spencer, Herbert, 124, 125, 128, 134, 224, 293; Agnosticism of, 296-297; 416.

Spencer, W. V., 95.

Spenser, Edmund, 404.

Spinoza, Baruch de, his type of ethical doctrine, 108; 126, 183, 352, 411.

Spiritual Faith, A, 122 n., 163 n., 166, 168, 169.

Stagirite, The, 80.

Stanley, Dean, 98.

Stanley, 334.

Stirling, Hutcheson, 302.

Strauss, David F., 124, 229.

Strauss and Theodore Parker, 79.

Studies of Christianity, 70, 78; first published, 88.

Study of Religion, The, 93; analysis of, 111-117; the *Address* it called forth, 118; the dyke it opposed to pantheism, 183; 187, 258, 286, 287, 288, 289, 292, 296, 297, 298, 312, 313, 315-316, 330-331, 334, 334, 338, 340, 341, 342, 344, 345, 349, 350-352, 353, 354, 356, 357, 364, 374, 377, 381, 384, 388, 390, 391, 396-397, 398, 399, 408-409, 415, 418-419, 420-421, 425, 428-429, 438, 440, 441-442, 443-444, 445, 447.

Study of Spinoza, 95, 107.

Swift, Dean, 369.

Synoptics, The, general features of, 231 seq.; compared with the Fourth Gospel, 244 seq.

T.

Tacitus, Histories of, 27; 437.

Taggart, Rev. Edward, 93.

Talmage, Thomas De Witt, 143.

Tauler, Johann, 141, 150.

Taylor, J. J., Principal of Manchester New College, 21; 91-92, 93, 94, 104, 130, 241 n.

Taylor, Jeremy, 150.

Taylor, Rev. John, 9.

Taylor, Rev. Philip, 35.

Taylor, William, 8.

Tennyson, Alfred, 97, 98 n., 119; quoted, 400, 443.

Theism, 113; contrasted with Deism and Pantheism, 407 seq.

Theodorus, dream of, 378-379.

Theologia Germanica, 78, 150, 214.

Theological Review, The, 94.

Theophilus, first to quote the Fourth Gospel with its author's name, 237, 246.

Thessalonians, Epistle to the, 230.

Thom, Rev. J. H., 57, 64, 65, 67, 71, 166, 169.

Thoreau, H. D., 138.

"Tides of the Spirit," The, 150, 159.

Tintern Abbey, W. Wordsworth, 125.

Toland, John, 408.

Transcendency, Divine, 401; contrasted with Divine Immanence, 402-404.

Transfiguration, The, 274-275.

Trendelenburg, Friedrich Adolf, 80, 81, 181.

Trinitarian Controversy, A Way out of, 201.

Tübingen, school of, 91, 95, 229.

Tupper, Martin, 139.

Turner, Henry, 19, 104.
 Tusculum, Disputations at, 27.
 Tyndall, John, 124, 321; Dr. Martineau's rejoinder to, 327-328.
Types of Ethical Theory, 80, 81, 92; publication of, 102, 107; analysis of, 108-109; 111, 131, 154, 174.

U.

Unitarian Chapels in England, their loss and their recovery, 211 n.
 Unitarian Society and Church, Dr. Martineau's contrasted attitudes towards, 213.
 Unitarianism at Manchester New College, 21-22.
Unitarianism Confuted, Clergymen of the Church of England, 65-68.
Unitarianism Defended, James Martineau and others, 68-71.
 Unitarianism, English, descended from English Presbyterianism, 37; its history reflected in Dr. Martineau's career; inconsistency of, in the Lady Hewley suit, 210-211; its secularization, 220.
 Unitarians, their attitude towards Inspiration, 167, towards miracles, 171; their ecclesiastical temper, 215.
 Unitarians, Hungarian Consistory of, 104.
 Universe, Moral aspects of the, 375 seq.
 Universities, English, closed to such as could not sign the creed of the Established Church, 20.
 University College, 80; becomes the ally of Manchester New College, 89; Dr. Martineau a candidate for the chair of Logic in, 96-97.
 University of Berlin, Dr. Martineau studies there, 80.
 Upton, Prof. C. B., 299.
 Utilitarianism, 363-366.

V.

Valentinians knew the Fourth Gospel, 237.
 Valentinus did not know the Fourth Gospel, 237.

Vie de Jésus, E. Renan, 95.
 Vinci, Leonardo da, 440.
 Virgil, 437.
 Vitellius, 433.

W.

Waldenses, The, 399.
 Walton, Izaak, 68.
 Warrington Academy, 20.
 Washington, George, 371.
Way out of the Trinitarian Controversy, A, 201-206.
Ways of the Spirit, F. H. Hedge, 336 n.
 Webster, Daniel, 362.
 Wellbeloved, Charles, Principal of Manchester New College, 21, 24; account of, 29-34.
 Wellington, Duke of, 438.
 Wesley, John, 9 n., 214, 446.
 Westminster Abbey, 134.
Westminster Review, 88.
 Whewell, William, 124.
Whewell's Morality, 79.
Whewell's Systematic Morality, 79.
 Whitefield, George, 144, 145.
 Whitney, W. D., 126.
 Whitton, Rev. James M., 202 n.
 Wicksteed, Charles, 50.
 Wicksteed, Rev. Philip H., 92.
 William of Orange, 399.
 William III., 44, 438.
 Wolfe, Gen., 145.
 Wordsworth, William, 354, 404, 438.
 Worthington, J. H., 104.

Y.

York, Archbishop of, 98.
 Youmans, E. L., 125.

Z.

Zacharias, 260.
 Zebedee, 241.
 Zeller, Dr. E., 119.
 Zumpt, Karl Gottlob, 25.
 Zumpt's Latin Grammar, 24.
 Zumpts, The, 81.



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